VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0545/01 1060651
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 160651Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3543
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1045
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0697
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0140
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0796
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1287
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2590
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1675
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1074
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0683

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000545 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL SU FR CD
SUBJECT: DASH ACROSS CHAD: FRENCH VERSION 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The French, according to Ambassador 
Bercot and his Defense Attache, only became aware two days 
before the fight in Ndjamena on April 13 that the rebel force 
was aiming at the relatively undefended city.   The city and 
government were saved, they say, because the rebels stalled 
their advance just long enough for Chadian reinforcements to 
arrive in Ndjamena.  A key element was the discovery that the 
Chadian army chief of staff was the mastermind.  The rebels 
were, they claim, largely Sudanese of Tama and Arab 
extraction.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Bercot gave a 
briefing April 14 to the American, Russian, Egyptian, and 
Algerian Ambassadors, and German Charge.  He said that it was 
inconceivable that a group of rebels could penetrate Chad 
from Central African Republic in the remote southeastern 
corner of Chad, sprint across 800 kilometers of rough tracks 
in a few days, and threaten chaos in Ndjamena itself.  He 
turned to his Defense Attache, Col. Jean-Mark Marril to give 
a day-by-day account. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Col. Marril said that it had been known for some 
days that rebels associated with Mahamat Nour's RDL had 
infiltrated the Salamat region (far southeast Chad) around 
Haraze Mangueigne, in the wake of the fighting at Modohina 
(eastern border) at the end of March.  The objective of this 
infiltration into Salamat seemed to be directed toward 
eastern Chad, where the Chadian armed forces were mainly 
located, and the real intention -- of striking Ndjamena 
itself -- was masked by the rebel attack on the refugee camp 
at Goz Amir, after which an attack on the chief town of the 
Dar Sila, Goz Beida, with its reinforced presence of Chadian 
armed forces, was expected next.   It was only on April 11, 
when the rebel group arrived in Mongo in the center of Chad, 
that the size of the force and its intention of moving on 
Ndjamena were appreciated -- by both the Chadian government 
and the French.  Sixty-five rebel vehicles were counted in 
Mongo, which had been nearly abandoned by the Chadian armed 
forces, as had been all the roads and villages between Mongo 
and Ndjamena.  At that point, Ndjamena itself was very weakly 
defended, as the Chadian armed forces had moved almost 
entirely to the East and to a lesser extent to the Southeast, 
around Am Timan, where they were vainly hunting down a rebel 
force that had already moved on.  On realizing the gravity of 
the situation April 11, President Deby ordered the troops in 
the Am Timan area and some of the troops in the East to 
proceed immediately to Ndjamena. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  According to Col. Marril, if the rebel force had 
maintained its momentum the story would have ended 
differently.  From Mongo to Ngama, the rebels continued at 
high speed, but from Ngama westward on April 12 they slowed 
down and lost precious hours.  Chad's sole helicopter was an 
important factor in this slow-down, as it began hitting the 
convoy at Bili.  At Massenya, the rebels took time to decide 
what to do, dividing themselves into two groups, the smaller 
one proceeding on a more northerly path.  The Chadian armed 
forces, reinforced by elements (25 vehicles) that rushed up 
from Am Timan, were able late on April 12 to engage the 
principal rebel column that arrived at Dourbali (100 
kilometers from Ndjamena), in an action that was crucial and 
inflicted heavy losses.  At that point the rebels became 
dispersed into small groups of two to three Toyotas, which 
nonetheless maintained their movement toward Ndjamena through 
the night of April 12-13.  The Chadian armed forces attacked 
these groups in the northeastern and eastern approaches and 
suburbs of Ndjamena from daybreak on April 13, easily 
destroying them.  Rebel fighters abandoned their vehicles and 
uniforms and tried to escape into the populace as civilians. 
Most of the prisoners and wounded were Tama and Arabs from 
Sudan who had been recruited and trained in Darfur.  Of the 
original 65 vehicles, seventeen were recovered and displayed 
and approximately thirty were destroyed; the remainder were 
used by rebels to flee or were stolen by the local populace. 
