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Viewing cable 06BRATISLAVA417, Slovak Election Scenescetter

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BRATISLAVA417 2006-05-26 14:59 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bratislava
VZCZCXRO9558
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHSL #0417/01 1461459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261459Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9871
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 000417 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/NCE 
BUDAPEST FOR USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV LO
SUBJECT: Slovak Election Scenescetter 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000417  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
This cable is sensitive but unclassified (SBU).  Please treat 
accordingly. 
 
1. Summary.  (SBU)  Recent opinion polls indicate that eight 
of the 21 parties running in the June 17 elections will gain 
the five percent of valid votes cast required to enter 
parliament.  SMER-Social Democracy leads the polls with more 
than 30 percent support. The next highest party, either SKDU 
or HZDS depending on the poll, does not exceed 12 percent 
support.  Any coalition is likely, therefore, to involve at 
least three political parties.  The 2006 campaign has been 
less showy and bombastic than in previous election years, 
largely because candidates are unwilling to offend rivals with 
whom they might have to form a coalition after election day. 
It is difficult to make predictions on post-election 
coalitions, but if SMER comes within 5 percent of its current 
polling results, it will likely be part of the future 
government.  PM Dzurinda's job is more difficult.  To keep 
SMER out it seems he would have to resurrect his coalition as 
it looked before the Christian Democrats left, and might have 
to include Vladimir Meciar's HZDS.  The post-election day 
"mathematics" of coalition formation will be at least as 
important as the vote itself.  End summary 
 
WHO WILL BE IN PARLIAMENT AFTER JUNE 17? 
---------------------------------------- 
2. (U) Political parties are busy campaigning in preparation 
for the fast-approaching June 17 parliamentary elections. 
Recent political polls suggest, however, that the campaign has 
not significantly influenced voter preferences, which have 
remained quite stable for the past several months. 
 
3. (SBU) These are the eight parties that are most likely to 
reach parliament: 
 
SMER-Social Democracy, headed by Robert Fico, has consistently 
polled in the 30 to 34 percent range throughout the year; last 
week's poll listed them at 31.7 percent.  In 2002, SMER was 
polling in the 20-25 percent range but dropped sharply in the 
last month before election day and finally gained just 13.46 
percent of valid votes cast.  Some observers have predicted a 
similar scenario this year, although the party appears better 
organized, has presented a more moderate image and has been 
more willing to leave its options open regarding future 
partners.  Most observers expect it to do considerably better 
than in 2002, but not to reach its current polling percentage. 
SMER would consider 25 percent or better to be a victory. 
Minister Kukan of SDKU told the Ambassador he expects SMER to 
come in with at least 22 percent. 
 
HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), led by former Prime 
Minister Vladimir Meciar, received the highest percentage of 
valid votes cast in 2002, 19.5 percent.  This year HZDS has 
consistently polled in the second or third position, with 10 - 
11.5 percent support, and that support has stabilized over the 
past year.  After being shut out of the previous government, 
Meciar has tried to sound like a middle-of-the road politician 
in order that the other major parties will view HZDS as an 
acceptable coalition partner.  Meciar seems most inclined to 
work with the current ruling coalition parties (SDKU and SMK) 
and KDH, although HZDS has only ruled out cooperation with the 
Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS). 
 
SDKU (Party of Democratic and Christian Union) of PM Mikulas 
Dzurinda is now polling between 9 and 11 percent and is 
running on its record of reform.  SDKU is the party expected 
to gain most from a low voter turnout and the tendency of many 
Slovaks to make up their mind in the voting booth. In 2002 
SDKU surprised most observers by coming out with 15.1 percent 
of valid votes cast despite months of polls that put its 
support in the 10 percent range.  SDKU's natural coalition 
partners are SMK and KDH, although the personal animosity 
between the leaders of SDKU and KDH resulting from the 
collapse of the government in February would have to be gently 
finessed. 
 
SMK (Party of the Hungarian Coalition) has the most stable 
polling numbers of any party at around 10 percent which, not 
coincidentally, is also the estimated percentage of Slovakia's 
citizens who claim Hungarian nationality. SMK has been a 
stable coalition partner and has shown interest in a renewed 
coalition with SDKU.  That said, SMK is quite flexible and is 
considered a possible coalition partner for SMER as well.  SMK 
has ruled out participating in a government only with KSS or 
SNS. 
 
