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Viewing cable 06ANKARA3004, SCENESETTER FOR MAY 30 VISIT OF CODEL BLUNT TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA3004 2006-05-25 11:38 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO7464
PP RUEHDA
DE RUEHAK #3004/01 1451138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251138Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5902
INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 0712
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0634
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0900
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0492
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4114
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0823
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 0792
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0588
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 3659
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0062
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUSNNOG/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 003004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS TO H/SUSAN SHEYBANI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 30 VISIT OF CODEL BLUNT TO 
TURKEY 
 
REF: STATE 82968 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy Ankara warmly welcomes the visit of 
CODEL Blunt on May 30.  Turkey is a strong ally in the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT), facilitating the distribution of 
critical supplies and fuel to the coalition in Iraq and 
supporting the NATO Training Mission (NTM-I) there; publicly 
calling on Iran to comply with its IAEA commitments; and 
pressuring Syria and Hamas to renounce their support for 
terrorism.  This summer Turkey will share command of 
ISAF-Central with France and Italy and open its first 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.  But 
there are challenges.  Bilateral defense cooperation is on 
the decline.  An increased Turkish security presence along 
the Iraqi border to combat an up-tick in PKK terrorist 
activity has raised concerns with the Iraqi government. 
Turkey's EU accession aspirations are frustrated by slow 
implementation of reforms and the lack of progress on Cyprus, 
though all concerned are working to avoid a train wreck. 
Domestic political tensions between traditional secularists 
in the Ataturk mold, who continue to control the military and 
important institutions like the Presidency, and a more 
religiously-minded conservative strain represented by PM 
Erdogan were heightened by a May 17 attack on a court that 
left one senior judge dead and four wounded.  You may wish to 
welcome their partnership in GWOT, urge Turkey to continue to 
stand firmly and publicly with the international community on 
Iran, and encourage early FM travel to Baghdad.  Israeli FM 
Livni will have just concluded her first trip to Turkey on 
May 29.  END SUMMARY. 
 
STRATEGIC DIALOGUE 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) During an April 25 visit to Ankara, Secretary Rice 
unveiled with Foreign Minister Gul an agreement to formalize 
a regular series of meetings to further our bilateral efforts 
on issues such as Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
among others.  Our two governments are currently putting the 
finishing touches on the document and hope to release it 
soon.  As a majority Muslim country that straddles Europe and 
the Middle East, Turkey shares a history and culture with 
many countries of US concern and is poised to increase its 
constructive role in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the Broader 
Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative and 
potentially in the Middle East Peace Process.  This will also 
provide a forum to dialogue with Turkey on issues of 
importance to its future, including Cyprus and the EU 
accession process. 
 
A PARTNER IN GWOT 
----------------- 
 
Iraq: 
 
3. (SBU) Turkey's agreement to allow the use of its territory 
as a logistical hub has been a crucial asset in our Iraq 
operations.  Two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments 
(3 million gallons per day) for the Iraqi people and 25% of 
sustainment fuel for the coalition crosses into Iraq through 
the Ground Line of Communication at Habur Border Gate.  Since 
Turkey approved the use of Incirlik Air Base as a cargo hub 
to support coalition operations in Iraq in May 2005, over 152 
million pounds of equipment has been shipped to US troops. 
Six C-17 aircraft now deliver from Incirlik the amount of 
supplies it took 9-10 planes to deliver from Germany. 
Additionally ten KC-135 tanker aircraft based at Incirlik 
since 2003 have run 2800 refueling sorties, delivering 192 
million pounds of fuel in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Turkey has four 
personnel assigned to NTM-I in Iraq and, under this rubric, 
has trained 57 Iraqi military officers in Turkey.  Iraqis 
 
ANKARA 00003004  002 OF 005 
 
 
have pledged to send officers to at least seven additional 
courses this year. 
 
