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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 002134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST 
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/19/06 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Discord growing between Japan, South Korea; Japan to conduct 
maritime survey near Takeshima later this month; Tokyo alarmed at 
Seoul's economic assistance to Pyongyang over abduction issue 
 
(2) Shaking world - changing power dynamics: Japan's diplomatic 
inability, its diplomatic vacuum in Asia 
 
(3) Ozawa's aggressive moves puzzle New Komeito; Planned 
reshuffle of party executives may need to be reviewed 
 
(4) Interviews with Tsuneo Oshiro, Taku Yamasaki on USFJ 
realignment and its future course 
 
(5) Politics 2006: Ruling parties adopt constitutional referendum 
bill that would grant voting right to those 20 or older; Minshuto 
reluctant to go along with the draft bill 
 
(6) Editorial: US force realignment must be settled in a way to 
win public support 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Discord growing between Japan, South Korea; Japan to conduct 
maritime survey near Takeshima later this month; Tokyo alarmed at 
Seoul's economic assistance to Pyongyang over abduction issue 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Abridged) 
 
The relationship between Japan and South Korea is already sour 
due to Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine and 
other issues. Tensions are likely to rise even further with 
Japan's plan to conduct a maritime survey later this month around 
Takeshima, a group of disputed islets known as Dokdo in South 
Korea. There is a growing backlash from South Korea. Tokyo is 
also visibly concerned about Seoul's move to consider massive 
economic assistance to Pyongyang in exchange for returning South 
Korean nationals abducted to North Korea. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe called yesterday Japan Coast 
Guard Commandant Hiroki Ishikawa to the Prime Minister's Official 
Residence to order him to send off a research vessel as planned, 
while giving full consideration to safety. Abe also told a press 
conference, "We must deal with the matter in a levelheaded manner 
so that it will not affect other issues." 
 
Japan has been lagging behind South Korea in conducting a 
maritime survey and naming places in the area. Tokyo's readiness 
to face a fierce reaction from Seoul comes from its determination 
to catch up with South Korea. The oceanic area in question is in 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claimed by both Japan and South 
Korea. Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi said: "Despite Japan's 
protests, South Korea has been conducting maritime surveys around 
Takeshima for the last four years." 
 
According to South Korea's National Oceanographic Research 
Institute, the country has independently named 18 spots in the 
sea area in the vicinity of Takeshima. South Korea now aims at 
winning international recognition for such names at an 
international conference in June. Reportedly four of those places 
lie inside Japan's EEZ. Tokyo fears that Japan's inaction would 
end up boosting South Korea's de facto control over Takeshima. 
 
TOKYO 00002134  002 OF 011 
 
 
 
Tokyo is lobbying Seoul to take joint steps in dealing with North 
Korea based on DNA test results that showed a high likelihood of 
the husband of abductee Megumi Yokota being South Korean. But 
that goal, too, seems to be elusive. 
 
In the South-North cabinet-level talks scheduled to begin April 
21, Seoul intends to broach the issue of South Koreans abducted 
by North Korea and offer to extend economic assistance to the 
North in exchange for resolving the issue. A Foreign Ministry 
official said alarmingly, "Economic assistance in connection with 
the abduction issue would send the wrong message to the North." 
 
Prime Minister Koizumi told reporters yesterday, "South Korea's 
circumstances differ from Japan's. Japan will continue to stick 
to a dialogue-and-pressure approach." 
 
(2) Shaking world - changing power dynamics: Japan's diplomatic 
inability, its diplomatic vacuum in Asia 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 1) (Full) 
April 18, 2006 
 
The scene is Washington, D.C., in mid-March. Vice Foreign 
Minister Shotaro Yachi was received by Bush administration 
officials, who were unusually prickly. The reason was the Iran 
issue. 
 
US distrustful of Japan 
 
"Iranian President Ahmadinejad is outrageous. Japan has no time 
to waste."  Such a remark came from Deputy National Security 
Advisor Crouch, Under Secretary of State Burns, and Under 
Secretary of Defense Edelman during separate meetings (with 
 
SIPDIS 
Yachi). As if by arrangement, they all asked for Japan's 
cooperation to build a coalition against Iran. 
 
