VZCZCXYZ0021
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0806/01 1011502
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111502Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5376
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000806 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
APRIL 7, 2006 
 
This is CWC-30-06. 
 
---------------------- 
U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST 
---------------------- 
 
¶1. (U) Del confirmed that, during the proposed week of the 
U.S. extension request submission and briefing, EC Chair 
Dastis, DG Pfirter, most senior Verification staff, Amb. 
Onate, and Amb. Khodakov will be available in The Hague.  Del 
continues to field questions concerning U.S. intent (both 
timing and content of extension request) ) most notably from 
Russia, who stated their del has heard from sources in 
Washington and the TS that the U.S. may reveal information 
that clearly shows operations past 2012.  EU President 
Austria continues to request the status of the request, while 
France and Germany work behind the scenes to express concern 
about the ability of &all possessor states8 to meet 2012. 
UK has been supportive, both in their significantly decreased 
volume of unhelpful questions and their willingness to share 
a draft statement they hope will be helpful in steering a 
constructive approach following the U.S. submission. 
 
----------- 
Article VII 
----------- 
 
¶2. (U) Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) led a 6 April 
2006 informal consultation, supported by Lisa Tabassi 
(TS/OLA).  Tabassi provided an update: over the past week, 
the TS received notifications from seven states designating 
or establish National Authorities (NA): Niue, Grenada, Haiti, 
Madagascar, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Suriname.  A press 
release will be issued, noting this positive development. 
There now remain 18 states without NAs, 12 of which adhered 
to the Convention after 2003.  The remaining difficult cases 
are Papua New Guinea (PNG), Guinea, Mauritania, Tanzania, 
Micronesia, and Nauru.  Tabassi noted that eight missions of 
the 18 had received visits from either Legal Advisor Onate or 
Head of ICA John Makubalu.  Another seven states have been 
contacted via phone in capital.  Three are represented only 
in New York, and Tabassi noted that Onate is willing to 
travel there to hold discussions.  Finally, the Ts will hold 
an 18 April meeting to review the situation and to recommend 
actions the DG should take between then and EC-45.  Note: The 
next consultation is Monday 10 April, and Magda Bauta will 
present IPB's plan of Article VII-related activities. 
 
¶3. (U) Delegations then noted their activities.  Portugal 
noted that it had contacted Timor Leste and Cape Verde, 
emphasizing the importance of establishing their interim or 
permanent NAs by EC-45.  Finland noted its willingness to use 
its long-term bilateral relationship with Tanzania to push it 
to establish a NA.  Australia noted that PNG has made only 
limited progress since the July 2005 TAV.  Tabassi noted that 
Makubalu had met with the PNG mission, which informed him 
that PNG was awaiting promised, follow up from Australia and 
(a surprise to us) the US.  Australia also noted that 
Cambodia is expected to establish its NA by Parliamentary 
decree by the end of 2006.  Australia, on behalf of New 
Zealand, reported that New Zealand made a voluntary 
contribution of 10,000 euros to support Keith Wilson's 
implementation assistance efforts in Fiji, Nauru, Solomon 
Islands, and Tuvalu.  Canada reported that it was considering 
supporting implementation efforts in Antigua and Grenada (but 
noted happily that apparently Grenada has already established 
its NA), but had no specifics on what steps Ottawa intended 
to take.  The UK noted its willingness to demarche Sierra 
Leone, Antigua, and Tanzania.  The UK also called for better 
coordination among assisting SPs, wanting to know the US, for 
instance, had sent TAV teams. Japan relayed that it would 
assist with outreach efforts in PNG and Timor Leste.  Mexico 
reported that its MFA had contacted Honduras, offering 
assistance with establishment of its NA and drafting its 
implementing legislation.  Colombia reported it had made a 
general offer to support implementation efforts of GRULAC 
states.  France noted that Paris had established a network of 
experts from those attending its training courses.  On this 
basis, France could reach out to the DROC and Dijbouti. 
 
Belgium intends to work with the Central African Republic and 
the DROC, which are significant because of their significant 
chemical industries (and pooh-poohed efforts in the tiny 
island states as far less significant).  Finally Iran noted 
that it had contacted Kabul to encourage it to establish its 
NA.  Kabul responded that it might take some time to finish 
elaborating its national legislation, which also established 
the NA, but expects the legislation to be enacted 
expeditiously. 
 