4. (SBU) Turkey shares the US goal of a unified, democratic 
Iraq that is secure within it borders.  While Kurdish 
aspirations and the PKK presence in northern Iraq remain a 
significant concern, the government is contributing to 
efforts to ensure the success of the country as a whole.  The 
GOT vocally supported the participation of all ethnic and 
religious groups in the elections and the constitution 
referendum; and separately hosted a multi-party conference on 
the Iraqi constitution, a dialogue of hard-line Sunni leaders 
with US Ambassador Khalilzad, and a meeting of tribal leaders 
from the city of Talafar in an effort to calm the situation 
there.  It provided extensive training to over 300 Iraqi 
diplomats and political party members, and spearheaded a 
"neighbors meetings" process which has helped Iraqi 
government leaders interact with their regional counterparts. 
 The Turks are considering providing more training, and are 
sending their Special Representative to Iraq, Oguz Celikkol, 
to Baghdad shortly, both to issue invitations to GOI 
officials to visit Turkey, and to lay the groundwork for a 
subsequent FM Gul trip to Baghdad. 
 
5. (SBU) In addition to Turkey's desire for political 
stability, a sovereign, stable Iraq is in Turkey's economic 
interest.  Bilateral trade in 2005 was $2.87 billion, of 
which $2.42B was Turkish exports to Iraq.  Turkey exports 270 
MW of electricity to northern Iraq.  Both countries aim to 
increase electricity exports from Turkey to 1000MW, which 
equates to 25% of Iraq's current peak capacity.  Turkey has 
pledged $50M in assistance to Iraq for energy, health and 
other projects, which remains mostly unfunded for security 
reasons.  Turkey's port of Ceyhan is the terminus of the oil 
pipeline from Kirkuk. 
 
Afghanistan: 
 
6. (SBU) Turkey has twice successfully led the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, most 
recently from February to August 2005.  Beginning in 
mid-2006, it will share joint command of ISAF-Central in 
Kabul for a two-year period, and will open its first PRT in 
the neighboring province of Wardak.  PM Erdogan visited 
Afghanistan in spring 2005 and subsequently increased 
Turkey's pledged assistance ten-fold to $100M.  This will be 
allocated in $16M increments for five years to build schools, 
hospitals, medical clinics and drinking water wells 
throughout the country.  Four hospitals have already been 
constructed.  The GOT provides counter-narcotics training in 
Turkey to Afghan security forces and will initiate such 
training in Afghanistan this year under the auspices of the 
Wardak PRT.  President Karzai demonstrated his gratitude for 
Turkey's assistance by participating in a March 
counter-terrorism conference at Turkey's NATO Center of 
Excellence for the Defense Against Terrorism. 
 
Other: 
 
7. (SBU) In addition to its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Turkey continues to cotribute forces to the peacekeeping 
efforts inthe Balkans and provides training to Georgian 
security forces, including for pipeline security.  Turkey has 
contributed $41M in equipment to Georgia over the past six 
years, and has trained some 1400 Georgian personnel.  In 
Azerbaijan, Turkey has provided some $150M in equipment and 
over $100M in training and facilities over the past six years. 
 
INCREASING PKK THREAT 
--------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Since ending its self-imposed cease-fire in May 
 
ANKARA 00003004  003 OF 005 
 
 
2004, the PKK terrorist group has stepped up bomb attacks in 
Istanbul and increasingly clashed with Turkish security 
forces in the country's southeast.  A PKK off-shoot, the 
Kurdish Freedom Hawks (TAK), has warned foreigners to stay 
away from Turkey and threatened additional attacks in tourist 
centers.  The funerals of 14 PKK terrorists killed in a March 
operation led to civil unrest in Diyarbakir and other 
southeastern cities, which in several cases turned violent. 
Televised news programs are filled with the funerals of 
Turkish security forces.  Tourism bookings are down from 2005. 
 
