VZCZCXRO5368
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #1922/01 1510122
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 310122Z MAY 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5540
INFO RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7588
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 2451
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ASTANA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2105
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0029

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ALMATY 001922 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE), ISN/CTR 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SECOND ROUND OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING 
DISCUSSIONS 
 
ALMATY 00001922  001.2 OF 007 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Following up on their February meeting, 
the U.S. outreach delegation, augmented by IAEA and European 
Commission representatives, met in Astana May 25 with a 
Kazakhstani delegation comprising 14 representatives from 
seven ministries and organizations.  The sides reached 
provisional agreement on a document laying out the key steps 
to improve Kazakhstan's anti-smuggling capabilities, as well 
as a list of priority assistance projects derived from that 
document.  The MFA will vet the document and the project 
list with two organizations that were absent from the 
discussions before providing final agreement.   END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) RESULTS OF MEETING.  The nuclear smuggling outreach 
delegation met in Astana on May 25 with a Kazakhstani 
delegation representing seven ministries and organizations. 
(See para. 6 for a list of participants.)  The meeting 
focused on negotiating a joint document laying out the 
priority needs for improving Kazakhstan's capabilities to 
combat nuclear smuggling, including those areas where 
existing efforts should be continued and new efforts 
undertaken.  The sides went through each section of the U.S. 
draft in detail and made a number of changes to the language 
of the document.  The most significant substantive changes 
involved removing specific mentions of Customs and border 
guards in the section on corruption in favor of more general 
language, and removing the section on revising Customs 
procedures in response to input from the Kazakhstani side 
that such revisions are already ongoing.  The sides reached 
provisional agreement on the document (text in para. 4), 
with the Kazakhstani side saying they would need to have it 
reviewed by the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) 
and the Ministry of Health (MOH, which has a significant 
role in overseeing the use of radioactive materials in 
medicine), which were not represented at the meeting, before 
it could be considered finalized.  Upon conclusion of the 
joint document, the Kazakhstani side reviewed a U.S.-drafted 
list of priority assistance projects for Kazakhstan, which 
was derived from the joint text.  The Kazakhstani side 
suggested one additional project, assistance to support 
"liquidation" of radioactive sources rather than their 
extended secure storage.  The U.S. side agreed to look into 
the feasibility of this option, once the Kazakhstani side 
provides additional information about the number and type of 
sources they would propose to liquidate.  Otherwise, the 
project list was provisionally agreed, again with the 
understanding that it would still need KAEC and MOH review. 
(See para. 5 for the projects list.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) NEXT STEPS.  The U.S. side agreed to have the 
Embassy translate the revised joint document and provide it 
to the MFA, along with the English version that was provided 
in the meeting, for review by the MOH and the KAEC.  These 
organizations will also review the project list.  In 
response to a question from the Kazakhstani side whether it 
would be possible to add projects to this list, the U.S. 
side emphasized that any additions should be consistent with 
the already agreed joint document.  Lastly, the Kazakhstani 
side agreed to provide information on the number of 
radioactive sources that it proposes to be liquidated.  The 
U.S. side agreed to review the feasibility of source 
"liquidation", and if feasible, include this as a project to 
be pitched to international donors.  The U.S. side also 
indicated that it would begin its outreach to international 
donors as soon as the Kazakhstani side provides final 
agreement on the joint document and projects list.  Both 
sides agreed to remain in communication regarding 
commitments of assistance from international donors to 
ensure that any such assistance is closely coordinated 
between the relevant experts from the GOK, the U.S., and the 
donors. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Begin text of communique: 
 
Communique of U.S. and Kazakhstani Delegations on Intentions 
to Improve Kazakhstan's Capabilities to Combat Nuclear 
Smuggling 
 
Delegations of the Governments of the United States of 
America and Kazakhstan met in Astana on February 24 and May 
25, 2006, to discuss the capabilities of Kazakhstan to 
combat the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. 
The U.S. delegation included representatives from the 
Department of State, Department of Energy, Department of 
 
ALMATY 00001922  002.2 OF 007 
 
 
Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Intelligence Community, U.S. Embassy, International Atomic 
Energy Agency, and European Commission.  The Kazakhstani 
delegation included representatives from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Industry 
and Trade, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, 
National Security Committee, and Kazatomprom.  As a result 
of their discussions, the delegations reached a common 
understanding on the need to continue existing efforts and 
undertake additional efforts to improve Kazakhstan's anti- 
smuggling capabilities, as described below. 
 
