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Viewing cable 06ABUJA1079, DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: ABUJA AFTERMATH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ABUJA1079 2006-05-10 13:41 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
VZCZCXRO9826
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHUJA #1079/01 1301341
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101341Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5607
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 4030
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001079 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: ABUJA AFTERMATH 
 
REF: ABUJA 1076 
 
 1.  (SBU)  Summary:  Sudan Liberation Movement faction 
leader Minni Minnawi remains under considerable pressure on 
number of fronts for signing the Darfur Peace Agreement.  His 
followers are seeking assistance in bolstering his ability to 
promote the deal in Darfur.  SLM's Abdelwahid Nur continues 
to try to strike a supplementary side deal that includes a 
region and majority of seats in Darfur, and SLM participation 
in verifying the disarmament of the janjaweed  Justice and 
Equality Movement leadership is sticking to its position, but 
some rank-and-file, particularly non-Kobe Zaghawa, support 
signing the agreement.  The African Union is holding the 
agreement open for signature before May 15 and closing down 
its operations at the Chida International Hotel on May 11 
when the Movements depart.  This marks the last report from 
the Abuja venue.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
MINNI UNDER PRESSURE 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (SBU)  Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader 
Minni Minnawi remains under considerable pressure for signing 
the agreement.  He is a convenient target for Justice and 
Equality (JEM) propaganda claiming he has "sold out" to the 
Government of Sudan.  In addition, SLM-Minni supporters claim 
that JEM's Dr. Khalil Ibrahim is spreading around "a lot" of 
money to Minni's commanders in the field.  Khalil is 
allegedly offering them positions in his "army".  Another 
popular accusation going around is that Minni signed under 
"American duress".  Unfortunately, many of those around Minni 
are so provoked by these tactics that they fail to counteract 
them by coolly publicizing the benefits of the DPA to Minni's 
constituents.  Finally, Ali Traiyo confided that Minni spent 
everything he had to secure consensus within his faction and 
has nothing left to offer those in the field.  As a result, 
his forces are highly vulnerable to these verbal accusations 
and monetary enticements.  Minni plans to go to Tripoli to 
appease the Libyans and most likely seek some support on the 
ground for his troops. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
INSIDE ABDELWAHID'S HEAD 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (SBU)  SLM faction leader Abdelwahid Nur still believes 
he can get a supplementary deal that will allow him to sign 
onto the DPA.  Abdelwahid told remaining USDEL member on May 
11 that he needs the following to bring the Fur onboard: 
Darfur must be a region, the Movements must have a majority 
of the seats and positions (55 percent) in Darfur, and SLM 
must be part of the verification of the disarmament of the 
janjaweed.  Abdulwahid said he is completely satisfied with 
the Senior Special Assistant position but still believes SPLM 
will allow Darfur to become a region.  Abakar Abubashir, 
Abdelwahid's chairman of the Wealthsharing Commission, said 
Abdelwahid met with Sudanese Government delegation head 
Magzoub Al Kaliffa the night before he departed.  According 
to Abubashir and Abdelwahid, Magzoub agreed to consider a 
supplementary side deal.  However, upon return to Khartoum, 
Magzoub, reneged on this promise.  Nonetheless, Abdelwahid, 
surrounded by three close advisors (Ahmed Abdulshafi, Nouri 
Abdullah, and Ahmed Al Deen) continues down this path. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Abdelwahid saw President Obasanjo on May 10 and 
presented his ideas and asked Obasanjo to assist him in 
brokering this deal.  According to Nigerian Special Envoy 
Ambassador Abayomi, Obasanjo rejected the idea and told AU 
Chief Negotiator Sam Ibok that he does not want to see 
Abdelwahid again.  Abdelwahid also refuses to participate in 
the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.  Abdelwahid said 
that he is worried that the Government of Sudan is going to 
have him assassinated so that he can be replaced with a more 
pliable Fur leader.  USDEL requested that Abdelwahid be 
careful not make any public statements about the agreement 
that could incite unrest in the refugee and IDP camps.  At 
this point, given his demands, the odds remain low that 
Abdelwahid will sign, according to the AU mediation. 
Abdelwahid is moving to a cheaper hotel for the next few days 
and says he intends to travel to Chad and then to Jebel Marra. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (SBU)  Justice and Equality Movement apparently continues 
its propaganda offensive against Minni.  According to two 
 
ABUJA 00001079  002 OF 002 
 
 
dissident JEM members, Mohammed Abdul Adam and Ismail Ahmed 
Rahama, Hassan Al-Turabi and Sadiq Al Maddi are arranging to 
disrupt an SLM-Minni press conference to be held in Khartoum. 
 According to Adam, Turabi is angry that JEM did not deliver 
the Vice Presidency or the region.  The dissidents said that 
the well-financed Khalil-run mafia will not stop in its 
efforts to undermine Minni. Adam said that there are many 
more disgruntled JEM members like him who are having 
difficulty returning to Egypt.  The Egyptian Embassy in 
Nigeria is awaiting a list from Abderahmane Moussa verifying 
their opposition to JEM's decision not to sign.  Adam said 
that Khalil is now in France, who supports his efforts to 
back Chadian President Idriss Deby.  They also said Khalil is 
likely to travel to Tripoli and back to Chad within the 
coming week.  Khalil is also exploiting the statements of 
Minni's London-based "assistant foreign minister" Ibrahim 
Adam Ibrahim (who was the planner for the Haskenita 
conference).  Ibrahim has insinuated that Minni is waffling 
on the deal. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
7.  (SBU)  Minni's SLM faction is becoming desperate in its 
appeals for assistance.  He urgently needs a public relations 
campaign in Darfur and in the international press promoting 
the agreement, not himself.  The campaign, which could 
include radio spots and handbills, should outline the 
benefits and timeline and how Darfurians can participate in 
the process.  SLM lacks any capable public relations 
personnel and lacks a headquarters after being moved out of 
Asmara.  SLM is looking to establishing a SLM center in 
Abuja, Cairo, or Tripoli.  In addition, SLM members are 
seeking political party training and have been invited to 
Juba to work with SPLM members there.  SLM is asking for 
assistance with transport and securing a house there for 
members who will be virtual "apprentices" to SPLM.  An 
important aspect of a public relations campaign is that it 
must target the Fur, Dadjo, Masselit, Birgid and other small 
ethnic groups to prevent the deal from looking like a Zaghawa 
pact with the Government of Sudan.  The GOS should also be 
encouraged not to say or do anything that will undermine the 
signatories.  Meanwhile, Abderahamane Moussa and other 
dissents should not be shut out of the process.  In this 
vein, Minni needs to be encouraged to be highly inclusive of 
other groups in nominating people for positions in Darfur. 
CAMPBELL