VZCZCXYZ0025
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0865/01 1091121
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191121Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5459
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000865 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING APRIL 14 
 
This is CWC-32-06. 
 
----------- 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶1.  (U) Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) chaired a April 
10 informal consultation on the Implementation Support 
Branch's Article VII-related program.  Magda Bauta (TS/Cuba) 
made a detailed presentation (faxed back to ISN/CB) of her 
branch's program, primarily pointing out where she lacked 
funds for Technical Assistance Visits (TAVs) due to the 
demands of the regional and sub-regional meetings of National 
Authorities (NA) and lack of voluntary contributions in 2006. 
 Colombia made a long impassioned intervention supporting the 
IPB plan, emphasizing the importance of regional and 
sub-regional meetings in the GRULAC.  Such meetings bring 
together a large number of States Parties, all of whom can 
simultaneously receive a message regarding the importance of 
implementation.  Such meetings also strengthen 
multilateralism, of key importance of GRULAC. 
 
¶2.  (U) Tunisia then asked why so many workshops were planned 
for Asia and none for Africa.  The response: IPB hoped to 
have a thematic meeting in Africa, but funds were not 
available.  Several Asian states made voluntary contributions 
to support the meetings there.  Further, Tunisia questioned 
Bauta's statement that attendees are carefully screened: why 
aren't these workshops, seminars and meetings open to any 
representative of any state that wants to attend?  Bauta 
responded that indeed these are open, but for sponsorship, 
IPB wants to ensure the correct people attend. 
 
¶3.  (U) Germany, supported by France, questioned the 
presentation's statistics, wondering why TS bilateral 
outreach efforts in Brussels and London were characterized as 
TAVs.  Germany reiterated its April 6 demand for a complete 
calendar of activities, and asked about the National 
Authority discussion forum initiated a year ago.  (NAs did 
not use it).  Italy noted the CSP-10 decision, emphasizing 
that IPB needed to refocus its efforts as directed in the 
decision.  The U.S., supported by Italy and the UK, also 
questioned IPB's strategy, noting that to accomplish the 
goals set out by CSP-10, there are only a few months left. 
Bilateral exchanges with one or two representatives on the 
margins of regional and subregional meetings of NAs are good 
for status checks, if the state has a NA.  However, to make 
significant progress, teams of relevant experts must go to 
capitals to meet with members of all relevant agencies. 
 
¶4.  (U) The U.S. also questioned the budgetary assumptions 
set out in the IPB briefing: not all TAVs require 3 TS staff 
(the U.S. pays for its own attendees).  Why couldn't the TS 
incorporate more national experts, so that TS costs are 
reduced?  Given the budget surpluses of recent years, had IPB 
considered asking the OPCW budget office on a quarterly basis 
if there were surplus funds elsewhere which could be used to 
support TAVs?  (ICA Division chief Makhubalo replied that no, 
that would require going to the Director General.  Makhubalo 
asserted that it is better to solicit voluntary 
contributions.)  Canada noted that voluntary contributions 
have increased IPB's budget by almost 80 percent, and 
wondered why it still was not enough to cover TAVs to the 
capitals of all requesting states.  Norway disagreed, stating 
that if states are willing to contribute more money, IPB 
should not be taken to task for its attempts to balance its 
implementation priorities. 
 
---------- 
ARTICLE X 
--------- 
 
¶5. (U) Consultations under facilitator Hans Schramml 
(Austria) were held on April 11, and discussions centered on 
paragraph 5 language provided by the UK and the Canadian 
proposal on Assistance and Protection Bureau programs.  The 
TS gave an overview of the status of the database: while the 
 
SIPDIS 
database is functionally ready, questions for delegations 
remain.  In particular, a criteria needs to be established to 
 
designate what information will be integrated into the 
database and who should be given permission to access the 
information.  So far only the TS is authorized to access the 
database.  Russia asked if the database will be translated 
into OPCW languages; the answer was probably not as it was 
too great a burden on the translators. 
 
¶6.  (U) Iran and India were concerned that the database 
focuses too much on capacity building, and not enough on 
protection measures.  The TS tried to reassure delegations 
that protection information is available in the database, 
further noting the database guidelines were based on 
decisions made in PrepCom V and VII, in particular 
PCVII/B/wp.6 Annex B&C.  Ultimately, it was decided to change 
the agenda of April 28; it will instead be an informal 
interactive session on the database for delegations.  Del rep 
will meet with the UK authors of the paper next week to 
discuss next steps to move forward on this subject, which 
might include a paper detailing the exact information 
delegations need to decide upon before the database is freely 
available to SPs. 
 