PREVENTION 
 
Physical Protection 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Complete discussions with the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) on the question of repatriating or downblending HEU 
from research reactors and converting reactors to LEU where 
technically feasible 
--Finish implementing the plan for long-term storage of the 
BN-350 spent fuel 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Begin long-term planning to maintain the integrity and 
effectiveness of the security systems installed through 
cooperation under the U.S.-Kazakhstan Material Protection, 
Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Agreement 
--Conduct periodic vulnerability assessments at facilities 
with dangerous nuclear and radioactive materials to ensure 
their security remains adequate as threats evolve 
 
Regulatory Infrastructure 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Complete work between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) and the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee 
(KAEC) to draft amendments to regulatory laws and then 
examine implementing regulations for any needed revisions to 
support the IAEA Code of Conduct 
--Continue cooperation with the IAEA on development of rules 
on security and classification of radioactive sources 
--Continue progress in meeting the IAEA Model Project 
milestones 
--Continue improvement of systems of accounting and control 
of nuclear materials 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Develop proposals to toughen sanctions for violators of 
nuclear and radiological safety and security rules 
--Adapt inspection procedures to verify radioactive sources 
in the registry for the Ministry of Health, which conducts 
many of these inspections.  Additional training or support 
for the Ministry of Health regional offices may be needed. 
 
Securing Orphaned Sources 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Implement the Orphan Sources Recovery Strategy developed 
by the Atomic Energy Committee and the Nuclear Technology 
Safety Center 
--Continue work with the DOE Search and Secure Program to 
identify high-risk locations for orphan radioactive source 
materials 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Work cooperatively to identify facilities and locations at 
a high risk for the presence of orphan radioactive source 
materials 
--Conduct searches of these facilities and identify and 
secure orphan sources that have been located 
 
DETECTION 
 
Border security 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Work jointly with the DOE Second Line of Defense (SLD) 
team to determine equipment and establish priorities for 
site installations at Kazakhstani points of entry 
--Work jointly with the DOE/SLD team on training of Customs 
and other officials on the operation and maintenance of 
 
ALMATY 00001922  003.2 OF 007 
 
 
radiation detection equipment installed at points of entry 
and response to alarms 
--Continue working with the EXBS program to conduct border 
security enforcement training throughout the country and 
deploy additional equipment 
--Continue efforts to incorporate WMD detection and 
interdiction into the standard training curriculum for 
customs officers and border guards 
--Continue working with the Department of Defense (DoD) on 
the Caspian Sea Maritime Project conducted under the Weapons 
of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative 
Program 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Deploy equipment and conduct training at points of entry 
identified by Kazakhstani Customs and DOE/SLD that are not 
addressed by the SLD program, in close coordination with 
Kazakhstani Customs and DOE to ensure compatibility of 
equipment 
 
RESPONSE 
 
Prosecution 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Continue efforts to arrest and prosecute nuclear smugglers 
to the full extent of the law, when such cases `rise 
 
Aditional EfforTs Needed: 
--Raise(aw!remes{$amongjudkcIal au|loRi|is gboet thedYfe%rs f~wb,ui 3qg\in, 
nuclear smuggling and prosecuting smugglers 
--Exchange operational data with the U.S., as appropriate 
and through appropriate channels, on individuals or groups 
involved in smuggling, methods used by smugglers, and any 
connections with terrorism or organized crime 
--Continue cooperation among the law enforcement and other 
agencies responsible for combating nuclear smuggling in 
Central Asian states 
--Continue coordination among Central Asian states on border 
security 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Kazakhstan could host international meetings and 
conferences on combating nuclear smuggling.  There have 
already been a number of valuable conferences and workshops 
regarding various elements of the fight against nuclear 
smuggling in Central Asia, so any additional conference 
should have a focus and expected outcomes that do not 
duplicate previous conferences and workshops. 
--Improve reporting to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database 
Program 
--Announce smuggling convictions in the press 
--Share aggregate smuggling data with the U.S., including 
the total number of smuggling cases detected, the number of 
arrests, and the number of suspects convicted and jailed 
 
CORRUPTION 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Continue U.S. outreach efforts with Kazakhstani agencies 
on integrity awareness 
--Continue work with OSCE and UNODC anti-corruption projects 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Develop specific plans to combat potential corruption, 
possibly including: 
      -Incorporating anti-corruption/integrity awareness 
training into standard training curricula 
      -Expanded use of automatic monitoring technologies, 
such as radiation monitors that automatically transmit 
alarms and anomalies to redundant and/or central locations. 
This approach is being planned for SLD installations. 
 
 
ALMATY 00001922  004.2 OF 007 
 
 
The delegations anticipate that the results of their joint 
efforts will contribute significantly to improvement in 
Kazakhstan's ability to combat the smuggling of nuclear and 
radioactive material. 
 
Astana 
May 25, 2006 
 
End text of communique. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Begin text of Possible Projects document (note 
internal numbering) 
 
Possible Assistance Projects to Address Kazakhstan's 
Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear 
Smuggling 
 
Regulatory Infrastructure 
Need: 
In July 2005, the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) 
compiled a registry of more than 14,000 radioactive sources 
currently in use in Kazakhstan, with assistance from the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  This registry was 
based primarily on compiling paper records and entering 
those into a database.  Many of these records are out-of- 
date, so compiling an accurate list requires conducting 
inspections to verify the contents of the registry.  The 
KAEC has already conducted a large number of these 
inspections, but the Ministry of Health (MOH) has 
jurisdiction for radioactive sources in use for medical 
applications.  The KAEC and MOH are working closely together 
to address this problem.  U.S. NRC only works with KAEC. 
 
Possible Project: 
A new project could help adapt inspection procedures 
developed by the KAEC to verify radioactive sources in the 
registry for the MOH, which conducts these inspections at 
medical facilities.  Conducting regular inspections to 
update and maintain the radioactive source registry should 
be integrated into the basic regulatory responsibilities of 
the MOH.  The MOH maintains regional offices throughout the 
country that need additional training and support to 
effectively conduct these inspections. 
 
Securing Orphaned and Unregistered Sources 
Need: 
Kazakhstan continues to discover a significant number of 
"orphaned" or abandoned sources.  In addition, industrial, 
medical, and other facilities may have disused radioactive 
sources that remain unregistered and improperly secured. 
These sources could be dangerous if smugglers discover them 
before they are appropriately secured.  The U.S. Department 
of Energy (DOE), through its Search and Secure Program, 
provided the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) with 
equipment and training to identify facilities most likely to 
have large numbers of disused radioactive sources, conduct 
targeted searches, and safely dispose of the prioritized 
vulnerable sources.  DOE and KAEC identified four sites 
likely to have disused sources.  The first of these searches 
recovered and secured a large number of sources.  DOE is 
planning to sponsor one additional Search and Secure 
mission, but lacks the budgetary resources to support all 
the needs in Kazakhstan. 
 
Possible Project: 
Additional project(s) are needed to fund missions to 
proactively search, locate, characterize and secure orphan 
radioactive sources at high-risk facilities in Kazakhstan. 
This project would require that the GOK work cooperatively 
with the project team to identify locations at high risk for 
orphan sources through literature and record searches.  The 
project would then provide technical and financial (e.g., 
local salaries, transportation costs, per diem) assistance 
to the GOK to competently search and clear this location(s) 
of orphan radioactive source materials.  A western nuclear 
agency could also share valuable experience by helping the 
KAEC conduct these searches.  For interested donors without 
existing implementing mechanisms for such assistance, 
partnering with DOE and/or the IAEA could provide a 
mechanism to support these activities in Kazakhstan. 
Technical and financial support of search missions would 
ensure that high-risk facilities are cleared of orphan 
radioactive materials and are given a high priority. 
 