9. (SBU) The PKK issue is the biggest irritant in bilateral 
relations.  The Turkish public and the GOT expect the US to 
take action against the PKK in Iraq.  The government welcomes 
our efforts with European allies to eliminate the PKK's 
financing sources and support networks in Europe and our 
intelligence-sharing program, but both the GOT and the public 
insist on US action against the PKK presence in northern 
Iraq.  While recognizing that the insurgency prevents 
coalition troops from engaging the PKK in Iraq, the GOT 
remains frustrated at its inability, and US unwillingness, to 
stop attacks it believes are emanating from the other side of 
its border. 
 
10. (SBU) Security forces have had some success against the 
PKK in Istanbul and Ankara, where significant caches of 
plastic explosives were found and suspects arrested.  The 
early up-tick in terrorist activity in 2006 also hastened the 
military's push to strengthen its troop presence along 
Turkey's border with Iraq, as it does every spring.  The 
Turkish press speculates that Turkey is either already 
conducting or will engage in cross-border operations into 
northern Iraq where the PKK has a presence.  The Chief of the 
Turkish General Staff GEN Hilmi Ozkok and FM Abdullah Gul 
have both publicly dismissed these reports and said that 
Turkey is doing nothing more than protecting its sovereign 
territory, as it does every year. 
 
REGIONAL DIPLOMACY 
------------------ 
 
11. (SBU) Given its shared historical, cultural and religious 
ties with countries in the region, as well as its geographic 
location bridging both east and west, Turkey feels both a 
right and a responsibility to engage countries of concern on 
issues of importance to the international community.  Turkey 
has worked hard in recent years to re-establish relations 
with Iran and Syria both to bolster its fight against the 
PKK, which has a presence in those countries, and to 
strengthen its economeQnQlG29, and the Turkish president will travel to Israel 
early in 
June. 
 
12. (SBU) The MFA, military and many in the AKP government 
view a nuclear Iran as a threat to Turkey but all view 
diplomacy as the only road to a solution and therefore insist 
on engagement.  The GOT is averse to broad economic sanctions 
that could disrupt a growing commercial relationship with 
Iran, particularly energy imports, but is willing to consult 
with us on targeted financial sanctions.  The government's 
public statements -- which we are told match their private 
statements -- on Iran's nuclear program have significantly 
strengthened since Iran resumed uranium enrichment.  You may 
want to welcome these statements and to encourage a continued 
strong message. 
 
CYPRUS THREATENS TURKEY'S EU BID 
-------------------------------- 
 
ANKARA 00003004  004 OF 005 
 
 
 
13. (SBU) The EU has expressed frustration with what it 
perceives as lackluster GOT efforts to fully implement 
democratic reforms.  Indictments against novelist Orhan Pamuk 
and other writers and intellectuals for statements 
purportedly undermining the Turkish identity, and unresolved 
issues with Turkey's Kurdish population that are exacerbating 
the PKK problem, give ammunition to those who want to prevent 
Turkey's accession.  But the lack of a settlement of the 
Cyprus question may be the biggest immediate threat to 
Turkey's EU bid.  Turkey remains bitter over the 2004 Greek 
Cypriot vote against UN secretary-general Annan's plan for a 
comprehensive settlement and the lack of measures to reward 
Turkish Cypriots for their favorable vote, and continues to 
look to the UN for the way forward.  Under its EU customs 
agreement, amended in 2005 and expanded to include all new EU 
members -- including Cyprus -- Turkey must, in theory, open 
its sea and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels by the end of 
2006.  Turkey is unwilling to do so in absence of some 
opening of Turkish Cypriot ports and an end to Turkish 
Cypriot economic isolation.  In January, FM Gul put forward a 
proposal that would include this.  The lack of a deal could 
stall further EU negotiations, though all parties seem intent 
on finding creative ways to avoid a Cyprus &train wreck8 
that could derail Turkey,s accession negotiations. 
 