Will Japan invest a vast amount of money in the Azadegan oil 
field project in Iran even if the issue of Iran's nuclear 
development program heats up? There was a hint of this sort of 
question in remarks made by US officials, although they did not 
actually mention the name of Azadegan. Yachi told them, "We on 
the part of Japan, as a friend, will work on Iran to act 
properly." But the United States has a deep-seated distrust of 
Japan on Iran. 
 
Japan endorsed the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after the 
terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001. By sending Self- 
Defense Forces (SDF) troops to Iraq on the mission of 
reconstruction assistance, Japan demonstrated its determination 
to work together. The Japan-US alliance has been enhanced to the 
level described as being the "best since the end of World War 
II," according to a US government official. But the Iran issue is 
too intricate to be solved under the "principles of the 
alliance." It has posed a difficult simultaneous equation to 
Japan. 
 
As the US exhaustion progresses, chances of Japan being forced to 
make a difficult choice grow. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
has emphasized the importance of ties with the US, but there is 
no sign that he will come up with any specific strategy to deal 
with such a situation. How can Japan deal with tasks for which 
the US remains unable to show guidelines or to which Japan cannot 
 
TOKYO 00002134  003 OF 011 
 
 
conform? 
 
"Aid to Myanmar must be cancelled." This sort of view has 
recently cropped up in the US government. Reportedly, there is a 
growing discontent with Japan, which has continued assistance to 
the junta of that country. Japan argues against such a view: "If 
it is isolated from the international community, Myanmar will 
move closer to China." But the US, which sees human rights 
suppression as an important issue, simply shrugs off such a 
Japan. 
 
A subtle difference is also seen between Japan and the US in 
responses to Indonesia, a major Islamic power. The US is becoming 
alarmed about a growing anti-US tendency in that country, while 
Japan is the largest customer of Indonesia's natural gas 
production. Japan and the US are less likely to take a concerted 
action toward Indonesia. What is more serious than that is the 
existence of a gap between Japan and the US in diplomacy toward 
China. 
 
Last week, high-level officials from such countries as Japan, the 
US, South Korea, China, and North Korea gathered in Tokyo and 
discussed cooperation in Northeast Asia. Participants included 
government officials and private sector individual. The fate of 
the North Korean issue drew attention there, but the focus of 
closed-door debate was the confrontation between Japan and China. 
 
A foreign policy expert from the US criticized Japan: 
"Excessively dwelling on paying homage to Yasukuni Shrine is 
undesirable for all of Asia." Following him, US Assistant 
Secretary of State Hill asserted: "The stagnant relations between 
 
SIPDIS 
Japan and China have stood in the way of cooperation in the Asia 
region." The US does not want to see tensions emerge in Asia at a 
time when it has enough trouble dealing with other issues like 
Iraq. 
 
Business leaders in Japan, as well, are worried about the chill 
between Japan and China. Japan Business Federation (Nippon 
Keidanren) Chairman Hiroshi Okuda commented: "It's important (for 
Japan and China) to have a summit meeting where the leaders of 
the two nations can frankly exchange views and understand the 
other side's thinking." 
 
China on offensive 
 
As if to fill the void made an absence of Japanese diplomacy in 
Asia, China is now on the offensive. Premier Wen Jiabao has 
already visited Cambodia and New Zealand this year. Defense 
Minister Cao Gangchuan recently raveled to Vietnam and Malaysia. 
China is even rumored to be selling arms to Indonesia and the 
Philippines. 
 
One idea for Japan to get out of this fix is to invite the 
foreign ministers of Central Asian nations to come to Japan in 
June to discuss a framework for cooperation in such areas as anti- 
terrorist measures, steps to stop the drug trade, and the 
environment. Central Asia is an important regions strategically, 
and already there is fierce rivalry growing there among the US, 
China, and Russia. If the discussions succeed, Japanese diplomacy 
in the region could take on additional importance. 
 
