VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0896/01 1140520
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240520Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5504
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000896 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): U.S. SUBMITS 
REQUEST TO EXTEND STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION DEADLINE 
 
 
This is CWC-33-06. 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (U)  U.S. presented its extension request for the maximum 
allowable extension of the deadline for finishing destruction 
of 100% of its chemical weapons (CW) stockpile to the OPCW 
Executive Council this week.  Del made it clear that the U.S. 
remains committed to complete elimination of its CW 
stockpile, and will strive to complete destruction by the 
treaty deadline of April 29, 2012, or as soon as feasible 
thereafter.  Formal request submission was followed by a 
detailed program briefing, presented by Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Elimination of Chemical Weapons 
 
SIPDIS 
Dale Ormond.  U.S. del notified key delegations and members 
of the Technical Secretariat prior to the briefing, and gave 
delegations the opportunity to ask questions and provide 
initial feedback at several informal sessions.  In general, 
member states welcomed U.S. transparency, but were clearly 
concerned about eventual legal and political implications for 
the Convention.  The availability of a program expert to 
address questions was invaluable, and will also be critical 
at the next Executive Council meeting in mid-May.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) U.S. delegation scheduled meetings with key 
delegations and TS staff in advance of the formal extension 
request submission and briefing.  Del first met with the 
Director General and Deputy Director General on 18 April to 
discuss not only the extension request, but also press 
coverage of the SECDEF's letters of notification to Congress. 
 DG Pfirter urged strongly that the U.S. not categorically 
state its inability to meet the extended 2012 deadline, and 
clearly caveat numbers provided as projections.  Pfirter 
stressed that a message along these lines would give him the 
political latitude to acknowledge U.S. commitment to the 
Convention. 
 
¶3. (U) Drawing on general talking points in del's 
instructions, Ambassador Javits explained the extension 
request, reassured delegations of continued U.S. commitment 
to the Convention, and introduced Dale Ormond, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Elimination of Chemical 
Weapons (DASA/ECW).  Reaction from the close allies in the 
advance sessions was predictable; France and Germany 
encouraged the U.S. to soften its message about potential 
inability to meet the 2012 deadline, while the UK was 
surprisingly supportive, and shared its thoughts on ways to 
counter criticism of U.S. efforts.  Germany in particular 
emphasized the difficulty the U.S. would likely experience 
from now on in advancing initiatives outside of CW 
destruction, and potential damage to the credibility of the 
Convention. 
 
¶4. (U) EC Chairs/Vice-Chairs, as well as regional group 
coordinators, were generally supportive of U.S. transparency, 
and looked forward to further information provided in the 
briefing.  Iran noted there would clearly be legal, as well 
as political, implications for extending the deadline beyond 
¶2012.  (In earlier discussions, Iran also raised the 
possibility of amending the Convention, and of addressing the 
subject during the 2008 Revcon if not sooner.  Iranian del 
also implied the U.S. was saving its most usable weapons for 
the end of its destruction schedule; U.S. del corrected this 
notion of a "secret stockpile.")  Possessor states also 
welcomed U.S. transparency, but showed a keen interest in how 
much of the stockpile would remain at 2012, and when the U.S. 
anticipated completing destruction.  Russia expressed an 
understanding for the U.S. situation, but also clearly noted 
that this would likely be very damaging to the Convention. 
States Parties also inquired about the reasoning behind such 
an early announcement of potential non-compliance; U.S. reps 
 
explained the mandated notification of Congress, and the 
public disclosure of accompanying information. 
 
¶5. (U) Senior Secretariat staff also welcomed U.S. 
transparency, and stated that the U.S. message was not 
surprising, but encouraged continued transparency, especially 
in light of TS need to accurately project resources necessary 
in future years of U.S. destruction facilities.  Amb. Onate, 
TS Legal Advisor, pointed out that although the CWC only 
 
SIPDIS 
legally addresses destruction through 2012, it does provide a 
"way out" through Article XV (Amendments to the Convention), 
although he later made clear he was not advocating this 
approach.   Ambassador Javits replied that it is premature to 
consider amending the Convention, with the U.S. still in 
compliance until 2012. 
 
¶6. (U) U.S. delegation met with WEOG member states just prior 
to presenting the detailed briefing.  WEOG states were 
generally very appreciative of U.S. transparency.  The 
Netherlands, Sweden and New Zealand all voiced concerns about 
the U.S. destruction program extending beyond 2012, and New 
Zealand thought a treaty amendment might be needed.  France 
and Germany stressed that the U.S. was providing projections, 
and that it was thus premature to draw conclusions.  UK 
expressed an understanding of challenges the U.S. faced, and 
a disappointment in its slower-than-expected progress, but 
emphasized that the extension request was within the CWC's 
terms (by clearly requesting the maximum allowable extension 
under the Convention), and echoed the sentiment that drawing 
conclusions about other measures now would be premature. 
Italy also expressed concerns about the potential impact of 
U.S. actions on the Russian destruction program.  Australia 
questioned the wisdom of revealing "projections" so far in 
advance of the deadline, after which U.S. del clearly 
explained Congressional notification requirements and public 
disclosure of program information.  Finally, Ireland welcomed 
the strong U.S. political commitment and transparency, and 
inquired as to whether any part of current or projected 
delays could be attributed to insufficient resources.  U.S. 
del also met briefly with the Eastern European Group (EEG), 
but due to limited time, was only able to deliver general 
talking points and introduce DASA Ormond.  EEG Chair Bulgaria 
encouraged member states to support the U.S. request. 
 
