VZCZCXRO9859
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0706/01 1381517
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181517Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3761
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0627
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1182
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1391
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2674
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1782
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1179
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0766
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI 0222
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0704

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000706 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, 
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR 
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT UPDATE: N'DJAMENA ACTIVITIES 
 
REF: A. STATE 078589 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 646 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 663 
 
NDJAMENA 00000706  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary: Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction 
leader Minni Minnawi was warmly welcomed in N'Djamena, where 
he is consulting with the Chadian Government, SLM followers 
in Chad, non-governmental organizations, and the media. 
Minni described his meetings with President Idriss Deby as 
positive.  Deby told Justice and Equality Movement President 
Dr. Khalil Ibrahim that if he does not sign the Darfur Peace 
Agreement by May 31, he must leave Chad.  Minni remains 
concerned about attempts by Khalil, Dr. Sharif Harir, and 
Khamis Abdullah to attack and/or undermine him.  He believes 
that the Government of Sudan will do all it can to get 
Abdelwahid to sign the DPA.  In response to Ref A, post's DPA 
implementation activities have focused on providing advisory 
and administrative support to Minni Minnawi; briefing Chadian 
Government officials at all levels on the DPA; working with 
the DPA's opponents in Chad, including Dr. Sharif Harir, Dr. 
Khalil Ibrahim, and National Movement for Reform and 
Development; and dissemination of information about the 
agreement to international and local journalists, refugee 
camps, and local authorities.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
CHADIAN RED CARPET 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader 
Minni Minnawi was surprised by his warm welcome in Chad on 
May 12.  Members of the Chadian Mediation team and Special 
Advisor to the President Abderahamane Moussa met Minni as he 
disembarked from the aircraft upon arrival from Abuja.  The 
Chadian Government has also put Minni up in the Novotel 
Hotel.  Minni has had two meetings with President Idriss 
Deby.  In the first, he reviewed the peace agreement with 
Deby and explained the benefits for Chad of the disarmament 
of the jandjaweed and the foreign combatants in Sudan. 
According to Minni, Deby responded positively.  Other members 
of Deby's inner circle, such as Minister of Territorial 
Administration Gen. Mahamat Ali Abdullah, remain skeptical of 
the Government of Sudan's intentions, but are supportive of 
the agreement.  In the second (three-hour) meeting, on May 
16, Deby included Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
President Dr. Khalil Ibrahim without telling Minni. 
According to Minni and the Chadian mediators present, Deby 
told Khalil that the African Union Peace and Security Council 
will brand him an outlaw if he does not sign the Darfur Peace 
Agreement by the end of May.  At that time, Deby said, Khalil 
would no longer be welcome in Chad.  Minni said that Khalil 
was visibly shaken and surprised at Deby's position. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RECRUITMENT FROM REFUGEE CAMPS BY ROGUE SLA ELEMENTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Meanwhile, SLM's (former) Vice Chairman Khamis 
Abdullah, JEM's Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, one of Minni's former 
commanders Adam Bahkit, and a cousin of Deby named Bidet are 
responsible for the heavy recruitment of men and boys from 
the refugee camps in Chad, according to a variety of sources. 
 Reports last week from Treguine and Breidjing camps indicate 
they are forcibly taking children from the camps. 
Approximately 4,000 Sudanese refugees have been recruited. 
In addition, the Abdullah-Khalil group was seen in Iriba with 
17 landcruisers with weapons supplied by President Deby's 
brother Daoussa. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Theories about Khamis and Khalil's objectives 
abound.  The most likely explanation is that they are 
recruiting forces to defend Deby against Chadian rebels.  A 
second likely rationale is that they are recruiting to attack 
Minni and Abdelwahid.  A third motivation, but more likely a 
cover story, is that they are arming the refugees to defend 
themselves against increasing jandjaweed incursions.  Members 
 