THE DOMESTIC EQUATION 
--------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) Over the next year or so, though, getting the 
Turkish Government to undertake anything even moderately 
controversial ) whether related to its own southeast, Cyprus 
or the EU ) will be difficult.  In the run-up to the 
presidential election (May 2007) and parliamentary elections 
(scheduled for November 2007), the government's room for 
maneuver will be limited.  This is even more so in the 
aftermath of a May 17 gunman's attack at the Council of State 
(an administrative appeals court) that left one judge dead 
and four others wounded.  This has heightened pre-existing 
tensions between PM Erdogan's pro-Islam Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government and the 
military/secularist establishment. 
 
ECONOMY RECOVERING STRONGLY, BUT VULNERABLE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) The AK Party government has implemented key 
economic and structural reforms that have supported the 
strong economic recovery from the deep 2001 financial crisis. 
 An average GDP growth rate of nearly 8% over the past three 
years is one of the highest in the world, foreign investment 
has strengthened, and high inflation has been subdued.  The 
IMF is currently overseeing a $11.8 billion stand-by program 
and the World Bank's loan portfolio of $6 billion is one of 
the largest for any country.  Reforms and optimism engendered 
by the EU accession process have also bolstered economic 
performance.  Yet, despite the significant achievements, the 
current account deficit is large (about 7% of GDP this year) 
and the government remains heavily indebted.  This leaves the 
economy vulnerable to market swings that could threaten 
economic and political stability.  Unemployment and poverty 
also remain serious problems.  These vulnerabilities were 
highlighted since mid-May by a global market pullback that 
coincided with increased political uncertainty in Turkey, 
leading to a 16% fall in the exchange rate and 18% drop in 
the stock market and a shap increase in domestic interest 
rates.  However, if the government continues to 
follow-through on reform commitments -- as it recently did by 
reaffirming the IMF program -- and EU accession remains on 
track, the economy should be able to weather the current 
turbulence. 
 
 
ANKARA 00003004  005 OF 005 
 
 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION DECLINING 
-------------------------------------- 
 
16. (SBU) Defense industry cooperation, once the strongest 
aspect of our military-to-military relationship, is in 
significant decline.  No US firm has won a direct commercial 
sale since Boeing was awarded a contract for an Airborne 
Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft in 2002.  In 2004, 
three tenders (UAVs, Main Battle Tanks, and attack 
helicopters) were canceled.  Two US firms, Boeing and Bell, 
were interested in a second attack helicopter tender, but 
declined to participate due to onerous liability and 
technology transfer requirements.  (Several non-US firms did 
submit bids.)  Sikorsky may choose not to participate in a 
tender for 54 utility helicopters for the Turkish Armed 
Forces and Forestry Service for the same reason, and Raytheon 
may bow out of contention for an aircraft trainer tender. 
Both in Ankara and in Washington, US firms and the USG have 
raised the technology transfer and liability concerns with 
Turkey's Ministry of Defense and Defense Industry 
Undersecretariat (SSM).  Despite both Turkish military and 
government insistence that it wants US competition in these 
tenders, SSM has resisted making the necessary changes to the 
tenders to ensure it. 
 
 
 
AGGRESSIVE COUNTER-NARCOTICS PROGRAM 
------------------------------------ 
 
17. (SBU) Turkey remains a significant transit country for 
Southwest Asian heroin destined for European markets. 
Turkish law enforcement vigorously pursues opiate traffickers 
and have made extensive opiate seizures.  Arrests resulting 
from large seizures are prosecuted and generally result in 
lengthy sentences.  Over eight metric tons of heroin were 
seized in Turkey in 2005, while nearly ten metric tons were 
seized in 2004.  Several of the world's largest verified 
opiate seizures have been made in Turkey in recent years, 
including 7.5 metric tons of morphine base that were captured 
in a single seizure in 2002.  In 2004, 4.4 metric tons of 
morphine base were seized and in 2005 there were two heroin 
seizures of over 1,000 kilograms each.  Turkish law 
enforcement is actively participating in DEA's Operation 
Containment, a regional plan for combating Afghan opiates. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON