VZCZCXRO4078
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBUL #2342/01 1431111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231111Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0397
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2566
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2717
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5979
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1388

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR RO AF
SUBJECT: PRT/QALAT Q ROMANIAN INTEREST IN PROVINCIAL 
RECONSTRUCTION TEAM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH 
CAUTION 
 
KABUL 00002342  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.Q(SBU) During a recent UN Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) training program on Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Romanian 
representatives, all from the Ministry of Defense, 
privately expressed their strong interest in taking 
over the US PRT in Qalat, given Romanian troop 
experience in the area.   They acknowledged, 
however, that the Romanian MFA and other civilian 
agencies remain to be convinced about the wisdom of 
Romania leading a PRT.  They noted limitations and 
caveats that constrain a possible Romanian 
contribution (below). 
 
¶2.  (SBU) We are not sure this idea has any traction 
in Bucharest.  We would like to suggest, however, 
that the Department consider the idea in Washington 
and inform Embassy Bucharest of USG views, so that 
if it arises the Embassy can respond appropriately. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) On May 5, the Romanian preliminary survey 
team provided the Regional Command Q South (RC-S) 
PRT officer an outline of their plans for the 
deployment of Romanian troops to the RC and to Zabul 
Province in July.  The two Romanian deployments will 
be set up as separate entities, and troops and 
equipment will not be transferred between them.  The 
contingent assigned to the RC Headquarters at 
Kandahar Air Field (KAF) will have slightly less 
capacity than the Romanian contingent currently 
there, which contributes to base security.  In 
particular, they will not have enough troops at KAF 
to be able to man the various watch stations and 
also patrol outside the base due to a national 
caveat on how many men are the minimum for a patrol. 
The shortfall will have to be made up by another 
nation.  In Zabul, the Romanians will cover the 
central part of the province, but will not be able 
to cover all of the Forward Operating Bases due to a 
shortage of personnel (the Romanian team plans to 
ask their headquarters for an additional platoon to 
eliminate this shortfall).  The Romanian team 
outlined areas in which the Romanian forces will 
need assistance from other nations.  These include: 
logistics (air transportation, as well as supply 
trucking), classified communications and medical 
evacuation.  The task force will also not have 
personnel to cover Civil-Military Affairs, 
Information Operations and certain intelligence 
functions.  The Romanians will also not bring a 
political advisor (POLAD).  In summary, the 
Romanians are very dedicated to their mission here, 
but resource limitations mean they will be seeking 
assistance at NATO HQs and from several nations on a 
bilateral basis. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) This approach could have important 
implications if they take over the PRT.  Certainly 
we would welcome an opportunity to relieve the US 
military presence in Qalat and replace it with 
Romanian forces.  We must ensure, however, that we 
maintain the performance of the PRT during and after 
the transition.  Qalat PRT is responsible for Zabol 
province, one of four critical southern provinces. 
Should we, nevertheless, decide on a handover, we 
would recommend that we maintain a small 
 
KABUL 00002342  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
State/AID/DOD civil-military affairs contingent with 
some force protection and access to CommanderQs 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) and AID Quick 
Impact Program (QIP) funding.  If we rely only on 
Romanian planning and assets, we may miss 
opportunities to improve the situation there at a 
crucial time. 
 
NEUMANN