VZCZCXRO9539
RR RUEHGR
DE RUEHPO #0311/01 1461538
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261538Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8361
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 1036
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1549
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1434
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0443
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARAMARIBO 000311 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CAR - LLUFTIG 
DEPT FOR WHA/PD - APRUITT, GADAMS, EDETTER 
DEPT FOR PA/PRS 
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA 
SAN JOSE FOR USAID/OFDA TIM CALLAGHAN 
PLEASE PASS PEACE CORPS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV PGOV PREL EAID ECON NS
SUBJECT: SURINAMESE FLOODS TWO WEEKS ON: PAST CRISIS PHASE 
 
REFS: (A) PARAMARIBO 266; (B) PARAMARIBO 269; (C) PARAMARIBO 
 
270 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000311  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  Summary:  While the ongoing rainy season may yet bring 
new challenges, for now the flooding disaster in Suriname's 
interior is under control.  A quick and generous 
international official and private sector response has been 
sufficient to meet identified immediate needs.  The picture 
remains less clear about medium term support that will be 
required to accommodate damage to the agricultural sector 
and health issues related to water sanitation and increased 
incidence of malaria; some eco-tourism sites were also badly 
hit.  The new National Disaster Response Center (NCCR), 
stood up with U.S. training and material assistance since 
2002 but untested in a country that rarely encounters 
disasters, won widespread praise from the international 
donor community for its cool and efficient handling of the 
crisis.   End summary. 
 
¶2.  Suriname's May 3-17 flooding had varying, but non-life 
threatening, impact on over 20,000 of the 37,000 residents 
in affected areas of the interior.  Water levels in the 
Upper Suriname River area have receded, and there was only 
minor flooding in the southern Kwamalasamutu area, although 
with some crop damage.  High water levels continue to affect 
residents in the eastern region along the Marowijne and 
Tapanahony Rivers.  Conditions are generally stabilizing, 
and expected to continue to improve - assuming no more 
severe rains through the remainder of the rainy season.  The 
root cause of the flooding was heavy rainfall in upper 
catchment areas in Brazil.  The water rose slowly, however, 
allowing many residents and medical clinics to rescue 
belongings.  While the rivers rise every year in Suriname in 
June and July, the increase was much higher this year, and 
the earlier onset meant crops had generally not yet matured 
enough to withstand the high water. 
 
¶3.  Given the remote locations of affected populations, 
relief provision was a complicated logistic exercise. 
Initially, delivery was via inadequate and deteriorating 
road conditions linked to riverine transport; this was 
eventually supplemented by the loan of four Dutch and one 
Brazilian helicopters.  While there are still isolated 
pockets not completely served, emergency food, water, and 
shelter needs are generally being met using Surinamese 
governmental and non-governmental capabilities with support 
from the international community.  Some complaints for 
unaddressed needs from communities in the interior, with the 
exception of shelter, are more chronic than flood-related. 
The Red Cross, pending correction on further assessment, 
intends to deliver temporary shelter supplies for 2,500 
families, generally to sustain them during home clean up and 
repair.  Comparatively few families are homeless in the 
sense of requiring relocation to temporary shelter. 
 
¶4.  Although the NCCR had never before handled a complex 
emergency situation, it drew very high marks under the 
leadership of National Army Colonel Slijngaard for 
accurately conveying needs to the international community 
and coordinating relief.  On her departure, the leader of 
the UN disaster response team held up the NCCR's management 
as a prime example of how to shape cooperation among the 
army, police, NGOs, the Red Cross, and international 
organizations into a quick response to a crisis situation. 
Our own Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) experts 
echoed these views based on their observations of the NCCR 
in action. (Note: The NCCR's skills stem in part from U.S. 
security assistance, which provided first responder and 
warehouse management training for disaster logistics 
operations in 2004 and 2005. End note.) 
 
¶5.  Complicated logistics were in fact the greater 
constraint than resources.  The Netherlands led the 
assistance effort, with a EURO 1 million cash donation from 
the Government of the Netherlands to UNDP, supplemented by 
the provision of helicopters and their fuel, as well as a 
plane-load of relief supplies and a team of disaster 
experts.  A telethon in the Netherlands raised USD 500,000, 
and sister city relationships with Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and 
the Hague resulted in a further USD 833,000 contribution. 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000311  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
The EU's disaster agency donated over USD 400,000 toward 
malaria control.  It appears that OFDA's USD 250,000 total 
contribution (to Red Cross emergency relief and to a Pan 
American Health Organization water sanitation project) was 
the next biggest official financial donation; IDB 
contributed USD 200,000.  Brazil gave a planeload of relief 
supplies in addition to the use of one helicopter for two 
weeks.  Venezuela is reportedly providing 20,000 barrels of 
fuel.  In all, over USD 2 million for humanitarian 
assistance was funneled through international organizations 
including UNDP, PAHO, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, and the World Food Program (WFP). 
 
¶6.  UNDP figures from May 24 show a financing gap of over 
USD 300,000 in those humanitarian relief needs, but the 
amount is more than dwarfed by the nearly USD 3 million in 
domestic and international private and official donations. 
That figure does not/not include contributions from 
parastatal and international corporations operating in 
Suriname.  It is not apparent how post-emergency funding 
coordination for yet-to-be-finalized medium-term needs will 
be handled, although there have been discussions about the 
GOS creating a multi-ministerial successor entity to the 
NCCR to accomplish this task.  To date, the NCCR's Colonel 
Slijngaard has left financial controls to a PAHO financial 
specialist; it is to be hoped that the GOS will ensure 
similarly transparent accountability for financing the tasks 
ahead. 
 
¶7.  On the health front, so far there have been a few 
reports of areas experiencing incidences of diarrhea, as 
safe water practices were disrupted by flood damage.  PAHO 
has rigorous plans for water safety (where our OFDA 
assistance was concentrated) and malaria control programs in 
the short term.   The fact that the system of health clinics 
serving the interior emerged largely unscathed is a huge 
benefit for disease surveillance.  We understand that a 
large-scale spraying campaign with support from the French 
will soon commence to attenuate the risk of malaria. 
Initial concerns that mercury from gold mining would spread 
with flooding to contaminate water supplies have not been 
borne out. 
 
¶8.    Comment:  Barring renewed flooding due to heavy rains, 
attention can now gradually turn to a broader view of 
requirements for recovery.  These will depend heavily on the 
results of assessments measuring the extent of crop losses, 
home and generator repairs.  While handling of a natural 
disaster provides ample fodder for political posturing, 
outside observers at least agree that to date the NCCR was a 
credible and effective steward of relief efforts.  Longer- 
term, transparent success in addressing the needs of 
Suriname's often-neglected interior populations will provide 
ample ground for renewed evaluation - by domestic political 
foes and the international community alike. 
 
BARNES