VZCZCXRO7808
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0747/01 1451345
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251345Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3812
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000747 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU CD
SUBJECT: EQUIVOCAL MESSAGES ON DARFUR PEACE 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary. Key Darfur interlocutors in N'djamena 
explained their reasons for dissatisfaction with the recently 
signed Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in meetings with 
Ambassador Wall May 24 and 25.  JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim 
poured venom on SLM leader Minni Minawi, whom he described as 
"dead to the people of Darfur."  He claimed that his own 
popularity was rising with Darfurians as a result of not 
having signed the Darfur Peace Agreement.   For his part, 
"first half-brother" Daoussa Deby said that unless Darfur 
could be placed under a UN mandate, the DPA was not the 
answer to Darfur's problems.  Daoussa reaffirmed that 
President Deby has asked all parties to sign the DPA and that 
JEM leader Khalil would have no reason to be in N'djamena 
after the 31st. In a meeting with SLM breakaway members Dr. 
Sharif Harir and Adam Shogar, Sharif and Shogar said that 
Minni's self-appointed role as "policeman for Darfur" had 
alienated Darfurians and that his support was rapidly 
diminishing.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Ambassador and DCM (notetaker) met with Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) President Khali Ibrahim, President 
Deby's brother Daoussa Deby and with SLM leaders Sharif Harir 
and Adam Shogar on May 24 and 25 in N'djamena to discuss the 
DPA and conflicting reports of inter-SLM clashes in Birzamma, 
Sudan on May 24 (discussed septel). 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Meeting with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, Ambassador 
Wall stressed that it was in JEM's interest to sign the DPA. 
It might not be perfect, but it provided a basis for 
security, compensation and representation.  Without an 
agreement, there would be no peace, and the people of Darfur 
would suffer. He encouraged Khalil to consider the fact that 
the DPA was only the beginning of the process.  The United 
States was serious about ensuring its success; we would work 
with all of those parties that wished to make it work.  The 
agreement itself was not the end of the process; putting it 
in place was the process by which Darfur leaders would have a 
chance to make a difference.  Parties that didn't play the 
game would be marginalized. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Khalil countered that the majority of Darfurians 
did not support the peace agreement.  Darfur had a distinct 
historical and cultural identity.  This identity needed to be 
recognized, and Darfurians needed to fully control their 
destiny.  Khalil explained that now, more than ever he 
realized that he had made the right decision in refusing to 
sign.  He noted that Abdel Wahid's popularity "had soared" 
after his refusal.  Minni Minawi had only signed because he 
was "finished on the ground."  Minni, in fact, had accepted a 
proposal from Khartoum that was only a "first draft" that was 
very far from Khartoum's bottom line.  The Government of 
Sudan, in fact, couldn't believe its good fortune that the 
agreement had been accepted.  Minni, according to Khalil, was 
now "dead" to the people of Darfur.  Those who had gained the 
confidence of the international community, had lost the 
confidence of their people.  The reverse was also true. 
Khalil reported that tribal leaders were spontaneously coming 
to him and telling him that he was right not to sign. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Turning to the details of the agreement, Khalil 
explained that a referendum would never work in Darfur. The 
results would be manipulated by Khartoum.  On the question of 
disarming the janjaweed, the Darfurians knew that the 
Government of Sudan (GOS) would never disarm them.  And then 
there was the question of compensation. Darfurians wanted 
compensation for their burned huts and other losses.  The DPA 
was not the bible -- clearly it could be amended if 
necessary.  Asked why he had not sought these amendments 
during the negotiations, Khalil responded that he had -- but 
they had not been accepted.  On relations with Chad, Khalil 
stated that they were "normal."  He reiterated that President 
Deby had told him to sign.  However, he also expected 
President Deby to "kick him out" and he was "ready to be 
kicked out." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Khalil expressed his disappointment that Minni had 
been favored because international partners thought that only 
Minni could maintain security.  But just looking at 
"security" would not solve the problems of Darfur -- the root 
causes of Darfur's economic, social and political root crisis 
needed to be examined as well.  Minni may have been powerful 
once, but other groups would be powerful in the future. 
Minni might have troops on the ground, but JEM was 
"politically smart." People had faith that JEM would do the 
right thing.  And finally, Minni was only a "self-declared" 
leader -- he had never even been to Khartoum. No one believes 
in Minni, and he had cheated the other movements. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Looking ahead, Khalil stated that "many things 
would change -- and change fast" as Darfurians realized that 
the DPA was not in their best interests.   President Deby was 
also encouraging him to sign -- but signing, according to 
 