¶4. (U) The facilitator then asked about the status of the 
remaining states.  Tabassi noted that Onate visited the 
Guinean mission in February 2006, and received a request for 
a TAV, noting that the US also was in discussions with the TS 
and Guinea regarding a joint mission.  Mauritania has been 
difficult to contact, and so far the TS has been unable to 
arrange a visit to its mission.  However, the US also is 
attempting to arrange a TAV to Mauritania.  Afghanistan's 
Consulate General is in Amsterdam, but its relationship with 
Kabul is difficult so the TS directly contacted the MFA that 
reported that it had waited election results before 
finalizing its legislation.  As of February, the MFA informed 
the TS that its legislation was being readied for submission. 
 The TS is in regular contact with Bhutan, and expects rapid 
progress because the local interlocutors are responsive and 
eager.  Onate visited the DROC mission, but was informed that 
due to upcoming elections, it is unlikely that it will meet 
the deadlines.  The DROC requested a TAV, which might be done 
jointly with the UK.  For Liberia, EIF was 25 March 2006. 
The TS is in contact with its Ministry of Justice, who 
representatives just completed the NA training in Paris. 
Quick progress is expected once elections are over.  It also 
is a candidate for a US/TS TAV. 
 
¶5. (U) Anand Dhavle (ICA/IPB) presented a six-page plan of 
activities (scanned and e-mailed to ISN/CB) noted that unless 
a state formally asks for a TAV, the TS could not initiate 
it.  There are a number of states in discussion with the TS 
regarding a TAV: Dijbouti, DROC, Rwanda, Malawi, Bhutan, 
Mongolia, Laos, Honduras, Haiti, Guatemala, and Uruguay.  If 
all of these come to fruition, the TS will face a funding 
shortfall of 125,000 euros.  Finally, 
Tabassi noted that the US was considering supporting TAVs to 
Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mauritania, Cape Verde, 
Antigua, and possibly Mozambique. 
 
¶6. (U) Canada, supported by the US, noted the facilitator's 
proposal to focus our efforts on establishment of NAs, but 
noted concerns that states had not yet submitted their plans 
for implementation by EC-47 (November 2006). Canada 
encouraged states reaching out to those in the process of 
implementing the Convention to note the requirement for 
submitting plans and finalizing legislation as well as 
establishing NAs by EC-45. 
 
--------------- 
FINANCIAL RULES 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Financial Rules consultations were held on April 6. 
The facilitator Richard Snelsire (U.S.) began the meeting 
using the Facilitator's Update on the proposed amendments to 
the draft Financial Rules dated 3 April 2006 (this document 
should be on the OPCW external server today).  Discussion 
centered on four of the still outstanding amendments. 
 
¶8. (U) 1.1.01 - Authority and Applicability 
Germany did not approve of the additional wording requiring 
approval by the Executive Council to the rule, saying it was 
repetitious, noting that this is already covered in rule 16.2 
and 16.2.01.  Iran, who made the suggested addition, defended 
it by saying legal text usually has cross-references, it is 
not a bad idea to make this reference in each set of rules to 
identify who has approval.  Eventually this was deferred to 
the next meeting. 
 
¶9. (U) 1.1.03 - Personal Responsibility/Liability - Accepted 
without comment. 
 
¶10. (U) 2.2.01 - Interpretation of the Financial Rules 
There was little comment here, but apparently some 
delegations feel it might be discussed once more... 
 
¶11. (U) 3.2.01, 3.3.01 (B), 4.1.01 (A) (B), 4.2.02 (B), 
4.5.01 (B), 4.12.02, Articles 5 to 8 and 9.1.01 (B) were 
accepted without comment. 
 
¶12. (U) 9.3.01 (B) and (C) - Income from Investments 
The wording of (B) was changed because delegations felt a 
need for a more logical step-by-step progression for 
reporting in case of an investment loss.  Which the TS had to 
say for the umpteenth time was not likely happen because the 
investment strategy is to put funds into short-term interest 
bearing accounts.  Italy was particularly dense during the 
discussion of (B) and (C). 
 
¶13. (U) The new wording of (B) is:  "Any investment losses 
must be reported at once by the Principal Financial Officer 
to the Director General.  The DG shall prepare a detailed 
report concerning these losses, and any required follow-up 
action.  This report shall be provided immediately to the 
External Auditor and Member States through existing reporting 
mechanisms." 
 
