VZCZCXRO9238
OO RUEHGI
DE RUEHNJ #0577 1101358
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201358Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3582
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0593
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1148
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1302
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2605
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1690
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1089
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0692
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0683

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000577 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, 
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR 
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: ANXIETIES OVER REFUGEE PROTECTION 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  UN Resrep agrees with the fears of the 
Chadian government it will be unable adequately to protect 
refugees and IDPs if, as he thinks likely, there are 
increased attacks over the next month before the rainy 
season.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Kingsley Amaning, Resident Coordinator of the 
United Nations System in Chad, met the Ambassador April 18, 
on his return from New York, where he had been during the 
dramatic events of the previous week.  He complained that he 
had not sensed a level of urgency at UN headquarters that he 
believed conditions in Chad merited. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Amaning said that the ultimata handed out by the 
Chadian government April 15 on oil and refugees were, he 
believed, a reflection of desperation.  Deby feared that his 
shambolic forces would not be able to meet the external 
military threat without rapid and expensive arms purchases 
(even with the presence of the French military) -- which 
meant immediate freeing up of oil revenues.  By the same 
token, he feared, all the more correctly, that his forces, 
overextended on regime survival, would not be able to cope 
with attacks on refugee camps and on Chadian tribes in the 
East. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Amaning said that Deby's decision to take on 
Khartoum, Esso, the World Bank, and the United Nations all at 
the same time -- while insisting on maintaining the election 
on May 3 -- was "mind-boggling" and seemed self-defeating. 
However, Amaning said that he shared the worry about the 
capability of the Chadian armed forces to ensure survival of 
the regime, not to mention protect the populace of the East. 
If what had taken place last week -- the incursion into 
Ndjamena -- were multiplied three-fold, as seemed likely from 
reports from across the border, assistance from the French 
would likely not be enough.  The French had no coherent plan, 
while the United Nations and the rest of the international 
community had tagged along behind the French.  The French 
Ambassador was not happy with the situation.  Frustrated with 
the lack of strategy and pilloried on all sides, the French 
Ambassador (a former military officer) had told Amaning that 
he preferred the military career to diplomacy and was eager 
for the end of his assignment on July 14. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Amaning said that, while it was difficult to get a 
handle on what was happening along the border east of Goz 
Beida and Goz Amer, he was worried that more and more 
janjaweed (note: Arabs from Darfur but typically originally 
from Chad and still viewed as Chadians) were moving into the 
zones vacated by the now thoroughly terrified local populace 
(note: mainly Dadjo ethnicity).  Attacks were bad enough, but 
if these vacated areas were now being settled in the weeks 
before the commencement of the rainy season, the difficulties 
were multiplied.  First, there was the diminishing prospect 
that these Dadjo IDPs would return home.  Second, there was 
the prospect that the new settlers, in need of food to get 
through the rainy season and in need of fuel and vehicles to 
effect their continued attacks, would find the large depots 
of food, fuel, vehicles, and communications equipment held by 
the UN in the area irresistible.  Finally, there was the 
prospect that they would find attacks on the refugee camps, 
as recruiting centers for the Darfur rebels, also 
irresistible. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Thus, Amaning reasoned, Deby had a basis for 
sounding the alarm on the refugees.  Very likely he would not 
be able to protect the refugees or assure the return of the 
IDPs, and the international community would indeed have to 
take greater responsibility.  Amaning said he particularly 
wanted to see if the French would be willing to expand their 
mandate in the East. 
WALL