"When Japan-US relations are in good shape, Japan can build good 
relationships with Asian nations," says Prime Minister Koizumi 
 
TOKYO 00002134  004 OF 011 
 
 
repeatedly, but how does he intend to make better use the 
alliance with the US for Japan's national interests? It is 
therefore necessary for Japan to have a complex approach to the 
problem, envisioning a changing diplomatic dynamic in the world. 
 
(3) Ozawa's aggressive moves puzzle New Komeito; Planned 
reshuffle of party executives may need to be reviewed 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Abridged) 
April 18, 2006 
 
The New Komeito is puzzled by Minshuto (Democratic Party of 
Japan) President Ichiro Ozawa's moves. Ozawa has referred to the 
possibility of joining hands with the New Komeito and met with 
the president of Soka Gakkai, a lay Buddhist organization serving 
as the party's largest support base. Such moves have set off 
alarms in the New Komeito that Ozawa is trying to drive a wedge 
between the LDP and the New Komeito. Some New Komeito members 
have begun mentioning the need for Representative Takenori 
Kanzaki to stay on beyond this fall and to review the party's 
strategy to deal with Minshuto. 
 
Kanzaki told reporters yesterday about Ozawa's meeting with Soka 
Gakkai President Einosuke Akiya: "Mr. Ozawa simply paid a 
courtesy call on Mr. Akiya; that was all." Kanzaki was apparently 
trying to play down the Ozawa-Akiya meeting. 
 
Akiya met with Ozawa for about 10 minutes on the evening of April 
11 at the latter's sudden request. Shortly after becoming 
Minshuto president, Ozawa pointed to the possibility of 
cooperating with the New Komeito if it could keep a distance from 
the LDP. The Ozawa-Akiya meeting has sparked speculation that 
Ozawa would actively approach the LDP's partner. 
 
From the Hosokawa administration through the Shinshinto (New 
Frontier Party) eras, Ozawa reportedly had connections strong 
enough to have direct talks with Soka Gakkai leaders without 
going through the Komeito. The New Komeito shares the view with 
Soka Gakkai that the party is closer to Minshuto than to the LDP 
when it comes to foreign policy and the social disparity issue. 
 
The Ozawa-Akiya session surfaced under such circumstances. Only a 
handful of New Komeito members are hopeful that cooperation with 
Minshuto will help increase the party's profile and its voice 
toward the LDP. But most of the New Komeito members are simply 
perplexed. They have an allergic reaction to Ozawa's high-handed 
political style. 
 
A senior New Komeito member noted: "Many members still hold 
resentment toward Mr. Ozawa, who badmouthed Komeito executives 
when he was a partner of our party." A Soka Gakkai executive spat 
out, "We must absolutely not team up with Ozawa." New Komeito 
Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Junji Higashi disapprovingly said 
last night: "Mr. Ozawa is untrustworthy. He first sets off a 
whirlwind, then becomes self-centered, and people leave him as a 
consequence." 
 
Asked by reporters about the Koizumi-Akiya meeting, Prime 
Minister Koizumi yesterday noon bluntly said: "I don't know (what 
Mr. Ozawa is thinking about). You must ask him that question. The 
LDP-New Komeito relationship is firm." Some New Komeito members 
fear that a relentless attack on the party will follow the 
provocation of Ozawa. A person connected with the New Komeito 
 
TOKYO 00002134  005 OF 011 
 
 
even suggested the possibility of making changes to the LDP- 
centered campaign cooperation strategy for next year's Upper 
House election. 
Ozawa is also expected to affect the New Komeito's reshuffle of 
its executive members, planned for this fall. The party has been 
paving the way for the departure of Kanzaki and Secretary General 
Tetsuzo Fuyushiba and the appointment of Acting Secretary-General 
Akihiro Ota and Land, Infrastructure and Transport Minister Kazuo 
Kitagawa as new party executives. But a senior Soka Gakkai member 
said, "The party will have to think hard about who should join 
the new executive lineup." 
 