KDH (Christian Democratic Movement), which is polling around 
9.5 percent, pulled out of the GOS coalition in February 2006, 
but would be willing to continue in some way with its former 
coalition partners.  It strictly rejects cooperation with 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000417  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Meciar, but not with his party, HZDS.  Some of its most 
prominent members do not want the party to join a SMER-led 
coalition but political realities will keep this option open. 
 
SNS (Slovak National Party), which does not currently hold 
seats in parliament due to fracturing in 2002, is more united 
and its popularity surged again in 2005.  It now polls around 
8 percent.  Its controversial and nationalist leader, Jan 
Slota, has indicated that he is ready to cooperate with SMER 
or HZDS, but SMER has not indicated any interest in working 
with SNS. Unfortunately, recent polling surveys indicate that 
none of the major parties - with the sole exception of SMK - 
have ruled out cooperation with SNS.  Even top members of SDKU 
have noted that giving Slota a ministry is not much different 
than what was done with Pavol Rusko of ANO. 
 
SF (Free Forum) is the new party of former SDKU MP Zuzana 
Martinakova.  While not dramatically different than SDKU in 
her philosophy, Martinakova's harsh criticism of PM Dzurinda 
suggests that any future alliance with SDKU is unlikely.  The 
party now polls at 6.0 percent, but has weakened slightly in 
recent weeks due to internal dissension and is not a sure bet 
to make it into parliament. 
 
KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia) currently holds seats in 
parliament.  By its own admission, however, the party has 
little to offer voters since it is an unacceptable partner for 
all the other major parties.  KSS has been polling at a low 
but consistent 5.5 percent, and voter turnout will determine 
whether they can hold onto a minimum number of seats in 
Parliament. 
 
FORM AND SUBSTANCE CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS ELECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
4. (U) The elections are regulated by a law passed in 2004, 
which addresses concerns raised in previous elections.  The 
law provides for elections to be held over the course of one 
day, as opposed to two days as was done in the past, and 
allows for votes by mail.  Three weeks before the election 
private TV and radio stations can broadcast political 
advertisements under the same conditions as the public media. 
Election campaigns and advertising can continue through 
election day; however, poll results must not be published 
after the polls open.  Parties have no limits on how much they 
can spend on their campaigns. 
 
5. (U) The new law did not change Slovakia's weak electoral 
districting system.  In all polling stations across the 
country, voters choose from an identical set of 21 lists (one 
for each political party) of 150 candidates (one for each seat 
in Parliament).  This lowers the accountability of candidates 
and decreases the public's desire to participate.  Lists of 
party candidates are chosen by party convention rather than by 
voters.  In addition to a vote for a party, each voter can 
also pick up to four "preferential candidates" from the 
respective party list.  The role of voters was notably 
strengthened in this regard by lowering the threshold for 
preferential votes from 10 to 3 percent. (In the last 
election, only one candidate was able to get to parliament 
thanks to preferential votes.)  Thus, if a party gets 100,000 
votes, a candidate with at least 3,000 votes would move to the 
top of the list (rank-ordered by preferential votes), even if 
the party had put him/her towards the bottom of the list. 
This fact could motivate candidates to run their own personal 
campaigns, in addition to the official ones with party 
election leaders. 
 
A MORE `NORMAL' CAMPAIGN 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (U) Unlike the 2002 elections that were dominated by 
Slovakia's integration efforts to both NATO and EU, the 2006 
elections have had a different focus, a struggle between the 
center-right parties currently in power, which are running 
largely on the strength of their economic reforms, and the 
left-of-center SMER, which promises to enact a more socially 
minded agenda.  SMER has not called for a complete overhaul of 
the current government's reforms, but has focused on areas 
such as the privatization of health care services, where 
public opinion clearly is against the government. 
 
7. (SBU) Though the official media campaign (TV and radio 
advertisements) begins on May 27, Slovakia is already covered 
with billboards and political leaders have been on the 
campaign trail for more than two months.  That said, the 2006 
campaign has been noticeably less showy and less bombastic 
than in previous years.  It is widely believed that parties 
are "playing nice" so that they can keep all options open for 
post-election negotiations with as few limitations as 
possible.  In addition there is no extensive anti-Meciar, pro- 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000417  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
democracy NGO mobilization this time. 
 
