VZCZCXRO1625
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0591/01 1131734
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231734Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3609
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0602
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1155
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1323
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2626
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1711
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1110
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0711
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0690

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000591 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, 
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR 
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR REBEL LEADER COMFORTABLY HOUSED IN CHAD 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 300 
 
NDJAMENA 00000591  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Darfur rebel leader Khalil Ibrahim 
received the Ambassador April 22 at his temporary quarters in 
Ndjamena (home belonging to President Deby's half-brother) 
and expressed unhappiness at the negotiations in Abuja and, 
in particular, the close relationship between the Americans 
and rebel leader Minni Minawi.  He dismissed reports of JEM's 
involvement in supporting Chad in its fight with Chadian 
rebels or in recruiting in the Sudanese refugee camps in 
Chad.  He said JEM would accept a UN force in Darfur once a 
peace agreement was in place.  He sought to dissociate 
himself from impressions that he was close to Turabi.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Ambassador Wall called on Khalil Ibrahim, leader of 
the Justice and Equality Movement, April 22.  He had moved 
out of the Meridien Hotel into a large house (in the 
up-scale, "Zaghawa" part of Ndjamena) owned by Timan Deby, 
Sultan of the Bideiyat Zaghawa in Bahai and half-brother of 
President Idriss Deby Itno.  A large number of white-robed 
men milled about in the courtyard, presumably Zaghawa 
followers of Khalil or the Sultan or both.  (Comment: 
Khalil's presence in this comfortable house speaks volumes to 
his metamorphosed relationship with Deby, as well as to the 
apparently close relationship he enjoys with the larger 
Bideiyat community.  Khalil fled Sudan to Ndjamena in March 
2001, only to be told to leave Chad in July 2001 in advance 
of a state visit by Sudanese President Bashir in August 2001, 
and Khalil was not allowed to return to Ndjamena until 
January 2006.  He has made up for lost time.  End Comment.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Ambassador asked when Khalil had left Abuja, 
when he was going back, and how negotiations were going in 
Abuja, considering that the peace agreement was to be 
concluded by the end of April.  Khalil said he had come to 
Ndjamena only in recent days from Abuja and he might or might 
not return to Abuja soon, depending on whether there were any 
progress there.  Since he had last seen the Ambassador in 
February (reftel) he had traveled to Libya, Ethiopia, and 
Congo-Brazzaville, but he had mostly been in Abuja.  In fact, 
he said, he did not perceive that there had been much 
progress in the negotiations since he had last seen the 
Ambassador.  On several vital issues there had been no give 
on the part of the Sudanese government (Darfur as one region, 
Darfurian vice-president, Darfurian role in the Khartoum 
regional government, adequate Darfurian participation in the 
Cabinet, adequate compensation for the Darfurian people, 
reconstruction of Darfur, increased revenues to regions, 
paying Darfurian soldiers' salaries and logistics). 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Khalil said that fixing a date (end of April) and 
trying to force an agreement would not bring peace.  The list 
constituted a bottom line not merely for JEM but for the 
Darfurian people.  If the agreement did not give the 
Darfurians the minimum they required, they would turn on the 
rebel movements and condemn them, asking, "You started a war 
for this meager result?"  Khalil said the fighting men in the 
field would not accept such an agreement.  The way the 
negotiations were heading, he said, would give the Darfurians 
no clout in Khartoum with which to enforce the terms of the 
agreement.  Look at the trouble the Southerners were having 
enforcing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, even with a 
First Vice President.  Khalil commented that everyone was 
overestimating Taha's role.  He had seen Taha in Tripoli and 
was surprised at how much lesser a man he was.  "The Ali 
Osman of today is not the same as the one of Naivasha.  The 
government in Khartoum then was more coherent, today it is 
divided." 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Khalil complained that the United States was 
putting too much reliance on SLM leader Minni Minawi.  Minni 
had previously been the most powerful rebel leader "in the 
camps," but times were changing and he was no longer as 
powerful.  The Americans were wrong to concentrate on one 
rebel leader, because a peace agreement with one rebel leader 
would not produce actual peace on the ground.  Meanwhile, 
 
