VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #1147/01 1140331
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240331Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3678
INFO RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC

UNCLAS SANAA 001147 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR G/AIAG 
STATE PASS TO AID/ANE/GH FOR ACLEMENTS 
STATE PASS TO AID/ANE/MEA FOR JWOOD, 
USDA FOR APHIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAGR KFLU YM
SUBJECT: AN ECONOMIC AND FOOD SECURITY ISSUE SHOULD AVIAN 
INFLUENZA OCCUR IN YEMEN 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Even though there are currently no reported 
cases of Avian Influenza (AI) in Yemen, Ministry of 
Agriculture (MAI) officials are extremely concerned AI will 
breakout in Yemen soon. To assist the Republic of Yemen 
Government (ROYG), the USG has to date: provided US$8,500 in 
reagents and antigens to the Central Veterinary Laboratory 
(CVL), facilitated assistance from the Department of Defense 
Naval Medical Research Unit 3 (NAMRU 3) in Cairo, and funded 
a poultry epidemiologist to assist MAI. Post will continue 
to monitor and report on the issue. End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶2. (U). Even though there are no reported cases of AI in 
Yemen currently, MAI officials are extremely concerned AI 
will breakout in Yemen soon. The new Minister of 
Agriculture, Dr. Galal Ibrahim Fakirah, in meetings with the 
US Ambassador in early March 2006, listed Avian Influenza as 
his number one priority for his new administration. Avian 
Influenza is spreading worldwide at a rapid rate and has 
been identified nearby in Egypt. With the identification of 
Avian Influenza in the region, this virus is expected by 
Government of Yemen officials to reach Yemen soon. Yemen is 
exposed with over 2000 kilometers of coastline along the Red 
Sea and Arabian Sea coast. These zones are historical 
migratory bird flyways between Africa, Europe and Asia with 
70 identified put-down locations for migratory birds 
 
¶3. (SBU) At a meeting on March 3, 2006 in Sana'a, both the 
Deputy Minister of Agriculture and the Head of the Central 
Veterinary Laboratory stated their fear that the H5N1 virus 
could already be in Yemen. It was stated at the same meeting 
that Avian Flu is being viewed by Yemeni officials as an 
economic issue with food security implications. 
 
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON YEMENI ECONOMY 
 
¶4. (U) Yemen is a country of over 20 million people. 
Beginning in the early 1980's, USAID projects introduced 
modern poultry production practices into Yemen. Prior to 
that time, limited imports of frozen poultry and low quality 
local produced chicken were mainly available. The result has 
been that by 2006, poultry meat and eggs have become the 
primary protein source within the Yemeni diet. The impact of 
the Avian Influenza H5N1 virus on the poultry industry in 
Yemen would have a severe economic impact and a potential 
food security problem. Over 65% of the meat consumed in 
Yemen is poultry (white meat) according to official sources. 
It is estimated that 277,778 broilers and 92,593 flats of 
eggs are produced daily on average for the local market.  An 
average loss from an outbreak of theH5N1 virus to the 
poultry industry in Yemen would be nearly USD1 million per 
day. 
 
¶5. (U) This loss of food can not be replaced easily by fish, 
sheep, goat or beef meat. Fish is available in Yemen but 
primarily in coastal areas and selected large market centers 
in limited quantity. It is estimated that fish accounts for 
less then 10% of "meat" consumption in Yemen due to 
traditional patterns of consumption, limited distribution 
country wide and a higher cost of USD3.57 per kilogram 
average. Cattle and small ruminants (sheep and goats) sell 
for USD6.15 per kilogram average which considered to be high 
priced and out of the reach of most Yemeni's. Poultry sells 
on average for less than USD2.00 per kilogram. 
 
