VZCZCXRO4058
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #1245/01 1440413
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240413Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2053
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1163
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHZU/APEC COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HANOI 001245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KCOR VM
SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S PARTY CONGRESS: CONSERVATIVES AND 
PROGRESSIVES TIE, LE HONG ANH IS MVP 
 
REFS: A. Hanoi 943; B. Hanoi 895; C. Hanoi 839; D. 
Hanoi 848; E. HCMC 382; F. Hanoi 788; G. Hanoi 771; H. 
Hanoi 1090; I. HCMC 503 
 
HANOI 00001245  001.6 OF 006 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Analysis of the new membership of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam's Central Committee and 
Politburo following the April National Party Congress 
indicates a barely perceptible victory of conservative 
over progressive elements within the Party (although 
Party insiders now say that the 
progressive/conservative rubric is becoming 
increasingly meaningless.)  Restive Party Congress 
delegates thwarted the Central Committee's plans to 
expand the Politburo to 17 members and declined to 
elect two of the favored Politburo candidates to the 
new Central Committee at all.  Minister of Public 
Security Le Hong Anh was the surprise winner, emerging 
as a power broker with a huge mandate within the Party, 
but without a formal position - for now.  End Summary. 
 
----- 
Nuts and Bolts of the New Central Committee 
----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) announced 
the list of new Central Committee members, including 
160 official members and 21 alternates, during the 10th 
National Party Congress on April 24 (Refs A-D). 
Compared to the previous Central Committee, members 
concurrently holding key Government positions decreased 
from 34 to 28, including 15 vice ministers, 10 
ministers, the State Bank Governor and Deputy Prime 
Ministers Nguyen Tan Dzung (Ref E) and Pham Gia Khiem. 
The reduction represents the fact that some key 
officials are retiring or being forced out, and their 
replacements have not yet been named; these successors 
will almost certainly come from the new Central 
Committee, so the number of Central Committee members 
holding key government appointments will stabilize at 
around 34, or perhaps slightly higher.  Some 22 Central 
Committee members are currently holding key Party 
positions at central offices and media agencies, as 
compared to 30 in the previous slate.  Again, this 
reflects retiring officials whose replacements have yet 
to be announced. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The military now has 16 of its own as Central 
Committee members, as compared with 11 in the previous 
Central Committee.  Seven military generals were re- 
elected, including Vice Minister and Chief of General 
staff Phung Quang Thanh (who is expected to be named 
Minister of Defense), General Political Department 
Chief Le Van Dzung and three out of four other vice 
ministers:  Nguyen Huy Hieu, Phan Trung Kien and Nguyen 
Van Duoc.  New members representing the military in the 
Central Committee include commanders of the Navy, the 
Air Defense Force and all seven military regions. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Ministry of Public Security did very well 
in the election, with seven of the nine top MPS 
officials winning seats.  These include Minister Le 
Hong Anh and Vice Ministers Nguyen Khanh Toan, Le The 
Tiem and Nguyen Van Huong.  Furthermore, the three new 
vice ministers who were appointed just before the Party 
Congress opened in April also made the cut.  This large 
representation on the Central Committee adds weight to 
the reports that the Ministry of Public Security will 
split into two ministries (Ref F). 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was shut out 
of the Central Committee; no MFA officials are among 
the regular membership, and the alternate list contains 
just one mid-level (though fast rising) cadre: 
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for International 
Organizations Pham Binh Minh.  However, MFA sources 
point out, Deputy PM Pham Gia Khiem, who was elected to 
the Politburo, is slated to take the Foreign Minister 
position in addition to his Deputy PM job; the current 
FM, Nguyen Dzy Nien, is not a member of the Politburo. 
"We are in better shape with our Minister on the 
Politburo and no representation in the Central 
Committee, rather than lots of representatives in the 
Central Committee and no spot on the Politburo," one 
CPV member who works at the MFA told Poloff. 
 
