VZCZCXRO2451
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0973/01 1141155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241155Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2453
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL CD SU
SUBJECT:  Written Statement of FM Lam Akol on Chad-Sudan 
Relations 
 
Ref:  a) Khartoum 00972, b) Khartoum 00938 
 
¶1.  Summary:  On April 23, Foreign Minister Lam Akol 
briefed the diplomatic corps on the state of Chad-Sudan 
bilateral relations.  The statement cites Chad as the 
source of tension in the relationship, and maintained 
that Sudan did not support rebel groups against it.  It 
further describes the historical roots of tension in 
Darfur and the two states, and identifies Chad as the 
source of its own conflicts.  Chad, it states, has failed 
to live up to the Tripoli agreement.  Sudan thanks Libya 
for its role in interceding on behalf of its interests, 
and in trying to resolve the differences between Chad and 
Sudan.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  During a 30-minute briefing of approximately 60 
diplomats in attendance, Foreign Minister Lam Akol 
outlined the state of Chadian-Sudanese relations.  Ref A 
details his verbal presentation; at the end of his 
remarks, the MFA distributed the below text, which 
provides a more detailed account of historical background 
and various rebels groups. 
 
(Begin text) 
 
Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Briefing 
Session of Foreign Diplomatic Heads of Mission 
Khartoum - April 23, 2006 
 
¶1.  Ever since the present regime assumed power in Chad, 
the Sudan government has maintained excellent relations 
with it based on mutual respect and good neighborly 
relations.  We have adopted a strategy that prevented 
hostile Chadian opposition activities be launched from 
the Sudanese territories.  This strategy has been 
enshrined in joint Agreements that contained arrangements 
for operations to patrol the common borders in 
anticipation of hostile attacks by rebel groups in both 
countries. 
 
¶2.  Furthermore, the government of Sudan has initiated 
reconciliation talks between the government of Chad and 
the major political and armed opposition groups in Chad, 
a move that cemented the stability of the regime and the 
region at large.  This course of stability could have 
continued has it not been for the behavior of the 
government of Chad that threatened the efforts of 
maintaining harmonious relations.  The Chadian government 
violated the already signed Agreements, suppressed 
internal opposition, liquidated its leaders, e.g., Abbas 
Kotti, Adama Asil, and others who were left with no 
option but to return to opposition camps and launch armed 
rebellion. 
 
¶3.  The current armed groups in Chad are targeting the 
regime of Idris Deby and has no links whatsoever with the 
government of Sudan.  The opposition activities are 
developing from different directions because of divisions 
and factionalism among army personnel equipped with 
weapons and machinery. 
 
Background to the current situation 
 
The present regime in Chad is widely based on tribalism. 
The ruling tribe has constituted a purely tribal strategy 
to establish the "Grand Zaghawa State" that includes the 
present three Darfur states of the Sudan as an integral 
part of the large dream state.  The plan to implement 
this strategy started as early as the year 2000 under the 
leadership of the former Minister of Defense Jim Four, 
who died in France as a result of an injury in the 
battlefield.  The Plan Implementation hence had been 
delayed until the emergence of the Fur Militias in (Jebel 
Marrah) in 2003, and this time Idris Debe has assumed the 
leadership of this movement himself. 
 
Many of the leadership of the rebel movements are not of 
Sudanese nationality.  The Sudan government is in 
possession of documents that they are citizens of Chad. 
Some of them are active officers in the Chadian army, to 
mention a few of them: 
 
¶1.  Mannie Arko Minawi, the founder of Darfur Liberation 
Movement, which then turned to be called Sudan liberation 
Movement. 
 
¶2.  Tigani Salem Jero founder of the Justice and Equality 
Movement is an officer in the National Guard of Chad. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000973  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶3.  Ahmed Tugud, a leading figure in the Justice and 
Equality Movement.  He was an officer in the Customs 
Department of Chad and now holds a British Passport.  He 
only had his education in the Sudan. 
 
¶4.  Major General Jebriel Abdelkarim, leader of the 
"Reform and Development Front" who is till an officer in 
the Chadian army getting his pay until this day from the 
Chadian army. 
 
¶5.  Many more army officers of Chadian nationality are 
presently fighting with rebel movements in Darfur.  The 
Sudan government has all the material evidence (i.e. 
photos and documents) to support this. 
 
¶6.  60% of the "Justice and Equality" forces are 
essentially Chadian soldiers. 
 
¶7.  64 soldiers of the Chadian army arrested inside the 
Sudan has testified to the AU interrogating offices that 
Chad is supporting the rebel movements in Darfur by 
logistics, training, and armaments. 
 
¶8.  The Stance of Idris Deby towards Darfur crisis was 
initially unclear.  He started strongly supporting the 
mediation to resolve the crisis, then under tribal 
pressures turned his back to the mediation effort render 
to render unconditional support for the rebel movements 
in Darfur.  At the same time he lost control of the army 
when many military officers failed to identify his real 
intentions towards Darfur crisis and his allegiance to 
the tribe was questioned.  At this juncture he decided to 
render full support for the rebels of Darfur, regardless 
of the effects that such stand could cause against his 
statesmanship and the national interests of his country. 
 
