VZCZCXRO7183
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1089/01 1281421
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081421Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2685
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, M/MED, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, RMO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: Sudan - Avian Flu Sitrep No. 4, May 8, 2006 
 
REF:  Khartoum 1025 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) On May 4, 2006, the U.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) office in Khartoum received positive 
test results from the World Organization of Animal Health 
(OIE) in Italy which confirm that the recent outbreak of 
avian influenza (AI) in Sudan is indeed the highly 
pathogenic H5N1 strain of avian influenza. 
On May 3, the FAO hosted a meeting to brief the donor 
community in Khartoum about the avian influenza (AI) 
outbreak in Sudan and to share the findings and 
observations of the FAO consultant who has recently 
assessed the AI situation in Sudan (Reftel).  The high 
rate of bird deaths and the symptoms associated with the 
disease indicate a highly pathogenic AI outbreak in 
Khartoum and Gezira States.  Donors pushed the U.N. to 
proactively appeal for funds needed to respond to the 
outbreak and to establish a weekly meeting in Khartoum to 
inform donors on the developing situation.  Preparations 
to contain an AI outbreak in Southern Sudan are in their 
early stages, but the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) 
has imposed a ban on importation of poultry, eggs, and 
other products from Khartoum and other infected areas. 
End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
FAO: Serious Outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Flu Underway 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On May 4, 2006, FAO/Khartoum received 
notification that animal tissue samples taken from 
chickens in Khartoum had tested positive for H5N1 avian 
influenza at the OIE reference laboratory in Italy.  FAO 
informed USAID of positive test results through informal 
channels, and it is imperative that USG personnel protect 
this sensitive information.  FAO has informed Sudan's 
Government of National Unity (GNU) of the positive test 
results which confirm an outbreak of H5N1 AI in Khartoum 
and Gezira States.  However, the GNU has not yet 
officially acknowledged presence of the H5N1 strain of AI 
in Sudan nor released this information to the general 
public. 
 
¶3.  (U) On May 3, 2006, FAO/Khartoum convened a meeting 
to brief the donor community in Khartoum about the AI 
outbreak in Sudan, and to share the findings and 
observations of an FAO consultant who recently completed 
an initial assessment of the AI outbreak in Sudan.  Many 
donors participated in the FAO meeting, including the 
United States, the European Commission, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, France, and Japan.  The 
meeting was also attended by representatives from the 
offices of the Humanitarian Coordinator and U.N. Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General for Sudan, the 
U.N. World Health Organization (WHO), the U.N. Children's 
Fund (UNICEF), FAO, and several international non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs). 
 
¶4.  (U) The FAO expert, a U.S. national, gave a 
PowerPoint presentation that included a short 
introduction to the biological structure of the avian 
influenza virus, described the mechanism of viral 
transmission, and stressed the likelihood that wild bird 
migrations played a causative role in precipitating the 
AI outbreak in Sudan.  She also gave a broad overview of 
the recent history of AI disease epidemiology in other 
parts of the world, explaining how the various strains of 
AI have devastated bird populations and caused human 
cases of H5N1 AI since the beginning of the recent global 
outbreak. 
 
¶5.  (U) Prior to receiving official scientific 
confirmation of H5N1 AI in Sudan, the consultant 
concluded that the AI strain in Sudan was highly 
pathogenic based on her direct observation of affected 
birds during field visits to local poultry farms.  The 
 
KHARTOUM 00001089  002 OF 003 
 
 
consultant showed a number of archive photographs of 
diseased birds and indicated that these symptoms were 
similar to those she observed on farms in Khartoum and 
Gezira States.  She identified the main constraints to 
implementing AI control measures in Sudan to be the lack 
of government capacity to manage the situation and the 
lack of local capacity for laboratory testing and 
analysis.  Furthermore, she observed that many Sudanese 
lack basic information about the disease, its impact on 
Sudan's poultry industry, and how to deal with the 
consequences of the outbreak.  Though the outbreak has 
seriously affected the local poultry industry, there are 
no plans to compensate farmers.  The culling of infected 
birds is still being carried out in a crude fashion, 
exposing workers to the AI virus. 
 
-------------- 
Agency Updates 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) The FAO country representative reported that weak 
government capacity to respond to the AI outbreak made 
the launching of disease control measures extremely 
challenging.  He appealed to donors to fund FAO's 
response efforts and asked for the immediate deployment 
of additional human resources to augment the government's 
capacity to respond to the outbreak by offering technical 
assistance to the Ministry of Animal Resources (MoAR). 
USAID noted that is has provided personal protective 
equipment (PPE) to the MoAR and has an expert arriving 
next week, and urged the FAO to make its requirements 
known to a broader audience. 
 
