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Viewing cable 06KABUL2411, New ISAF Headquarters Approach to PRTs:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL2411 2006-05-28 06:04 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO3469
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2411/01 1480604
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 280604Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0479
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2573
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2722
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5995
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1395
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002411 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, SCA/PAB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR AF
SUBJECT: New ISAF Headquarters Approach to PRTs: 
Coherence 
 
 
KABUL 00002411  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  Summary:  The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 
has assumed the mantle of command of ISAF.  They are 
bringing a commitment and plan of action to the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program that 
should bring greater coherence to the effort.  We 
strongly support this initiative, and recommend that 
we cooperate fully.  This might even include making 
our State PRT officers more directly responsible to 
ISAF HQ.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Prior and subsequent to the ISAF change of 
command on May 4, we have had numerous meetings with 
the ARRC personnel who are taking over and will be 
responsible for the PRT program.  We are very 
impressed by the thought and effort they are putting 
into improving the performance of the 13 PRTs ISAF 
will control in Phase 3. 
 
3. (SBU) The most important elements of these 
contacts are encapsulated in a briefing given by 
British Brigadier General Dickie Davis to the PRT 
Executive Steering Committee Working Group (ESC WG) 
on the subject of QPRT Coherence.Q  Brigadier Davis 
is the Chief Engineer at ISAF and reconstruction and 
develop programs, as well as the PRTs, will be in 
his portfolio. 
 
PRT Coherence 
 
4. (SBU) General Davis, who was the first UK PRT 
commander in Mazar-e Sharif as a colonel, listed six 
areas in which ISAF hopes to bring coherence to the 
PRT program:  Policy, Policy Support, Process, 
Training, Information, and Review.  On Policy, he 
stressed the importance of making ESC guidance 
available to the PRTs and conforming PRT programs to 
that guidance.  There has been a proposal to make 
ESC meetings every other month instead of quarterly, 
and to provide more opportunity for discussion 
rather than just presentations. 
 
5. (SBU) On Policy Support, he listed the PRT ESC 
Working Group (WG) as the mechanism, and giving 
timely support to the ESC as the goal.  ISAF intends 
to spend more effort on WG projects, and will make 
staffing available for those projects, although 
exactly in what form has yet to be determined.  ISAF 
staff see a functioning ESC and ESC WG at the center 
of all other efforts to improve the PRTs. 
 
6. (SBU) Regarding Process, there is a belief at HQ 
ISAF that there is too much variation in the way 
that PRT commanders and civilian components in 
various PRTs approach the mission.  While 
understanding that national caveats will always play 
a role, and that PRTs have to be flexible enough to 
meet the particular challenges in their regions, 
there is also recognition that without stronger 
guidance and coordination from the center, it will 
not be possible to push ISAF, or more importantly, 
central government programs out to the provinces in 
any coherent fashion.  As a first step to bringing 
this to fruition, they have embarked on compiling a 
PRT handbook that will collect ESC-agreed guidance 
and best practices.  While the final status is under 
consideration, they hope to make it as binding as 
 
KABUL 00002411  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
possible.  They have invited the international 
community to join the working group, and will seek 
comments from the ESC before going final.  Target 
timeframe for completion is July. 
 
7. (SBU) To get an early start on Training, ISAF 
sent a major to monitor the April National Defense 
University course for incoming PRT officers, and was 
well represented at the UN Assistance Mission 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) course in May.  They were 
impressed by the potential for such courses to unify 
thinking on PRT missions and procedures, and are 
exploring how best to institutionalize such training 
so that all senior incoming PRT personnel are 
exposed.  There will be another UNAMA course in 
October with ISAF support and USG participation. 
 
8. (SBU) Information is being approached through a 
traveling program and a headquarters-based program. 
On the travel side, there will be PRT Engagement 
Teams that travel to the provinces.  Exact 
composition and tasking is still being developed, 
but it is envisioned to include UNAMA and embassy 
representatives, as well as technical support staff. 
On the other hand, there will be a PRT Helpdesk that 
will take any and all questions, from basic 
background information to major policy issues, and 
get an answer back out to the field as quickly as 
possible.  Davis hopes that this process will help 
form a link between ISAF and the PRT that will 
complement the support of their respective 
embassies. 
 