The vehicles, Bercot added wryly, had no license plates. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Bercot, taking the floor, said that an important 
factor was the discovery on April 12 that the chief of 
military staff, Ahmat Fadoule Makay, had been coordinating 
the movement of the rebels toward Ndjamena and preparing the 
scene for their welcome into the city.  Bercot described 
Makay as a "brilliant Tama," i.e., the same ethnicity as 
Mahamat Nour, leader of the RDL.  (Note: This conflicts with 
our previous information that Makay was a Chadian Arab, but 
we defer to the French.  End Note.)  Bercot said that it had 
been a source of extreme perplexity to him that these rebels 
could have come from so far, presumably come together from 
different routes, evaded any Chadian armed obstacles along 
the way, and suddenly manifested themselves as a significant 
fighting force in Mongo.  The secret lay in the very heart of 
the Etat Major. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) From the moment of the discovery of Makay's role, 
Bercot said, the French henceforward dealt directly and only 
with President Deby himself.  In the course of Bercot's 
meeting with Deby during the night April 12-13, Deby outlined 
the battle plan for engaging the remaining rebel elements on 
the morning of April 13 and by 5:00 a.m. the plan was fully 
in place.  Deby assured Bercot that he would be able to 
confine the battle in the eastern portion of the city, thus 
sparing the better-off western parts of the city where the 
foreigners lived and worked, and the battle took place almost 
as Deby laid out.  An hour and a half after the battle got 
under way, the RDL attempted a strong attack in the East, on 
Adre. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Bercot said that "80 percent" (note: a favorite 
number, for him) of the rebels captured were Tama and Arabs 
from Darfur.  They had been given very little training. 
Every vehicle had been crammed with 15-20 of these recruits. 
He had reasons to believe that Southern rebels were 
implicated, in helping them get across the country. 
Meanwhile, Bercot could not resist his customary dig at the 
political opposition, who he said were "all for" the rebels, 
even at the risk of the chaos they would have brought to 
Ndjamena. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Bercot said that, despite the heavy criticism in 
Chad of the French role and, more significantly, the strong 
criticism in the French media, France had not been involved 
in any combat whatever.  Its sole mission was to ensure the 
safety of the French and international communities in the 
country.   France had provided logistical and transport 
assistance to ensure the defense of Ndjamena.  On one 
occasion, a Mirage had fired a warning shot at the column 
advancing from Ngama.   France had also provided logistical 
and transport support in the battle at Adre, including 
transporting wounded to Farchana, and it had provided 
logistical and transport help in reinforcing the garrison at 
Sarh.  Bercot warned that the larger conflict was far from 
over.  Major attacks were taking place in the East and more 
were expected, and there were outbreaks in the South. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Bercot said that the battle in Ndjamena put Deby in 
the quandary of having to keep troops in the West that were 
direly needed for the East, at a time when it was clearer 
than ever that trouble could also come from the direction of 
the Central African Republic.  (Bercot, for his part, never 
discounted the prospect of trouble from Libya, too.)  It 
became all the more imperative for the international 
community to secure Darfur, otherwise it was going to become 
ever more difficult to guarantee the safety of the Darfur 
refugees.  There was the prospect of massacres in the refugee 
camps, as the attack on the Goz Amir camp on April 10 could 
be a prelude of worse to come.  Deby could not permanently 
assure the security of the camps.  It was wrong to see the 
French forces in Abeche as being there to protect the camps. 
These forces had no mandate as a peace force but were there 
purely as part of a bilateral Chad-France agreement, under 
which France undertook to prevent any external attempt to 
take power by force in Chad. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment:  The story the French tell presents a 
gripping account of the events over the last week.  The spin 
they put on it reveals their concern to counter perceptions 
here of their involvement in stopping the advance of the 
rebel force.  They neither intervened directly in the fight 
nor had they any other mission than assuring the safety of 
the French and international community, they are at pains to 
stress.  They have an uphill battle convincing many Chadians 
of this version of the events. 
WALL