VZCZCXRO0614
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0755/01 1500609
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300609Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3820
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0636
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1186
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1405
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2683
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1796
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1189
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0769
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0713

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000755 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, 
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR 
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: TOUGH SELL IN REFUGEE CAMPS 
 
NDJAMENA 00000755  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary: Sudanese refugees say they will support 
the Darfur Peace Agreement if Sudan Liberation Movement 
faction leader Abdelwahid Nur signs and their need for 
individual compensation are adequately met.  From May 23 to 
27, P/E officer traveled to six of twelve refugee camps to 
explain what the Darfur Peace Agreement offers refugees, the 
dynamics of the Abuja peace process, and the next steps in 
the peace process.  The refugees' priorities are: security in 
Darfur guaranteed by an international force, individual 
compensation to replace lost possessions, and justice for the 
perpetrators of criminal acts.  Power-sharing issues were 
rarely mentioned.  The refugees complained that they were not 
part of the negotiations and want to be consulted and 
involved in the implementation of the peace agreement. 
Support for or against the agreement is personality-driven 
more than issue-based as refugees expressed support for the 
positions of individual leaders, rather than the agreement 
itself.  Given the high-level of misinformation being spread, 
particularly by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in 
the camps, we recommend that a sustained public diplomacy 
effort focusing on compensation, security, and justice issues 
be undertaken to educate the refugees and displaced Sudanese 
what the agreement does for them as individuals.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - 
BACKGROUND 
- - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Post reproduced and bound 250 copies of the Darfur 
Peace Agreement in Arabic, French, and English for the twelve 
Sudanese refugee camps in Chad.  In addition, each refugee 
committee received factsheets in English and Arabic and 
copies of relevant UNSC and African Union resolutions.  UNHCR 
arranged for P/E officer (who was a member of the USDEL at 
the Darfur Peace Talks) to visit six of the twelve camps over 
a four day period (May 23-27) to discuss the agreement with 
the refugees.  Refugee committees and non-governmental 
organizations in the six other camps received copies of the 
peace agreement, factsheets, and resolutions.  During each 
meeting, P/E officer emphasized the importance of signing an 
agreement for bringing in a UN force, the provisions within 
the agreement for compensation and reconstruction, and 
creation of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultations to 
bring more Darfurians, especially refugees and displaced 
persons, into the implementation of the agreement. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
GOZ AMIR-KOUKOU 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  On May 23, the primarily Masselit refugees at 
Koukou were skeptical of the Darfur Peace Agreement because 
"the authors of criminal acts" (i.e the janjaweed) are still 
at large and attacking closer and closer, threatening the 
18,000 camp residents.  The disarmament of the janjaweed and 
restoration of security in Darfur by an international force 
are their top priorities.  They also were concerned about 
individual compensation for property and livestock losses 
incurred by janjaweed attacks.  Nonetheless, the refugees 
said that they will do whatever Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM) faction leader Abdelwahid Nur instructs them to do.  If 
Abdelwahid signs on, they will support the agreement.  The 
refugee leaders accused SLM faction leader Minni Minnawi of 
signing the agreement for his own interests. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
GOZ BEIDA-DJABAL 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The refugees at nearby Djabal Refugee Camp 
(population 14,000), also dominated by the Masselit and Fur 
tribes, focused on receiving compensation for their destroyed 
homes and looted possessions and livestock during the 
discussion on May 24.  The refugees complained bitterly about 
the African Union force's inability to stop janjaweed 
attacks, which they argued continue on a daily basis.  They 
noted that the janjaweed are "everywhere" now that they have 
 
NDJAMENA 00000755  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
been integrated into the security services.  The group said 
that an international force must disarm the janjaweed before 
they consider returning to Sudan.  The refugees asked how 
they will be included in the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. 
Finally, they stated that they will support the agreement if 
SLM faction leader Abdelwahid Nur signs on. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
BAHAI-OURE CASSONI 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The 29,000 refugees at Oure Cassoni crossed into 
Sudan from the so-called "liberated areas" now controlled by 
SLM faction leader Minni Minnawi.  The camp is overwhelmingly 
Zaghawa and pro-Minni.  On May 25, refugee leaders said that 
the majority of the refugees at Oure Cassoni supported the 
agreement.  Refugees were interested in the dynamics of the 
negotiations and why Abdelwahid and Justice and Equality 
Movement's (JEM) Khalil Ibrahim did not sign.  They demanded 
that individuals be compensated for their losses and a 
mechanism be developed to assist the thousands of widows and 
orphans created by the crisis.  In addition, the refugees 
requested an international force to secure Darfur. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Women refugees spoke up and said that they do not 
care who signs the peace agreement, they will accept any 
peace that allows for the respect of their basic human 
rights.  One woman asked what will be done to redress the 
harm caused by the rape of women and girls and the 
traumatization of children forced to flee burning villages. 
The women also asked that their possessions be replaced and 
stated that they would return once the security situation was 
stable. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  A JEM supporter, and known camp agitator, said 
that the rebel movements deserve the presidency, not the 
fourth position in government.  He also said that only a 
minority tribe signed the agreement and began a slew of 
personal insults against Minni Minnawi.  Another refugee 
countered that Minni's Vice President is a Fur and his 
Secretary General a Tunji.  The other refugees silenced the 
 
SIPDIS 
JEM supporter, but he continued to interject and interrupt 
the session, which ended in a shouting match between him and 
the rest of the camp.  Tensions in the camp are elevated due 
to the presence of a large encampment of JEM-led mercenaries 
and dissident SLM members at nearby Carriari lake.  On May 
23, members of this group drove through the camp in a display 
of force and may have recruited a few residents.  The aim of 
the JEM-SLM group which is receiving material support from 
the Chadian Government, according to a defector, is to attack 
Minni Minnawi and then to attack Chadian rebels along the 
border. 
 