¶6. (SBU) As in past Central Committees, geographically, 
 
HANOI 00001245  002.6 OF 006 
 
 
the new Central Committee is extremely diverse.  Sixty- 
three out of 64 provinces are represented, with only 
the Central Highlands province of Dak Nong left out. 
Hoang Cong Hoan, the former Party Secretary of Lang Son 
Province, was not re-elected to the Central Committee. 
In March, he was dismissed and reprimanded by the 
Politburo for "signs of violations to the principle of 
centralized democracy and Party's working method" after 
becoming embroiled in a corruption scandal and the 
embarrassing and expensive public failure of an 
infrastructure project.  However, Hoan landed on his 
feet:  in spite of being sacked in Lang Son and losing 
his Central Committee seat, he was appointed a vice 
chairman of the Central Committee-affiliated Commission 
for Management and Finance, a position some would argue 
is a promotion from his previous job in Lang Son. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Hanoi has three representatives in the new 
Central Committee, including Party Secretary Nguyen Phu 
Trong, Deputy Party Secretary Phung Huu Phu and 
Chairman of the Municipal People's Committee Nguyen 
Quoc Trieu.  For Ho Chi Minh City, Party Secretary 
Nguyen Minh Triet, Deputy Party Secretary Le Hoang 
Quan, Chairman of the HCMC People's Committee Le Thanh 
Hai and Vice Chairman of the People's Committee Nguyen 
Thien Nhan were named to the Central Committee. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The "election" of the Central Committee went 
according to the CPV's plan.  According to official 
sources, all members of the new Central Committee 
(official and alternate) were nominated by the previous 
Central Committee; none of the two self-nominated or 33 
"independent" candidates nominated by other delegates 
at the 10th Party Congress succeeded.  The failures 
included widely disliked Minister of Public Health Tran 
Thi Trung Chien and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Nguyen Phu Binh. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The presence of alternates in the new Central 
Committee is important, and this is the first time in 
20 years the Central Committee has included alternates. 
According to local interlocutors, all 21 alternates are 
successful mid-level officials, and their alternate 
membership in the Central Committee marks them for 
promotion in the future.  The last time the CPV Central 
Committee elected alternate members, in 1986, the 
alternates were already high-ranking officials. 
Alternate membership at that time was a form of 
recognition of achievement without real significance, 
commented local observers. 
 
--- 
Politburo Structure: Narrow Victory for "Conservatives" 
--- 
 
¶10. (SBU) According to our interlocutors, Nong Duc 
Manh's re-election reflects a narrow victory for 
conservative over progressive elements within the 
Party's Central Committee after a surprisingly tough 
battle.  Ngo Cuong, Editor-in-Chief of the Supreme 
People's Court-affiliated Judicial Journal, said 
conservative elements favored the "safe choice" of 
retaining Manh in office for another term, instead of 
replacing him with challenger Nguyen Minh Triet from Ho 
Chi Minh City, despite Triet's popularity among 
delegates attending the Party Congress.  According to 
Cuong, over the past five years, Manh has proven to be 
an incompetent and indecisive leader, which in fact 
made him attractive to those in the Party who do not 
want a strong leader who might challenge the 
deliberative consensus-based decisionmaking process in 
the Party.  Conservative elements within the Party, who 
favored the "status-quo" scenario, successfully 
insisted on having the Central Committee elect the 
Party Chief rather than adopt an alternative proposal 
to open up the Party Chief election to the entire 
Congress, a setback for the "progressives." 
 
¶11. (SBU) According to Cuong, these conservative 
elements were counting on the new Central Committee 
members to demonstrate loyalty to Manh, whose 
"Personnel Task Force" recommended their selection by 
the previous Central Committee.  The failure of any non- 
sanctioned candidate to win election to the Central 
Committee and the rejection of the proposal to expand 
voting for the Politburo to the entire Congress were 
victories for the conservatives, former Office of the 
National Assembly Vice Chairman (and failed candidate 
for the Central Committee) Nguyen Sy Dzung told Poloff. 
 
HANOI 00001245  003.6 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) Party Chief Nong Duc Manh held off a 
challenge from Nguyen Minh Triet, but his allies had to 
yield key State and Government positions to the so- 
called "southern progressive factions" in the 
Politburo.  This is a clear reflection of the current 
power struggle within the country's top institutions, 
commented Prof. Ngo Van Hoa from the Institute of 
History.  Among southerners coming out on top, former 
HCMC Party Secretary Truong Tan Sang, chief of the 
Party Central Economic Commission in the previous 
Central Committee, has been named Permanent Standing 
Member of the Politburo Secretariat, a powerful 
position that is sometimes considered deputy to the 
Party Chief.  Similarly, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai 
has publicly endorsed Permanent Deputy Prime Minister 
Nguyen Tan Dzung (also from the south) to replace him 
as PM at the end of the ongoing National Assembly 
session.  Finally, current HCMC Party Secretary Nguyen 
Minh Triet is expected to become the State President. 
This represents a net gain on the Politburo for the 
supposedly progressive southerners, but Manh's survival 
as Party Chief means the status-quo conservatives 
maintain the upper hand, slightly. 
 
--- 
Rank and File Thwart the Establishment's Plans 
--- 
 
¶13. (SBU) When the Congress' votes for Central 
Committee members were counted, it was clear that Manh 
and his allies had received a bloody nose.  Two 
Government ministers, Home Affairs Minister Do Quang 
Trung and Minister of Education and Training Nguyen 
Minh Hien, were not elected to the new Central 
Committee despite being nominated by the previous 
Central Committee, demonstrating a clear lack of 
confidence in their abilities among the Congress 
delegates.  Party insiders said that both Hien and 
Trung were expected to be named to the new Politburo. 
The two ministers, however, were blamed for 
shortcomings and mistakes that took place in their 
domains that outweighed their Party connections and 
ideological loyalty, Cuong asserted. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Trung's downfall involved the PMU 18 
corruption scandal (Refs G and H), disclosed shortly 
before the Party Congress opened.  That case involved 
both the Minister and a Vice Minister of 
Transportation, both of whom were supposed to become 
members of the new Central Committee, with the Minister 
expected to be promoted to Deputy Prime Minister. 
Trung, the Minister of Home Affairs, was implicated 
because of the work he did in his position to 
facilitate the promotion of the central figure in the 
scandal.  Though he escaped investigation and 
prosecution, the Congress delegates registered their 
anger at his involvement in the scandal by withholding 
votes for him for the Central Committee.  As a result, 
he is likely to lose not just his elevation to the 
Politburo, but also his job, despite the efforts of 
Party insiders to protect him. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The other "missing member" of the Politburo, 
according to Prof. Hoa, is Phung Huu Phu, currently 
standing vice chairman of Hanoi Party's Committee and a 
protege of Hanoi Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong.  Trong, 
currently heading the CPV Central Committee's 
Theoretical Council, has long been seen as a truly 
conservative ideologue and is expected to replace 
Nguyen Van An as Chairman of the National Assembly 
during the May-June 2006 session of the National 
Assembly.  Phu was supposed to be elected to the 
Politburo, ensuring his succession to Trong's Hanoi 
Party Chief position.  However, he failed to win a 
majority of Central Committee votes and was thus left 
out of the Politburo, Hoa asserted.  Pham Quang Nghi, 
the conservative Minister of Culture and Information, 
who was elected to the Politburo, is now expected to 
replace Trong.  With the absence of Hien, Trung and 
Phu, the Politburo stands at 14, despite the earlier 
decision to elect 17 members.  No other candidate 
received a more than 50 percent approval rating.  That 
said, some HCMC contacts report that the Politburo will 
expand membership to 17 later in the year. 
 