(4) Interviews with Tsuneo Oshiro, Taku Yamasaki on USFJ 
realignment and its future course 
 
YOMIURI (Page 17) (Full) 
April 18, 2006 
 
Now that the government and Okinawa Prefecture's Nago City have 
reached an agreement on the pending issue of relocating the US 
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station, Japan and the United States 
are in the final phase of intergovernmental consultations over 
the realignment of US forces in Japan in order to release a final 
report. The Yomiuri Shimbun interviewed Tsuneo Oshiro, a 
professor at the University of the Ryukyus, and Taku Yamasaki, 
chairman of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's security 
affairs panel, to hear their views about problems that cropped up 
in the realignment talks and to explore the challenges lying 
ahead. 
 
It's time for the government to reconsider how to aid local 
hosts: Oshiro 
 
-- The government and the city of Nago have now agreed to lay 
down a V-shaped pair of airstrips in the coastal portion of Camp 
Schwab. 
 
Oshiro: The agreement came out of the blue. Futenma is said to be 
the most dangerous base, and that was evident from the crash (of 
a Futenma-based US military helicopter) onto the campus of 
Okinawa International University in August 2004. It's desirable 
to relocate the airfield to somewhere outside Okinawa Prefecture 
or otherwise to an overseas location. But it's important for 
Okinawa as well to move it at the earliest possible date. It will 
not be easy to get (US) understanding, and the governor (of 
Okinawa Prefecture) will be tested on his negotiating capability. 
 
-- How do you evaluate the realignment talks this time? 
 
Oshiro: The schoolgirl rape incident of 1995 touched off the 
agreement of SACO (Japan-US Special Action Committee on 
Facilities and Areas in Okinawa). The government considered 
alleviating Okinawa Prefecture's base-hosting burden while 
attaching importance to bilateral security arrangements between 
Japan and the United States. The government, Okinawa Prefecture, 
and Nago City reached an agreement (on Futenma airfield's 
relocation to Nago). It took time, but the government finally set 
about carrying out an environmental assessment (of the relocation 
site and its environs). However, the government came up with a 
new plan in the interim report released in October last year. 
That was the idea of building an alternative facility in the 
coastal area of Camp Schwab. The government bypassed Okinawa in 
its decision-making process on this matter, and the government 
 
TOKYO 00002134  006 OF 011 
 
 
itself undermined its relationship of mutual trust with Okinawa 
Prefecture's Governor Inamine. 
 
-- Do you think Okinawa Prefecture might have failed to cooperate 
well? 
 
Oshiro: The government decided on a basic plan (to build a sea- 
based facility at a site in waters off the coast of Nago City's 
Henoko district to take over the heliport functions of Futenma 
airfield). In the meantime, the governor has also cooperated on 
what he could. But the government said it could not carry out 
Futenma airfield's relocation because environmentalist groups 
campaigned against the plan. But that's wrong. The government 
didn't have the strong will to build a new facility offshore of 
Henoko. At the request of Okinawa Prefecture, the government made 
a cabinet decision to set a 15-year time limit on the US 
military's use of the new facility and to build that facility as 
a dual-purpose airport for joint military and civilian use. 
However, the government apparently didn't negotiate those two 
preconditions with the United States. The coastal installation 
plan adopted this time is to build the new facility in an area on 
the premises of a US military base, so the two preconditions were 
left out. 
 
-- Okinawa has only grown distrustful of the government? 
 
Oshiro: The United States will redeploy 8,000 Marines (from 
Okinawa) to Guam. In addition, the United States will also return 
its military bases located south of Kadena airbase. These burden- 
lessening plans were not included in the SACO agreement. This is 
a step forward toward dissolving Okinawa's excessive burden. The 
returning of bases in urban areas is also a plus, indeed. 
However, it does not seem to me that such a package can replace 
the preconditions the governor has demanded. The government 
should reconsider its aid (to Okinawa), including fiscal 
measures. 
 
-- Concretely speaking? 
 
Oshiro: Since the SACO accord, the government has invested 
approximately 300 billion yen in the development projects of 
Okinawa Prefecture and its base-hosting municipalities. However, 
the money was for government-set purposes only. Instead, the 
government should consider something like subsidies for the 
burden of base-hosting localities. It's desirable for local hosts 
to use the money for their own accountable purposes. 
 
