VZCZCXRO1763
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1499/01 1501556
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301556Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0865
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 001499 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR DAS YAMAMOTO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: OPPOSITION DIALOGUE WITH EPRDF PROVIDES 
PATH TO DEMOCRATIC REFORM 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 1400 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The political dialogue between the ruling 
EPRDF and opposition parties UEDF and OFDM yielded its first 
fruit on May 22: a joint public declaration on respect for 
the constitution and renewed space for peaceful political 
activity.  The government, UEDF and OFDM also agreed on a 
joint commission to investigate political violence in the 
Oromiya region and plans for a joint visits to Oromiya and 
other areas.  A separate dialogue has also been initiated 
with Lidetu Ayalew's UEDP-Medhin party, which withdrew from 
the CUD earlier this year.  The EPRDF plans to offer a 
dialogue to the reconstituted CUDP soon do so.  The next, 
critical phase of the dialogue with the UEDF and OFDM will 
focus on reform of key democratic institutions, including 
Parliament, the National Electoral Board (NEB) and the media. 
 Discussions will be supported by detailed comparative 
analyses funded and conducted by international donors, 
including the USG.  Senior GOE officials have indicated that 
the GOE is prepared to implement many of the international 
community's recommendations for reform as part of its 
dialogue with the opposition.  Bereket Simon, senior advisor 
to PM Meles, has also indicated the GOE's preference for 
talking with all opposition parties together, but opposition 
groups remain wary of each other.  Comment: While the 
Diaspora calls for immediate aid cut-offs and confrontation 
with the EPRDF, supporting the current political dialogue, 
spearheaded by genuine opposition leaders resident in 
Ethiopia, provides the most promising and appropriate way for 
the international community to put Meles' commitments on 
democratization to the test. Most critically, doing so will 
nurture democracy and development by fostering a stable 
environment where political space can grow.  Donors have 
recently made clear in their parallel dialogue with the EPRDF 
(reftel) that aid flows to Ethiopia will reflect progress on 
democratic governance.  Finding a positive way to resolve the 
trial of CUD leaders and others will, of course, also play a 
critical role in lowering tensions and bolstering democracy 
in Ethiopia.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Political Dialogue, Studies Set Reform Agenda 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (SBU) Just two months after violent unrest rocked Ethiopia 
and well known leaders of the Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD), leaders from the United Ethiopian Democratic 
Front (UEDF) and the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement 
(OFDM) made a leap of faith and began a structured dialogue 
with the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF).  The opposition parties were represented by 
UEDF Chair Beyene Petros and Vice Chair Merera Gudina, as 
 
SIPDIS 
well as OFDM Chairman Bulcha Demeksa.  Prime Minister Meles 
kicked off the dialogue on behalf of the EPRDF, but soon 
turned the reins over to senior advisor Bereket Simon and 
EPRDF parliamentary whip Shiferaw Jarso.  Discussions moved 
slowly at first; simply agreeing on a detailed agenda 
consumed nearly two months.  Much of the initial discussion 
focused on charges of ongoing repression in Oromiya during 
February and March.  Nonetheless, the negotiating agenda that 
emerged from the talks covered nearly the same elements as 
failed talks that included the CUD in September 2005: 
 
-- Respect for the Rule of Law, Human Rights and the 
Constitution 
 
-- Revision of Parliamentary procedures 
 
-- Media Law and Code of Conduct, Freedom of the Press and 
State media 
 
-- Reform of the National Electoral Board 
 
-- Financing of Political Organizations 
 
¶3. (SBU) In parallel to launching talks with the UEDF and 
OFDM, PM Meles publicly commissioned several studies 
comparing Ethiopia's democratic institutions with those of 
four developed democracies: the UK, Canada, Germany and 
India.  He invited international donors to fund and carry out 
the studies, which would include comparisons between the four 
individual model countries with Ethiopia, as well as 
synthesize best practices from each.  Meles stated publicly 
that he wanted Ethiopia's Parliament to operate at the level 
not of emerging democracies, but rather that of 
fully-established democracies in developed countries.  Many 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001499  002 OF 005 
 
 
donors were initially reluctant to participate in the 
projects, skeptical that the results would be used to plan 
reforms, or would even be disseminated beyond the EPRDF.  A 
number of donor countries also argued that no progress could 
be made on democratization as long as senior CUD leaders were 
detained.  Post eventually persuaded European donors to take 
the Prime Minister at his word and prepare the studies to 
support the dialogue process.  At the same time, the agenda 
of the EPRDF-Opposition dialogue was arranged to allow time 
for the studies to be completed before discussions began on 
individual institutions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Rule of Law Talks Focus on Unrest, Political Space 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Parties approached the first agenda item in the 
political dialogue with vastly different priorities.  EPRDF 
representatives sought commitments from opposition parties to 
respect the constitution and engage in strictly peaceful, 
legal political activity.  They argued that Oromo parties in 
particular, including both the OFDM and the Oromo National 
Congress (ONC), had been playing a double game: while 
publicly professing that they pursued only peaceful political 
tactics, the parties had at the same time incited their 
supporters and others toward violent unrest and called for 
ousting the government.  The UEDF (which includes the ONC) 
and OFDM, for their part, claimed that their supporters were 
being harassed, beaten and imprisoned by EPRDF cadres and 
local government officials in rural areas.  They demanded an 
end to the repression and permission to re-open party offices 
and to conduct normal political activities again.  While 
these difficult discussions proceeded, Western diplomats 
including Charge Huddleston met separately on a regular basis 
with both sides and sought to foster understanding the 
compromise. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Agreement Improves Political Environment 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) After more than two months of hard bargaining on 
this agenda item, the two sides conducted a joint press 
conference broadcast on State television and radio.  They 
announced agreement on the following points, among others: 
 
-- Respect the constitution; 
 
-- Engage in only peaceful political activity; 
 
-- Actively oppose violent and unconstitutional activities; 
 
-- Facilitate peaceful political activity, including through 
the re-opening of party offices and visits to constituencies; 
 
-- Appointment of a joint commission, with members from both 
sides, to investigate reports of unrest and repression in 
Oromiya; 
 
-- Joint visits to constituencies outside Addis to 
demonstrate tolerance 
 
-- A joint study of constitutional provisions concerning 
local administration; 
 
Several of these points are simply reiterations of existing 
laws and obligations, but in the context of post-election 
tensions and unrest they represent important, useful public 
commitments.  The joint investigative commission constitutes 
a significant achievement for opposition leaders, since the 
presence of their own, hand-picked members should ensure a 
serious effort.  The ability of the OFDM to re-open political 
offices and hold meetings would also be an important step 
forward. 
 
¶6. (SBU) One potential complication for the UEDF, however, is 
that Ethiopian courts have ruled that Merera Gudina and his 
associates are no longer the legal leaders of the ONC; the 
courts instead recognized in March (?) a break-away faction 
led by Tolosa Tesfaye.  The later group, which Merera charges 
was financed by the EPRDF, appears to command little loyalty 
among elected ONC officials or the general public.  For now, 
Merera's Federal MPs operated as UEDF members, while Regional 
MPs are seated as "individuals" in Oromiya's parliament. 
Merera has not indicated what strategy he might pursue to 
re-establish a political entity. 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001499  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
Next Phase: On to the Institutions 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) While the initial phase of EPRDF-Opposition talks 
was crucial for re-building trust and re-opening political 
space in the short term, the next phase of discussions will 
focus on more permanent institutional reforms designed to 
strengthen the pillars of Ethiopian democracy.  Progress here 
would likely be more tangible and have a more powerful impact 
on public confidence in the democratic process. 
Donor-produced studies in all areas are now ready or nearly 
so, and should pave the way for progress. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Parliamentary Rules: Strengthening Opposition's Voice 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) A detailed study of Parliamentary rules of 
procedure and practices of the institution itself was 
completed in late January and distributed the following month 
to leaders of opposition parties.  The study contains a 
number of hard-hitting recommendations on how the rules and 
practices of Ethiopia's Parliament should be changed to 
strengthen the voice and representation of opposition 
organizations.  For example, the study proposes: 
 
-- Naming a Deputy Speaker from an opposition party 
 
-- Awarding some Standing Committee Chairmanships to 
opposition parties 
 
-- A multi-party council to set the agenda and administer 
Parliament 
 
-- Guaranteed time (e.g. biweekly) for debate of opposition 
items 
 
-- Major debate annually on the government's overall 
legislative plans 
 
-- "Question time" once a week where ministers must answer 
opposition MPs 
 
-- Rights for opposition parties or MPs to offer amendments 
to bills or motions 
 
-- Enlarging Standing Committees to allow more MPs to serve 
on them 
 
¶9. (SBU) Opposition leaders have expressed real enthusiasm to 
post officers about the ambition of the study's 
recommendations.  Senior Advisor Bereket Simon told the 
Charge and other diplomats on May 26 that the GOE expected to 
implement many of the suggestions regardless of what 
transpired in the next phase of dialogue with the UEDF and 
OFDM.  The Speaker of Parliament and the PM himself have also 
indicated previously to the Charge that they hoped to have 
consensus on modifications to parliamentary rules and 
practices prior to the legislative recess in July. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
National Electoral Board: GOE Builds Capacity in Private 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) A donor-funded study of the NEB completed by 
British consultant Hannah Roberts in March found that the NEB 
had been seriously under-staffed and under-funded during the 
2005 election cycle.  Equally alarming was the conclusion 
that the director of the NEB, an EPRDF loyalist, had 
basically withdrawn from any role in the organization as of 
November 2004, leaving the weak organization in the hands of 
board chairman Kemal Bedri and NEB deputy director Tesfaye 
Mengesha.  The report suggested that the rest of the NEB 
board had had little or no involvement in the organization 
before, during or after the elections.  The report 
recommended that the board be made fully accountable to an 
active board, rather than to Parliament as it is now.  It did 
not discuss how the board should be appointed.  NEB staff 
often lacked the skills for the positions they occupied and 
electoral operations at the local level relied heavily on 
poorly trained temporary workers from other GOE agencies, 
especially the Ministry of Agriculture.  The consultant's 
report was prepared with the full cooperation and candid 
assessments of current NEB staff, and has not been 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001499  004 OF 005 
 
 
disseminated by the GOE to opposition parties or the public. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Nonetheless, in March NEB Chair Kemal Bedri told 
donor represeZi/QFTk plan for addressing weaknesses before 
"politicians" became directly involved.  In November 2005, 
Parliament approved PM Meles' request to extend the mandate 
of the current NEB board until June 2006, by which time he 
expected the organization to have addressed weaknesses 
revealed by May 2005 national elections.  Kemal told donor 
reps, however, that fixing the NEB would likely take the rest 
of 2006 and hinted that the existing board's mandated might 
again be extended to complete the project. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The agenda of EPRDF talks with the UEDF and OFDM 
includes an item entitled "Instituting a new Electoral Board 
in accordance with the law."  On this point, the EPRDF has 
apparently agreed to a significantly broader discussion that 
it would accept with (now jailed) CUD leaders in September 
¶2005.  Other sub-items include NEB staffing at the local 
level and the conduct of local elections expected in 2007. 
Ethiopian law already calls for board members, who are 
appointed by Parliament upon a recommendation for the PM, to 
be independent of political parties.  Intra-party discussions 
of how to guarantee that board members are truly independent 
will be crucial to re-building shattered public confidence in 
the electoral process.  As the Roberts report indicated, 
however, issues of institutional capacity will be as crucial 
to facilitating free and fair elections as the naming of an 
impartial board. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Media Reform: Freedom and Responsibility 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The crackdown on media following the November 2005 
riots, including the arrest of a large number of Amharic 
language tabloid journalists, ended a period of significant 
press freedom in Ethiopia.  While local and international 
media watchdogs have decried the arrests and other practical 
restrictions on the press, the GOE has charged that many 
media outlets' irresponsibility and calculated subversion 
contributed materially to street violence in November.  PM 
Meles issued repeated calls for donors to fund a comparative 
study of legal frameworks governing the press in the same 
four target countries.  USAID ultimately agreed to fund the 
study, which should be available the week of May 29. 
 
