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Viewing cable 06KABUL2093, PRT/QAL I NOW: BADGHIS PROVINCE SECURITY OVERVIEW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL2093 2006-05-10 10:10 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO9449
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHMOS RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2093/01 1301010
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101010Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0100
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 5652
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2529
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5941
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1353
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2692
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR AMEND AND HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR SNAR SOCI AF
SUBJECT: PRT/QAL I NOW:  BADGHIS PROVINCE SECURITY OVERVIEW 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  The Badghis province Director for of the 
National Security Directorate (NSD) Mehr Ali offered a 
provincial security overview to PRToff, including poppy 
eradication efforts, Taleban influence, the recent slaying 
of five medical workers, and the police and justice system. 
Although the current picture is one of relative tranquility, 
potential destabilizing factors include poppy production, 
the presence in Pashtun areas of former Taleban, and weak 
government, including inadequate and corrupt police and 
judiciary.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Poppy and the economy 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) At present, the security situation is stable.  The 
economic situation, however, is troublesome and could become 
worse if there is a major drought.  Many unoccupied youth 
are traveling to the south to work in poppy cultivation and 
distribution.  There, they are susceptible to recruitment by 
anti-government elements including Taleban.  Badghis youth 
also go to Iran where they become involved in the opium 
distribution network. 
 
3.  (SBU) Poppy destruction has occurred in Badghis, 
primarily in areas where provincial officials have talked 
with elders.  There are areas, however, where significant 
poppy production continues.  These include the districts of 
Ghormach and Jawand, which are geographically remote and 
where the provincial government has little influence. 
(Comment.  While the Badghis governor in meetings with the 
PRT cites Deputy Interior Minister Daoud's claim that 80 
percent of Badghis poppy cultivation has been destroyed, 
Mehr Ali believes the figure is exaggerated.  He implied 
that the GoA was painting an overly-rosy picture of poppy 
elimination in the province.  End Comment.) 
 
4.  (SBU)  The provincial government has few resources to 
aid in poppy elimination.  Particularly troubling is the 
absence of alternatives to poppy production.  Those farmers 
who have stopped growing poppy are now asking for 
assistance.  The Afghan government and foreign countries 
have talked about helping those who cooperate in the GoA's 
campaign against poppy, but nothing has happenedprograms 
have not yet led to significant impact.  Assistance and 
alternatives must be offered.  (Note: The USAID Alternative 
Livelihoods and agriculture programs are working on several 
programs in Badghis.  The Rebuilding Agriculture Markets 
Program has trained 20 Para-vets to operate private 
businesses providing basic animal health care to farmers and 
pastoralists.  The Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture 
Program (ASAP), a five-year program aimed at north and west 
Afghanistan, will focus on developing the agriculture sector 
with activities that increase agriculture productivity and 
product variety for domestic consumption, and promote the 
agro and food processing industries to achieve added-value 
in Afghan agricultural production.  End Note.) 
 
 
5.  (U) Badghis needs major development aid to develop 
infrastructure and get the economy moving.  Up to now there 
have only been handouts.  A weak economy will ultimately 
result in insecurity.  (Note.  The Spanish Agency for 
International Development has recently begun construction of 
major road, water, and hospital projects, and has pledged an 
additional 50 million Euros in assistance to Badghis over 
the next five years.  Apart from USAID-funded schools and a 
few other projects, and small National Solidarity Project 
programs, however, little assistance has reached the 
districts outside of Qal I Now.  End Note.) 
 
------------------------ 
Pashtuns and the Taleban 
 
KABUL 00002093  002 OF 003 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (SBU) Tajik-Pashtun relations are generally good in the 
province.  The districts of Ghormach and Bala Murghab are 
the most problematic; they are largely Pashtun, and there is 
concern about ex-Taleban now residing in these areas and 
about anti-government Pashtun fleeing the conflict-ridden 
situation in the South to temporarily take refuge in 
Badghis.  (Note.  Badghis province as a whole is almost two- 
thirds Tajik and one-third Pashtun.  There are also small 
numbers of Turkman, Uzbek, and Hazara.  Ghormach and Bala 
Murghab are over 95 percent and 90 percent Pashtun, 
respectively.  Under the Taleban, Mullah Badar from Bala 
Murghab served as a district governor in Badghis and Herat 
province before becoming governor of Badghis; Abdul Rahman 
from Ghormach served as governor of Ghor.  Many Tajiks in 
Badghis, who suffered under the Taleban, are genuinely 
worried that ex-Taleban living in Bala Murghab, Ghormach, 
and Pashtun pockets in other districts of Badghis will lead 
a Taleban resurgence.  End Note.) 
 
----------------------- 
Medical worker slayings 
----------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU)  NSD took over from the Afghan National Police the 
investigation of the April 10 execution of five staff at a 
medical clinic in Dari Bum in Qadis district.  Six people, 
including the clinic guard, are in custody.  (Note:  On 
April 10, five Aghans-four Tajiks and a Turkman-were 
executed at the clinic.  The guard, a Pashtun, was not 
harmed.  End Note.)  The guard confessed and implicated the 
others, who so far have not admitted guilt.  Dari Bum is a 
Pashtun area at the crossroads of routes to Faryab and Ghor 
provinces and is a center for poppy cultivation and 
trafficking.  One of the victims, a doctor, was related to a 
police officer involved in poppy eradication in the area, 
and was suspected by locals of having tipped off authorities 
on poppy fields.  (Note:  An NGO worker told PRToff that a 
few weeks earlier Danish NGO DACAAR, which also works in 
Qadis, was threatened and advised to leave Qadis district, 
allegedly because local poppy growers are wary of outsiders 
who may inform on them.  End Note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Warlords a reduced factor, but government weak 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
8.  (SBU)  During the fight against the Russians, and after 
the fall of the Taleban, two individuals exerting 
significant power in Badghis were Ismael Khan (the current 
Minister of Energy) and General Zahir Naibzata.  (Note: 
Naibzata, a mujahadeen commander became a general after the 
fall of the Taleban.  After a dispute with Khan, a former 
ally, his troops allegedly killed Khan's son.  Naibzata died 
in a car accident last year; at the time he was a candidate 
for parliament.  End Note.)  Khan and Naibzata's family 
continue to have followers in Badghis, but lack the 
significant influence they once had.  Although there are 
powerbrokers in communities throughout Badghis, none 
represents a significant threat to the government. 
 
9.  (SBU)  The extension of governmental authority is 
constrained by district governors who are poor 
administrators with little experience, and who are generally 
corrupt.  Power in the districts is exercised primarily by 
village elders.  (Note:  The governor has replaced some 
district sub-governors with people he considers honest.  He 
states the replacements have themselves become corrupt; and 
he believes the problem is not individuals but a culture of 
corruption.  End Note.) 
 
------------------------------ 
 
KABUL 00002093  003 OF 003 
 
 
An ineffective judicial system 
------------------------------ 
 
10.  (SBU)  Badghis police have insufficient salaries and 
lack adequate equipment.  Most are involved in smuggling and 
petty corruption.  Similarly, the justice system is corrupt; 
cases are decided in favor of theby the party with the most 
money.  Few cases enter the formal judicial system,the   . 
The majority beingof cases are resolved within the 
traditional justice system by elders. 
 
11.  (SBU)  In Jawand last year there were over 80 murders 
(most involving personal or tribal disputes).  The failure 
of the formal justice system to investigate and process 
these crimes undermines confidence in the provincial 
government. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
1112.  (SBU)  Mehr Ali is a Baluch from Nimroz province.  He 
appears to have the confidence of the governor and is 
generally considered competent and honest.  He has a good 
working relationship with PRT intelligence officers.  Mehr 
Ali talks disdainfully of the police and his relationship 
with chief of police Ghoulam Rasoul is strained.  End 
Comment. 
 
NEUMANN