- - - - - 
BREDJING 
- - - - - 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  At Bredjing on May 26, the primarily Masselit and 
Fur population (29,000) was highly organized politically for 
the discussion.  This camp closely identifies with Abdelwahid 
and expressed their support for the agreement if Abdelwahid 
signs it.  A recent forced recruitment drive, supported by 
local Chadian authorities and dissident SLM commander Khamis 
Abdullah, included the abduction of the camp's refugee 
committee leader who opposed the recruitment.  The refugees 
at this camp, said that an agreement signed by Minni Minnawi 
alone is not enough.  They stated that they "agree" with 
Abdelwahid that their possessions must be replaced and that 
700 million USD is not enough to reconstruct Darfur.  The 
refugees said that they want to be paid "one-by-one" for 
their losses.  The group criticized AU Commission President 
Alpha Omar Konare and Darfur Negotiations Special Envoy Salim 
Salim as being Government of Sudan collaborators.  Finally, 
the refugees expressed their support for a UN force and 
stated that the African Union cannot provide security with 
its current mandate.  Their posters and drawings included 
slogans such as: "we need individual recompensation for the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000755  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
losing of our properties.  The agreement doesn't express 
about compensations and rehabilitation", "the international 
security council should disarmament of janjaweed militia", 
and "we all need Darfur in one region".  The refugees also 
demanded to know why the agreement does not address criminal 
justice issues. 
 
- - - - - 
TREGUINE 
- - - - - 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The refugees at Treguine, located fifteen minutes 
from Bredjing with a predominately Masselit and Fur 
population of 14,000, were less organized politically, but 
clear in their conditions for their return to Darfur.  First, 
international intervention is needed to restore the security 
situation in Darfur.  Second, those responsible for 
committing crimes against the local populations must be 
brought to justice.  Third, individuals must be compensated 
for their losses.  Fourth, all armed elements (Sudanese and 
Chadian) in Darfur must be disarmed and demobilized.  The 
refugees at Treguine were concerned that a peace agreement 
signed by one person cannot bring peace.  The camp residents 
are supporters of Abdelwahid Nur and want him to sign to make 
a "lasting peace".  Nonetheless, the refugees were largely 
satisfied with the agreement and asked specific questions on 
how the compensation scheme would work.  They are also 
supporters of Abdelwahid Nur. 
 
- - - - - 
FARCHANA 
- - - - - 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Farchana, the first camp established in Chad in 
2004, hosts a largely Masselit population of 17,000.  Camp 
residents are supporters of Abdelwahid Nur.  European Union 
Special Envoy Pekka Haavisto had met with the refugee leaders 
on May 23 to outline the peace agreement.  As a result, the 
group had more specific follow-up questions for P/E officer 
on May 27.  First, the leaders asked how long will it take to 
get international troops to Darfur and what will be the 
mandate.  They asked why President Bashir continues to oppose 
a peacekeeping force in Darfur.  Second, the group emphasized 
how important the title Vice President is and expressed 
concern that the U.S. did not support their demand for one. 
Third, the group stressed the importance of replacing the 
refugee's personal possessions.  The group of leaders said 
that it wants Abdelwahid to sign the agreement.  They 
expressed discontent with SLM dissident Khamis Abdullah, who 
they charged, was spearheading the recruitment in the camps 
to create his own force in collaboration with the Chadians. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMENT: LESSONS LEARNED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  During the course of the refugee camp briefings, 
the agreement's provisions on power-sharing, integration of 
forces, and wealth-sharing were completely overshadowed by 
the personal losses incurred by the refugees.  We began to 
tailor the discussions to focus on the compensation 
provisions (individual, reconstruction, refugee return 
packages, free education at all levels).  A factsheet brought 
down to the individual level could be more persuasive with 
refugee and displaced populations and their leaders. 
Additional discussions of the agreement with Sudan Liberation 
Movement members on May 28 revealed a total lack of 
comprehension of the compensation provisions in the 
agreement.  It is very clear that this lack of understanding 
hinders their ability to support or sell the agreement.  We 
found that the refugees need to be able to envision what 
their return will look like and how the various funds will 
work.  In addition, highlighting the justice mechanisms, such 
as the International Criminal Court and UNSC sanctions, as 
well as the types of discussions that will be held during the 
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultations on bringing 
individuals to justice, helped answer some of the refugees 
 
NDJAMENA 00000755  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
concerns.  The Sudanese refugees in Chad were not strongly 
opposed to the agreement itself, but instead the dislike for 
SLM faction leader Minni Minnawi clouded refugee opinions of 
the accord's prospects.  It will be critical to include large 
numbers of representatives from the refugee and displaced 
persons camps in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue to overcome their 
feeling of marginalization in the peace process. 
WALL