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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 KABUL 002154 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO (AMB MQUINN), SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PAB, 
S/CT, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SNAR ASEC AF
SUBJECT: A COURSE OF ACTION TO REBALANCE THE ANP 
CORRECTED VERSION 
 
KABUL 00002154  001.2 OF 008 
 
 
A)KABUL 01884 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Course of Action plan outlined 
below is designed as a guide for implementing 
President Karzais decision to re-balance the Afghan 
National Police in order to address pressing 
g 
security issues in the south (reftel).  This outline 
will be used by members of the international 
community involved with building up the ANP to 
assist the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) staff 
to plan and execute this rebalancing exercise.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) BACKGROUND AND SCOPE. 
 
The need to re-balance the Police Operating Forces 
became clear in the course of a series of provincial 
assessment studies, conducted by NSA Rassoul with 
input from the security Ministries and members of 
the international community.  It was reinforced by 
concerns raised by several governors, specifically 
the Governors of Kandahar and Helmand, to President 
Karzai.  Once the need to rebalance the police force 
became apparent, several Courses of Action were 
developed and briefed to President Kazai on April 
21, 2006.  He agreed that something needed to be 
done and selected our preferred Course of Action 
which would initially use the Afghan Highway 
Polices personnel and equipment to increase the 
strength of the Uniform, Border, and Stand-By 
Police.  This rebalancing will take place in 
conjunction with the necessary pay and rank reforms, 
as well as the activation of Police Regional 
Commands, to better address immediate security 
concerns.  However, the Course of Action will not 
cover overall Ministry of Interior missions or 
manning in Kabul. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  MISSION STATEMENT.  Assist the Ministry 
of Interior of Afghanistan in developing and 
executing plans to re-balance and re-distribute its 
police forces to meet urgent security concerns, 
establish Police Regional Commands and Staffs, and 
implement national level reform programs during the 
remainder of CY 2006. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) COURSE OF ACTION DESIGN. 
 
¶A.  Overview.  Re-balancing is designed to improve 
the distribution of Afghan Police Forces nationally, 
by moving them from locations and missions where 
they are not as urgently needed to areas and 
missions where the need is greater.  Specifically, 
by moving police to the southern provinces of 
Kandahar and Helmand, and from the Afghan Highway 
Police to the Uniform, Stand-By and Border Police, 
overall national stability and civil security should 
be improved.  This Course of Action cannot be 
successful without proper political support: it must 
have the weight of President Karzais authority in 
writing to ensure that all who must plan and execute 
the re-balancing actions understand the urgency of 
the situation.  This effort will be directed 
according to guiding principles from the national 
level with Afghans, assisted by the international 
community.  However, much of the detailed execution 
will be completed by the new Police Regional 
Commands, with mentorship from the Regional Police 
 
KABUL 00002154  002.2 OF 008 
 
 
Advisory Teams (RPATs).  We expect to begin re- 
balancing efforts by May 15, 2006, and complete 
these initial actions by September 1, 2006. 
Ultimately, these re-balancing efforts will form the 
basis of developing a future Tashkil (Afghan 
staffing pattern) that better reflects threats and 
population demands on Afghan security forces. 
 
¶B.  President of Afghanistan Decision Directive 
(PDD) Minimum Elements.  To ensure the proper 
emphasis behind this task, a Presidential Decision 
Directive from President Karzai is necessary.  It 
will focus our efforts, assist in further developing 
our guiding principles and provide sustaining 
motivation in a process that will undoubtedly be 
difficult and sometimes frustrating.  Therefore, we 
will work to ensure that this PDD addresses as a 
minimum the following elements: 
- 1) the Ministry of Interior must re-balance to 
meet urgent security needs; 
- 2) the Afghan Highway Police must be the initial 
source of personnel and resources to accomplish the 
re-balancing requirements; 
- 3) the Ministry of Interior must implement its 
selected Course of Action without delay. 
 
¶C.  Guiding Principles.  Because execution of this 
plan will be a joint effort between the Afghan 
Ministry of Interior and the international community 
combined with de-centralized tasks to the Police 
Regional Commands, some guiding principles must be 
established nationally to ensure that purpose and 
intent are properly understood and efficiently 
executed.  Highlighted below is our list of guiding 
principles for re-balancing the Afghan National 
Police in CY 2006. 
 
- i.  Re-Balancing activities must be properly 
recorded and captured in future Tashkils.  One of 
the reasons this re-balancing effort is currently 
needed is because of the inadequacies of current and 
past Tashkils.  The development of future Tashkils 
must include a process to match security forces and 
resources to law enforcement and security needs 
based on population and threat. 
 
-ii.  The future Tashkil must be modified by 
better threat and population studies IAW thorough 
Provincial Assessments.  The international community 
and the  MOI  need to pick a single standard to 
assess threat and population to prevent multiple 
views on where the re-balancing of forces is to 
occur. 
 