¶9.  Last October Chadian forces in Abeche staged a 
mutiny, after that the Chadian authorities closed their 
consulate in Jenaina and ordered the Sudan Consulate in 
Abeche to close and the staff was evacuated to Sudan.  A 
request by the Sudanese authorities to go to Ndjamena to 
meet Chadian authorities on the matter was rejected by 
the Chadians.  The Sudanese President tried to talk on 
telephone with Idris Deby and that was also refused. 
 
¶10.  The Chadian leadership failed to administer the 
internal plight and the confrontational attitude among 
the factions ad that prompted the presidency to accuse 
Sudan of interference to divert attention away from the 
internal problems of the government.  The president of 
Chad used his argument to close our Consulate in Abbashi 
while the real reason for this step is to escalate his 
supportive campaign for the rebels in Darfur. 
 
¶11.  The Sudan has documented evidence of Chadian plans 
to launch offensives against Sudanese border points and 
they had issued licenses for importation of arms as 
military equipment from East Europe and Asia for arming 
rebel forces of Darfur. 
 
¶12.  Many regional and bilateral attempts were made to 
reconcile and normalize relations between Sudan and Chad 
the last of which was the Libyan initiative culminating 
in the Tripoli Agreement which laid the foundation for 
security and political arrangements aiming at patrolling 
the joint borders.  Yet Chad had refused to deploy its 
observers at the agreed border points in clear 
manifestation of its reluctance for the control of the 
borders lest the Sudanese observers detect the Chadian 
logistical and material support for the rebel groups. 
 
¶13.  The government of the Sudan accepted the mediation 
in Darfur crisis, despite our prior knowledge of their 
flagrant support to the Darfur rebels.  This fact was 
proved once more when the Chad delegation in the AU Peace 
and Security Council started to launch allegations 
against the Sudan government instead of reporting on 
their role as a mediator.  They even rejected the idea of 
a common political strategy between the two countries 
towards their respective opposition groups, and that 
demonstrates their bad intensions towards the Sudan. 
 
¶14.  In another attempt to reconcile the difference 
between the two countries, Tripoli has invited Heads of 
Security Services in Sudan, Chad and Libya last March to 
follow-up implementation of Tripoli Agreement, and to 
meet with President Idris Deby in Ndjamena.  All parties 
met in 19 March 2006 and agreed with President Deby to 
terminate all forms of opposition presence in both 
 
KHARTOUM 00000973  003 OF 003 
 
 
countries under the Libyan supervision.  The opposition 
forces to bypass this tripartite arrangement urge their 
forces to speedily move towards Adry and Abeche and 
southward through Central Africa territories towards 
Ndjamena, to take the lead in the recent attack. 
 
Official stance of the Sudan: 
 
In continuation of Sudan strategy of transparency in the 
course of relations with Chad, and in our attempts to 
curb the present escalation against the Sudan, it has 
confined its action to a process of clarification of the 
situation in Chad and its organic relationship with the 
current situation in Darfur. 
 
The Sudan will take all necessary measures to safeguard 
its national interests at bilateral, regional, and 
international levels.  It will take all necessary 
precautionary measures to defend its borders against any 
possible attacks, in light of the hostile attitude of 
Chad that developed in the last few days.  However, the 
Sudan maintains its principal stance towards the 
developments in Chad as follows: 
 
¶1.  The government is committed, in letter and spirit, to 
the Tripoli Agreement signed between the two countries 
last February, including its commitment to deploy joint 
military observers to the agreed upon points at the 
common borders.  We hope that Chad would send its 
representatives to the joint military Observers. 
 
¶2.  The government upholds its commitment to the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
others and will continue to observe the good neighborly 
relations. 
 
¶3.  The Sudan welcomes the statement issued by the AU 
Peace and Security Council on 13 April 2006 on the 
current situation in Chad.  The statement indicates that 
what is happening in Chad is an internal problem that 
should be resolved through dialogue. 
 
¶4.  The Sudan welcomes the Libyan initiative for 
reconciliation as expressed by the Libyan envoy Dr. 
Eltereiki during his recent visit to Sudan.  We are ready 
to attend meetings of the security and political 
committees as envisaged by Tripoli Agreement. 
 
¶5.  The Sudan continues its determination to reach a 
settlement of the Darfur crisis at the on-going Abuja 
negotiations, hopefully before the end of April 2006. 
 
¶6.  The Sudan calls on the international community to 
lend full support to the on-going Peace Process in Darfur 
and refrain from any actions that might discourage the 
peace process. 
 
¶7.  We strongly condemn the occupation of the Sudan 
Embassy in Ndjamena, which was engineered and directed by 
the Chadian authorities, and the uncivilized behavior of 
the occupants.  We take this opportunity to thank the 
Libyan mission in Ndjamena for their relentless efforts 
that facilitated the safe return of the Embassy staff to 
Khartoum 
 
(End text) 
 
STEINFELD