Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06HOCHIMINHCITY503, VIETNAM PARTY CONGRESS: HCMC REACTIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06HOCHIMINHCITY503.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HOCHIMINHCITY503 2006-05-17 03:18 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
VZCZCXRO7097
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHHM #0503/01 1370318
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170318Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0835
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 0608
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0874
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 000503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL ECON SOCI PGOV VM
SUBJECT: VIETNAM PARTY CONGRESS: HCMC REACTIONS 
 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000503  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  HCMC-based businessmen, bureaucrats and 
journalists are disappointed, but realistic about the results of 
the Party Congress.  Despite the strong push from the reform 
wing, in their view, conservatives and supporters of the status 
quo prevailed.  They are uncertain about the orientation of 
Prime Minister-select Nguyen Tan Dzung.  While decisive, they 
fret that he draws his strength from Mekong Delta conservatives 
and the security establishment.  Our contacts report that the 
Party has begun to close ranks after intense pre-Party Congress 
maneuvering.  The Party has made it clear to HCMC-newspaper 
editors that it wants a "soft landing" on the PMU-18 corruption 
scandal.  While unenthusiastic about the results of the 
Congress, our contacts see little prospect of significant 
backsliding in areas where there has been progress.  They look 
to Vietnam's WTO accession as the external push that the Party 
needs to catalyze further socio-economic reform.  End Summary. 
 
Early Views Of The Party Congress 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Over the past few weeks, ConGenOffs have pulsed 
journalists, key businessmen and city bureaucrats on their views 
of the Party Congress, leadership changes and the role of the 
media post-Congress as an agent of change and corruption 
watchdog.  All these contacts generally self-identified as being 
associated with the reform wing of the Party.  They were 
disappointed:  status quo at best, perhaps one step back, one 
journalist told us.  HCMC business leaders didn't see anything 
coming out of the Congress that would accelerate economic 
growth.  The reform camp was particularly disappointed that the 
Party Congress political report didn't push for an overhaul of 
the state-owned sector.  Despite strong reform entreaties, the 
State Owned Enterprises remain the "leading force" in the 
economy. 
 
Inside Baseball 
--------------- 
 
3. (SBU) A leading HCMC-based journalist posted to Hanoi for the 
Party Congress said that the outcome of the Party's personnel 
debate was in doubt until the last possible moment.  A number of 
senior Party leaders continued to oppose Nong Duc Manh's 
reselection as General Secretary.  The Saturday immediately 
before the Party Congress, Party elders, including former Party 
Secretary Le Kha Phieu, launched a drive to draft outgoing 
 
SIPDIS 
National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Van An as an alternative to 
Manh.  Our contact told us that An came under intense pressure 
not to accept the challenger mantle.  Reporters who were 
covering the story were warned by security services to be 
"extremely careful" about how and what they reported on the An 
story.  Within 24 hours, An formally declared that he was 
retiring.  Two other well-placed HCMC business contacts told us 
that HCMC's Party Secretary Nguyen Minh Triet also decided not 
to challenge Manh for the top Party slot, despite internal 
balloting in which Triet reportedly placed higher than Manh. 
 
4. (SBU) This press contact said that the Politburo was focused 
purely on internal politics when it made the decision (which it 
later reversed) not to install new GVN leaders until after the 
APEC leaders meeting.  Party leaders did not consider the optics 
of lame duck leaders meeting the President and other world 
leaders a few weeks before they left office.  Our contact did 
not know what led the Politburo to reverse that decision. 
However, Vo Viet Thanh, Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister for 
the South told the Consul General on May 8 that the Central 
Committee will meet shortly to put forward formally a new 
leadership slate to the National Assembly for confirmation. 
According to Thanh, the National Assembly will vote on the slate 
in mid-June. 
 
5. (SBU) Our press contact confirmed that Central Vietnam got 
short shrift in key personnel decisions; the Party did not 
consider leaders from the Center such as Danang Party Secretary 
Ba Thanh sufficiently talented to be promoted.  Reemphasizing 
political control over the military was also a preoccupation at 
the Party Congress.  This, our contact said, helps explain why 
the political report called for reinvigoration of the political 
commissar system in the military.  Our contact added that the 
Party decided not to promote Nong Duc Manh's son to the Central 
Committee because of concerns that it would signal that dynastic 
politics was a factor in personnel selection. 
 