 
 
-iii.  All fills should be accomplished using 
the principle of closest to home assignment first. 
Because of the nature of Afghan society, it is 
counter-productive to move personnel long distances 
away from their homes and families to meet police 
manning requirements.  Coupled with a lack of 
electronic banking that would allow individual 
police to send their pay home to families, moving 
personnel without regard to places of origin would 
only result in poor recruiting and an increase in 
severance from the police forces.   Therefore, our 
efforts should emphasize volunteering over forced 
moves. 
 
KABUL 00002154  003.2 OF 008 
 
 
 
-iv.  This Course of Action and any other will 
be affected by pay and rank reform over time and 
require those efforts take into account the re- 
balancing actions. 
 
-v.  All personnel should move to new 
assignments with assigned weapons and personal 
equipment.  This will provide for immediate 
capability upon reaching a new duty assignment.  The 
gaining police unit will record and document the 
 the 
weapons and equipment of all arriving personnel. 
 
-vi.  The MOI should identify which highway 
security missions previously performed by the AHP 
should be maintained.  These missions should be 
justified by historical analysis, such as reviews of 
arrest records and reports of attacks on commercial 
and private vehicles by Anti-Coalition Militias. 
Highway areas assessed as having a high risk of 
attack should retain security protection, but 
performed by the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan 
Stand-By Police or Afghan Border Police, whichever 
is more appropriate. 
 
-vii.  All Afghan Highway Police personnel, 
except for a small caretaker staff of senior 
leaders, must volunteer for new positions or elect 
to resign from the Afghan National Police 
altogether. 
 
-viii.  To minimize the number of AHP personnel 
to reassign, and to prevent the mission from 
growing, the MOI will be pressed to halt all AHP 
recruiting now. 
 
-ix.  Adjust all Afghan National Police fielding 
ing 
and logistics support plans to support this Course 
of Action. 
 
-x.  Develop public information programs to 
highlight the major fielding initiatives, 
inauguration of Regional Commands and significant 
personnel re-assignment actions.  Start by 
conducting an inaugural ceremony on May 15, 2006, at 
the Kandahar Police Regional Training Center that 
covers activation of Regional Command South, and 
includes a major display of vehicles, weapons, 
uniforms and equipment that will be fielded 
immediately to the Afghan National Police in 
Kandahar Province. 
 
-xi.  Quote Proper Demographic Representation 
Unquote is the basic model used to focus recruiting 
policies for this effort.  It basic tenets are 
listed below. 
 
-1.  Quote Proper Demographic 
Representation Unquote was emphasized as a method of 
conducting business by President Karzai and applies 
to all types of police, placing special emphasis on 
operational effectiveness achieved by establishing a 
presence and understanding with the community in 
 in 
which the police operate. 
 
-2.  Quote Proper Demographic 
 
KABUL 00002154  004.2 OF 008 
 
 
Representation Unquote consists of three major 
components:  a) maintaining ethnic balance in all 
police units, promotions, and assignments - for the 
Afghan Uniform Police this must be done at the 
district level and must be a goal of the current 
plan, and for Afghan Border Police and Afghan Stand- 
By Police this must be done at least at the regional 
level when feasible; b) fill police ranks, 
especially the local Afghan Uniformed Police, first 
through local recruiting, which make it easier and 
should maintain proper local ethnic mix if executed 
fairly;  c)  ensure that properly equipped police 
maintain a presence in the areas they are 
responsible for and seek to achieve understanding 
and trust with the local population. 
 
-3.  Do not over-recruit in any one 
particular area to fill other areas or in any one 
particular ethnic group, already an often-stated 
concern. 
 
-4.  Recruiting should use threat study and 
y and 
population analysis reports, accepted by the GOA and 
the international community. 
 
¶D.  Timeline.  The initial timeline for executing 
this Course of Action is as follows.  Further timing 
details will be developed by the International 
Community and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. 
 
-15 May 06:  RC-South established with Regional 
Police Advisory Team (RPAT). 
 
-27 May 06:  Commence Force Re-Balancing; 
Regional Command- South 
ceremony with RC-South Commander and Staff, Senior 
MOI representatives, and local Afghans as well as 
International Press Coverageformat for subsequent 
events. 
 
-01 Jun 06:  Afghan Stand-By Police Battalion 
deploys to RC-South permanently 
from RC-North; provides for two permanent Afghan 
Stand-By Police Battalions in RC-South. 
 
-15 Jun 06:  Phase I Pay Reform begins for the 
Afghan National Police. 
 
-01 Jun 06:  Rank Reform Phase III complete for 
all of the Afghan National 
Police. 
 
-01 Aug 06:  All Afghan Border Police Re-Balance 
actions are complete. 
 
lete. 
 