------------------------------- 
U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST BRIEFING 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Detailed U.S. presentation on the status of the U.S. 
chemical weapons destruction program and the challenges we 
face, given by DASA Ormond, was well received.  Few 
delegations had questions following the briefing, although 
Russia asked about "legal implications" of the extension 
request, and South Africa expressed concern (and some 
confusion) at the presentation of various challenges posed by 
CW stockpile destruction.  In a later meeting, South African 
Ambassador Mkhize (who will assume the role of EC Chair in 
May) expressed her concern that the U.S. had undermined its 
traditional leading role in the organization, citing previous 
examples where the U.S. had been instrumental in furthering 
progress or achieving consensus (e.g. Article VII).  South 
Africa also noted that while generally one would expect 
faster progress as the U.S. gained more experience with CW 
destruction, the opposite seemed to be occurring.  Finally, 
Amb. Mkhize pointed to the value of having objective 
standards, such as deadlines, in 
assessing performance of states, and the difficulty in trying 
to apply subjective standards. 
 
---------------- 
INITIAL FEEDBACK 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (U) U.S. del held an open-ended, informal question and 
answer session on April 21, 2006.  Session was attended by 
France, Australia, Sweden and Russia.  Only France came 
prepared with questions; French reps had clearly studied the 
table the U.S. provided in the extension request, and asked 
 
for clarification on several instances where processing rates 
changed dramatically from year to year at certain sites. 
Ormond explained that the differences were due to changes 
between types of munitions being processed, changeovers from 
munitions to bulk agent, and other technical processing 
details.  France also requested further information on 
reasons for delay in construction of the final two facilities 
and asked several pointed questions about current processing 
rates, and how the U.S. planned to increase these rates in 
future years. 
 
¶9. (U) In a follow-on bilat, Russia's deputy rep said that 
the U.S. request does not meet the requirement to provide a 
detailed plan for complete destruction during the extension 
period.  U.S. rep responded that the U.S. request does in 
fact meet the requirement to provide detail on planned 
destruction activities during the requested extension period. 
 Russian del rep inquired as to how a decision could possibly 
be taken on an extension request to 2012 that was accompanied 
by projections indicating completion of destruction in 2017. 
He actually suggested that the only legally correct approach 
would be for the U.S. to submit a "plan" under which all U.S. 
stocks are destroyed by the 2012 deadline; whether or not it 
was realistic was not important.  U.S. del rejected this 
scheme to submit different plans to the Congress and to the 
OPCW.  Russian rep said that the Russian National Authority 
was probably quite relieved at the U.S. presentation, and 
would no longer feel pressure for Russia to complete its CW 
destruction in accordance with Convention timelines. 
Finally, Russian del implied that Russia would be unable to 
approve the current U.S. request.  Russia also confirmed its 
intent to submit its updated (20-page) detailed plan for 
destruction on Monday, which del will forward upon receipt. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Extensive series of "preview" sessions with key 
players before the formal presentation was effective in 
setting the stage for the detailed U.S. briefing to Executive 
Council members.  While clearly concerned that the U.S. is 
unlikely to meet an extended 2012 deadline, many dels 
expressed appreciation for the transparency displayed by the 
U.S. presentation and the U.S. commitment to destruction. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Not surprisingly, many dels, particularly in the 
WEOG, have latched on to the idea that the projected 
destruction levels in the U.S. paper "are just projections" 
and noted our statements that the U.S. will try hard to 
accelerate its destruction activities to meet the 2012 
deadline, conveniently ignoring the "or if this is not 
possible, to complete destruction as soon thereafter as 
feasible."  We will need to be very careful not to mislead 
dels into believing that the 2012 deadline can be met. 
Intellectually, many recognize that it cannot, but 
emotionally, they have not accepted this. 
 
¶12. (SBU) A common informal reaction is that a treaty 
amendment needs to be considered.  If not now, then perhaps 
at the 2008 Review Conference.  Del has responded that 
discussion of changing the 2012 deadline now is premature, 
but we can expect that the perceived need to "do something" 
will persist. 
 
¶13. (SBU) While the paucity of immediate questions from 
delegations is somewhat surprising, we can expect much more 
active discussion as soon as dels receive instructions from 
capitals.  In particular, we need to be prepared for probing 
questions at the mid-May Executive Council meeting.  Del 
strongly recommends that a senior DOD policy official attend 
to make clear the U.S. commitment to complete destruction as 
soon as possible, and that DASA/ECW Ormond present a 
streamlined version of the briefing and answer additional 
program questions delegations may have. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Russian del argument that the U.S. request is 
not legal because it does not meet Convention requirements is 
 
most likely only a local invention and not based on any 
instructions.  While we believe this argument is unlikely to 
gain much traction, the Iranians and a few others may latch 
onto so-called "legal" arguments to create mischief.  Del 
will need to be well-armed with appropriate talking points to 
rebut these arguments. 
 
¶15.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL