VZCZCXYZ0016
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0756/01 1011359
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111359Z APR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8670

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000756 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KUNR UNGA
SUBJECT: UN: FIFTH COMMITTEE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A SCALE OF 
ASSESSMENT RESOLUTION 
 
 ¶1. Summary. Following weeks of discussion and then 
negotiation on a draft resolution, the Fifth Committee had 
agreed to all paragraphs except operative paragraph (OP) 5, 
which included eight proposals to be forwarded to the 
Committee on Contributions (CoC) for its consideration this 
June.  In the face of Russian and Chinese opposition to 
forwarding elements in the draft which their delegations did 
not agree with, the Committee became deadlocked over how to 
send forward Member States' proposals to the CoC.  After 
numerous attempts by the coordinator and delegations to break 
the impasse, Fifth Committee chairman Ashe announced on April 
4 that no agreement could be reached on the resolution and 
the item would be deferred to the 61st GA. End summary. 
 
¶2. The Fifth Committee spent nearly two weeks negotiating a 
draft resolution to forward eight methodology proposals from 
individual or groups of Member States for the consideration 
of the CoC (in addition to the existing methodology, 
 
proposals were made by Saudi Arabia, US, EU, Japan, Mexico, 
Caricom and Singapore, and a "like-minded group" of some G-77 
delegations).  Though the proposals were grouped together in 
one paragraph (OP5), there were a number of additional 
paragraphs in the resolution that were the subject of lengthy 
negotiation in the committee (relating to the principle of 
capacity to pay and requests for additional information from 
the CoC).  Following two weeks of debate, these paragraphs 
were agreed to informally, leaving only OP5 to be agreed. 
Most delegations had been working on the assumption that this 
would automatically be agreed, however, this assumption was 
soon challenged, and ultimately blocked, by Russia and China. 
 
¶3.  In both 1997 and 2000 the General Assembly could not 
agree on one set of criteria to be sent to the CoC for 
consideration, and opted instead to send forward all 
proposals without prejudice to the deliberations by Member 
States on the scale later in each respective year.  It was 
apparent to all delegations from the outset of the current 
negotiations (which began in November 2005) that a similar 
approach would have to be employed this year given the 
divergent views among Member States on the various elements 
of the scale methodology.  As such, there was a working 
assumption that Member States could table any proposal to be 
forwarded to the CoC.  The Committee would have an 
opportunity to ask questions and seek clarifications from the 
proponents and from the Secretariat on each proposal but, 
ultimately, the proposals would not be negotiated at this 
stage and would be sent forward to the CoC for information 
only. 
 
¶4. As the discussion evolved, two -- and later three -- 
options were tabled to address OP5.  The first option was to 
follow the existing practice of 1997 and 2000 by requesting 
the CoC to present scales based on the eight proposals 
enumerated in the draft resolution.  There was broad 
agreement by Member States to follow this precedent, with the 
exception of Russia and China who refused to forward any of 
the proposals in a resolution because they were not agreed to 
by all Member States. (Comment: The position of Russia and 
China was precipitated foremost by the inclusion of the 
Japanese proposal of a P-5 floor rate, and to a certain 
extent by the inclusion of the US proposal on purchasing 
power parity. End comment.) 
 
¶5.  As the committee came close to agreement on all other 
paragraphs in the resolution, India introduced six new 
paragraphs that directly targeted the US proposal on PPP. 
Immediately rejected by the US, EU, Japan and CANZ for being 
judgmental in nature, the paragraphs nevertheless remained on 
the table.  To broker a compromise, the coordinator (Iran) 
proposed 1) modification of the chapeau language to OP5 to 
make clear that the proposals were submitted separately by 
various Member States for information only and without 
prejudice to the decision to be taken by the GA on the scale 
in the 61st GA, and 2) deletion of the Indian paragraphs.  In 
the hours after the "compromise" was introduced, there seemed 
to be growing momentum towards acceptance of this package. 
The US, EU, CANZ, and Mexico all agreed, while Japan, India 
and China indicated their willingness to "think it over" and 
possibly proceed on the compromise as a way forward. 
 
¶6.  Two days later, on a Sunday afternoon, delegations 
reconvened with the intent of finalizing the resolution by 
Monday morning.  However, this was prevented by the Russian 
and Chinese proposal of new language.  Their language -- to 
replace OP5 in its entirety -- would result in the deletion 
from the resolution of all proposals, and would allow for 
proposals to be submitted bilaterally to the CoC by Member 
States. It also stipulated that the CoC only had to consider 
those proposals that were in accordance with the principle of 
capacity to pay.  The language created a role for the CoC 
(which is a committee of only 18 members) to take decisions 
on which proposals did and did not meet the principle of 
capacity to pay.  This judgement, however, is reserved for 
 
 
Member States in their consideration of the methodology to be 
used in calculating the scale of assessment and does not 
constitute a part of the CoC's mandate. In short, the 
Russia/China proposal represented a radical departure from 
past practice and would set precedent for an entirely new 
manner of interaction between Member States and the CoC. 
 
¶7.  Despite numerous questions on the proposal, and 
suggestions on how to change it to make it acceptable, the 
Russians would not depart from their original proposed 
language.  As such, the proposal was strongly opposed by 
Japan, the US and EU, with Mexico and the Caricom Group 
expressing their strong discomfort with the language.  Egypt 
and India, however, were prepared to work on the Russia/China 
language. And so the gap in positions widened, making the 
prospect of any agreement even more distant.  In a last 
attempt to bridge the divide, the US and Mexico proposed 
amendments to the coordinator's "compromise" language to 
explicitly take into account the concerns of Russia and China 
that the eight proposals have not received the full support 
of all Member States.  This was immediately rejected by 
Russia, and the negotiations ended.  Following this deadlock, 
and in light of the growing divide in the Committee, Chairman 
Ashe announced to all delegations on April 4 that no 
agreement could be reached on the resolution and the item 
would be deferred to the 61st GA. 
 
¶8.  Without a resolution from the GA, the CoC will likely 
continue to consider elements of the current methodology 
(including the base period, low per capita income adjustment, 
and debt burden adjustment).  It does not have a mandate to 
consider any of the eight proposals tabled by Member States 
this March.  Member States may write to the CoC and request 
that it consider their proposals, however, as the CoC 
operates by consensus it is highly unlikely that the 
committee would agree to consider any/all of the proposals 
forwarded by individual Member States.  This is a practice 
that has never before been used and would most likely create 
gridlock in the CoC. 
 
¶9.  It is clear, however, that some or all of the eight 
proposals (and maybe more) will be tabled by Member States 
this fall.  In preparation for this, the Secretariat has 
already indicated that it will attempt to gather as much 
pertinent information and data as possible. 
BOLTON