¶7. (U) The Canadian paper generated a detailed response from 
the Colombian delegation who noted that projects for single 
SPs are valid measures.  They welcome a higher level of 
information on the activities of the APB, but feel that a 
formal report is unnecessary citing the annual report, and 
the DGs report at ECs and CSPs.  Further, if a single SP 
desires more information, it is free to ask the TS for it. 
They do not agree that the TS needs to provide advanced 
information to the EC on projects, fearing this could lead to 
politicization of APB projects.  (The facilitator asked for a 
hard copy of these points, and del rep will get a copy.) 
 
¶8. (U) Russia agreed in general with Colombia, fearing 
regular detailed reports could be a burden on the TS. Uruguay 
concurred.  India supported the Canadian paper, as did 
France.  Del rep agreed more transparency is needed, but 
called for periodic briefings over formal reports.  Del rep 
also suggested the TS provide information on outstanding 
requests for assistance that are not currently being 
addressed, to assist in determining if resources are 
effectively allocated.  The facilitator believes there is a 
two-year backlog of assistance requests.  He suggested if the 
backlog is known then perhaps other SPs could assist on a 
bilateral basis.  Canada reiterated that they do not wish to 
micromanage the TS.  However briefings only help those who 
can attend meetings and are subject to what attendees report. 
 Canada feels the TS should judge which is the greater 
burden.  The facilitator said he would discuss this 
internally with the TS and report back at the next regular 
meeting. 
 
¶9. (U) As stated above, the next meeting on April 28 will be 
an informal interactive demonstration of the APB database for 
delegations, and an invitation will be out soon.  The 
briefing on the Joint Assistance Exercise 2005 will be 
postponed to early May and will include TS participants and a 
participant from France. 
 
--------------- 
FINANCIAL RULES 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (U) The Financial Rules consultations were held on April 
13, and had three outstanding issues, none of which were 
resolved.  Prior to the meeting Iran requested a pre-meeting 
with interested delegations to try to resolve the outstanding 
procurement issues (10.6.04 (D), 10.6.05 (c) and 10.6.06). 
The facilitator (Snelsire/U.S.) laid out three options: 
Option 1 - add the terminology "available to all States 
Parties;" Option 2 - delete the three procurement sections; 
and Option 3 - use CSP-8 language "available to States 
Parties of the CWC.  Germany took a hard line advocating 
deletion of these sections (Option 2).  They feel they do not 
belong in the Financial Rules.  Iran in turn held to their 
stand these sections were necessary, that all SPs have a 
right to understand the equipment that will be used during 
inspections inside their country, and that the terminology 
 
"available to all States Parties" must remain.  They were 
seconded by India, who supported Option 1.  This argument did 
not deviate in the pre- 
meeting discussion. 
 
¶11. (U) The consultations began covering the same ground as 
the pre-meeting, procurement issues.  Iran and India again 
stated their desire to retain the "available to all States 
Parties" terminology, Germany reiterated that procurement 
language should be deleted.  Other delegations tried to swing 
both sides to Option 3, using various CSP decisions, such as 
France noting CSP-1, DEC.71, that SPs have the ability to 
check out all approved equipment and Germany noting CSP-7, 
DEC.20 which also states "equipment available to States 
Parties of the CWC."  France also noted that CSP-1, DEC.71 
has an annex that describes all approved inspection equipment 
down to the last detail.  These citations did not move Iran 
or India from their stance.  In particular India mentioned 
that these references are all over the place, thus were not 
helpful. 
 
¶12.  (U) In the end, Germany agreed to go with Option 3, but 
by then they had alienated Iran and India to the point they 
would not budge.  Thus there was no further progress on this 
issue.  The facilitator attempted to get agreement from 
delegations that at the next consultation Option 3 would be a 
starting point.  Although Iran and India did not argue, del 
rep did not hear them say they would work with Option 3. 
This issue was closed and discussion began on Para 2.2.01. 
 
¶13. (U) 2.2.01 - Interpretation of Financial Rules.  Iran 
believes that if the EC is approving the Financial Rules, 
then the EC should interpret.  Other delegations drew their 
attention to the second sentence of the proposed rule, which 
would cover the EC's rights, but Iran remained firm on this. 
Delegations pointed out that this is micromanaging the DG and 
could lead to expensive special ECs for interpretations of 
the rules.  Discussion went no-where and was closed.  There 
was no discussion of 1.1.01 - Authority and Applicability. 
 
¶14. (U) The facilitator asked delegations to take to capitals 
the procurement language and noted that he will talk 
bilaterally with delegations on the outstanding issues.  He 
noted that the next consultations would be after the May EC. 
 
¶15.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL