VZCZCXRO8060
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0492/01 0931814
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031814Z APR 06        ZDK DUE TO NUMEROUS SVCES
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3455
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0557
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1130
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1255
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0517
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2535
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1642
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1015
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0644
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0646

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000492 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, 
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR 
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS; NAIROBI FOR 
OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN:  FIGHTING, IDPS, AND RECRUITMENT 
 
REF: A. A. NDJAMENA 425 
 
     ¶B. B. NDJAMENA 462 
     ¶C. C. NDJAMENA IIR MAR 31 
 
NDJAMENA 00000492  001.9 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  ICRC does not foresee a major displacement 
of Chadian IDPs away from the border unless fighting is 
persistent; UNHCR is more worried.  UNHCR has long suspected 
recruitment in the refugee camps and now has clear proof. 
UNHCR sees Chad as complicit and Darfur rebels as the 
recruiters.  SLM leader Minni Minawi disclaims any knowledge. 
 End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Poloff spoke to ICRC and UNHCR March 31 and April 3 
to get clarification on the battle that took place March 
30-31 between the RDL rebel force under Mahamat Nour and its 
consequences for the internally displaced Chadian population 
located in the area of the fighting.  Poloff also asked UNHCR 
about recruitment of Darfurian refugees in Chad. 
 
Fighting March 30-31 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) The trapezoid-shaped piece of Chadian territory 
across the Wadi Kadja, populated by people of the Dadjo 
tribe, was largely evacuated by its population in the period 
December-February, in the wake of the fighting around Adre, 
withdrawal of Chadian security forces from the area, and 
attacks by Arabs (ref A).  The largest portion of these 
people moved to the southwestern (right) bank of the Wadi 
Kadja and congregated around the largest local village, 
Koloy.  ICRC learned that elements of Mahamat Nour's RDL 
appeared across the Wadi Kadja and occupied the now-evacuated 
village of Modoyna (aka Madeina) on Sunday March 26.  In the 
following days, RDL also came into Koloy, making purchases in 
the market.  It became widely known that the RDL was present 
in the area with significant numbers.  On Wednesday March 29, 
ICRC had a team poised to move from Goz Beida (seat of the 
prefect for the department that covers the entire area) to 
Koloy, but the team was stopped by Chadian authorities in Ade 
and informed that the area was closed.  ICRC learned that the 
Chadian armed forces were moving into the area from points 
north, hurrying to take on the RDL.  ICRC's sources further 
indicated that the Chadian armed forces were ambushed on the 
north side of the Wadi Kadja.  The battle, which took place 
mainly on March 30, resulted in the death of the Chadian 
chief of staff, General Abakar Itno, and another general. 
ICRC understood that "dozens" in the Chadian armed forces 
died, and "at least 100" were wounded. 
 
¶4. (SBU) UNHCR representative Ana Liria-Franch said that 
UNHCR also had personnel in the area on March 30 and they 
believed that the ambush occurred nearer to Ade, some 30 
miles to the west.  Liria-Franch saw the Interior Minister 
Mahamat Ali on March 28 and delivered an appeal that Chad 
reestablish security in the area south of Adre, particularly 
to include Koloy.  The minister had told her that it was in 
Chad's interest as much as the international community's to 
reestablish security there, as Chad wanted to ensure the 
fastest possible return of these IDPs to their villages and 
farms.  Mahamat Ali told her that the armed forces were going 
be dispatched to the area soon.  Liria-Franch surmised that 
the ostentatious presence of RDL forces in Koloy and Modoyna 
had forced Chad's hand, prompting the armed forces to move 
precipitately. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment:  When Mahamat Ali received the Ambassador, 
immediately after Liria-Franch, on March 28, he dismissed 
Mahamat Nour's RDL as an insignificant force (ref B) and he 
was riding high on the basis of the blow that the Chadian 
armed forces had given the Zaghawa rebel group SCUD on March 
¶22.  That euphoria was short-lived.  End Comment. 
 
