VZCZCXRO8106
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0517/01 0980908
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080908Z APR 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3501
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0585
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1136
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1260
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2564
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1648
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1044
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0668
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0670

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, 
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR 
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN: DADJO BITTERNESS 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 492 
 
NDJAMENA 00000517  001.4 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The Dadjo, probably the most populous 
tribe in Eastern Chad, have taken the brunt of Arab 
cross-border attacks and are, according to one of their 
leaders, angry toward Arabs on both sides of the border and 
also at the regime for leaving them unprotected.  They could 
align with rebel leader Mahamat Nour, but only in the 
(unlikely) event he forswore the Arabs.  Meanwhile, Nour 
remains planted on a sliver of Chadian (Dadjo) territory, 
after his victory March 30, while the Chadian armed forces 
are regrouping 30 miles away in Ade.  Dadjo leaders are 
concerned that their people will not be able to return to 
their lands to plant before rains begin in May.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) DCM and poloff on April 4 met Yacine Bakhit 
Abdelkadir, nephew of the Sultan of the Dadjo in Goz Beida, 
leader of a small political party aligned with the ruling 
party, former Minister of Interior under Habre, and former 
special advisor to Deby.  He said he was in daily telephonic 
contact with his brother, district chief in the Ade-Koloy 
border area, and his relatives in Goz Beida. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Yacine confirmed that the Chadian armed forces, as 
widely believed, suffered a defeat at the hands of Mahamat 
Nour's rebel group on March 30.  As indicated reftel, Mahamat 
Nour's RDL began occupying the now largely abandoned village 
of Modohyna (aka Modoyna, Madeina) four days before the 
battle, and moved westward across the trapezoid-shaped 
Chadian territory across the Wadi Kadja, occupying other 
largely abandoned villages.  The RDL was equipped with 52 
all-terrain vehicles, and had 1000 men.  Mahamat Nour's force 
had moved into the area from Habilah, in Sudanese territory 
20 miles east of Modohyna.  The fighting on March 30 took 
place at or in the approaches to Modohyna.  The region is 
relatively forested, and the rebels used forest cover to 
effect their ambush.  The Chadian force lost more than 300 
killed, including Deby's nephews General Abakar Youssouf Itno 
and Colonel Bahar Sinine.  The survivors fled in disarray 
back to the subprefectural center, Ade, 30 miles to the west. 
 The Chadian armed forces are reinforcing themselves there, 
with the arrival of 200 all-terrain vehicles. Yacine's 
informants anticipate a repeat attack. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Yacine said that the Dadjo had traditionally good 
relations with the Tama, the ethnic group (centered north of 
Adre) to which Mahamat Nour and most of his rebel group 
belong.  There were some Dadjo in the RDL.  The problem for 
the Dadjo was that Mahamat Nour had brought Arabs into his 
group and had aligned himself with the "janjaweed."  Dadjos 
in the area had observed that mounted Arabs had followed the 
Toyota-wheeled RDL into Modohyna.  Mounted Arabs had 
depopulated the trans-Kadja zone in January and February, and 
the janjaweed accompanying the RDL in its occupation of the 
zone beginning March 26 stripped whatever was left of food 
stores in the area.  Yacine believed that Sudan had promoted 
this alignment of the Arabs with Mahamat Nour, wanting to put 
itself in a position to claim to the international community 
that the janjaweed came from Chad and were now at least 
partially based in Chad. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In fact, Yacine said, there was a Chadian dimension 
to the janjaweed, both in the historical sense of Chadian 
Arabs who had displaced themselves in recent decades to 
Darfur, where it was greener and had been less violent than 
Chad, and in the sense of Arabs living still in Chad who had 
recently joined or cooperated with the Arabs in Darfur. 
There were, moreover, senior Arab figures in Ndjamena -- 
including several government ministers (Defense, Economy, 
Livestock) -- who Yacine identified as the Chadian Arabic 
"political leadership."  The Dadjo had been particularly 
outraged in the wake of a large janjaweed attack on Modohyna 
in February, when the Chadian armed forces had staged their 
only reprisals and captured twelve janjaweed, among whom were 
four Arabs from the Nuwayba Jamul, a Chadian Arab nomadic 
group who had traditionally grazed in the trans-Kadja.  The 
Dadjo were angry that these Chadian Arabs, who had lived 
 