ALMATY 00001922  005.2 OF 007 
 
 
 
DETECTION 
 
Border security 
Need: 
Kazakhstan is the ninth-largest country in the world in area 
and the only Central Asia country bordering Russia.  Its 
extensive borders, limited radiation detection equipment at 
border crossings, and limited training of border security 
personnel in detecting nuclear and radioactive materials 
presents a significant vulnerability.  Several USG programs 
are active in Kazakhstan. 
 
Kazakhstan recently signed an Implementing Arrangement with 
DOE on cooperation under the Second Line of Defense (SLD) 
Program.  A typical suite of equipment delivered by the SLD 
program includes stationary radiation portal monitors, 
handheld radiation detection equipment for secondary 
inspections, and related communications equipment and 
training.  Portal monitors are generally linked to a central 
alarm station to connect border personnel to technical 
experts if needed and to reduce the opportunities for 
corruption.  The Export Control and Related Border Security 
(EXBS) program has been working in Kazakhstan for more than 
five years on improving all areas of the country's export 
control system, including delivering nonproliferation- 
related training and enforcement equipment.  DoD is working 
with Kazakhstan to improve maritime security in the Caspian 
Sea. 
 
Possible Projects: 
 
¶1.  Augment Ongoing Efforts to Improve Detection Capability 
at Kazakhstan's International Borders 
DOE/SLD is already working with Kazakhstani Customs to re- 
validate sites (land border crossings, international 
airports and seaports) that were identified several years 
ago to be of mutual interest for the deployment of radiation 
detection systems under the SLD program.  In addition, the 
EXBS program is conducting border security enforcement 
training throughout the country and deploying additional 
equipment, particularly along the Russian border. 
Prospective international donors interested in supporting 
deployment of radiation detection equipment at Kazakhstan's 
international borders should work in close coordination with 
Kazakhstani Customs and existing USG assistance providers to 
ensure consistency in equipment and compatibility with 
communications systems. 
 
¶2.  Improving Security at Green Borders, particularly on the 
Russian Border 
Many areas between established points of entry have little 
or no security, which presents a significant vulnerability 
that could be exploited by smugglers.  The flat terrain 
along the Russian border and established points-of-entry 
that in some cases are more than 100km apart offer few 
obstacles to illegal crossing.  This also makes remote 
monitoring of this border a possibility, but Kazakhstan does 
not have the appropriate technology to make this a reality. 
Roads are also limited in many of these areas, so four-wheel- 
drive vehicles and snowmobiles are needed to adequately 
patrol many areas of the border.  Additional vehicles, 
communications equipment, portable radiation detection 
equipment, remote sensing equipment, and training would help 
border guards better patrol these areas to prevent 
smuggling. 
 
RESPONSE 
 
Prosecution 
Need: 
Though Kazakhstan has strong criminal laws on nuclear 
smuggling and shown a willingness to prosecute offenders, in 
a few cases involving small amounts of radioactive 
materials, suspects were convicted and given suspended 
sentences.  While these incidents did not involve 
proliferation-significant quantities of nuclear material, 
they were typical of the opportunistic, profit-driven 
smuggling incidents common in the region.  Without effective 
deterrence, these individuals or others could "graduate" 
into more serious forms of smuggling.  These cases 
perpetuate the belief that smuggling nuclear and radioactive 
materials can be very profitable and may encourage 
 
ALMATY 00001922  006.2 OF 007 
 
 
additional thefts of these materials.  All criminals 
involved in smuggling should receive significant jail time, 
regardless of material actually smuggled. 
 
Possible Project: 
International experts could help educate judges and 
prosecutors on the dangers of nuclear smuggling and 
encourage stricter sentences, even for smugglers caught with 
small amounts of radioactive material. 
 
Sponsoring International Cooperation in Nuclear Forensics 
Need: 
The international nuclear forensics and attribution 
community benefits from wide participation and especially 
appreciates participation of States with significant 
experience in this area.  Kazakhstan is a state with 
significant knowledge of nuclear chemistry, forensics, and 
attribution, and it has very capable facilities to support 
nuclear forensics and attribution investigations.  In recent 
years, Kazakhstan has not participated consistently in the 
Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group 
(ITWG), an important forum that hosts this discipline.  The 
ITWG meets yearly, encourages forensic scientists and law 
enforcement bodies to participate, and conducts nuclear 
forensic exercises using actual material.  Consistent and 
enduring participation would help ensure that all 
international resources available are technically current 
and practiced to support each other in the event of a 
significant nuclear smuggling case or investigation. 
 
Possible Project: 
If resources are the primary issue regarding non- 
participation, we envision that a donor country or the IAEA 
could sponsor the time and travel for several Kazakhstani 
scientists and law enforcement personnel to participate in 
ITWG activities for the upcoming year.  This would include 
attendance at the ITWG-12 in the fall of 2006, participation 
in the annual Exercise, and participation in ITWG Working 
Groups.  Based on U.S. experience, this effort would cost 
approximately $50K for one year.  Participation would 
prevent a perceived stagnation and isolation of an otherwise 
capable and necessary entity. 
 
CORRUPTION 
 
Need: 
Though there has been some considerable improvement 
recently, corruption in Kazakhstan remains a serious problem 
and could undermine Kazakhstani and international efforts to 
improve capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling. 
Corruption among Customs officials and border guards is a 
particular concern, since bribes could be paid to overlook 
smuggling or avoid radiation detection equipment. 
 
Possible Project: 
Projects to address potential corruption among Customs 
officials and border guards could include incorporating anti- 
corruption/integrity awareness training into the standard 
curriculum for these agencies, helping develop standardized 
risk analysis models for determining what is searched, 
automatic monitoring technologies, like radiation monitors 
that report hits to headquarters, and increased pay for 
border security personnel.  It would be particularly useful 
for a donor to help Kazakhstan integrate various anti- 
corruption efforts and develop a comprehensive plan to 
address corruption among Customs officials and border 
guards. 
 
End text of Possible Projects document. 
 
¶6. (U) List of U.S. participants: 
Michael F. Stafford, Head of Delegation, U.S. Department of 
State 
Brent M. Eastman, U.S. Department of State 
Patrick Connors, U.S. Department of State 
Natalie Hardwick, U.S. Department of State 
Breanne Hite, U.S. Department of State 
Deborah Mennuti, U.S. Embassy, Almaty 
Andrew Offenbacher, EXBS Advisor, U.S. Embassy Almaty 
Clyde Langley, Legal Attache, U.S. Embassy Almaty 
Tracy Mustin, U.S. Department of Energy 
Mark Cwynar, Department of Homeland Security 
 
 
ALMATY 00001922  007.2 OF 007 
 
 
IAEA: 
Mark Aronoff, International Atomic Energy Agency 
 
European Commission: 
Regine Roy, European Commission 
 
List of Kazakhstani participants: 
Saveliyev, S.R., Head of Delegation, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Sarzhanov, K.A, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Smagulov, T.N., Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Zhusupbekov, Ministry of Industry and Trade 
Bekturov, T.D., Ministry of Defense 
Mukybiev, M.N., Ministry of Defense 
Vozhakova, A.G., Ministry of Finance (Customs) 
Tashenova, A.K., Ministry of Finance (Customs) 
Amirov, A.A., National Security Committee (Border Service) 
Kurbanov, N.K., National Security Committee 
Orynbasarov, A.A., National Security Committee 
Amirov, B.K., Kazatomprom 
Karabalayev, K.I., Kazatomprom 
Gromov, Kazatomprom 
 
 
ASQUINO