VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWL #0260/01 0950355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 050355Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2611
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4358
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000260 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR D (FRITZ), EAP/FO, AND EAP/ANP 
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA LIZ PHU 
PACOM FOR JO1E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NZ
SUBJECT: THE NUCLEAR BAN AND NEW ZEALAND'S IDENTITY 
 
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor 
Katherine Hadda, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  For reasons of history and politics, New 
Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation has become a core part of 
the nation's psyche.  The ban arose just as the country was 
forging its post-colonial identity, and has become as 
integral to many Kiwis as the Constitution is to us. 
Although we may never be able to convince New Zealanders to 
lift the legislation, we can and should continue to address 
the anti-Americanism that has become linked with the policy. 
This includes encouraging new areas of bilateral cooperation 
that will enable Kiwis to see the positive benefits of our 
relationship. We should also not let the anti-nuclear issue 
be used as an argument against a closer relationship with the 
United States.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) U.S. officials are often struck by the strong 
attachment many New Zealanders hold for their country's 
anti-nuclear legislation.  Whenever we try to discuss the 
issue's relevance to our current operations in the Pacific, 
or question the logic of the policy in a post-Cold War world, 
the response of most Kiwis is that we are bullying New 
Zealand.  What we see as a policy discussion appears to these 
New Zealanders an attack on their core identity.  But how 
could legislation passed just 20 years ago be so intrinsic to 
a nation's sense of self?  There are four main reasons: 
history, geography, the search for identity, and politics. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
A Brief History Lesson: The Search for a Post-Colonial 
Identity 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶3.  (C) During the second world war, the United States 
protected New Zealand, then a British dominion, from Japanese 
invasion.  By 1947, Britain had given New Zealand's 
Parliament sole power to make laws for the country.  With the 
creation of the ANZUS defense alliance in 1951, both New 
Zealand and Australia formally recognized for the first time 
that their Cold War security depended primarily on the United 
States, not Great Britain. Although even at that time an 
anti-nuclear movement had begun here in response to U.S. and 
others' nuclear testing in the Pacific, New Zealand remained 
a strong ally of the United States and allowed U.S. naval 
ship visits, including in later years those that were nuclear 
armed or powered. 
 
¶4.  (C) Beginning in the late 1960s, many Kiwis became 
uncomfortable with being U.S. allies.  According to NZ 
Historian Jock Phillips, while Americans took away 
military/political lessons from the Vietnam War, New Zealand 
came away with a new sense of national identity.  Opposition 
to the war was couched in nationalistic terms, because like 
many Commonwealth countries at that time, New Zealanders were 
carving out a post-colonial role.  Because of the Vietnam war 
and Britain's declining influence here, what arguably should 
have been a rebellion against the UK was instead directed 
against the United States. 
 
¶5.  (C) This desire to distance New Zealand from the United 
States, and a growing hunger for a uniquely Kiwi identity, 
were the backdrop against which the anti-nuclear movement 
took center stage during the 1980s.  By that time, American 
testing in the Pacific had all but stopped, but French 
testing in the region had created something akin to a mass 
hysteria about all things nuclear in New Zealand.  These and 
other factors, including rising U.S.-Soviet tensions in the 
early '80s, revived once more the anti-nuclear movement in 
Australia and New Zealand.  The demonstrators who opposed 
U.S. warship visits to New Zealand at this time actually had 
the environment on their mind more than the military. 
National Party Prime Minister Robert Muldoon helped fan the 
resentment by encouraging American ship visits, so that he 
could point to the irresponsible nature of the demonstrators 
and divert attention from the flailing post-oil shock 
economy.  The Labour Government that took power in 1984 and 
initiated the anti-nuclea 
r policy the following year also introduced radical economic 
liberalization that induced real hardship for many Kiwis, 
including core Labour supporters.  Prime Minister Lange, too, 
welcomed the diversion of anti-U.S. and anti-nuclear 
sentiment from the problems of the day.  Because of his own 
political ideology he also had the secret agenda of wanting 
to break New Zealand away from ANZUS, but was afraid the 
average Kiwi voter would not accept this.  Adopting the 
pro-environment, moralistic stance of the anti-nuclear 
movement gave him perfect cover to force a break in the 
alliance. 
 