-- Do you see any change in the mindset of people in Okinawa 
Prefecture? 
 
Oshiro: A Chinese submarine intruded into Japan's territorial 
waters, and North Korea is reportedly developing nuclear weapons. 
In such a situation, national security has become close to the 
residents of Okinawa. Historically, Okinawa was tilted toward 
China. However, Okinawa is situated near the border. So, the 
prefecture has to accept an appropriate burden. 
 
-- What do you want the government to do about base issues? 
 
Oshiro: The United States has shifted its national strategy to 
deal with terrorists, nuclear ambitions, and China. They agreed 
to move the Marines to Guam against such backdrops, but it's 
regrettable that they didn't fully account for that. After the 
 
TOKYO 00002134  007 OF 011 
 
 
1995 rape incident, the government set up a three-party 
consultative body for the foreign minister, the director general 
of the Defense Agency, and the governor of Okinawa Prefecture to 
talk about base issues and security affairs. But it ended after 
meeting only several times. The government should use such a 
consultative body to talk not only with Okinawa but also with 
other base-hosting localities. 
 
Follow-up needed to translate agreement into action: Yamasaki 
 
-- Japan has held consultations (with the United States over the 
realignment of US forces in Japan) for more than two years. But 
the government was out of step, particularly between the Defense 
Agency and the Foreign Ministry. 
 
Yamasaki: That's true. It's unclear for a while which was the 
control tower. From the beginning, the government needed to hold 
interdepartmental discussions on this matter involving many of 
its sections-in addition to the Foreign Ministry and the Defense 
Agency. So the prime minister and his office should have taken 
the initiative from the start. Regrettably, the government was 
not well aware of how important it is to realign the US military 
presence in Japan. 
 
-- Washington was reportedly frustrated at Tokyo's slow response. 
 
Yamasaki: The United States has always had someone in charge of 
critical issues regarding its national strategy. For example, 
there was (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense) Campbell at the 
time of consultations on regional contingencies. And now, there's 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Lawless. This time, President 
Bush has entrusted Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld with everything 
about the (realignment) talks. The State Department is working 
together with him. Lawless briefs Rumsfeld almost everyday. 
Endorsed by Rumsfeld, Lawless has negotiated with Japan. However, 
the locus of responsibility was unclear in the Japanese 
government, and this irritated the United States. 
 
-- What do you think is significant for the Japanese government 
to address the US military's realignment? 
 
Yamasaki: During the post-Cold War decade, Japan considered its 
bilateral security alliance with the United States in 
anticipation of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. But after the 9- 
11 terrorist attacks, there's another theme in terms of dealing 
with international terrorist networks. They're a global threat. 
Japan makes it a basic policy to maintain its national security 
under its security pact with the United States. That's Japan's 
basic stance, so Japan must properly coordinate with the United 
States. I mean that Japan should ready itself for newly emerging 
threats. In the process of realigning US forces in Japan, 
however, the United States wants the Self-Defense Forces to take 
over the duties of US forces as much as possible. That's a 
categorical imperative for the United States. Also, for Japan, 
Okinawa-which is home to 75% of all US military bases in Japan-is 
the Japan-US security arrangements' Achilles heel. So Japan 
needed to consolidate its security arrangements there. That's why 
Futenma relocation was at the center of (realignment) talks. 
 
-- For all that, the government didn't provide sufficient 
explanations not only to Okinawa but also to other base-hosting 
localities, did it? 
 
 
TOKYO 00002134  008 OF 011 
 
 
Yamasaki: In the case of Futenma airfield, the government 
couldn't explain its relocation because the government had yet to 
decide on where to build an alternative facility for its 
relocation. The government explored the idea of integrating 
Futenma airfield's functions into the US Air Force's Kadena base 
and looked into the feasibility of relocating the airfield to an 
outlying island. In late September last year, the government 
decided on a plan to relocate the airfield to a coastal area of 
Camp Schwab. However, Futenma relocation has been left unattended 
for 10 years. The US government asked the Japanese government to 
get the local host's understanding without fail. It was the prime 
minister's initiative that resolved the situation. Prime Minister 
Koizumi promised to do so. In October last year, the Japanese and 
US governments released the interim report. After that, the 
Defense Agency negotiated in earnest with Okinawa Prefecture and 
Nago City. 
 