8.  (SBU) Voters have responded to moderation with apathy - 
important in an election whose result may depend heavily on 
turnout.  This could be the crucial factor of the election, 
since many parties have similar polling numbers but very 
different levels of core support.  In current opinion polls, 
approximately 60 percent of voters say they will vote, which 
is significantly lower than the 70 percent turnout in 2002 and 
84 percent participation rate in 1998.  Many observers expect 
participation rates to be lower, likely in the low to mid 50s. 
The head of the Election Department Livia Skultetyova told us 
recently that her estimate of voter turnout is 60 percent, and 
she firmly believes in the impartiality of the election and 
the processing of the results.  She reacted viscerally to 
Fico's recently voiced suspicion that results might be 
manipulated, noting that even Meciar did not raise such 
charges in the past. 
 
APPROVAL RATINGS UP, BUT IS ELECTORATE LOOKING FOR CHANGE? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
9. (U) Based on a survey by the center-right Institute for 
Public Affairs (IVO) from May 2006, the general perception of 
the public is less pessimistic than before.  Almost half of 
the population believes that the country is heading in the 
right direction, which is high for Slovaks, who are renowned 
for seeing the glass as half-empty.  A majority of the 
population asserts that reforms (tax, decentralization, 
pension, social benefits) had been positive to a significant 
degree, although changes are required to minimize negative 
impacts of the reforms.  The exception is health care reform, 
which was rejected outright by 72 percent of respondents.  Few 
voters, however, unequivocally endorse the reforms - only 
about 10 percent strongly support tax, pension, and social 
benefit reform.  Interestingly, opinions on government policy 
performance do not differ dramatically by party affiliation, 
except for SDKU voters, who are much more positive. 
 
10. (U) IVO predicts the gap between preferences and actual 
election results of SMER will be much smaller than in the 2002 
elections; the election results are estimated at around 25 
percent.  SMER has expanded its youthful base to include a 
more diverse but also more reliable constituency: former HZDS 
and SDL supporters, older and middle aged groups, etc. 
According to polls, 36 percent of SMER voters have firmly 
decided to vote for SMER, which is slightly more than the 
average of all political parties.  SDKU also has the capacity 
to gain more in the elections than predicted in polls; the IVO 
estimate being around 13-15 percent. 
 
COALITION NEGOTIATIONS WIDE OPEN 
-------------------------------- 
 
11. (U) The focus of the main political parties and much of 
the speculation surrounding this election is on post-June 17 
coalition negotiations.  There are several possible scenarios 
for post-election developments, but almost anything is 
possible.  Most speculation is based on an estimated election 
turnout between 50 and 60 percent. 
 
12. (SBU) The current coalition partners, SDKU and SMK, 
together with former coalition member KDH, would like to 
continue, but polling numbers show that their cumulative 
support would not give them enough seats to form a government. 
The sum of preferences for these three party (SDKU + SMK + 
KDH) according to the latest Focus poll conducted in May, 
brings a slightly smaller percentage (29.0) than SMER's 
preferences alone (31.7).  Internal disputes and gaps in 
mutual trust further reduce the likelihood of cooperation.  It 
seems that only the threat of Fico allying with HZDS and SNS 
might mobilize them to work together.  Many speculate that 
Meciar's HZDS could add to either side the missing seats to 
complete the 75 that are needed for a majority government. 
 
13. (SBU) If the election results look anything like the 
current polls, SMER will be offered the first chance by 
President Gasparovic to form a government.  Having learned his 
lesson in the past, Fico has left all options open and has 
repeatedly refused to name any potential coalition partner, 
claiming that Slovak citizens will decide at the ballot box. 
SMER's election results will likely be the biggest factor in 
coalition negotiations.  The lower the percentage, the more 
likely that SMER will be forced to compromise and form a 
government with several of the current rightist parties.  A 
Slovak version of Germany's "grand coalition" cannot be ruled 
out.  HZDS is still viewed as an unlikely partner for SMER, 
though neither party has ruled out potential cooperation. 
 
14. (SBU) Although Free Forum (SF) leader Martinakova has 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000417  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
recently expressed concern over secret talks between SMER, 
SDKU, and HZDS, her scenario seems to reflect fears of 
unstable SF voters not showing up rather than a realistic 
future set-up.  Either SMK or SNS, but not both, will likely 
be a part of any coalition.  KSS is the least likely party to 
be a part of any coalition. 
 
VALLEE