VZCZCXRO7814
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0748 1451349
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251349Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3814
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000748 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU CD
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTING THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: TROUBLES 
IN BIRMAZZA 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 706 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  Differing reports are coming in about a 
clash between SLM forces near Birzamma in Sudan across the 
frontier from Chadian border town of Bahai.  SLM leader Minni 
Minawi accused opponents of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
of initiating the attack with some Chadian supporters 
complicit in the action.  JEM leader Khalil denied 
involvement or even awareness of the engagement.  President 
Deby's half-brother Daoussa Deby as well as SLM breakaway 
members blamed it on Minni's efforts to use force against 
groups who refuse to join the agreement. End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Shortly before his departure from N'Djamena for 
Tripoli early on May 24, SLM's Minni Minawi called the 
Ambassador to report that at least 20 vehicles were on their 
way into Darfur to attack his forces near Birzamma.  He said 
the convoy had crossed the border at Bahai and was preparing 
to launch their attack later on May 24.  In a subsequent call 
from Tripoli later in the day, Minni confirmed the arrival of 
the vehicles near Birzamma. He said he had told his forces 
not to attack  But if they were the ones attacked, he warned, 
there could be civil war. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to Minni, the operation was organized by 
the JEM's Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and the SLM splinter faction 
under Dr. Sharif Harir, with support from Daoussa Deby, 
President Deby's influential half brother.  He said he had 
confronted Daoussa Deby about the matter and was told by 
Daoussa that his forces would be attacked because Minni had 
signed an agreement with the Sudanese government.  Minni 
believed the offensive against his positions was part of a 
campaign to keep the Zaghawas fighting against Khartoum. 
Minni said he had raised his concerns with President Deby and 
that President Deby had said he would give orders to stop it. 
 In reality, Minni believed, President Deby was playing a 
double game and was actually complicit in the operation. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Over the next 12 hours, the Ambassador raised the 
matter with Chadian Foreign Minister Allam-mi, Dr. Khalil 
Ibrahim of JEM, and Dr. Sharif Harir of the SLM splinter 
group that has refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA).  Foreign Minister Allam-mi disclaimed knowledge of the 
reports.  He said President Deby had urged JEM's Khalil 
Ibrahim to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  He 
shrugged his shoulders when asked if Deby's family was fully 
behind the agreement, but commented that mistrust over 
Sudan's intentions made it difficult for Chadians to believe 
Sudan was serious about implementing the DPA. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In a two-hour meeting largely concerning his views 
on the DPA (septel), Khalil claimed he was not aware of 
reports of any problems near Birzamma.  He said he would have 
no interest in attacking Minni's forces in the area.  He 
argued, however, that JEM would defend itself if attacked. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Daoussa Deby was aware of clashes involving Minni's 
forces, but attributed them to a mutiny involving supporters 
of the SLM factions close to Abdelwahid and Khammis.  He said 
the conflict arose from Minni's declaration that his forces 
would serve as the police for Darfur.  Daoussa claimed that 
Minni should be encouraging the non-signers to cooperate with 
the DPA, rather than threatening them with force.  He 
dismissed claims of any Chadian involvement or support in the 
fighting near Birmazza. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) SLA faction leaders Sharif and Shogar described a 
clash outside Birzamma the morning of May 24 between Minni's 
and Khammis's forces which had resulted in defeat for Minni's 
forces.  According to Sharif, the fight was provoked by 
Minni's intention to use force against non-signers of the 
DPA.  Sharif denied that the GOC was assisting SLM groups 
against Minni.  However, he feared that Minni's strong-arm 
tactics would lead to violence among the Zaghawa and civil 
war in Darfur for years to come. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Comment:  It is virtually impossible here to sort 
through the credibility of these differing versions of this 
event.  They nonetheless underline sharply the mistrust among 
the parties and the challenges facing efforts to implement 
the DPA.  End Comment. 
WALL