GOVERNMENT OF YEMEN RESPONSE 
 
¶6. (SBU) In November 2005, an assessment was undertaken by 
the NAMRU team to determine the capability and capacity for 
the MAI/CVL in case of an AI outbreak. The capacity for the 
CVL to accurately test was hindered by lack of proper 
testing equipment, poorly trained staff and shortage of 
supplies. A field surveillance system was established by the 
MAI in January 2006 with approximately twenty five two man 
teams positioned primarily along the coastal areas. However 
this number can cover only a small portion of the country 
and the surveillance teams rely on farmers to bring 
suspected birds to them. Lack of adequate training of the 
team members in proper surveillance methods, poor sample 
handling techniques, inadequate sample storage and lack of 
any protective clothing for handling of suspect birds are 
 
obstacles to proper identification and containment of an 
outbreak of AI. Transport of specimens to the only testing 
facility in Yemen, the CVL in Sana'a, is currently done 
without any cold storage or proper packing. Most suspected 
specimens arrive unable to be tested at the CVL. 
 
USG RESPONSE 
 
¶7. (U) In November 2005, the NAMRU-3, the US Naval 
laboratory in Cairo, Egypt sent a team to Yemen at the 
request of USAID/Yemen to investigate a potential outbreak 
of the H5N1 virus because the CVL kept getting false 
negative readings. The results from NAMRU's field findings 
identified a severe Newcastle outbreak. 
 
¶8. (U) The MAI/CVL had not been capable of testing due to 
lack of materials including reagents or antigens. On 
February 22, 2006, in response to a request from the MAI, 
USAID Representative handed over USD8500 worth of reagents 
and antigens to the Ministry of Agriculture. This supply is 
expected to last only a month, but it will allow the CVL to 
begin testing for the presence of the H5N1. 
 
¶9. (U) USAID/Yemen is working with the MAI to identify 
actions needed to be taken and funding sources available. An 
International Poultry Epidemiologist consultant funded by 
USAID/Yemen arrived in Yemen on April 18, 2006. The 
consultant will collaborate with USAID/YEMEN, the USAID 
funded Yemen Agriculture Support Program and the Ministry of 
Agriculture to profile and assess the Highly Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza (HPAI) surveillance and detection 
capabilities of the MAI. This includes identifying and 
prioritizing the needs related to HPAI surveillance and 
containment and evaluating and synthesizing the existing 
Government of Yemen Avian Influenza Emergency Plans 
including agriculture, health, planning, Avian Flu High 
Committee and other ministries and authorities as required. 
The consultant will also review the ROYG Emergency Action 
Chain of Command structure, make policy and training 
recommendations and conduct workshops and trainings with key 
stakeholders. The intent will be to produce specific outputs 
including an AI Action Plan Framework, priority policies 
needed for implementation, a draft Action Plan and 
surveillance needs and laboratory requirements. 
 
¶10. (U) Post's AI Working Group, which includes the 
USAID/Yemen Health Strategic Objective Team Leader and the 
Senior Economic and Agricultural Advisor, has developed a 
Mission Emergency Response Plan and monitors the AI 
situation in country. 
 
OTHER DONORS RESPONSES 
 
¶11. (U) The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has 
approved a USD400,000 six country regional project entitled 
"Emergency assistance for early detection and prevention of 
Avian Influenza in the Middle East region". Implementation 
has not yet started and it is expected that funding for the 
Yemen activity will be limited. A proposal has been 
developed by MAI but not yet submitted to the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) for development of 
a regional veterinary laboratory in the coastal city of 
Hodeidah. World Bank(WB)/Yemen is assisting the MAI with an 
activity to assess surveillance capabilities. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) continues  to assist the ROYG 
Ministry of Public Health and Population (MOH) in 
integrating international guidelines into the National Avian 
Influenza Preparedness Plan. 
 
COMMENTS 
 
¶12. (SBU) Yemen is not prepared for an outbreak of the Avian 
Influenza. The Central Veterinary Laboratory, the only 
facility of its type in Yemen, is not equipped or operating 
at acceptable world standards to properly identify the H5N1 
virus.  Surveillance teams are not trained to conduct 
acceptable field surveillances for disease identification. 
There are no personal protective clothing units available in 
Yemen. No containment program is in place with the military, 
police or any other government authority. Policy is in place 
with the National Avian Influenza Preparedness Plan but this 
plan has gaps and is not being implemented appropriately. 
Compensation, should culling be required, is not being 
considered as an option.  The MAI and MOH have established 
 
Technical AI Working Committees operating under the guidance 
of the High Committee on Avian Influenza however none of the 
committees are actively implementing actions regarding AI 
prevention or preparedness. 
 
 
KRAJESKI