¶14. (U) 10.3.04 (B) (C) and 10.4.01 - Accepted without Comment 
 
¶15. (U) 10.6.04 (D), 10.6.05(C) and 10.6.06 - Procurement - 
These were deferred to the next meeting. 
 
¶16. (U) 11.1.02, 11.1.03 and Articles 12-16 - Accepted 
without comment. 
 
¶17. (U) The facilitator said he and the TS will make the 
changes suggested at this meeting and requested delegations 
be prepared to discuss 1.1.01 and 10.6.04, .05 and .06 at the 
next meeting. 
 
¶18. (U) After the consultation the Iranian delegation 
approached the facilitator and asked if it would be possible 
to meet with interested delegations shortly before the next 
consultation on the 13th, to try and arrive at a compromise 
on the procurement section of the rules.  The facilitator 
believes that the Iranians would not propose such a meeting 
unless they were willing to make an effort to arrive at a 
compromise on the procurement language. 
 
-------------------- 
Geneva Group Meeting 
-------------------- 
 
¶19. (U) The two new co-chairs of the Geneva Group (Angela 
Peart - Canada and Sonya Koppe - Australia) convened a 
meeting on April 7, 2006.  The primary focus of the meeting 
was the preparation of the Geneva Group report submission for 
the OPCW.  Members also gave their views on the 2007 budget, 
the financial rules consultation, the regularization of 
arrears consultation, the possible creation of an exchange 
rate mechanism, and tenure policy. 
 
¶20. (U) During a &tour de table8 members of the Geneva 
Group members began by providing suggestions for, and asking 
questions about, the annual Geneva Group report on the OPCW. 
Several delegations asked why there were only two direct 
recruitments listed for the last twelve months.  Angela Peart 
explained that &direct recruitments8 referred to positions 
that were not advertised and for which there was no 
competitive recruiting.  She said the two cases in the last 
twelve months were the Deputy Director General position and 
the Special Advisor to the Deputy Director General position. 
The Swiss suggested that this should be listed under the 
comments section of the report along with a note  explaining 
that the lack of competitive recruiting for these two 
positions was an accepted practice by SP,s. 
 
¶21. (U) The Japanese suggested that the references to gender 
equity be removed from the report, as this could lead to more 
questions regarding geographical representation that would 
not be appropriate because the CWC does not allow for 
 
geographical quotas.  Angela Peart responded by noting that 
the Geneva Group questionnaire asked specifically about 
gender representation and therefore it would be acceptable to 
include references to gender representation.  Sonya Koppe 
noted that the percentage of women working at the OPCW was 
the second lowest of any international organization, with 
only the IAEA having a lower percentage of women.  Members 
agreed to keep the references to gender representation in the 
report. 
 
¶22. (U) France asked that a reference to maintaining the 
balance between Chapter One and Chapter Two expenditures and 
the importance of realizing cost savings in Chapter Two be 
added to the Recommendations for Future Action.  The UK and 
Italy supported the proposal.  Italy asked that reference to 
the unofficial 11-12 million Euro surplus for 2005 be 
included in the Overview section of the report.  Members 
agreed to include a reference to the surplus.  Italy asked 
that the agreement between Germany and Pakistan to share the 
next term as the External Auditor be deleted.  The UK, 
Germany, and France opposed deleting the reference and it 
will be retained especially as it was already included in the 
CSP decision on the External Auditor. 
 
¶23. (U) Italy and the U.S. asked that the assertion that 
procurement delays had occurred because of late payments of 
assessed contributions.  The UK pushed back and said they had 
been told directly by the Directors of BFB and Administration 
that delays had in fact occurred.  Italy said it had never 
been officially notified that such delays had occurred and 
the U.S. noted that it had remained in close contact 
throughout the year to ensure that no TS operations, 
including procurement, had been impeded as a result of 
liquidity problems.  The UK finally agreed that as there was 
conflicting information from the TS, the references to 
procurement would be dropped.  (Note: Del rep later confirmed 
with the TS and the UK that they in fact had never been told 
that any procurement delays had occurred as a result of 
funding problems.)  Language stating that late receipts did 
create practical problems, including planning, was retained, 
as the DG had made references to these issues in his 
statement to the CSP and past EC,s. 
 