-01 Sep 06:  Total Afghan National Police Re- 
Balance actions are complete. 
 
-15 Sep 06:  Institute Phase II Pay Reform for 
all of the Afghan National Police. 
 
¶E.  Fill Requirements, Priorities, and Strategies. 
Because each part of the Afghan National Police has 
different requirements a standard strategy or fill 
method cannot be used.  This is because in the case 
of the Afghan Uniform Police, the current Tashkil 
 
KABUL 00002154  005.2 OF 008 
 
 
inadequately documents security requirements in RC- 
South.  Additionally, the current Tashkil does not 
determine which police structures should be filled 
first in a resource-constrained environment. 
Therefore the following fill strategies will be 
used. 
 
-i.  Fill Strategies by Type of Police. 
 
 
-1.  Afghan Uniform Police (AUP).  Fill 
according to the provinces with the highest threat 
and lowest ratio of police to the general 
population.  Use only the four highest threat 
provinces and fill to a level that will bring these 
provinces online with ratios in provinces that have 
have 
a low threat risk. 
 
-a.  Kandahar:  current need is 
approximately 800 policemen. 
 
-b.  Helmand:  current need is 
approximately 600 policemen. 
 
-c.  Uruzgan:  current need is 
approximately 150 policemen. 
 
-d.  Paktika:  current need is 
approximately 300 policemen. 
 
-2.  Afghan Stand-By Police (ASP).  Because 
Afghan Stand-By Police are a regional asset, they 
should be filled by region starting with the 
Province with the overall highest threat and lowest 
police to population ratio.  Using that thought 
process listed below are the actions and fill 
priorities for the Afghan Stand-By Police. 
 
-a.  RC-South. 
 
-i.  Move one Afghan Stand-By 
Police battalion from RC-North (5th Bn in Konduz) 
permanently to RC-South and man to 100 percent: 
current need is approximately 140 policemen. 
 
-ii.  Fill existing RC South 
Afghan Stand-By Police battalion to 100 percent (2d 
Bn in Kandahar):  current need is approximately 221 
policemen. 
 
-b.  Fill remaining Afghan Stand-By 
l remaining Afghan Stand-By 
Police battalions to 100 percent 
 
-i.  ASP Bn in RC Central (6th 
Bn):  current need is approximately 176 policemen. 
 
-ii.  ASP Bn in RC East (1st Bn): 
current need is approximately 372 policemen. 
 
-iii.  ASP Bn in RC West: 
current need is approximately 100 policemen. 
 
-iv.  ASP Bn in RC Central (7th 
Bn):  current need is approximately 378 policemen. 
 
-v.  ASP Bn in RC Central (8th 
Bn):  current need is approximately 376 policemen. 
 
KABUL 00002154  006.2 OF 008 
 
 
 
 
-vi.  ASP Bn in RC North (4th Bn 
in MeS):  current need is approximately 343 
policemen. 
 
-3.  Afghan Border Police (ABP).  Fill in 
accordance with the new Tashkil which does 
adequately describe Border Police requirements. 
 
-a.  RC South4th and 5th ABP Bdes: 
Current shortfall is approximately 1056 policemen. 
 
-b.  RC East2nd and 3rd ABP Bdes: 
Current shortfall is approximately 848 policemen. 
 
-c.  RC West6th ABP Bde:  Current 
shortfall is approximately 672 policemen. 
 
-d.  RC Central1st ABP Bde:  Current 
. 
 
-QQQd.  RC CentralQ1st ABP Bde:  Current 
shortfall is approximately 583 policemen. 
 
-e.  RC North7th and 8th Bdes: 
Current shortfall is approximately 923 policemen. 
 
-ii.  Fill (Man, Equip, Train) Priorities from 1 
to n. 
 
-1.  AUP in Kandahar. 
 
-2.  AUP in Helmand. 
 
-3.  5th ASP Battalion with move to RC- 
South. 
 
-4.  2d ASP Battalion in Kandahar. 
 
-5.  6th ASP Battalion. 
 
-6.  AUP in Uruzgan. 
 
-7.  AUP in Paktika. 
 
-8.  4th and 5th ABP Brigades in RC-South. 
 
-9.  2nd and 3rd ABP Brigades in RC-East. 
 
-10.  1st ASP Battalion in RC-East. 
 
-11.  6th ABP Brigade in RC-West. 
 
-12.  3rd ASP Battalion in RC-West. 
 
-13.  1st ABP Brigade in RC-Central. 
 
-14.  7th ASP Battalion in RC-Central. 
 
-15.  8th ASP Battalion in RC-Central. 
 
-16.  7th and 8th ABP Brigades in RC-North. 
 
-17. 4th ASP Battalion in RC-North. 
 
-iii.  Therefore, the total personnel 
requirement for all type of police to be re-balanced 
is approximately 8,038. 
 