NDJAMENA 00000706  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
of the groups claim that the refugees at Goz Amir were 
attacked by Chadian rebels and jandjaweed earlier in April 
because of their ties to the Sudanese Liberation 
Movement/Army. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
MINNI MEETS THE PRESS 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The Chadian Government arranged a widely-attended 
press conference for Minni at a local hotel.  The questions 
focused on whether or not Minni was pressured into signing 
the agreement and what effect the peace agreement will have 
on the deteriorating security situation in eastern Chad. 
Minni said that he was not pressured into choosing peace over 
war in Darfur.  Rather, those who did not choose peace may 
have been pressured.  He stated that members of his faction 
are in Darfur meeting with militants explaining the gains 
that will come with the agreement and that it will be adopted 
by the Revolutionary Council of SLM soon.  One reporter asked 
him about a recent agreement signed in Khartoum.  (Minni has 
a copy of an agreement between Adam Shogar and Mutrif Sadiq 
signed in Khartoum which contains verbatim some text from the 
DPA.)  Minni reminded the journalists that the DPA is the 
only agreement signed between the rebels and the Government 
of Sudan this year and it has the support of the 
international community.  He expressed his hope that the 
other rebel movements will sign the accord and said he is 
open to dialogue with Abdelwahid and Dr. Khalil.  Regarding 
Chad's security, Minni cited provisions for the disarmament 
of the jandjaweed and foreign combatants that could help 
alleviate border tensions. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Embassy facilitated an interview for Minni with 
CNN's Nic Robertson on May 15.  The series of programs 
entitled "Crisis in Chad" began airing on CNN International 
on May 17 and is examining the recruitment of children out of 
the refugee camps and increased jandjaweed attacks in 
southeastern Chad.  Minni outlined the benefits of the 
agreement for Darfur and for Chad.  He also told Robertson 
that his former SLA colleagues were behind the recruitment in 
the camps. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
OUTREACH TO NAYSAYERS, SPOILERS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  On May 16, P/E officer met with Dr. Sharif Harir 
and Adam Shogar, two of Minni's and the DPA's greatest 
detractors. Ambassador and DCM had met previously with Harir 
(Ref B). Harir's only explanation for his opposition, after 
reading the two copies provided by Embassy, was that the DPA 
does not meet the central demand of the refugees for 
compensation.  P/E officer asked Harir to go through the 
agreement again and return to provide suggestions that the 
implementation process could address.  Embassy is also 
reaching out to Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, who is in N'Djamena, to 
see if he might have changed his position now that the 
Chadian Government has weighed in with him.  National 
Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) is meeting with 
P/E officer on May 19. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Minni has recently met with some of Dr. Sharif 
Harir's supporters.  Perhaps as a result of this, for the 
first time, he has expressed concern about the lack of an 
amnesty provision in the accord this week.  Harir told P/E 
officer on May 16 that no one should avoid prosecution, even 
signatories to the agreement, implying Minni.  Harir bears a 
grudge from the spring of 2005 when he received support from 
the Government of Chad to go to the border area to undermine 
Minni.  Minni's forces prevented Harir from entering Darfur 
and instead spread money and their message in the refugee 
camps and in the Tine area.  Harir said that Minni's troops 
tried to kill him last year.  According to UNHCR, Harir used 
one of his relatives in Oure Cassoni refugee camp as a focal 
point to buy supporters.  At that time, the Chadian 
 
NDJAMENA 00000706  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Government unceremoniously pulled Harir and Shogar back from 
the border, seizing their landcruisers, money, and Thuraya 
telephones. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  For his part, Minni told us that he does not trust 
the British because they favor the Fur tribe in Darfur.  He 
said that the British do not trust the Zaghawa and will work 
hard to give Abdelwahid whatever he wants to sign.  P/E 
officer responded that each international partner can play a 
different role and if the U.K. can deliver Abdelwahid's 
signature, that only helps the agreement's credibility, and 
by extension, Minni's.  Nonetheless, SLM-Minnawi faction 
suspicions of U.K. intentions were circulated frequently by 
members of Minni's inner circle from January through March in 
Abuja.  This distrust is a reality for Minni and his 
associates. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
POST ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF DPA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (SBU) P/E officer returned to N'Djamena with Minni and 
the other rebel movements.  P/E officer meets with Minni 
daily to provide advice, consult with him on implementation, 
and furnish information packages, which include African Union 
and U.N. communiques and other press articles, and connecting 
Minni with AU mediators working with Abdelwahid Nur.  In 
addition, post is preparing an implementation calendar for 
Minni to clarify tasks and upcoming deadlines.  On May 14, 
post arranged for Minni to meet with the director of 
INTERNEWS, the non-governmental organization running radio 
stations in the refugee camps in Chad, to discuss 
dissemination of information about the peace accord via 
radio.  Post also provided Chadian Government officials and 
Minni with copies of the DPA in Arabic, English, and French 
for their roundtable discussion with Minni on May 13.  On May 
16, P/E officer briefed UNHCR and its NGO partners on the 
agreement and discussed options on how best to deliver the 
agreement to the refugee committees. P/E officer will travel 
with UNHCR Country Director from May 22-25 to brief refugees 
in Chad and local Chadian officials on the benefits of the 
agreement as well as deliver copies of the agreement to each 
camp. 
 
¶11.  (U)  Ambassador Wall hosted Minni, the Chad Mediation 
team, and the Minister of Territorial Administration for 
lunch in recognition of their role as peacemakers on May 17. 
He discussed the issue with President Deby May 9 (ref C) and 
has raised it repeatedly in meetings with Chadian officials 
and civil society leaders in N'Djamena and during a trip to 
eastern Chad May 10-11. Over the last week he explained the 
importance of the agreement and highlighted U.S. efforts to 
implement it in interviews with local and international 
journalists (e.g., CNN, BBC, Reuters). 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Minni continues to perform well in N'Djamena, 
despite being under significant pressure.  We need to help 
focus him on implementation of the agreement, including 
nominations for positions and setting up physical 
infrastructure in Darfur.  He has had virtually no contact 
with the African Union since his arrival in N'Djamena, a 
connection post continues to pursue by updating the AU on his 
activities and passing along contact information to various 
officials.  N'Djamena will continue to grow in importance as 
a platform for key actors involved in making the DPA a 
reality, and post's reporting, negotiating, advising, and 
facilitating services will be similarly called upon.  With 
the planned departure of post's Pol/Econ officer, Pol/Econ 
staffing at Embassy N'Djamena must remain a priority. 
WALL