NDJAMENA 00000747  002 OF 002 
 
 
Khalil, would be suicide.  JEM's first priority was to make 
amendments - achieve Darfur as a single region, and have a 
Vice President.  He explained why the current arrangements in 
the DPA were not satisfactory.  The Senior Assistant position 
was not a real job -- and if Darfur was not a region, there 
was no way that Darfurians could control the territory and 
ensure security. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  As far as options, Khalil was ambivalent on 
whether they could stand by and watch and "be observers."  He 
opined that much depended on what happened on May 31st. 
Khalil stated that he was waiting to see what the AU Peace 
and Security Commission would decide.  Would the treaty truly 
close on the 31st?  Would amendments be offered?  Khalil 
asked the United States to help the JEM sign by agreeing to 
amendments. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Khalil was interested to know whether the United 
States would then consider JEM an "illegitimate group" after 
May 31st.  Asked point blank by the Ambassador whether JEM 
would fight, Khalil responded "If I don't have anything -- 
what do you advise me?" Asked whether he would fight Minni, 
Khalil stated "I will never attack Minni -- unless Minni 
attacks me -- then I must fight in self-defense."  Ambassador 
Wall asked that Khalil at least not be a "spoiler."  Khalil 
took umbrage at this, saying that one could not call a 
legitimate confrontation with the government spoiling. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In a separate meeting, Daoussa Deby (half-brother 
to the President) said that Chad's position vis-a-vis Sudan 
was clear.  They did not consider the GOS to be serious in 
its approach to peace.  Abuja was not the answer -- Darfur's 
problems would not be solved by the DPA.  According to 
Daoussa Darfur needed to be placed under a UN mandate and 
with UN-held elections.  That being said, President Deby had 
indeed told the rebel movements to sign. Daoussa vehemently 
denied that the GOC was assisting the non-signatory rebel 
movements. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Daoussa said that that he thought that Minni was 
sincere, but the Government of Sudan was certainly not; it 
would try to occupy as much land as possible before the 
arrival of the UN force.   The DPA could be seen as a minimum 
step, but already it was dividing the rebel movements as they 
jockeyed for posts.  Minni needed to understand that he could 
not militarily defeat the other rebels -- if he continued to 
act in this way, the situation would be radicalized quickly. 
In closing, Ambassador Wall emphasized that the United States 
was very serious about supporting the process; we will 
support those who  sign.  There will be consequence for those 
who do not sign. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  SLM breakaway members Adam Shogar and Dr. Sharif 
Harir called Minni an obstacle to peace who had developed an 
inflated notion of his self-worth during the negotiations and 
who was surrounded by paid agents of the Sudanese 
intelligence chief.  They argued that a debate was necessary 
on the DPA -- something as important as peace in Darfur 
required a serious give and take.  They said that they would 
never recognize the agreement in its current form as it went 
against the will of the Darfur people.  They did not advocate 
violence, but at the same time could not accept aggression by 
other movements.  They criticized Minni's "assumption of 
responsibility" for peace and security in Darfur  and 
complained that he had threatened to kill all those who 
didn't agree with the DPA.  Dr. Sharif told the Ambassador 
that "someone needs to tell Minni that he is not the police 
of the region."  Meanwhile, they believed that his support on 
the ground was diminishing every day.  Like Khalil, they 
stated that they were not encouraging opponents of the peace 
agreement to fight, but that if threatened, they would defend 
themselves. 
 
WALL