--- 
Choice of Manh versus Triet:  Role of Le Hong Anh 
--- 
 
HANOI 00001245  004.6 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶16. (SBU) Echoing Cuong's assertion regarding Nguyen 
Minh Triet's popularity as the challenger to Nong Duc 
Manh for the position of Party Chief among delegates 
attending the Party Congress, Professor Hoa said 
Triet's chances of unseating Manh were good until 
Minister of Public Security Le Hong Anh, who has a 
strong powerbase in the Party and was the top vote- 
getter in the Politburo after Manh's coronation, 
withdrew his support for Triet at the last minute.  One 
government official, speaking to Poloff on the deepest 
of background, noted with disgust that following the 
Party Congress, "Anh is in the kingmaker seat, and 
suddenly all the PMU-18 pressure on Manh goes away." 
 
¶17. (SBU) That official noted that Le Hong Anh is the 
lead official directing the investigation of the PMU-18 
case, which was widely considered to be very damaging 
to Manh because PMU-18 employs several of his proteges, 
including his son-in-law.  Now, however, investigators 
have "failed to reach the end of the trail because 
powerful figures have seemingly put a stop to them." 
The official noted that soon after the conclusion of 
the Congress, the Ministry of Public Security conducted 
another meeting, after which Major General Cao Ngoc 
Oanh stood with a relaxed smile at a press conference, 
side by side with his fellow investigators who 
confirmed that they are "still on the same boat."  Oanh 
had lost his ticket to attend the Party Congress, as 
well as his widely-expected election to the Central 
Committee and promotion to Vice Minister of Public 
Security, after press reports of his involvement in the 
case appeared. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Cuong and Hoa quoted other local observers as 
saying there appears to have been a significant change 
in MPS's approach to the PMU-18 case since the Party 
Congress, which must relate to a change in Le Hong 
Anh's attitude about it.  Local observers say Anh, who 
is still relatively young at the age of 57, is likely 
to take a more important portfolio within the Party. 
They noted that for the first time, the list of members 
to the new Politburo was made public in the order of 
votes each member received, instead of in rank of 
importance/top positions.  Anh received the second 
largest number of votes of support, after Manh, who 
received everyone's vote by virtue of already having 
been chosen Party Leader. 
 
--- 
Conservative vs. Progressive: Consider Corruption 
--- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Despite our desire to frame Vietnamese intra- 
Party politics as a competition between two well- 
defined factions, our interlocutors caution that 
"conservative/progressive" labels have become much less 
meaningful.  Cuong, Hoa and Senior Colonel Tran Nhung, 
a senior journalist of Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's 
Army) newspaper, said there is no clear difference 
between progressive and conservative elements in terms 
of ideological belief and only a limited difference in 
terms of geographic origin.  The only significant 
difference between them might be their attitude on how 
to promote national anti-corruption efforts and deal 
with corrupt officials and the speed they prefer for 
economic (and, to a lesser extent, political) reform. 
There exists a common belief that current prominent 
southern figures like Triet, Dzung and Sang have not 
been as involved in corruption cases and/or the use of 
corrupt officials, which makes them better candidates 
for top leadership positions (although Sang lost his 
luster for many years because his oversight of HCMC 
during the heyday of mobster Nam Cam).  For this 
reason, more corrupt elements within the Party often 
insist on "safe choices" when it comes to personnel 
issues, using the pretext of maintaining stability in 
order to avoid "disruption" through overzealous pursuit 
of corrupt cadres, said Nhung. 
 