-- Is it possible to translate the final report into action for 
sure? 
 
Yamasaki: The role of Prime Minister Koizumi and his government 
is up until the final report. After that, it is the post-Koizumi 
government's role. When someone comes into office after Prime 
Minister Koizumi, the minister in charge (i.e., the defense 
chief) will also change. Okinawa is not the only problem. There 
are some other issues to resolve. For example, there's the 
problem of Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) (i.e., a plan to move 
the command functionality of the US Army's 1st Corps from the US 
mainland to Camp Zama in the city of Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture). 
Besides, there's also the problem of Iwakuni (in Yamaguchi 
Prefecture) (i.e., a plan to redeploy a carrier-based wing from 
the US Navy's Atsugi Naval Air Station to the US Marine Corps' 
Iwakuni Air Station in the city of Iwakuni, Yamaguchi 
Prefecture). Someone will have to properly follow up the issue of 
realigning US forces in Japan to the end. 
 
-- You preside over the LDP's security affairs panel. So you're 
the right person, aren't you? 
 
Yamasaki: I'm concurrently in the post of chairman on the party's 
committee for the promotion of Okinawa. So I can do it for 
another year and a half or so, if I want to. During that time, we 
must get the bilateral agreement underway and hand over the job 
to the next person. That's important, I think. Okinawa Prefecture 
also will have someone else in charge. If so, it will be even 
more important for the government to continue to make efforts. 
For now, the government has no system or position to entrust 
someone with security issues. When thinking over the realignment 
issue this time, it's urgently necessary to raise the Defense 
Agency to the status of a ministry. 
 
(5) Politics 2006: Ruling parties adopt constitutional referendum 
bill that would grant voting right to those 20 or older; Minshuto 
reluctant to go along with the draft bill 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
April 19, 2006 
 
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its junior 
coalition partner New Komeito agreed yesterday on a draft bill 
that would set procedures for amending the Constitution. The 
draft bill was formulated by the LDP on April 12. The ruling 
coalition intends to engage in a discussion on the draft with the 
 
TOKYO 00002134  009 OF 011 
 
 
main opposition party Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan), 
aiming to pass it through the Diet during the current session. 
 
Although the New Komeito had suggested the minimum age for 
granting voting rights be 18, it has now accepted the LDP's idea 
that the minimum age should be 20 since those aged 20 and over 
are permitted to vote in Upper and Lower House elections. 
 
As to whether to restrict the media from reporting and 
forecasting the probable outcome, the draft proposes leaving 
decisions up to the media, but it calls for prohibiting 
television and radio spots for a week before the referendum day. 
 
The ruling parties propose a debate and vote be conducted on 
individual amendments in principle, at the same time, but a 
debate and vote would be carried out on amendments to related 
articles and chapters. 
 
Minshuto has already balked at accepting the draft bill for a 
referendum on amending the Constitution. Therefore, reaching an 
agreement between the ruling camp and the main opposition party 
will be difficult, even though the ruling coalition wants to 
submit the bill to the ongoing Diet session. Given such 
circumstances, whether the bill to set procedures for amending 
the Constitution will be enacted is uncertain. 
 
"That's different from (our party's plan)," Minshuto President 
Ichiro Ozawa told reporters last evening. The largest opposition 
party has called for focusing on general principles, while the 
ruling coalition's draft focuses only on the specific 
constitutional reforms. With this in mind, Ozawa seems to have 
made this remark. 
 
The draft proposal contains the ruling bloc's concession to 
Minshuto regarding whether to restrict the media and the minimum 
age for granting voting rights. "If the media are allowed to 
control themselves, there is no need to specify such in law," 
said a senior member of the LDP Research Commission on the 
Constitution. 
 
