VZCZCXRO4908
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1150/01 1351510
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151510Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2815
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0182
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
State for D and AF A/S Frazer 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF KPKO US SU
SUBJECT:  Darfur Peace Agreement: Seizing the Opportunity 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  To ensure a lasting and just peace, 
the USG must move quickly to support the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) and help the African Union (AU) establish 
its institutions.  The DPA outlines some ambitious 
timelines and requires AU action in almost all areas. 
The security provisions in the agreement will most 
quickly deliver a peace dividend and create a positive 
environment for recovery and reconstruction.  The AU will 
require significant support from the international 
community to make this happen.  For power sharing, the 
immediate need is to broaden the support for the 
agreement.  Under wealth sharing, an increase in the 
delivery of food and humanitarian supplies will show the 
immediate and tangible benefits of the agreement.  The 
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultations should also 
begin soon as a confidence-building measure.  The most 
effective way to support the groups that signed the 
agreement is not to promote them personally, but to 
ensure the success of the agreement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Security Arrangements: No Time to Lose 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) The AU is charged with monitoring and verifying 
the provisions of the ceasefire.  From the entry into 
force of the agreement (D-Day), the AU has 3 days to 
ensure cessation of hostilities and reconstitute the 
Cease-Fire Commission.  They have 6 days to develop a 
policing plan, and 37 days to develop a plan to disarm 
the Janjaweed, begin patrolling the buffer zones, and 
establish the boundaries of the militia areas of control. 
The AU then has 60 days to begin planning for security 
sector reform, 65 days to neutralize the Janjaweed and 
other militias, 69 days to establish logistics 
distribution points, and 77 days to limit parties to 
their area of control.  And that is just a partial list 
from Phase I of VI. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) To effectively support the AU in meeting these 
goals, the USG must provide both logistical and advisory 
support.  The Department of Defense is adding another 8 
military observers (MILOBs) to assist and advise AU 
peacekeeping troops.  This will bring the total number to 
¶16.  Once deployed, the 16 MILOBs will be spread to two 
per AMIS sector.  It is recommended that the total number 
of U.S. MILOBs increase to 35.  This number provides for 
one MILOB in each AMIS camp, one senior MILOB reporting 
to the AMIS Force Commander, one MILOB to support AMIS 
Civilian Police (CIVPOL), and one MILOB to support and 
back-up the senior MILOB. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In collaboration with the Department of 
Defense, the strategy should also include engaging the 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in a constructive military-to- 
military dialogue to increase SAF confidence in U.S. and 
NATO forces.  This should include a series of visits by 
senior-level U.S. military representatives to engage in 
discussions with senior SAF leaders and to visit AMIS and 
UNMIS.  Additional military options to support the DPA 
will to follow by classified septel. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Power Sharing: Broad Support, Functioning Institutions 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5.  (U) The AU is currently working with parties that did 
not sign the agreement, most notably Abdul Wahid, to 
broaden support for the DPA.  The USG can support this 
effort by helping delivering a simple message that 
clearly communicates how the peace agreement will deliver 
freedom from fear and want.  The USG can also assist the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) in establishing the 
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) which 
serves as the main voice of the people.  The TDRA must be 
established within 21 days of the entry into force of the 
agreement. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Most civil society and intellectual leaders of 
Darfur are still forming their final opinions on the 
peace agreement.  There is a narrow window of opportunity 
to influence their decisions by communicating the true 
content of the peace accord.  The Charge d'Affaires is 
leading a media outreach that includes an interview with 
the largest independent Arabic-language newspaper, the 
production of a radio program through USAID, and the 
development of a concise fact sheet in Arabic that 
addresses the concerns of the people and dispels common 
myths.  The Charge is also meeting with prominent Fur 
 
KHARTOUM 00001150  002 OF 002 
 
 
leaders in Khartoum, and USAID is investigating the 
possibility of collaborating with local groups to do 
small, community-based outreach programs in Darfur. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The AU will need a public information office to 
promote the agreement and distribute non-partisan 
information.  They will also require a secretariat to 
coordinate the intense schedule of meetings the DPA 
requires.  Currently, the AU lacks the capacity to 
perform either function.  The USG could provide the 
resources and personnel to help the AU establish these 
offices.  This may also be an opportunity for the UN to 
provide technical support, which could ease a transition 
to a UN operation. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Because Mini Minawi is from a minority ethnic 
group, his ability to rally broad support for the DPA 
will be limited.  While he will inevitably receive 
significant benefit from signing the DPA-- only 
signatories to the agreement will be able to fill its 
positions-- the AU needs to find a way to deliver the 
message using spokespeople with a broader appeal. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Wealth Sharing: First Keep People Alive 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) The DPA outlines a variety of mechanisms for 
assisting with the recovery and reconstruction, but the 
first priority is to better deliver food aid and 
humanitarian supplies.  The goal of peace is to improve 
the lives of the people of Darfur, and a demonstrable 
increase in the delivery of aid can show the immediate 
benefits of the agreement. 
 
¶10.  (U) Within the first 30 days, both the Darfur window 
in the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the Darfur 
Reconstruction and Development Fund should be created. 
The DPA also calls for a donor conference within 3 
months.  The Netherlands have taken the lead on the donor 
conference, but the USG should start immediate planning 
to assist with these functions. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) As a signatory to the agreement, the increased 
security in Minawi-controlled areas due to a cessation of 
hostilities should allow for easier access from 
humanitarian agencies and create the proper environment 
for recovery and reconstruction.  However, any effort to 
directly tie humanitarian support to participation in the 
agreement is against the basic principles of humanitarian 
aid and jeopardizes the entire humanitarian response. 
Delivery of humanitarian assistance must be based upon 
need alone. 
 
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Darfur-Darfur Dialogue Can Build Confidence 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultations 
(DDDC) gives a voice to the people of Darfur, many of 
whom were not part of the Abuja negotiations.  It can 
lend credibility to the DPA and provide an effective 
channel for peace-building and the dissemination of 
information.  The AU is looking for a prominent 
international leader to head this commission.  Once this 
person is selected, the USG could offer expertise, 
personnel, and resources to help it become functional and 
effective. 
 
HUME