HCMC Bureaucrats and Businessmen 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) In separate discussions, two HCMC business leaders 
fretted that HCMC Party Secretary Nguyen Minh Triet's probable 
elevation to State President effectively sidelines a reformer 
from his powerbase.  HCMC People's Committee Chairman Le Thanh 
Hai, Triet's likely replacement, is seen as a more pragmatic, 
political lightweight.  One city bureaucrat noted that Vietnam 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000503  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
needs a "rejuvenating," new generation of leaders, but such 
figures cannot be found.  Although disappointed, the two city 
administrators we spoke with went on to say that "there will be 
no turning back," but progress will be gradual.  The two 
officials made it clear that they looked to Vietnam's entry into 
the WTO to drive further change. 
 
7. (SBU) Our HCMC contacts are undecided about Nguyen Tan Dzung. 
 They acknowledge that he has a reputation for being decisive 
and note that he sent his children to the U.S. for higher 
education.  (As a result they say, one married a 
Vietnamese-American and the other now works for VinaCapital, one 
of Vietnam's largest investment funds.)  That said, they see 
Dzung drawing his strength from more conservative elements deep 
in the Mekong Delta and from Hanoi-based security services. 
They also see him as more pro-China in his orientation, although 
Vo Viet Thanh insisted that this was a reflection of the 
specific role that he played as Deputy Prime Minister. 
 
The Media and Corruption 
------------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) A number of press contacts in HCMC confirmed that the 
leak of the multi-million dollar PMU-18 corruption scandal 
(which embroiled inter-alia the Minister of Transportation) was 
the result of the pre-Congress infighting between General 
Secretary Manh and DPM Dzung.  One press contact said that, 
 
SIPDIS 
while the two leaders do not trust each other, they will be able 
to work together post-Congress. 
 
9. (SBU) Now that leadership decisions have been made, our press 
contacts report that the Party is closing ranks quickly.  Beyond 
those already implicated in the PMU-18 scandal, other lines of 
inquiry on corruption would be closed.  Highlighting how this 
process is already underway, on May 8, Vo Viet Thanh told us 
that the media "misconstrued" the relationship of a Ministry of 
Public Security General Cao Ngoc Oanh to central figures in the 
PMU-18 scandal.  (Note: UN contacts in Hanoi report that the 
rehabilitation of General Oanh is underway.  He was approved 
last week to represent Vietnam at an international law 
enforcement conference in Singapore, a decision made personally 
by Minister of Public Security Le Hong Anh.  End note.)   On May 
11, Prime Minister Khai issued a public warning to the media, 
asking the Ministry of Culture and Information to "take measures 
to seriously sanction press agencies and people involved in 
writing and publishing untrue information" about the corruption 
scandal. 
 
10. (SBU) Various contacts in Tuoi Tre (Youth) and Phap Luat 
(The Law) newspapers, two of the HCMC-based newspapers that 
spearheaded debate on reform and on PMU-18 before the Party 
Congress, told us that the Party now has tightened up access to 
information in the Congress' aftermath.  They say that Vietnam's 
reform-oriented press will not press the reform and 
anti-corruption agenda further at this point.  One media contact 
explained that senior editors of Tuoi Tre, Phap Luat, and the 
web-based VietnamNet are under intense scrutiny due to their 
pre-Congress pushing on reform.  They have no appetite for 
further confrontation with Party ideologues at this point.  When 
one Hanoi-based editor known to have pushed the envelope of 
reporting on Party reform pre-Congress was asked if he was 
concerned about possible post-Congress pressure, he laughingly 
replied, "oh, I bought my plane tickets for the United States 
even before the Party Congress.  I was expecting pressure." 
 
11. (SBU) Comment:  While disappointed that the Party chose 
control and the status quo over accelerated reform, our contacts 
outside the Party are realists and survivors.  Those inside the 
Party know when they need to go back "on message."  All 
understand that the relatively greater openness and debate that 
characterized the pre-Congress period is over and that they need 
to hunker down until the next opportunity presents itself.  End 
Comment. 
WINNICK