Many Minshuto House of Councillors members are reluctant to go 
along with any constitutional referendum bill. They began to 
harden their stance toward the referendum bill, with one senior 
lawmaker saying, "It is impossible to pass the bill during the 
current Diet session. If the ruling coalition alone submits the 
bill, we will stubbornly oppose it by submitting 
counterproposals." 
 
The ruling camp, however, intends to ask Minshuto to agree to 
jointly submit the bill. At yesterday's meeting, one participant 
said, "It is important to secure approval from the whole Minshuto 
members (including the Upper House)." 
 
Some ruling camp members once called for submitting the bill to 
the Diet by the ruling parties alone. LDP Constitutional Research 
Commission Chairman Hajime Funada commented, however, "An 
important bill that would set procedures amending the 
Constitution should be passed by the Diet with more than two- 
thirds vote." The ruling camp, therefore, has judged that it 
would not be wise to ram the bill through the Diet. 
 
Prior to the Lower House by-election in the Chiba No. 7 district, 
Minshuto has assumed the stance of facing down the ruling camp. A 
 
TOKYO 00002134  010 OF 011 
 
 
senior LDP Upper House member made this comment, "Depending on 
the outcome of the by-election, the idea of drafting a joint bill 
by the ruling parties and Minshuto may disappear." 
 
(6) Editorial: US force realignment must be settled in a way to 
win public support 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
April 17, 2006 
 
A meeting held recently in Tokyo between senior foreign and 
defense officials of Japan and the United States failed to reach 
an agreement. 
 
Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga also met 
separately with US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard 
Lawless on the sidelines of the senior working-level talks. But 
that, too, ended in failure. 
 
The two countries are wide apart on how to split the cost of the 
relocation of US Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The US has asked 
Japan bear 75% of the estimated 10 billion dollars, or 1.8 
trillion yen, for moving 8,000 US Marines to Guam. Japan has 
expressed its willingness to loan 3 billion dollars for building 
housing and other facilities. 
 
When America's request for 7.5 billion dollars became clear in 
mid-March, we criticized it as extravagant in comparison to 
Japan's annual host nation support of 230 billion yen. We also 
pointed out a lack of clarity in specifics and the basis for the 
estimate. 
 
Considering the fact that it was Tokyo that first requested the 
Guam relocation, it is natural for Japan to bear a certain 
percentage of the cost. But the US has been transforming its 
forces around the globe to suit its own needs. Japan might end up 
playing a role in America's new Asia strategy as a result of the 
Guam relocation. 
 
We would like to see Tokyo and Washington conduct penetrating 
talks on the future role and nature of US forces in Japan along 
with negotiations on the cost sharing of the Guam relocation. 
 
How and to what extent Japan should bear the cost? When working- 
level talks become deadlocked, there is no other way but to seek 
a bilateral political settlement at the highest or cabinet level. 
The cost must be split logically in line with the Japan-US 
security arrangements. 
 
The question is whether the two countries can settle the issue in 
a way that wins public support. The other day at the Diet, 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso expressed the government's desire to 
reduce Japan's share to under 50% of the total cost. We do not 
understand why he had to mention such a specific figure at that 
point. Is it wise for the government to refer to a concrete 
figure at a time like this when a fierce tug-of-war is going on 
between Japan and the US? 
 
Tokyo and Washington failed to meet the March 31 deadline for 
their final report on US force realignment. The failure is 
ascribable to the inability to convince local governments to 
accept the relocation of Futenma Air Station to the coastline of 
Camp Schwab, as well as the stalled cost-sharing talks. 
 
TOKYO 00002134  011 OF 011 
 
 
 
An ambiguous political settlement must be avoided, however. In 
order to maintain a healthy Japan-US alliance, each side must say 
what has to be said, and matters must be discussed thoroughly. 
 
The realignment of US forces in Japan is part of the 
transformation of the US military around the world. The 
realignment also will direct Japan's security policy toward 
transformation and restructuring. The cooperative relationship 
between the Self-Defense Forces and US forces in Japan is 
expected to change drastically especially with the introduction 
of the missile defense system. 
 
What does US force realignment mean for Japan? The government is 
accountable to answer such a fundamental question apart from the 
cost-sharing issue. 
 
SCHIEFFER