¶20. (SBU) The Party is attempting to make the right 
noises on the subject of corruption.  Speaking at the 
opening session of the 10th Party Congress in April, 
Party Chief Nong Duc Manh made a shocking statement (by 
Vietnamese standards), saying that corruption is "one 
of the major threats to the survival of the system." 
"The degradation in terms of political ideology, moral 
quality, lifestyle, opportunism, individualism and 
bureaucracy, corruption and wastefulness by cadres and 
 
HANOI 00001245  005.6 OF 006 
 
 
civil servants is serious," he said. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Furthermore, in May, Prime Minister Phan Van 
Khai said the Party will assign a Politburo member to 
be Deputy Prime Minister in charge of anti-corruption 
efforts.  According to Ngo Cuong and Tran Nhung, it is 
likely that Truong Vinh Trong, current CPV Central 
Internal Commission chief and a strong voice for anti- 
corruption and Party reform, will be assigned to that 
position.  Ngo Cuong, however, expressed doubt that 
Trong will be able to make much progress.  Local 
observers who followed the Party Congress were 
disappointed that the Congress focused too much on 
reviewing 20 years of Doi Moi (economic renovation), 
and failed to map out the political reform that is 
essential to the promotion of democracy and 
transparency and to efficient anti-corruption efforts, 
Cuong asserted.  He quoted former Party Chief Le Kha 
Phieu as saying that "corruption is guarded by the 
perpetrators and even defended by outside sources. 
This really is a fierce battle in which, if we wish to 
win, the Party and the State must take a closer look at 
themselves."  The slowdown in PMU-18 prosecution (in 
particular Gen. Oanh's rapid rehabilitation) suggests 
that anticorruption efforts will not be too radical. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Troels Vester, a program manager and law 
enforcement expert in Hanoi for the UN Office of Drugs 
and Crime, pointed out that although MPS's prosecution 
of the PMU-18 case may not have been a triumphant 
success from the perspective of crime fighting, it was 
a devastatingly clear demonstration of Le Hong Anh's 
power over any Government or Party official, up to and 
including the General Secretary.  Considering that: 
public sentiment is so clearly disgusted with public 
corruption; the main current mechanisms for 
investigating and prosecuting corruption now fall under 
the Ministry of Public Security; nearly every senior 
Government and Party official in Vietnam (or their 
families) is guilty of at least some corrupt activity; 
and, Minister of Public Security Anh received a 
commanding mandate in the Poliburo election, he has 
amassed more power than any Vietnamese official in a 
generation, Vester said. 
 
--- 
Comment 
--- 
 
¶23. (SBU) Public Security Minister Le Hong Anh was the 
clearest winner in the 10th National Party Congress.  A 
relatively low-profile member of the Politburo with 
ties to Nguyen Tan Dzung, in the months before the 
National Party Congress, Anh was the key figure 
directing the investigation and prosecution of the PMU- 
18 case.  Considering the smorgasbord of possible 
corruption investigations available to the MPS in 
Vietnam, the timing and targeting of this one (a few 
months before the Congress, at an agency stacked with 
Manh proteges, including Manh's son-in-law) could not 
have been accidental.  Weakened conservative 
northerners rallied around Manh, but ultimately had to 
yield both the State President and the PM jobs to 
southerners (in the past, only the PM job went to a 
southerner) before they secured Anh's support for 
retaining Manh. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The drama of the 10th Party Congress may not 
be over.  The Party took the unprecedented step of 
acknowledging that Anh received the most Politburo 
votes of any Central Committee member other than Manh. 
Listing Anh as number two in the Politburo, a position 
normally accorded to the State President regardless of 
vote counts, is a loud signal that Anh will hold 
significant authority.  His specific job title is not 
yet decided; he may stay as Minister of Public 
Security, or take over the previously dormant position 
of National Security Committee head on the Politburo 
and oversee MPS or its successor agencies from there. 
And there is another possibility that is increasingly 
whispered about in Hanoi and HCMC:  that Manh had to 
agree to step down early in his second term as the 
price of his re-election, just as General Secretary Do 
Muoi was forced to yield to Le Kha Phieu in 1997. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Regardless of what eventually happens to 
Manh, the 57 year-old Anh has positioned himself to be 
a powerful force in Vietnamese political life, which 
after the 10th Party Congress appears to be more 
 
HANOI 00001245  006.6 OF 006 
 
 
personal and less geographic and ideological.  End 
Comment. 
 
BOARDMAN