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Viewing cable 06KABUL1975, Afghanistan Border Management Initiative - Fueling

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL1975 2006-05-02 13:52 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO1834
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1975/01 1221352
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021352Z MAY 06 ZFD
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9955
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 5188
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6879
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3359
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 6841
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 5646
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0214
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3573
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2495
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5905
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1326
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RHFJUSC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 001975 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC PVANSON, ACHURCH, KCROUCH AND JLCOLLINS; 
CBP/INA FOR JKELLY; DOE/NNSA FOR RSTUBBLEFIELD; DOC FOR 
ELOCKWOOD-SHABAT; DOT FOR APARAMESWARAN; SECDEF FOR 
MHOFFMANN, FLIGHT, AND RVIERKANT; NSC FOR AHARRIMAN AND 
KAMEND; CUSTOMS FOR US CUSTOMS AND BRODER PROTECTION 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV EFIN PREL AF
 
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Border Management Initiative - Fueling 
the Program 
 
KABUL 00001975  001.4 OF 006 
 
 
This is an Action Request - See paragraph 8. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) The International Border Management Advisory Team 
(IBMAT) visited Afghanistan April 9 to 17 and conducted an 
assessment of overall border management activities in Herat 
province.  The IBMAT team corroborated earlier assessments 
indicating an overall lack of GoA initiative, poor 
coordination between GoA border and customs officials and 
inconsistent border policies and procedures.  The Embassy's 
Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG) will incorporate the 
team's recommendations into an international action plan to 
prod the GoA to aggressively continue border management 
reform.  We will work with the Finance Ministry and donor 
community to create a border management task force (BMTF) to 
focus specifically on the border management initiative from 
an international perspective led from behind by the United 
States. The proposed staffing for such a BMTF is outlined in 
paragraph 6.  Many of the staff would come from other donors 
and Coalition (CFC-A) assets.  However, a modest increase in 
Mission oversight is required to keep this effort on track. 
An estimated USD 9.4 million is needed immediately to fund 
an adequately resourced BMTF for the next 18 months (USD 4.9 
million in 2006, USD 4.5 million in 2007)to manage the 
program (personnel=USD 6 Million) and implement immediate 
corrective facility and design actions at four priority 
Afghan border crossing points. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
IBMAT VISIT TO HERAT PROVINCE - FINDINGS AND FOLLOW-UP 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The IBMAT team traveled to Herat along with 
representatives from the ARG, CSTC-A, CFC-A, Bearing Point 
(USAID), the German Police Program Office (GPPO), Guardia di 
Finanza of Italy and the Afghan Ministries of Commerce, 
Interior and Finance.  In Herat the IBMAT linked up with 
local GoA officials, the Finance Ministry's Management 
Intervention Team (MIT) for customs specific information, 
the 6th Brigade commander for border police specific 
information and the Regional Training Center (RTC) commander 
for RTC capabilities information. The primary task of the 
IBMAT was to conduct an assessment at Islam Qalah (the major 
border control point on the Iranian border), Towraghundi (on 
the Turkmen border) and Herat focusing on best practices, 
policies and procedures, infrastructure and equipment, 
customs operations, immigration, trade facilitation, and 
illegal cross-border trade (counter-narcotics, etc.). 
 
3.  (SBU) The IBMAT assessment team made the following 
initial findings regarding border management and customs 
issues (the team's full report will be issued in 
Washington): 
 
-- disparity and irregular payments of salaries to both the 
Afghan Border Police (ABP)and customs police, 
 
-- 15% literacy rate of police and customs recruits, 
 
-- lack of SOPs, regulations, roles and responsibilities for 
 
KABUL 00001975  002.4 OF 006 
 
 
-- lack of first line and middle management structure, 
 
-- lack of ethics and integrity training, 
 
-- rampant low level corruption at border control points, 
 
-- "turf battles" between ministries and no interagency 
cooperation, 
 
-- lack of training in the customs ranks and little or no 
advanced training in the police ranks, 
 
-- archaic immigration law with ad hoc legal decisions, 
 
-- lack of infrastructure for proper passport 
control/customs inspections and processes, 
 
-- lack of adequate physical, procedural and personal 
security mandates, 
 
-- insufficient access or proper identification control, 
 
-- poor customs facility design or control that allows 
unauthorized access, passport control avoidance, theft, 
revenue leakage and outside influence from private 
businesses and individuals, 
 
-- rampant customs irregularities of submission of false 
documents, under valuation, diversion of collected revenue, 
 
-- lack of resource management with little or no 
accountability, 
 
-- lack of inspectional tools, training and oversight, 
 
-- improper warehousing, transfer and transportation control 
of cargo, 
 
-- dysfunctional brokerage system favoring trader 
interference and influence, 
 
-- ineffective and inefficient traffic control and customs- 
controlled space, 
 
-- inadequately equipped facilities and workforce, 
 
-- poor communications and inadequate automated systems, and 
 
-- handwritten records with little or no dissemination. 
 