¶7.  (U) A representative from WHO reported that although 
the first human cases tested proved negative for H5N1, 
WHO is continuing to work with the Ministry of Health 
(MoH) on preparedness initiatives.  He expressed his 
concern over the slow implementation of AI response plans 
which had been prepared weeks earlier.  WHO has also 
deployed a PCR machine through U.S. Naval Medical 
Research Unit Number 3 (NAMRU-3) in Cairo to establish an 
in-country capacity to test for the H5N1 strain of the AI 
virus at the MoAR in Khartoum.  (Note:  The MoAR refused 
to send samples to the MoH for testing, apparently 
insisting that the PCR machine be delivered to the MoAR 
lab instead.  End note.) 
 
¶8.  (U) UNICEF has taken the lead on developing an AI 
public information campaign, and is developing a number 
of products in Arabic to communicate personal protective 
measures for poultry farm workers and safe ways to handle 
poultry products in the home.  UNICEF is also 
collaborating with the MoH to develop a manual designed 
to assist health workers in reporting possible cases of 
AI infection in humans.  UNICEF anticipates that this 
information campaign will cost approximately $135,000. 
To date, UNICEF has allocated $35,000 of its own funding 
to the project.  Unless additional funding is received, 
UNICEF will only be able to produce and distribute a 
limited number of posters and pamphlets. 
 
¶9.  (U) U.N. agencies called on donors to provide funding 
for their AI operations.  One donor representative 
pointed out that this was the first general briefing the 
donor community had received on the AI response, and that 
until now donors had not known the extent of U.N. funding 
needs to deal with this crisis.  USAID announced its 
contributions of PPE and the forthcoming consultant, and 
noted that only USAID had received a funding request and 
that other donors should be approached as well.  It was 
agreed that weekly meetings would commence immediately 
and that U.N. agencies would prepare funding requirements 
for additional donor appeals. 
 
¶10.  (U) Comment:  There were tense exchanges during the 
meeting as the FAO country representative launched into a 
speech blaming donors for their lack of funding as the 
reason for the delayed FAO and MoAR response to the 
outbreak.  Participants responded that FAO had not 
briefed donors, had not convened meetings, and moreover 
 
KHARTOUM 00001089  003 OF 003 
 
 
had not even kept the U.N. Country Team apprised of the 
extent of the outbreak.  WHO also noted that they had 
dipped into other resources to start the process moving 
forward, hinting that FAO should have done the same 
rather than just waiting for the commitment of additional 
financial resources.  Despite the atmosphere of finger- 
pointing that occurred during those moments, the meeting 
served to focus attention on the outbreak, the extent (or 
lack thereof) of preparedness here in Sudan, and the need 
to work together to achieve a coordinated response to AI 
in Sudan.  End comment. 
 
¶11.  (U) In Southern Sudan, USAID reports that Dr. Agol 
Malak, South Sudan Director of Vet Services, MOA/LS has 
consulted with the USAID office concerning AI 
preparedness and coordination.  The ministry has not yet 
formed an AI task force due to the lack of financial 
resources needed to convene stakeholders.  Within the 
GoSS, the MOA/LS Director of Planning and the MOA/LS 
Director of Research have been named as focal points to 
lead the AI response.  A preparedness plan for the south 
is under preparation.  In the meantime, the GoSS has 
imposed a ban on importation of poultry products from 
northern Sudan.  (Comment:  Donors must improve efforts 
to establish a dialogue between GoSS AI officials and the 
federal-level Government of National Unity (GNU) AI task 
force to ensure coordination of country-wide AI response 
strategy.  End comment.) 
 
¶12.  (U) Note:  On May 3, Minister of Animal Resources 
and Fisheries Deng thanked Embassy Khartoum Pol/Econ 
Chief for USAID's timely support in responding to the AI 
outbreak in Sudan and for USAID's donation of PPE to 
support local containment efforts.  He reiterated the 
government's interest in conducting rapid testing in- 
country, followed by international laboratory analysis 
for confirmation purposes.  He indicated that donors can 
now import testing materials directly or through the FAO. 
He noted that his Under Secretary was currently in Paris 
obtaining more detailed information about handing the 
epidemic from the OIE.  He also mentioned that a WHO team 
from Cairo had arrived with additional testing kits. 
Finally, Minister Deng reported that the government is 
focusing on compensation for poultry farmers and is 
forming a committee composed of FAO, UNICEF, the U.N. 
Development Program (UNDP), the MoH, and his own ministry 
to address this funding need. 
 
STEINFELD