VZCZCXRO8917
RR RUEHGR
DE RUEHPO #0219/01 1101208
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201208Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8235
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 1005
RUEHBR/USDAO BRASILIA BR
RUEWMFC/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARAMARIBO 000219 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CAR  LLUFTIG 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI ECON NS
SUBJECT: GROWING DIVIDE WITHIN PRESIDENT VENETIAAN'S 
COALITION 
 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000219  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
REFTELS: (A) 05 PARAMARIBO 768 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary. Eight months into his second consecutive 
term, President Ronald Venetiaan is presiding over an 
increasingly fractured eight-party coalition. The all- 
Maroon (descendants of escaped slaves) A-Combination (AC) 
is in a coalition standoff with the President's New Front 
grouping over a bill concerning unlawful occupation of 
property.  Members of the Javanese-based Pertjaja Luhur 
(PL) are refusing to attend sessions of the National 
Assembly to protest President Venetiaan's public 
admonishment of a PL minister.  Meanwhile the Hindustani- 
based United Reform Party (VHP) is cracking from within as 
splinter groups are pressing for more internal party 
democracy, undermining Vice-President and party chair 
Ramdien Sardjoe's control.  This recent escalation of 
coalition infighting has many observers questioning whether 
the governing coalition will stay together until the next 
scheduled election in four years.  Sounding the death knell 
for the coalition is premature, however, as for the moment 
the parties still appear inclined to limp forward as a 
group in order to remain in power.  The result will be a 
cautious president and cabinet preoccupied with balancing 
competing interests.  This cable, which is the first in a 
series of cables on the fractured coalition, focuses on the 
pivotal AC.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) With the loss of its parliamentary majority in the 
May 2005 election, President Ronald Venetian's four party 
New Front coalition (the Creole-based NPS, labor-oriented 
SPA, VHP, and PL) was forced to caucus with the three party 
AC coalition and the single seat DA91 party to form a 
governing coalition dubbed the New Front Plus.  The 2005 
election represented a political watershed for the Maroon 
community as three all-Maroon parties (ABOP, BEP, and 
SEEKA) united to form a coalition and for the first time 
won parliamentary seats (five of 51) and secured cabinet 
positions (three of 17).  Their success brought not only a 
previously underrepresented ethnic group into the forefront 
of Surinamese politics, but turned them into critical 
dealmakers. 
 
¶3. (U) Smooth cooperation within the New Front Plus has 
been elusive since its formation.  Simmering troubles 
erupted on April 4 when AC parliamentarians refused to 
attend a DNA session, preventing the formation of a quorum 
and scuttling an expected vote on a bill concerning 
unlawful occupation of property and buildings. New Front 
leaders claimed the AC members never raised their 
objections to the bill until the day of the vote, while 
deputy DNA speaker Caprino Alendy, a former International 
Visitor's Program participant, maintained that New Front 
leaders paid no attention to proposed AC changes prior to 
the session. 
 
¶4. (SBU) AC members oppose the bill, claiming it would 
enable the government to easily evict Maroons from their 
traditional lands because the bill's definition of a plot 
of land could be interpreted to include the undemarcated 
interior territory used by Maroon communities.  The intent 
of the original bill, however, was more to address illegal 
occupation of clearly defined land plots and buildings and 
to give law enforcement the tools to evict squatters. 
Because there are several Maroon "squatter villages" in 
Paramaribo that would be jeopardized by the proposed law, 
some are questioning whether the AC's objections are more 
related to keeping illegally occupied property in the hands 
of Maroon groups in Paramaribo, where the AC has one DNA 
seat. 
 
¶5. (U) The vote has been postponed to give the AC and New 
Front leadership a chance to hash out a compromise bill, 
but finding common ground may be difficult as Alendy wants 
the complex and long-ignored issue of land rights for 
indigenous groups to be included in the parliamentary 
debate.  Maroon groups in the interior often do not have 
title to the land on which they live and farm, which 
creates social tensions particularly when traditional 
Maroon land overlaps private mining concessions granted by 
the government. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
FORMER JUNGLE COMMANDO LEADER BRUNSWIJK STILL A LOOSE 
CANNON 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000219  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Adding to coalition instability is former Jungle 
Commando rebel leader, convicted narcotics trafficker, and 
AC parliamentarian Ronnie Brunswijk's hostile stance 
towards his coalition's plan to sell the state-owned lumber 
company Bruynzeel to Dutch-Belgian concern Doorwin. 
Brunswijk, who holds a large wood concession himself, 
heavily criticized a Letter of Intent (LOI) submitted for 
DNA approval by President Venetiaan's cabinet.  Only after 
long and tortuous debate did the New Front Plus majority 
approve the LOI on March 30, but with Brunswijk abstaining 
from the vote, putting him not only at odds with the New 
Front, but fellow AC leaders.  Brunswijk is also rankling 
the New Front by leading an effort to place fellow AC 
members in key positions on the boards of various state- 
owned companies. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Brunswijk's unpredictable and aggressive nature 
(also a former bank robber, he recently brandished a gun at 
soccer match, threatening the other team) is in stark 
contrast to the traditional, slow-moving politics of 
compromise associated with President Venetiaan.  The 
president faces little choice but to tolerate and appease 
the influential, yet impetuous Brunswijk in order to keep 
his majority in tact.  The President's decision to join 
forces with Brunswijk upset many in the political 
establishment, who see the ex-jungle commando as a thug, as 
well as many in the military, who fought against him in the 
interior war of the late 1980's. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
OPPOSITION ALSO FIGHTING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS OF MAROONS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) For AC leaders, it is a political necessity to 
appear strong on the issue of land rights, a top concern 
for their Maroon constituents, to enable them to fend off a 
direct challenge for the hearts and minds of their 
electorate from the largest opposition party National 
Democratic Party (NDP), chaired by former military dictator 
and convicted narcotics trafficker Desi Bouterse. (See 
reftel). Over the last several months, the NDP has been 
attempting to tap into pockets of Maroon discontent and 
promote itself as the defender of Maroon interests. The NDP 
too is opposed to the unlawful occupation bill, claiming 
the bill will force Maroons off their land.  By the NDP 
keeping the political pressure on the AC, AC leaders will 
be compelled to be out in front of the land rights issue 
even if their position is at odds with other New Front Plus 
partners. Some political observers comment that the NDP's 
true goal is to drive a wedge between coalition partners by 
focusing on its perceived weakest link, the AC. 
 
--------- 
COMMENT 
--------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Inter-coalition squabbling has preoccupied the New 
Front Plus since coming together several months ago and set 
the government on a plodding, cautious course.  Having to 
swallow the demands of its new AC partner and to share the 
political spoils of an election has been difficult for the 
New Front. Long-standing ethnic prejudice against Maroons, 
which has resurfaced lately after a Maroon man allegedly 
brutally murdered a Hindustani women, may also be playing a 
role in the reluctance of some New Front members to think 
of the AC as an equal partner.  On the other side, the 
mostly politically inexperienced AC has faced a steep 
learning curve in the art of political compromise.  The AC 
parties are under intense scrutiny from the Maroon 
community to fulfill inflated expectations and to push 
through their agenda, which can sometimes put the AC at 
odds with coalition partners.  While the fissures in the 
coalition are quickly growing, they are yet not permanent 
cracks, as all sides still seem willing to work towards 
acceptable compromise in order to continue holding onto the 
reigns of power. 
 
BARNES