KABUL 00002154  007.2 OF 008 
 
 
 
¶F.  Sourcing Strategies.  After identifying the 
rcing Strategies.  After identifying the 
requirements, the sources to fill those requirements 
will be defined.  There are four major potential 
sources of manpower to accomplish the re-balancing 
tasks.  All of these are limited by the individual 
Afghans willingness to serve outside a certain 
radius of his ancestral homeland.  In all of the 
sources we must first seek volunteers from the 
existing forces that will give up personnel to other 
police forces with greater need and attempt to keep 
the volunteer as close to home as possible. 
 
-i.  Afghan Highway Police Manpower.  The first 
manning pool to explore is the Afghan Highway 
Police.  They are currently located in 298 fixed 
checkpoint locations along the Ring Road and along 
spur roads that lead to the 12 recognized border 
crossing points.  It currently has approximately 
5,945 personnel in the operating forces that could 
be available for placement in the Uniformed, Border, 
and Stand-By Police.  Given that not all of these 
personnel will elect to remain as policemen and move 
e 
to new jobs and locations, the number available will 
be something less than 5,945.  However, it must be 
made clear to AHP personnel that they must move to a 
new police function or lose their job. 
 
-ii.  Afghan Security Force (ASF) Recruiting. 
There are approximately 800 ASF personnel along the 
Afghan-Pakistan Border that may still want to 
volunteer for some type of national service.  Some 
of these 800 will want to join the ANA.  The 
remainder may want to joint the ANPpresumably the 
Border Police first.  Therefore, the Afghans must 
capitalize on the existing programs to de-mobilize 
the ASF into our high priority requirements in RC- 
South, most likely 4th and 5th Afghan Border Police 
Brigades. 
 
-iii.  Move Personnel from Over-Manned  to 
Under-Manned Areas.  This strategy is the least 
desirable because it is least likely to be 
effective.  Most Afghan policemen will not volunteer 
to move long distances away from their current 
homes.  However, the Afghan Uniformed Police is 
is 
over-manned, primarily in RC-North, and the Afghans 
could ask for volunteers to relocate to RC-South 
where Uniformed Police are under-manned, according 
to the threat and population studies. 
 
-iv.  Local Hire and Send to RTC for Training. 
The most likely source of manpower after re- 
assigning AHP personnel is a policy of local hire. 
If we receive close to 5,900 personnel from re- 
balancing the Afghan Highway Police,  we will need 
to local hire approximately 2,100 new police of all 
types in several locationsprimarily in RC-South. 
However, the Afghans must be prepared to hire 
locally up to the entire requirement of 8,038 
personnel, if needed, in order to ensure re- 
balancing does occur. 
 
¶G.  Assisted Implementation Phasing.  Given that re- 
balancing will be a difficult task, phasing our 
efforts will most likely lead to more efficient 
 
KABUL 00002154  008.2 OF 008 
 
 
execution.  The Afghans must start in the areas of 
greatest needthat have the greatest security 
issues.  This means RC-South must be the focus of 
of 
initial re-balancing efforts.  The other Regional 
Commands Police Operating Forces will be 
successively re-balanced on a similar estimate of 
need.  In all of this the MOI will be assisted by 
those international community organizations and 
personnel with police expertise.  Additionally, the 
Afghan Regional Commands will be assisted by 
Regional Police Advisory Teams (RPATs), concerned 
with the daily planning and execution of re- 
balancing tasks in the regions and provinces. 
 
-i.  Phase 1starts 15 May 2006.  (RC-South) 
 
-1.  Establish all of the Regional 
Commands. 
 
-2.  Begin Re-Balancing Tasks in RC-South. 
 
-3.  Deploy one Permanent Afghan Stand-By 
Police Battalion to RC-South (5th ASP Bn); provides 
for two permanent Afghan Stand-By Police Battalions 
in RC-South. 
 
-4.  Rank Reform Phase III complete. 
 
-ii.  Phase 2starts 15 June 2006.  (Other RCs) 
 
-1.  Complete Phase I pay reform. 
 
-2.  Take lessons-learned from re-balancing 
activities in RC-South and apply to the other 
ply to the other 
Regional Commands. 
 
-3.  Afghan Border Police reforms completed 
not later than 01 August 2006. 
 
-4.  All re-balancing actions in all of the 
Regional Commands must be completed not later than 
01 September 2006complies with budgeting demands. 
 
-iii.  Phase 3starts 15 September 2006. 
 
-1.  Institute Phase II Pay Reform. 
 
-2.  Take lessons-learned from rebalancing 
coupled with agreed upon Threat and Population 
Studies and begin to develop a new Tashkil that will 
capture more realistic Security Forces requirements 
across Afghanistan. 
 
NEUMANN 
 
 
 
 
EUMANN