¶6.  (C) Many New Zealanders consider Lange's performance at a 
1985 Oxford Union debate to be a defining moment in their 
modern history.   Lange, who argued the position "Nuclear 
Weapons are Morally Indefensible," for the first time gave 
New Zealanders a confident and witty Prime Minister lecturing 
the world on a position unique to their country.  Kiwis most 
applaud Lange's remark that he could smell the uranium on the 
breath of the opposing young American debater.  The line was 
devoid of substance but to Kiwis that's beside the point: the 
debate's significance was not intellectual but emotional. 
New Zealanders were taking a moral stand worthy of the 
country's Scottish missionary forefathers.  Kiwis told 
themselves they were a force in the world.  For many Kiwis, 
the Chernobyl disaster the following year vindicated the 
anti-nuclear policy and it became law in 1987. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Where I Stand Depends on Where I Sit... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The second factor behind the nuclear ban's continued 
draw is size and geography.  New Zealand is as large as 
California, but it's population is just four million.  It's a 
standing joke among Kiwis that everyone knows everyone else. 
The country's newspapers resemble those in small town 
America.  Every major car accident is reported. 
Everyone who has ever passed through New Zealand is a New 
Zealander.  (The press consider recently released Iraq 
hostage Harmeet Sooden a New Zealander, even though his 
passport -- and the rest of the world -- identify the 
Auckland University student as Canadian.) 
 
¶8.  (C) New Zealand's small, geographically isolated 
population also prides itself on its self-sufficiency and 
ingenuity.  They have an apocryphal ability to fix anything 
with some number 8 wire, and visitors are often struck by how 
much of the country's food is locally produced.  Kiwis' 
no-nonsense pioneer spirit -- possibly aided by indigenous 
Maori and Pacific island culture -- has also led to an 
admirable insistence on egalitarianism.  But this has the 
downside of at times encouraging the impractical and 
discouraging innovation.  The Prime Minister flies on 
commercial or charter flights, even within the country.  The 
media waxes indignant over the parliamentary pension that New 
Zealand's High Commissioner in London draws on top of his 
"high" NZD 125,000 (USD 75,000) salary.  The country's "tall 
poppy syndrome" -- an overwhelming desire to cut high fliers 
down to size -- is legendary. 
 
¶9.  (C) As with many small towners, New Zealanders long to be 
noticed.  They often have to clarify for themselves and 
outsiders how they differ from their larger and more 
ebullient neighbor Australia (think Canada and the United 
States).  They are also painfully aware that as many as 20 
percent of their fellow countrymen (25 percent of those with 
advanced degrees) have chosen to live abroad, often 
permanently.  There's a nagging insecurity among many Kiwis 
that their country is inferior.  As a result they vigorously 
point to its uniqueness.  Many things, from Busy Bee toys to 
Holden cars, are classified as "iconic" Kiwiana.  The 
anti-nuclear legislation, seen as both unique and a way to 
cut the mighty United States down to size, is the most iconic 
of all.  (Many of us suspect that if we  were to openly 
applaud the ban -- or at least say it no longer mattered to 
U.S. policy -- the legislation would lose some of its appeal.) 
 
¶10. (C) Despite their country's small size, geographic 
isolation makes New Zealanders feel invulnerable.  The 
military regards itself as an expeditionary force, and the 
official charged with international policy at the Ministry of 
Defense almost laughed out loud when Polcouns once suggested 
New Zealand might one day appreciate the option of U.S. 
military assistance.  The lack of a geographic threat also 
enables Kiwis to view the world with a sense of detachment 
and a bit of moral superiority.  Many feel their small 
country's interests are best served by multilateral rather 
than bilateral arrangements.  New Zealand's UN Perm Rep 
Rosemary Banks has told us that because former PM Frazier 
helped create the UN, many Kiwis have an unrealistic view of 
the country's influence in that body.  They also have a poor 
understanding of how much the multilateral system depends on 
the United States.  It fits New Zealanders' sense of moral, 
multilateral destiny to try to set an example for the rest of 
the world through the ant 
i-nuclear legislation. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
The Continued Search for a Common Identity 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) In the twenty years since the anti-nuclear 
legislation was implemented, New Zealand has become a much 
more heterogeneous society.  In 1975 and again in 1987, the 
country changed its race-based immigration policies.  As of 
the 2001 census some 30 percent of New Zealanders were Maori, 
Pacific Islanders, Asian, African, or Middle Eastern.  In 
recent years, Maori have become more vocal about their 
historic grievances and continued lag in key social 
indicators such as income and health.  The increased ethnic 
mix and debate over the proper compensation for Maori have 
raised a lot of questions here about what it means to be a 
New Zealander. 
 
¶12. (C) Recently, a guide showing EAP A/S Hill around the 
national museum was asked whether the country sees Maori 
culture as a common bond.  He immediately answered that it 
was the country's nuclear ban that made it unique.  The 
probable reason for that non sequitor is that in today's New 
Zealand, people see both Maori culture and the anti-nuclear 
policy as means of uniting Kiwis and differentiating the 
country from others.  The Labour government in particular has 
used the search for a uniquely Kiwi identity -- including 
being Maori, clean, green, and anti-nuclear -- to its 
advantage. A junior Labour MP tells us Prime Minister Clark 
sees this as part of her legacy. 
 
-------- 
Politics 
-------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  Some of the anti-nuclear legislation's creators, 
including Prime Minister Clark and Defense Minister Goff, are 
in Government today and remain personally attached to the 
policy.  Their sentimental attachment aside, the ban has also 
proved useful for them politically.  The Labour government 
continues to cast itself as the guardian of the policy, and 
the opposition National Party as closet U.S. poodles who 
would immediately scrap the legislation if elected.  There is 
some evidence that such claims won Labour votes during the 
last election campaign.  But as we have previously reported, 
National was never likely to be able to overturn the 
legislation anyway because it is such a lightning rod issue. 
Further, National is now close to declaring that it supports 
maintaining the ban.  In this way, the Nats hope to eliminate 
it as a source of strength for Labour. 
 
¶14.  (C) The truth is that since 1994 no NZ Government of 
either party has ever really had to pay a high price for 
maintaining the anti-nuclear policy, whereas scrapping it 
would cost a government dearly at the polls.  There were no 
U.S. bases in New Zealand at the time the anti-nuclear 
legislation was passed, and so unlike Australia no potential 
economic loss from a military split.  Unlike France, which 
successfully gained the release of the agents behind the 
"Rainbow Warrior" bombing by threatening economic sanctions, 
the United States has not been able to change New Zealand 
policy through bans on high level political and military 
contacts. In future reporting, we will explore further the 
impact of these U.S. policies in New Zealand. 
 
------------------------- 
Where Do We Go From Here? 
------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) The anti-nuclear legislation is not going anywhere 
soon, as most New Zealanders have a strong identification 
with the policy and there is no political leadership calling 
for a change. New Zealand's future energy shortages may force 
an eventual rethink on the nuclear ban, but for now most 
analysts see this as unlikely given the options of solar, 
wind, and other technologies that are more in keeping with 
New Zealanders' "clean and green" self image. 
 
¶16.  (C) Nor would a decision to explore the use of nuclear 
energy necessarily mean New Zealand would allow U.S. naval 
ship visits, even on paper.  The ban -- and U.S. reaction to 
it -- has been used by its masters to become a surrogate for 
New Zealand nationalism (and, by extension, anti-American 
sentiment).  Even if Kiwi officials were to decide it would 
be in their interest to change the policy, they'd have a hard 
time doing so. 
 
¶17.  (C) But although the ban is tough to address directly, 
the underlying anti-Americanism does not have to be.  We have 
found that by shifting the conversation from the ban to New 
Zealand's overall security interests, we have encouraged New 
Zealanders to take a broader look at US-New Zealand 
cooperation in the region and around the globe.  Media 
coverage of New Zealand's participation in the Proliferation 
Security Initiative has been quite breathless, for example. 
While previously this was due to misreporting that the U.S. 
had changed its policy limiting joint exercises, there now 
seems to be genuine interest in New Zealand's contribution to 
this US-led multilateral effort.  We can and should continue 
to look for more such ways to encourage our Kiwi counterparts 
to cooperate with us on issues of bilateral and regional 
interest. We should also act -- within our broader interests 
-- to keep the anti-nuclear issue from being used against 
those of all political stripes who want a closer relationship 
with the Un 
ited States. 
McCormick