¶24. (U) The co-chairs reported to members that Rick Martin 
(BFB) had reported to them that TS division heads would now 
have to have their budget submissions in by late-April and 
that the draft budget would be released shortly after the 
July EC.  The TS was then hoping to hold at least one or two 
consultations introducing the 2007 budget and would then work 
on information papers based on SP,s questions during the 
July August break.  Martin indicated to the co-chairs that 
the DG was now strongly leaning towards a zero percent 
nominal growth budget, although there were some concerns 
about a likely UN salary increase and its impact on the 
budget.  Martin also said, according to the co-chairs, that 
the other two variables, inflation and exchange rate 
fluctuations, appeared to be stable for the time being and 
were not a major concern for the TS.  Reportedly, Martin also 
said that he would continue to work to refine RBB. 
 
¶25. (U) The UK, France, and the U.S. were generally 
supportive of the TS approach as outlined by the co-chairs. 
Germany cautioned that the TS should be more careful this 
year in making any changes in agreed performance indicators 
in order to avoid some of the confusion experienced last year. 
 
¶26. (U) Del rep gave a brief presentation on the progress 
made to date in the financial rules consultations.  He noted 
that there was only the procurement issue as well as one 
other minor language issue in rule 1.1.01 outstanding.  He 
said that the TS had placed his most recent facilitator,s 
paper on the external server on Friday and that he was 
hopeful that an agreement could be reached at the next 
scheduled consultation on April 13.  He noted that the 
Iranian delegation had suggested that interested delegations 
meet shortly before the consultation on the 13th to work 
towards a compromise on the procurement language.  Del rep 
opined that it would not be likely that Iran would agree to 
do this, unless they were interested in reaching an 
 
agreement.  Other members agreed but noted that it would be 
better for the process to take longer than to agree to 
problematic language. 
 
¶27. (U) On repayment plans, Germany urged that the process be 
kept simple and focused.  The Japanese suggested that any 
potential plan should allow for repayments of arrears to be 
credited towards the most recent year, even if this 
necessitated making changes in the financial regulations. 
France agreed but noted that the process could become more 
complicated if it were necessary to amend the financial 
regulations.  Italy said they viewed the process as a lot of 
work for a potentially minimal inflow of cash.  They were 
skeptical about the process as a whole. 
 
¶28. (U) Japan said that as facilitator, they were 
disappointed that the EC Chair gaveled through the noting of 
the report on the Implementation of the Recommendations of 
the External Auditor, despite the fact that no consultations 
had been held on it, the report had only been issued days 
earlier, and the facilitator had not even read the report. 
Other delegations agreed that this should not have happened 
and should not be allowed to happen again.  (Note: This begs 
the question, why didn,t the facilitator (Komuro - Japan) 
speak up during the EC and prevent this from happening.) 
Komuro also told dels that the new OIO report should be out 
the week of April 17. 
 
¶29. (U) On possibly creating a mechanism to address exchange 
rate fluctuations, the Swiss asked that this be included on 
the next Geneva Group meeting agenda.  Japan said that they 
believed there was a Geneva Group report out of New York that 
came out against using surpluses to create an exchange rate 
mechanism.  The Japanese delegate said she would try to 
obtain a copy of the report to share with other dels.  Del 
rep said that at this time the USG was not inclined to 
support the creation of a mechanism to address exchange rate 
fluctuations that use the surplus. 
 
¶30. (U) As the meeting ran longer than expected, Del rep 
remained after the meeting with other interested members to 
provide input for the Geneva Group report and questionnaire. 
The co-chairs agreed to use the stronger language proposed by 
the U.S. concerning studying tenure.  Del rep was able to 
remove the language concerning delayed procurement activity 
as a result of late payments.  The co-chairs told dels that 
the responses to the Results Based Management Questionnaire 
were based both on answers provided by the TS and their 
personal knowledge. 
 
¶31. (U) On question 4, the co-chairs confirmed that they were 
referring to ABAF as the independent audit advisory 
committee.  Del rep questioned whether ABAF really served as 
an independent audit advisory committee other than the fact 
that they do review the External Auditor,s report.  The 
co-chairs agreed to note in the comment section that they 
were referring to ABAF.  On question 5, the co-chairs and 
others felt that the question was more of an objective and 
not subjective nature and therefore did not require a 
qualitative answer.  On question 9, the co-chairs said that 
they had been told by the TS that OIO has since 2004 
conducted periodic program reviews.  On question 13, the 
co-chairs agreed that there was a non-prioritized program 
plan or strategy.  They agreed to note that the Medium Term 
Plan is not prioritized in the comments section.  On question 
15, the answer provided reflects the fact that officially 
individual program managers are accountable for program 
delivery.  On question 20, the co-chairs agreed that there is 
no EC or CSP approved HR strategy.  The co-chairs also agreed 
to correct the report and state that the Dutch government 
does not own the OPCW building as originally stated. 
 