4. (SBU) GoA officials who accompanied the IBMAT team were 
alarmed by what they saw at the BCPs.  Subsequent individual 
meetings between the ARG Chief of Staff, Deputy Finance 
Minister Shahrani, Director General of Customs Awad and 
Ministry of Commerce Senior Advisor Haqiqi led to the 
following proposals and actions. (NOTE: Deputy Minister of 
Finance and Customs Farhad was not available for the 
assessment team visit, a sign that his personal position in 
the ministry may be in jeopardy.  Deputy Minister Shahrani 
is considered a likely replacement.  We expect that several 
of the proposals will require broader policy dialogue within 
 
KABUL 00001975  003.4 OF 006 
 
 
the GoA, which we will encourage, at the Ambassadorial level 
if necessary. 
 
-- Deputy Finance Minister Shahrani will request a 
presidential decree naming a single ministry, recommended to 
be the Finance Ministry, to be the lead ministry for GoA 
Border Management activities; 
 
-- Deputy Finance Minister Shahrani will request a 
presidential decree closing the minor border crossing points 
to commercial traffic. (Note: This process has been 
initiated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.); 
 
-- Deputy Finance Minister Shahrani will support an increase 
in budget to fund customs operations and provide incentives 
(better compensation, rewards for uncovering undervalued 
cargo, etc.) and continual improvement of border management 
programs to wean them from donor reliance; 
 
--  Col. Ayub, commander of the 6th Brigade of the border 
police with responsibility for the Herat, Islam Qalah and 
Towraghundi area, would be given a copy of the MOU between 
the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance 
defining roles and responsibilities of each at the BCPs; 
 
-- Col. Ayub, being told that the ABP were not responsible 
for assuring the performance of customs officials, agreed to 
limit his operations to tasks identified in the MOU and not 
interfere with customs officials.  (Note: As a subsequent 
follow-up to this action, Deputy Minister Shahrani met with 
MoI Minister Muqbal to implement this decision.), and; 
 
--  A joint MoI and MoF team will travel to Islam Qalah by 1 
May to define and agree on physical areas of responsibility 
of the customs officials, customs police and ABP. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
STAFFING A BORDER MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
5.  (SBU) The Embassy (ARG)-led BMI has insufficient customs 
and border expertise to successfully critique and support 
the GoA to implement reform efforts or rapidly assess the 
best knowledge/skill set needed to provide prompt corrective 
action to border security and customs operational concerns. 
We propose an international Border Management Task Force 
(BMTF) concept be resourced to manage the program over the 
next 18 months. The task force would be initially managed by 
the ARG and would report progress to the Department, DOD, 
affected Afghan ministries and the involved donor community. 
We would propose to expand the international make-up of the 
existing BMI efforts by seeking BMTF leadership and 
participation from the wider donor community. The BMTF would 
have a goal of placing the entire BMI in GoA control within 
18 months.  (Comment: To be effective, the BMTF will require 
a GoA lead agent with the appropriate authority to enforce 
inter-ministerial cooperation and autonomy to direct 
necessary changes in GoA activities regarding border 
management activities.   This requirement would be partially 
accomplished upon signature of the first Presidential Decree 
mentioned in paragraph 4.) 
 
 
KABUL 00001975  004.4 OF 006 
 
 
6.  (SBU) The BMTF would incorporate international donor and 
Afghanistan-based USG personnel where possible.  The 
structure as currently envisioned is estimated to require 
nine full time positions, two part time (not funded by this 
proposal) and two support positions in Kabul and 12 
observers/mentors for the top four BCPs for a period of 18 
months.  The approximate cost of these positions would be 
USD 6 million over the 18 month period split into USD 1.5 
million in 2006 and USD 4.5 million in 2007.   The positions 
would be as follows: 
 
--      BMTF Program Director (full time):  Directs and 
leads the BMI activity.   Required skills include management 
of complex projects and high level of interpersonal skills. 
A background in Customs would be a significant advantage. 
We see this position as being filled by an international 
person from a country or organization (e.g. Germany, EC) 
already involved in Border Management issues. 
 
--      Deputy Director and Lead Planner (O-6 from CFC-A 
full time):  Performs planning function and provides back-up 
for the Program Director.   It should be filled by an 
experienced planner with project management experience. 
 
--     GoA Coordinator (CFC-A part time):  Maintains on- 
going working relationships between the Task Force and the 
Ministries of Interior, Finance, Commerce and others as 
required.   This position would be part time and could be 
filled by CFC-A's PMI Finance Ministry liaison. 
 
--     Trade Facilitation Coordinator (USAID part time): 
Ensures that policies, practices and procedures addressed as 
part of BMI implementation are consistent with long range 
plans to facilitate trade between Afghanistan and its 
regional neighbors.  This position would be part time and 
could be filled by a USAID Bearing Point Ministry of 
Commerce advisor. 
 
--   Customs System Design and Implementation Coordinator 
(full time): Expert familiar with all aspects of immigration 
and customs.  Once a specific customs "model" is agreed by 
the GoA, an immigration and customs expert from a country 
using the chosen "model" would be the best fit.  (This could 
be a USG official from DHS, but this determination would be 
made later.) 
 
--    Finance/Metrics and Donor Coordinator (full time): 
Researches and advises on sources and applications of funds 
for BMI related activities including sustainment, equipment 
and capital facilities.   Recommends potential sources of 
funding necessary to fill voids identified in the 
sources/applications exercise.  Establishes and reports on 
metrics to indicate progress in process and results. Ensures 
that donor pledges and commitments are identified, 
rationalized and applied according to BMI goals. This 
position could be filled from international donor sources. 
 
--   Border Police Systems and Integration Coordinator (full 
time):  Expert familiar with all aspects of Border Police 
requirements, the interface between Customs and Border 
Police and can recommend system changes.   This position 
could be filled with a German national detailed from the 
Police Training Program (GPPO). 
 
KABUL 00001975  005.4 OF 006 
 
 
 
--   Pilot Project Coordinator (full time):  Alternate 
Customs system expert to ensure pilot project at Islam Qalah 
is effectively executed and also provide guidance during 
each new BCP roll out. This could be a detailee from the US 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or CFC-A. 
 
--   Infrastructure Coordinator (full time):  Preferably 
from US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or CFC-A) who can 
maintain oversight and synchronization of all 
infrastructures and delivery of trained personnel at each 
BCP. 
 
--  Field LNO (full time):  Alternate financial expert and 
on site reporter of BCP activities. This could be a detailee 
from the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or CFC-A. 
 
--   EXBS Advisor (part time):  Expert with focus on EXBS 
activities.  This position already exists within the Embassy 
 
--   Observers/mentors (12 full time):  Phased into the BMTF 
as the BCPs are aligned with correct policies and 
procedures.   These contract personnel would be the 
collective consciousness of the system, based at the BCPs, 
to develop and enforce ethical behavior and conformance to 
GoA initiatives. 
 
--  Support Staff ( 2 full time):  Secretary and 
Interpreter/Translator. 
 
----------------------------------- 
ACTION PLAN: INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT 
----------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) To effect rapid change in border management and 
customs revenue collection, the BMTF would need to 
aggressively move to improve the top four BCPs (Islam Qalah, 
Towraghundi, Towrkham and Shir Khan Bandar) with appropriate 
facilities layout, traffic and goods flow and standard 
operational capabilities.   Rapid implementation at Islam 
Qalah would occur over the next 3 to nine months and include 
the following: key components to regulate and control 
pedestrian and vehicular traffic (USD 1 million), training 
of customs officials and customs police in cooperation with 
the Italian government (USD 500,000), inspection equipment 
(lighting, cameras, tools, etc) (USD 1 million) and other 
BCP infrastructure to ensure the protection of collected 
revenue (USD 500,000).   At Towraghundi additional traffic 
control would be installed (USD 300,000) and office capacity 
for customs officials on Commerce Ministry land (USD 
100,000).  Infrastructure at Towrkham has recently been 
completed by the European Commission and only minimal 
incremental infrastructure expenditure should be required. 
Shir Khan Bandar infrastructure is fully funded by JIASC and 
European Commission.  As the program develops additional 
donors will be solicited to contribute to the entire BMI 
infrastructure effort. 
 
(8)  (SBU) ACTION REQUESTED- FUNDING OF USD 9.4 MILLION FOR 
BMTF AND INFRASTRUCTURE.  Washington Agencies are advised 
that the BMTF will require USD 9.4 million to move forward 
on the BMTF personnel actions and the necessary facility, 
equipment and personnel training requirements at the four 
 
KABUL 00001975  006.4 OF 006 
 
 
top BCPs.  This includes security costs that will be 
complemented by Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) being built 
and managed by Dyncorp. The figures are based on the state 
of existing infrastructure and current levels of 
international donor commitment, and will complement current 
and anticipated levels of donor commitments. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
(9)  (SBU)  The BMI addresses all aspects of border 
management but with a core focus on customs revenue.  GoA 
customs collections in the Afghan year 1384 (21 March 2005 
to 20 March 2006) were approximately USD 190 million, 
representing almost 50 per cent of total GoA revenues.  The 
measures described above are estimated to provide an 
increase in annual customs revenue of at least USD 50 
million or a payback of the requested funds within one year 
of their receipt.  When applied country-wide (over a five 
year plan), the overall revenue increase can be expected to 
be in the area of USD 400 million (the magnitude of this 
potential increase is estimated by various donors to be 
between USD 200 million and USD 600 million). The security 
aspects will also be important although they are more 
difficult to quantify. 
 
NEUMANN