9. (SBU) Finally, on Review, ISAF has taken 
considerable interest in the ESC Provincial 
Indicators process that was finally put in place by 
the former ISAF staff just as it was departing. 
Although an ESC initiative, the program will need 
strong coordination from Kabul if it is to be 
meaningful, and ISAF is in the best position to 
provide that.  Although expressing some reservations 
about the questions and methods, ISAF HQ took the 
reasonable approach that it was better to use the 
baseline this will provide, and generally refine the 
process, than start again from scratch. 
 
Comment and Thoughts for the Future: 
 
10. (SBU) We strongly support the steps ISAF is 
taking to bring greater coherence to the PRT 
program, and intend to support it as much as 
possible.  Our most serious concern is that the 
command relationship between the headquarters and 
the PRTs remains weak, and almost everything General 
Davis hopes to accomplish will have to be done more 
through persuasion than by direction.  For our part, 
we have always instructed our State representatives 
at ISAF PRTs to be as responsive as possible to 
their commanders and to requests from ISAF in Kabul 
Q they are to consider themselves an ISAF asset as 
well as an Embassy one.  We are also providing 
support to the handbook, training, and provincial 
indicators efforts. 
 
11. (SBU) Our most significant contribution to date 
has been the establishment of a USAID position at 
 
KABUL 00002411  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
ISAF HQ to act as an adviser and to provide 
coordination with our bilateral programs.  The 
incumbent had the opportunity to train with the ARRC 
in Europe prior to deployment, and is well- 
integrated into the ISAF structure.  We are in the 
process of establishing a similar State Department 
position in the office of the political adviser, and 
hope to have someone in place by late August. 
 
12. (SBU) As ISAF moves to Phase 4, possibly by late 
Fall, it will oversee all of the PRTs.  If our 
experience continues to be a positive one, and we 
are confident we can significantly influence the 
direction of the PRT program through our civilian 
placements at ISAF and an increase in American 
military presence (as some of CJTF76 personnel and 
responsibilities are transferred), we may want to 
take stronger steps. 
 
13. (SBU) One such measure would be to encourage 
ISAF to require every PRT to host two political 
officers whose primary responsibility would be to 
it, and not to their lead nationQs MFA.  We could 
offer our 20 field officers to form the basis for 
that pool, with other lead nations responsible for 
providing the other 30 or so officers necessary. 
This would strengthen the PRT program by giving ISAF 
more control over PRT activities, would increase our 
insights into some provinces where we currently do 
not see PRT reporting (which would then be available 
to us through NATO), and would resolve our recurring 
bilateral problems with housing our officers at 
other countriesQ PRTs Q ISAF could set down minimum 
standards for communications, housing, food, and, 
most importantly, force protection services.  If we 
decide to move in this direction we should attempt 
to do this under the current, primarily British, HQ. 
If we wait until ISAF X, which will be more heavily 
American, it may be greeted with suspicion by some 
in NATO.  End Thoughts and Comment. 
 
14. (SBU) Key HQ ISAF Staff with PRT 
Responsibilities: 
-- Lead:  Brigadier General Dickie Davis 
-- Development Advisers (DEVADs):  USAID Michelle 
Parker, DFID Clare Harkin 
-- Political (POLADs):   Terence Jagger and Paul 
Wyatt (both are partially dedicated; Terence is FE- 
MC equivalent) 
-- Coordinating officer for PRT Coherence: LTC 
Petersen 
-- Secretary to the ESC and WG support:  Major 
Matthew Swannell 
-- Operational analyst supporting Provincial 
Indicators: Mr. Rob Grossman 
-- Several other military officers and supporting 
staff will be involved with delivering 'PRT 
coherence' 
-- Drazen Hrastic, NATO Senior Civilian 
Representative POLAD, is also engaged, although this 
is a partnership not under ISAF command. 
NEUMANN