NDJAMENA 00000591  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Khalil claimed that rival SLM leader Abdel Wahid had no power 
base remaining in Darfur and nowhere to go (no relations with 
Eritrea, Libya, or Chad), so he was just hanging on uselessly 
in Abuja. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether the JEM were assisting 
the Chadian forces in combatting Chadian rebels based in 
Darfur.  Khalil said that, no, JEM had not helped Chad in 
fighting.  However, if Deby now requested such help, JEM 
would provide it.  In fact, next time, the JEM would not wait 
to help out.  Any prospect of the fall of Deby's Chad to 
Sudan and its allies would be disastrous for Darfur.  Khalil 
had seen Deby the day before to congratulate him on the 
victory April 13 (when a rebel force made its way all the way 
into Ndjamena).  Khalil said that Sudan had underestimated 
the capability of the Chadian armed forces.  It had thought 
it could use Mahamat Nour to do the "rough work" after which 
Arab fighters would come in to clean up and take over.  Sudan 
had already set the janjaweed in motion to clear out 
"Africans" from the Chadian border area and resettle there. 
It had pulled together a force for this invasion of Ndjamena, 
mainly from Chadians long settled in Sudan (including Masalit 
and Tamas that had settled in the Gezira generations ago). 
It now had a large force of Arabs at Wadi Saleh south of 
Zalingei, ready to follow if Mahamat Nour could pave the way 
into Chad.  However, the failure at Ndjamena had set Sudan to 
thinking again.  Deby had not fled and his forces had not 
folded.  And the JEM would help as necessary. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether JEM had been engaged 
in recruiting soldiers from the refugee camps in Chad. 
Khalil said JEM did not need to recruit, as it had soldiers 
enough already.  The Ambassador asked his version of events 
when JEM entered the Sudanese embassy in Ndjamena two days 
previously.  Khalil said that the newspaper accounts, 
suggesting a violent confrontation, were entirely wrong.  JEM 
had entered the compound peacefully and met the outgoing 
Sudanese ambassador, talked to him in a normal manner, and 
did no one any harm. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Ambassador asked Khalil's view on a UN force to 
impose a peace in Darfur.  Khalil said that JEM would accept 
a UN force, but only if peace were first established. 
Darfur, in fact, needed an international force, to protect 
the IDPs and enforce the peace agreement.  Most of the land 
was still controlled by the janjaweed, especially in the 
Masalit domain, and a UN force would be essential to getting 
them their rights to land.  However, so long as Sudan 
continued to block a peace agreement, it would be a mistake 
to bring in a UN force.  (Note:  Khalil's language was 
markedly less violent against a UN force than it had been two 
months ago -- but the bottom line remained the same.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) One of Khalil's aides strongly complained to the 
Ambassador that the United States was not doing enough to put 
pressure on Sudan, and he lamented that JEM did not have a 
good enough relationship with the United States.  Indeed, JEM 
did not have enough friends.  Chad was coming along, and 
Libya was "reasonable," but JEM needed more.  Khalil angled 
for an invitation to the United States. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Khalil regretted that the United States had got 
the idea that he was close to Hasan al-Turabi.  Once such 
ideas took hold, they were difficult to uproot and he had 
been slow to recognize the problem.  In fact, once peace was 
achieved, JEM's next battle would be with Turabi.  People 
from all the marginalized corners of Sudan would flock to the 
JEM, and Turabi and the rest of the old dragons (Sadiq 
al-Mahdi, Mirghani) would see JEM as a huge threat.  In fact, 
JEM would definitely rule Sudan.  Sudan was not a majority 
Arab country but a majority African country, and JEM would 
meet the aspirations of the marginalized African majority. 
Khalil said that his agenda was not religious.  He sought a 
liberal democracy that would deemphasize the army and 
emphasize development.  It would seek equal distribution of 
resources as had been done in Cuba.  Turabi's language was of 
 
NDJAMENA 00000591  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
religion and nationalism, a nationalism that had subjugated 
the African majority. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Khalil lamented that there was inadequate 
international attention given to the Darfur crisis.  The 
international community had given much more support to 
resolving the crisis of Southern Sudan, to include even a 
meeting of the UNSC in Nairobi to ensure finalization of the 
comprehensive peace agreement.  The Ambassador said that in 
its much shorter span, the Darfur crisis had engaged the 
international community, and certainly the United States, as 
intensely as the Southern crisis had.  Poloff pointed out 
that mediation of the Darfur crisis had engaged the Afican 
Union (vice IGAD), and the main problem lay in the absence of 
a figure comparable to John Garang on the rebel side.  Khalil 
made no riposte, but rather repeated his complaint that the 
United States was putting too much emphasis on Minni Minawi. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Comment:  Khalil has the air of someone who has 
been pushed aside in the negotiations and is debating how to 
regroup.  He may have damaged his relations with Libya over 
the affair of the Sudanese embassy (now overseen by the 
Libyans), but it does not appear that he has damaged the 
rapidly improving relations with Deby.  He has cottoned on to 
the fact that being seen as being close to Turabi is not good 
public relations.  He is eager for closer contacts with the 
United States, though he has not quite mastered the 
vocabulary to please the American ear.  He harbors what 
appears to be a serious, if ridiculous, national ambition. 
End Comment. 
WALL