VZCZCXRO9223
OO RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1257/01 1461248
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261248Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2955
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG/, AF/PD (A. JOHNSON, S. WESTGATE), 
IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPAO OIIP PGOV PINR SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: PRESS REFLECTS ON DARFUR DEVELOPMENTS, 
EMERGING U.S.-SUDAN RELATIONS 
 
REF: Khartoum 1210 
 
¶1. SUMMARY.  Sudanese press commentaries suggest growing 
consensus in favor of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). 
Opposition continues, however, to the proposed transition 
from African Union (AU) to UN peacekeepers in Darfur 
(something explored with the Sudan Government this week 
by UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Al-Brahimi, septel), and 
growing perception of government confusion in this 
regard.  Speculations also continue concerning the U.S. 
role and motives in Darfur, with some thinking an 
improvement in relations is in the air. 
----------------------------- 
Growing Acceptance of the DPA 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. Compared to the diffuse rejection of the DPA that was 
common in opposition circles a few weeks ago, most 
comments now focus more on how to can be fixed and made 
to work.  A piece by Khartoum Monitor editor Alfred 
Taban, for instance ("Darfur in Crisis" May 18), begins 
by condemning the DPA: 
 
"What should have brought the people of Darfur their 
rights is now a naked power struggle between Khartoum and 
Darfur, and between the Darfuris themselves.  What is 
clear is that the DPA has not answered even a quarter of 
the aspirations of the people of Darfur.  It is grossly 
in favour of the government in Khartoum." 
 
His prescription, however, point to an unromantic 
compromise among rival leaders jockeying for power: 
 
"Unless there is a formula found whereby the three 
political leaders... are given prominent roles, there 
will be no peace in Darfur.  Many of these leaders, while 
they talk of the rights of their people, are actually 
referring to their rights to leadership positions.  That 
is a reality that has to be taken into consideration." 
 
¶3. Pro-government writers continue to defend the DPA. 
Idriss Hassan (a columnist known to be close to Vice- 
President Taha) suggests the agreement should be followed 
up with discussions with civilian as well as armed groups 
(Al-Wihda, May 18).  Abdel Hamid Musa Kasha - a Rezeiguat 
Arab from Darfur and former Minister of Foreign Trade, 
notorious for his role in channeling funds to the 
Janjaweed in 2003-04 - takes aims at the rebels who have 
not yet signed: 
 
"Those opposing the Darfur Peace Agreement seem to be 
oblivious to the fact that there are people in Darfur who 
are still suffering.... These same people are waiting for 
the rains, the schools and their lives to begin again 
following the signing of the agreement. I call on all 
warring factions in Darfur to sign the agreement so as to 
first establish a cease-fire, and squabble later about 
the details." 
 
-------------------------------- 
UN Rehatting Still Controversial 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. There is still considerable opposition to the proposed 
"international intervention" of UN peacekeepers in 
Darfur, representing for some a real blow to the Sudanese 
state: 
 
"The GOS is risking loss of credibility with the Sudanese 
public.  The deployment of international forces to Darfur 
gives the impression that their own government is not 
capable of assuring their safety, and that it must resort 
to UN forces in order to maintain security.  National 
sovereignty is the government's responsibility and no 
other party can be responsible for that" ("Restoring 
National Sovereignty." Al-Sudani, May 18). 
 
¶5. Some -- especially in the pro-government Sudan Vision 
-- still nurture hopes that an expanded UN presence can 
be avoided.  One editorial calls for Darfur's traditional 
chiefs to use their lore to bring about peace, obviating 
the need for foreign troops ("Revive Traditional Wisdom," 
Sudan Vision, May 18).  Another argues that, in light of 
popular opposition to deployment of UN forces in Darfur, 
the special UN Envoy should consider alternative roles 
for the UN to play in that region (Sudan Vision, May 21). 
 
¶6. There is a general perception that the government is 
in a quandary on the issue: 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001257  002 OF 003 
 
 
"The contradictory statements issued by the GOS regarding 
international forces' deployment to Darfur are striking. 
We have one official affirming that the government will 
not accept the deployment... and another official 
asserting that the GOS is still reviewing this proposal. 
The President is currently engaged in intensive 
discussions with NCP leaders on this matter.  I hope that 
he chooses to extend his consultations to include the 
opposition as well.  The issue at hand is huge and the 
two parties in power should not be the only ones 
responsible for making this decision."  "An Issue as Big 
as Our Nation," Al-Sudani, May 22). 
 
¶7. Another editorial, noting the advent of the UN special 
envoy, suggests that this should be a lesson to the 
government, "not to make vows in the name of Allah" 
before better weighing the odds. 
 
"We have been hearing conflicting statements by senior 
Sudanese government officials about the presence of UN- 
led forces in Darfur.  But much of that is simply meant 
for local political consumption. The government is 
looking for justifications to convince the Sudanese 
public as to why it has to step down in the face of all 
the strong avowals it made earlier in its rejection of 
foreign intervention in Darfur.  ("Driving the Nail 
Home," Khartoum Monitor, May 22) 
 
---------------------------- 
Perceptions of the U.S. Role 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. Others reflect on why the U.S. is promoting a U.N. 
presence in Darfur.  One columnist commends a recent 
press interview with the U.S. Charg (reftel), but 
wonders about what was left unsaid: 
 
"The U.S. Ambassador to Khartoum sees Sudan's future in 
an optimistic way.  His upbeat view of the Sudan should 
be compared with the bleak assessments of certain 
Sudanese politicians.... but there seems to be a question 
missing... why does the U.S. insist on deployment of 
international forces to Darfur?  Does the deployment of 
forces help to feed the thousands who were displaced in 
Darfur?  The problem of Darfur is that its social fabric 
has been ripped apart: can foreign troops fix that? " (Al- 
Rai Al-Aam, May 23) 
 
 
¶9. "What is the Price of Submission to the U.S.?" another 
editorial asks: 
 
"The deployment of international forces to Darfur was met 
with massive rejection by the Sudanese public.  This 
proposal... was submitted by the U.S. Administration to 
the UNSC.  It is only logical for us to ask the GOS what 
it will gain from cooperating with the U.S. 
administration in the deployment of international forces. 
An even more pertinent question is: is the expected gain 
worth the humiliation we are doomed to face?" (Al-Sudani, 
May 21) 
 
--------------------------------- 
U.S.-Sudan Relations may Improve? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. The U.S. role in facilitating the DPA, the U.S. 
Charg's recent interview, the dropping of Libya from the 
Sponsors of Terrorism list -- all have stimulated new 
reflections on U.S.-Sudan relations.  Some reject any 
reassessment.  One columnist criticized a Sudanese 
official spokesman for characterizing U.S.-Sudanese 
relations as being "good." 
 
"This adjective... cannot be used to describe relations 
between Sudan and the U.S.  The Presidential Press 
Secretary might have considered his statement a routine 
 
SIPDIS 
courtesy, but I think he should be more exact - when he 
refers to a relationship viewed by many as the worst ever 
found between two countries ." 
 
¶11. Another columnist, reviewing a recent meeting between 
the MFA Minister of State Al-Sammani Al-Waseela and the 
U.S. Charg d'Affaires ("Putting the Cards on the Table," 
Al-Wihda, May 24), detects mixed signals: 
 
"The meeting also covered the issue of deploying 
international forces to Darfur, given the U.S. conviction 
n 
 
KHARTOUM 00001257  003 OF 003 
 
 
of the importance of [such] deployment.... The U.S. was 
the party responsible for the escalation of war in 
Darfur, for internal electoral reasons.  It is trying now 
(and for the same reasons) to calm down the crisis in the 
troubled region.  The U.S. administration has also 
expressed, through its Charge d'Affaires, its support for 
the Abuja agreement.  Nonetheless, and surprisingly, it 
is still pressuring the GOS." 
 
¶12.  "It is Time for America to Change its Foreign 
Policy," concludes the pro-government Sudan Vision (May 
23).  Praising the normalization of U.S.-Libyan 
relations, the paper calls for a similar deal for the 
Sudan: 
 
"We at Sudan Vision believe that it is high time for 
America to review its policy towards Sudan and normalize 
bilateral relations by lifting Sudan's name from the list 
of terrorist countries, in addition to lifting unilateral 
sanctions.  We see no reason why these two measures 
remain imposed when USA is saying it is genuinely 
brokering peace in Sudan.  South Sudan and Darfur peace 
agreements need the support of the International 
Community, including the United States." 
 
Whitehead