Effect on the IDPs 
--------------- 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000492  002.13 OF 003 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Prior to the fighting, on March 27, ICRC, MSF, and 
UNHCR came to agreement that the number IDPs in the entire 
border zone running from Goungour (25 miles south of Adre) to 
Daguessa (125 miles south of Adre) now totaled between 31,400 
and 44,050, with ICRC tending toward the lower figure.  ICRC 
in ref A, in mid-March, had provided a significantly lower 
tally (20,000).  ICRC director Thomas Merkelbach explained 
that part of the new tally was accounted for by IDPs not 
previously counted in the far south of this region, near 
Daguessa, where there had been an attack during the past two 
weeks; over 5,000 IDPs were now to be found in that area 
(Dogdore and Tour, west of Daguessa), many of whom had come 
from villages just south of Koloy.  Otherwise, the change was 
largely due to more thorough canvassing of the area, 
revealing a higher number of IDPs who had already fled in the 
December-February period.  ICRC said that the number of IDPs 
moving from Koloy to the main town of Goz Beida had increased 
to 2500-3000, but the rate of IDPs moving from Koloy to Goz 
Beida had decreased the previous week. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Merkelbach said that ICRC had no information from 
its people on the ground suggesting a major change in IDP 
locations due to the fighting March 30-31.  IDPs in Koloy had 
seemed relatively unfazed by the RDL presence in the area. 
He said that the presence of the Chadian armed forces in the 
Koloy area could cut both ways.  On the one hand, they could 
be the factor for security that the international community 
had asked for and that had been missing in the area since the 
forces withdrew completely in December.  On the other hand, 
if fighting continued, if armed bands moved back and forth 
through the Koloy area, if the Chadian forces or RDL or 
Sudanese-Arab allies of the RDL harmed the IDPs and local 
populace, both IDPs and villagers that had not previously 
moved could decide the area was too unsafe and move inland, 
especially to Goz Beida.  Liria-Franch took the view that the 
IDPs/villagers were already making the decision to move to 
Goz Beida.  She said that her staff were advising her to 
double or even triple the projected IDPs. 
 
Recruitment of Refugees 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) On the UNHCR announcement in Geneva March 31 that 
"armed groups" had  forcibly seized several hundred Sudanese 
refugees from camps in Chad for military training, 
Liria-Franch said that UNHCR had suspected for two years that 
recruitment was taking place but had not previously had 
proof.  Now it was confirmed.  She said it was typical, in 
her experience of refugee camps in various parts of the 
world, for secrecy surrounding and enthusiasm for recruitment 
to begin to break down within a few years of the outbreak of 
conflict, and such appeared to be the case among the 
Darfurian refugees in Chad.  The first confirmation came on 
March 2-3 when a truckload of youths was intercepted at 
Koundungo camp, and refugees in the camp had spilled the 
beans that the youths had been actively recruited for the 
Darfur rebellion. Then UNHCR learned that on 17-19 March 
Bredjing and Treguine camps had been surrounded by recruiters 
wielding sticks and whips, who rounded up 400-500 men, a few 
of them under 18, and transported them to a "training base" 
(bare field) between Hadjar Hadid and Borota (village called 
Arkoum).  Some of the young men had been forcibly recruited, 
but MSF believed 70 percent had gone voluntarily.  Again, a 
number of refugees in the camps spilled the beans.  The 
prefet in Adre and sous-prefet in Hadjar Hadid denied any 
knowledge, as did the gendarmes at the camps. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Liria-Franch said that the ignorance of the Chadian 
authorities, who should have known what was going on, had at 
first caused her to speculate that it was the Chadian 
authorities doing the recruiting.  However, multiple refugee 
accounts now established that the recruitment was being done 
by one or more Darfurian rebel groups, probably the SLM or 
one of its splinter groups.  She concluded that the Chadian 
government was complicit, that a decision had been made, 
 
NDJAMENA 00000492  003.31 OF 003 
 
 
presumably at some senior level of the government, to wink at 
the recruitment.  It was also possible, she speculated, that 
the SLM had bought off officials and gendarmes.  Liria-Franch 
said she had formally written the Interior Minister and 
discussed the recruitment issue with him, letting him knowthat UNHCR would being going public.  She said that the UN 
resrep would raise the issue with President Deby. 
 
¶10. (SBU) During SLM leader Minni Minawi's transit through 
Abeche on his way to his father's funeral April 2, the 
Ambassador asked him about reports of recruitments in the 
camps.  He said he was aware of the UNHCR statements, but 
having spent recent weeks far from the field at the Darfur 
peace talks in Abuja, he claimed he was not familiar with the 
matter.  He added that he did not know who might be 
responsible. 
WALL