¶32. (U) The UK suggested that members consider, for the next 
Geneva Group meeting, ways in which the TS could achieve 
savings in Chapter 2 activities, specifically in 
Administration.  The next Geneva Group meeting will likely be 
in early June. 
 
----- 
 
LIBYA 
----- 
 
¶33. (U) Del rep met with Libyan delegate and TS to inform all 
parties of Washington,s recommendation to move forward with 
two national papers (request to establish dates for 
intermediate deadlines and 100% extension request) and one 
draft decision.  Del rep also suggested revisions to the 
Libyan submission of March 31, 2006 ) an expanded version of 
Libya earlier request to establish dates for intermediate 
deadlines based on U.S. suggestions (initially discussed at 
EC-44).  TS expressed appreciation for continued cooperation 
between U.S. and Libya, and will use March 31, 2006 (original 
submission) as the official date for subsequent edits, thus 
ensuring EC members are aware that Libya technically 
fulfilled its commitment to provide more detailed information 
by March 31, 2006. 
 
------------------------- 
KAMBARKA AND MARADYKOVSKY 
------------------------- 
 
¶34. (U) Del rep met with TS CDB office Yaugen Ryzhykau to 
clarify points on current operations at Kambarka, and the 
status of documents for both Kambarka and Maradykovsky.  On 
Maradykovsky, no progress on documents is expected until the 
final engineering review in May.  TS confirmed there are two 
identical mobile destruction units operating at Kambarka, and 
provided a copy of the slides they use to brief inspectors 
rotating to Kambarka.  TS also explained that reaction mass 
at Kambarka is processed in an evaporator, and the remaining 
salts are being stored in drums for later shipment to Gorny. 
The incinerator on site is used for processing wastewater and 
solid wastes only.  TS and Russia have agreed on final text 
for the Kambarka FA and VP, but are awaiting confirmation 
from Moscow before distributing the documents. 
 
¶35. (U) Ryzhykau explained that in resolving remaining issues 
on the Kambarka documents, Russia agreed to declare the 
storage buildings as temporary holding areas, and the TS 
agreed to use the equipment list from the Gorny FA/VP. 
Camera positions in the buildings have not been changed, with 
the Russians arguing that it is unsafe to make modifications 
in buildings already involved in destruction operations.  Del 
read is that Russia is unlikely to change camera positions in 
the remaining three buildings, and that the TS will have to 
continue to compensate with a more elaborate sealing plan. 
TS noted that Russian officials pressured TS to sign 
 
SIPDIS 
certificates of destruction, which TS has refused to do.  TS 
and Russia also came to an agreement on reconciliation of 
agent quantity fed to the reactor, but TS continues to 
express concerns over the lack of dedicated instrumentation 
(specifically the flow meter).  Ryzhykau pointed out that 
verification of agent quantity entering the reactor is 
challenging, partly because all movement of agent is through 
piping (versus individual munitions or ton containers) and 
partly because the TS believes readings from the flow meter 
can be manipulated at several points before reaching the 
inspector data screens.  Overall, TS is skeptical that 
measures agreed in the FA/VP will be fully implemented. 
 
------------ 
OPTIMIZATION 
------------ 
 
¶36. (U) TS also shared thoughts on possibilities for an 
optimized verification regime at Russian facilities. 
Ryzhykau emphasized that the approach to optimization at 
Russian facilities has differ significantly from that at U.S. 
facilities, primarily due to the lack of opportunity to 
directly observe (through observation windows or safety 
corridors) operations at Russian facilities.  Manpower 
savings on night shifts in Russia may be challenging because 
of a lack of dedicated instruments; currently inspectors have 
to simultaneously view readings in the inspector and facility 
control rooms.  The TS predicts that, due to cost, Russia is 
unlikely to build better observation capabilities into future 
facilities.  In future, when most or all of the Russian 
facilities are operational, non-optimized verification will 
 
require a significant increase in Inspectorate resources. 
 
¶37. (U) JAVITS SENDS. 
ARNALL