¶14. (SBU)  The political dialogue agenda on the media 
includes three elements: 
 
-- creation of a unitary press law 
 
-- respect for freedom of the press as well as for the law 
 
-- ensuring that state media operated according to the law 
and "entertains the views of others" 
 
In addition to discussions within the context of the 
EPRDF-Opposition dialogue, PM Meles told Parliament in March 
that a broad debate on the media would be held in the chamber 
and would include the views of all stakeholders. 
 
-------------------- 
What about the CUDP? 
-------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The EPRDF is likely to invite the leaders of the 
re-formed Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP) to 
initiate a similar dialogue within the next two weeks.  PM 
Meles told Charge that the CUDP's decision to walk out on the 
appointment of an interim government for Addis Ababa -- after 
the PM had repeatedly extended the legislative deadline to 
facilitate a CUDP take-over of the capital -- had 
demonstrated that the new party "had no principles." 
Nonetheless, senior advisor Bereket Simon told the Charge on 
May 30 that the dialogue with the CUDP would begin soon. 
(Comment: The CUDP's recent denunciation of the formation of 
the Diaspora-dominated "Alliance for Freedom and Democracy" 
might have helped restore the Ethiopian-based CUDP's 
reputation in EPRDF eyes.  End Comment.)  Bereket also told 
Charge and other diplomats that the EPRDF would prefer to 
conduct the next phase of dialogue -- focusing on 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001499  005 OF 005 
 
 
institutions -- with a joint group of opposition leaders, 
rather than holding three separate discussions.  He expressed 
regret that some opposition leaders, particularly Beyene 
Petros, did not want joint discussions.  Charge said she 
would encourage the leaders to accept joint talks. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The EPRDF has began a dialogue with Lidetu Ayalew's 
UEDP-Medhin party; post does not yet have details on those 
 
SIPDIS 
discussions.  Although part of the CUD prior to Nove=QNPalogue Puts Meles' Commitments to the Test 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The announcement of the first agreement to come out 
of EPRDF-Opposition talks this past week was overshadowed to 
some extent by the announcement of a new "Alliance for 
Freedom and Democracy (AFD)" by opposition leaders in exile 
(septel).  The ongoing trial of jailed CUD leaders has also 
claimed more of the public's attention than 
largely-behind-the-scenes political dialogue.  Nonetheless, 
the ongoing dialogue between the opposition leaders operating 
in Ethiopia and the ruling party provides the clearest, most 
promising path to lasting progress on democratization.  The 
agenda of the talks directly addresses the fundamental 
challenge of strengthening the country's democratic 
institutions, and is very similar to the agenda that jailed 
CUD sought through their ill-fated strategy of a legislative 
boycott and civil disobedience.  The advantage of the current 
dialogue is that an insecure ruling party now has 
counterparts that have clearly demonstrated their credentials 
as a "loyal opposition," opening the way for the EPRDF to 
make concessions without appearing to give in to pressure. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Will the EPRDF agree to meaningful reforms that 
could level the political playing field in Ethiopia?  Despite 
the ruling party's dubious history of undermining its 
opposition, there are now indications that for whatever 
reason -- statesmanship, legacy or political pressure -- PM 
Meles is prepared to allow significantly freer democratic 
competition and stronger institutions.  Ethiopia would not be 
in a position to make progress on opening real political and 
economic space over the coming year if donors had accepted 
Diaspora calls for immediate aid cut-offs and confrontation 
with the EPRDF.  Encouraging and respecting the current 
political dialogue, spear-headed by genuine opposition 
leaders resident in Ethiopia, provides the most promising and 
appropriate way for the international community to put Meles' 
commitments on democratization to the test.  Donors' have 
recently made clear in their parallel dialogue with the EPRDF 
(reftel) that aid flows to Ethiopia will reflect progress on 
democratic governance. 
 
¶19. (SBU) We will want to monitor the EPRDF's commitments 
against some benchmarks for progress.  It would reasonable to 
expect the political dialogue to result in multi-party 
agreements on key reforms of Parliamentary procedures, the 
media and the National Electoral Board during the second half 
of 2006.  Amendment of Parliamentary rules and practices 
could some as early as July, and would provide and important 
boost to public confidence in Ethiopia's legislature. 
Finding a positive way to resolve the trial of CUD leaders 
and others will, of course, also play a critical role in 
lowering tensions and bolstering democracy in Ethiopia. 
HUDDLESTON