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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1127, Sudan - Darfur Water and Sanitation Assessment

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1127 2006-05-14 13:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5466
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1127/01 1341323
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141323Z MAY 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2765
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, NSC/AFRICA FOR SHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT:  Sudan - Darfur Water and Sanitation Assessment 
 
 
-------------------- 
Summary and Comments 
-------------------- 
 
1.  From April 29 to May 2, 2006, OFDA Water and 
Sanitation Specialist Peter Wallis traveled to North and 
South Darfur to evaluate the effectiveness of ongoing 
USAID-funded programs and make recommendations concerning 
future support of water and sanitation humanitarian 
interventions in Darfur.  In summary, all NGOs visited 
appeared to be implementing water and sanitation 
interventions in a satisfactory manner.  However, recent 
improvements in water and sanitation interventions 
throughout Darfur are now threatened by sharp declines in 
financial resources and technical capacity.  Without 
increased donor funding, implementing agencies will be 
forced to drastically cut water, sanitation, and hygiene 
promotion programs, a move which will likely decrease 
access to water and increase rates of water and 
sanitation related morbidity and mortality.  To maintain 
the sustainability of Darfur's water and sanitation 
infrastructure, USAID should support efforts by UNICEF 
and WHO to maintain technical water and sanitation 
advisors both in Darfur and Khartoum and increase funding 
for water, sanitation, and hygiene promotion activities 
in IDP camps and host communities where IDP populations 
overwhelm existing water and sanitation facilities.  End 
summary and comments. 
 
------------------- 
Visits and Contacts 
------------------- 
 
2.  While in Khartoum, Mr. Wallis met with water and 
sanitation coordinators representing the U.N. Children's 
Fund (UNICEF), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), 
and GOAL-Darfur.  While in Darfur, Mr. Wallis met with 
representatives from UNICEF, the U.N. World Health 
Organization (WHO), and the U.N. Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as well as 
USAID implementing partners IRC, Action Contre la Faim 
(ACF), American Refugee Committee (ARC), Relief 
International (RI), and International Medical Corps 
(IMC).  Mr. Wallis also visited several internally 
displaced person (IDP) camps including Kutum and Abu 
Shouk in North Darfur and Kalma and El Salem in South 
Darfur.  Security issues in Darfur limited access to 
rural project sites preventing a more comprehensive 
assessment of project activities.  Mr. Wallis previously 
traveled to Darfur to conduct similar humanitarian 
assessments in June 2004 and May 2005. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Limited Donor Funding Threatens Recent Improvements in 
Water and Sanitation Services throughout Darfur 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
3.  All USAID-funded organizations visited in Darfur 
appear to be making excellent progress in implementing 
water and sanitation interventions.  USAID partners are 
implementing effective, creative water sanitation 
interventions despite severe security, logistical, and 
bureaucratic challenges.  However, recent funding 
shortfalls have forced the international humanitarian 
community to drastically reduce water and sanitation 
staff, program activities, and hygiene promotion and 
health education programs. 
 
4.  Coordination:  In partnership with the non-government 
organization (NGO) community, UNICEF resolved the serious 
coordination problems noted in past assessments and 
standardized water and sanitation interventions 
throughout North and South Darfur.  Sector coordination 
meetings and related workgroups formed to develop 
creative solutions to difficult issues are effectively 
used to solve water and sanitation problems throughout 
the region.  Increased presence of UNICEF and WHO 
expatriate water and sanitation technical staff in Darfur 
appear to be the primary reason coordination and 
effectiveness of water and sanitation interventions have 
improved over the past year. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001127  002 OF 003 
 
 
5.  Technical Capacity:  UNICEF and WHO water and 
sanitation sector technical staff have improved water and 
sanitation sector initiatives in Darfur over the past 
year.  In addition to their responsibilities as water and 
sanitation sector leads, these expatriate technical staff 
offer expert advice to the NGO community and facilitate 
meetings and work sessions dealing with water and 
sanitation problems facing Darfur's conflict-affected 
population.  Though technical advisors' knowledge and 
experience adds significant value to ongoing water and 
sanitation activities, many experts will soon be out of a 
job.  Due to lack of donor funding, UNICEF announced 
plans to down-size water and sanitation staffing to 2003 
levels by eliminating nearly 70 percent of their 
expatriate staff positions in Darfur as well as their 
stand-alone Darfur Water Sanitation Coordinator position 
in Khartoum.  Previous staffing levels were demonstrated 
to be inadequate to meet emergency needs, as evidenced by 
the abysmal coordination and delivery of water and 
sanitation interventions in Darfur during that time 
period.  In addition, WHO plans to eliminate one of its 
two Water Sanitation Coordinator positions in the near 
future.  These two experts have provided superb technical 
support to the water and sanitation sector, were 
responsible for the implementation of drinking water 
testing operations to identify contaminated water sources 
used by IDP populations, and are strong advocates of 
water treatment and vector control. 
 
6.  Health and Hygiene Promotion:  Progress toward 
achieving water and sanitation sector objectives in Darfur 
seems to have peaked in December 2005, with many hard-won 
gains made in 2005 disappearing since January 2006.  IRC 
decreased the number of hygiene promoters in Kutum IDP 
camp by 75 percent and is maintaining a staff of just five 
hygiene promoters to serve Bielel, Sekele, Mossai, Dereig, 
and Otash IDP camps surrounding Nyala, whose total 
population exceeds 86,000 IDPs.  (Note:  Sphere standards 
recommend two hygiene promoters per 1000 IDPs.  End Note.) 
Since, hygiene promoters and community motivators are 
typically responsible for monitoring and evaluating camp 
water and sanitation activities, the relief community can 
no longer effectively identify needs, prioritize actions, 
or evaluate the effectiveness of water and sanitation 
initiatives. 
 
7.  Drinking Water:  Recent cutbacks in donor funding for 
water and sanitation activities have negatively impacted 
access to safe drinking water throughout Darfur. 
Following an arduous 18-month implementation effort, hand- 
pump chlorination programs throughout Darfur ground to a 
halt as of March 2006.  Combined with recent reductions in 
staffing and hygiene promotion activities, this failure to 
chlorinate drinking water has greatly increased potential 
for water-related disease outbreaks in IDP communities. 
 
8.  Solid Waste Collection:  Solid waste collection 
activities have also fallen victim to recent donor funding 
constraints.  NGOs initiated these programs in an effort 
to prevent recurrence of the spike of fly-borne diseases 
in IDP camps in May 2005.  Last year's massive fly 
infestations resulted in costly pesticide spraying 
campaigns, an intervention that will likely be repeated in 
2006 unless NGOs can maintain garbage collection 
activities. 
 
9.  Sustainability:  Based on meetings with U.N. agencies 
and NGOs, it appears that the Darfur rural water system 
construction program is encountering serious 
sustainability issues.  The number of rural community 
water systems constructed and/or renovated exceeds the 
technical support capacity of the UNICEF-supported 
Government of National Unity (GNU) Water and Environmental 
Services (WES) program.  In addition, many systems were 
constructed in insecure areas which are no longer 
accessible to WES personnel.  NGOs who assumed 
responsibility for technically supporting these systems 
have also encountered increasing difficulty in accessing 
rural communities.  Additionally, their general lack of 
expertise in establishing community water systems limits 
even the minimal technical assistance they are able to 
provide.  Reduced humanitarian access combined with 
 
KHARTOUM 00001127  003 OF 003 
 
 
limited NGO technical capacity has resulted in the 
degradation of many recently constructed water and 
sanitation facilities. 
 
10.  The above-mentioned trends in water and sanitation 
programming in Darfur are only the beginning of a massive 
decrease in water and sanitation services precipitated by 
recent donor funding constraints.  Nine months of progress 
in the water and sanitation sector has already been lost, 
and the outlook is growing even more grim as the rainy 
season approaches.  Funding shortfalls will undoubtedly 
translate into a rise in water and sanitation related 
morbidity and mortality throughout Darfur in the upcoming 
year. 
 
----------------- 
Plugging the Dike 
----------------- 
 
11.  To stabilize the collapse of water and sanitation 
sector interventions in Darfur, USAID should take the 
following immediate actions in order of priority: 
 
a)  Fund UNICEF to support three expatriate water and 
sanitation technical experts in each of Darfur's three 
states as well as the full-time Khartoum-based Darfur 
Water Sanitation Coordinator position. 
 
b)  Fund WHO to maintain three Water Sanitation 
Coordinator positions, one each in North, South, and West 
Darfur. 
 
c)  Fund water, sanitation, and hygiene promotion 
interventions in all IDP camps as well as host communities 
where large IDP populations overwhelm existing water and 
sanitation facilities. 
 
d)  Fund reconstruction of water and sanitation facilities 
in rural communities only in secure locations where 
mechanisms to ensure realistic, long-term technical 
support have been identified, and only in close 
coordination with local repatriation efforts.  The level 
of service provided in these areas should not exceed that 
which existed prior to the beginning of the conflict in 
2003. 
 
HUME