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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1132, Update on Darfur Security and Humanitarian

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1132 2006-05-14 16:46 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5460
OO RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1132/01 1341646
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141646Z MAY 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2783
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/RSA, AND AF/SPG 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/EA AND DCHA SUDAN GROUP 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS KPKO PREF UN AU SU
SUBJECT:  Update on Darfur Security and Humanitarian 
Access - May 14, 2006 
 
Ref:  Khartoum 01104 and previous 
 
1.  Summary:  Demonstrations continue in several Darfur 
locations, with reports indicating that May 13 incidents 
at Abu Shouk and Al-Salaam IDP camps in El Fasher 
resulted in the death of a 13-year old boy and damage to 
AU property.  The SLA shot at an AMIS helicopter near 
Korma, forcing it to curtail its mission.  The South 
Darfur Humanitarian Aid Commissioner gave permission for 
Norwegian Refugee Council to resume work in locations 
other than the Kalma IDP Camp.  The UN has not conducted 
assessment missions or site visits for two weeks due to 
problems arising from the lack of observance of the SOFA 
on the part of the Sudanese Government.  End summary. 
 
2.  Security Update (Source - AMIS and USAID): 
 
A.  On May 10, roughly 100 IDPs demonstrated against the 
Darfur Peace Agreement at the Tawilla AMIS Military Group 
Site.  Angry crowds thought to be associated with the 
Abdel Wahid faction of the SLA protested that the 
agreement does not address the needs of Darfur.  AMIS 
used armored personnel carriers to block their attempts 
to enter the site; some then stoned the AMIS facility. 
OCHA cited the AMIS site commander as reporting that six 
AMIS Force Protection troops, one civilian police, and 
two PA&E staff were injured during the protests. (Note: 
Tawilah town is controlled by GNU police while its 
surrounding villages are controlled by SLA forces.  End 
note.)  UNDSS reported demonstrations in other parts of 
Darfur both supporting and protesting the Darfur Peace 
Agreement. 
 
B.  On May 11, heavy bombardment was observed in the 
vicinity of Arto, near Tawilah, North Darfur.  AMIS 
confirmed that the village was attacked by jinjaweed 
militia. 
 
C.  On May 11, MGS Tawilla conducted an aerial patrol to 
Khazan Tunjur, Nelma, and Korma.  The team reported that 
the SLA in Korma opened fire at the AMIS MI-8 Helicopter 
as they were orbiting around the Korma area, and were 
forced to abandon their task and return to the MGS.  The 
team observed that the SLA soldiers in Korma were in 
defensive positions, with one big truck and two Land 
Cruisers. 
 
D.  On May 11, Commander MGS Kutum held a meeting with 
the SLA Field Commander in Kafod, who was visibly angry 
and complained about the GOS use of white vehicles and 
helicopters.  He alleged that a white helicopter went to 
Kutum on Sunday May 7 with GOS salaries and that the same 
helicopter dropped ammunition for the jinjaweed.   He 
asked why GOS convoys passed along the same route as AMIS 
convoys near Kafod, 30 minutes before or after them, 
suggesting a linkage between the two occurrences.  He 
stated that he would only accept one driver per truck and 
threatened to deny AMIS access to the route if this was 
not adhered to by AMIS.  The AMIS team reminded him that 
AMIS had freedom of movement throughout Darfur, and 
convinced him that the movement of the GOS convoys was 
coincidental and had nothing to do with AMIS.  He was 
further assured that no extra civilians would go with 
the vehicles in future. 
 
E.  On May 13, one GOAL vehicle was hijacked in Kassab 
camp with three drivers onboard.  UNDSS confirmed that 
the vehicle was later recovered; no details are available 
on the hijackers. 
 
F.  On May 13, demonstrations broke out in the morning in 
the Abu Shouk IDP camp in El Fasher.  The AU CIVPOL team 
left the site due to the protesting mob; unconfirmed 
reports are that the AU CIVPOL compound was destroyed 
and/or burned down, with numerous vehicles in the area of 
the Abu Shouk and Al Salaam IDP camps damaged.  The 
Sudanese Government sent security forces into the camp to 
control the situation; a USAID Field Officer reported 
hearing gunfire from the direction of the camp; others 
report hearing gunshots in the areas of Abu Shouk and Al 
Salaam IDP camps as well as the airport.  Aid agencies 
reported that at least one person was shot and killed in 
the camp; the camp coordinator later confirmed that a 13 
year-old boy had died.  All INGOs as well as UN agencies 
pulled out from the camp.  At noon, a UNDSS-cleared team 
of UNMIS human rights observers and OCHA representatives 
traveled to the camp.  ACF reported that Sudanese 
military helicopters with mounted guns hovered over the 
IDP camps at a very low altitude.  ICRC closed its 
 
KHARTOUM 00001132  002 OF 002 
 
 
warehouse around the U compound and proceeded to 
evacuate its staff.  Most of the slogans heard were "AU 
Out" and "We Don't Accept the Peace Deal."  A heavy 
presence by GNU police and soldiers appeared to try to 
seal off the camps, apparently to dissuade the IDPs from 
moving to the AU headquarters and the town.  UNMIS pulled 
out its team when shooting in the air intensified in the 
camp at 1:00 p.m. 
 
3.  Humanitarian Access Update (Source - AMIS and USAID): 
 
A.  On May 11, South Darfur's Humanitarian Aid Commission 
(HAC) reported that the Deputy Wali has agreed to allow 
the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to operate in IDP 
camps around Nyala with the exception of Kalma camp.  The 
South Darfur Wali has agreed to discuss this issue with 
the Security Committee for South Darfur. 
 
B.  On May 11, the HAC weekly coordination meeting took 
place in El Fasher; the HAC Commissioner presented a copy 
of the State work plan for 2006 in Arabic.  The IOM 
promised to translate the document and disseminate it in 
one week.  The HAC plan focuses on IDP returns and 
anticipation of programs to support IDPs who want return 
home.  The HAC stated that his office had received more 
resources from the Federal Government to conduct its 
work.  HAC will soon have offices in many rural areas; he 
urged UN and INGO representatives to collaborate and 
coordinate with these sub-offices.  No program update 
from OCHA or other UN agencies took place; the UN stated 
that no assessment of site visit had taken place during 
the past 10 days due to difficulties posed by the 
Sudanese Government's interpretation of the Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA).  WFP, WHO, and OCHA raised the 
impact of travel permit issues on their work and ability 
to help the government during the transition period after 
the DPA. 
 
HUME