NDJAMENA 00000517  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
among the Dadjo and migrated through the trans-Kadja for 
years, had now proved to be among their attackers.  (ICRC 
recently confirmed that these "Chadian janjaweed" remained 
under "house arrest.")  Yacine also cited the names of five 
Chadians who had fled to Darfur in the past year or two, 
joined the janjaweed, and now had been aligned to the RDL (by 
Sudan). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Yacine said that the predominant Arab tribe in 
eastern Chad was the Mahariyya, traditionally centered in 
Arada and Abu Gudam, near Am-Dam, but with a large presence 
also in Darfur.  A week previously, the shaykhs in Abu Gudam 
had proposed a meeting after the May 3 presidential election 
with the Sultan of the Dadjo in Goz Beida, to offer their 
apologies for the Arab attacks on the Dadjo.  Yacine said 
that so far, the Dadjo notables were inclined to refuse to 
meet the Arab shaykhs.  In recent years the Arabs had been 
progressively encroaching on their farmlands, with population 
increase and the drying up of the northern areas which were 
the Arabs' home base.  Now had come the attacks of January 
and February, with proven Chadian participation. The 
Mahariyya had traditionally moved through the Dadjo terrain 
during the dry season October to May.  Henceforward, the 
Arabs would not be welcome to return; if they did, they would 
be killed.  Yacine predicted a civil war between the Dadjo 
and the Arabs. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Yacine said that the Dadjo were now active 
purchasing arms and ammunition and had formed a militia with 
500 men, including 180 soldiers from the Chadian armed 
forces.  The Minister of Interior (Territorial 
Administration) had condemned these militias as outlaws and 
rebels.  For purchase of arms, the Dadjo had been asked to 
make payments (women 5000 Sudanese dinars, men 10,000, 
merchants 50,000 - Sudanese dinars being the currency in use 
on both sides of the border, though not in Goz Beida itself). 
 This militia had been present in the trans-Kadja when the 
RDL began moving into the area March 26.  However, it did not 
confront the RDL, but rather evacuated to Koloy on the other 
side of the Kadja.  The point of this militia was to defend 
villagers against Arabs. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Yacine said tht the Dadjo would sound out Mahamat 
Nour on his ntentions.  The Dadjo wanted good relations with 
Mahamat Nour and might even align with him, but onl on 
condition that he clearly cut all relations ith Arabs.  It 
was not clear to what extent Mahaat Nour was able to act 
independently from the gvernment of Sudan, which appeared to 
be forcing te RDL-Arab alignment.  The Dadjo were bitter 
against Sudan.  Increasingly, they were also bitter against 
the Chadian government.  They now saw that they would get no 
help from the Chadian government.  They had repeatedly 
requested help from the government to protect them from 
janjaweed depredations, but there had been very little 
response, except the one pursuit of the janjaweed by the 
armed forces in February.  The government had concentrated on 
protecting the area to the north, especially the Zaghawa 
area.  There had been no janjaweed attacks on anyone but the 
Dadjo (and Masalit), who had caused no problems to anyone and 
were the most numerous ethnic group in eastern Chad (also 
with a large presence in Darfur).  Yacine said that he would 
be traveling to the Dar Sila (the region based in Goz Beida, 
with 70 percent Dadjo population) in three days with a Dadjo 
delegation; although he headed a political party that was 
formally allied with the MPS, he would not help the regime to 
turn out the vote for Deby, nor did he expect the Dadjo would 
vote for him. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Yacine said he did not have exact figures on 
numbers of IDPs, but he thought that the ICRC probably had as 
accurate figures as existed.  He said (as indicated by the 
ICRC) that there had been an up-and-down trend of IDPs moving 
from the border to the greater safety of Goz Beida.  Some of 
these IDPs were slipping into refugee camps.  The fighting on 
March 30 did not appear to have spurred a great jump in the 
trend of movement to Goz Beida, but he would soon get more 
specific information.  Further fighting could change the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000517  003.4 OF 003 
 
 
picture considerably.  Yacine was worried about the IDPs, 
because the rains would start as early as May and people 
needed to get back to their farms for planting.  Even if they 
were able to get back to their farms, they would have 
difficulty feeding themselves until the harvest in October, 
because the janjaweed had destroyed their food stocks and 
livestock. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Asked whether there was a Libyan role in 
instability along the border, Yacine said that he was 
informed that a delegation of Chadian Arabs had recently gone 
to Tripoli seeking Qadhafi's assistance.  There was concern 
among the Dadjo that Qadhafi's promise to pay for a 3000-man 
force to patrol the border was a ploy to ensure Arab 
domination over the area. 
WALL