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Viewing cable 06KABUL1887, PRT/BAMYAN: KHALILI SUPPORTERS MUDDY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL1887 2006-04-28 12:52 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO9691
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHMOS RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1887/01 1181252
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 281252Z APR 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9841
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0208
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2470
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5887
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1310
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2659
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR AMEND AND HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR BREZEZINSKI 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: PRT/BAMYAN: KHALILI SUPPORTERS MUDDY 
POLITICAL WATERS IN BAMYAN 
 
KABUL 00001887  001.4 OF 003 
 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1. (SBU) The supporters of Second Vice President 
Khalili are playing political hardball, and Governor 
Sarabi appears to be their target.  Minority Tajik 
unrest, which has received tacit backing from Khalili 
stalwarts, appears designed to discredit the Governor. 
The recent appointment of a crony of former Governor 
Aliyar as Deputy Chief of Police and Governor Sarabis 
recent meeting with President Karzai only bolster the 
perception of her isolation.  Sarabi has a tough hand 
to play, and is in sore need of some recognizable 
wins to counter the notion that she cannot deliver 
improvements to the lives of Bamyans people.  Sarabi 
is looking to donors, especially the US, to deliver 
those wins.  End Summary. 
 
Minority Tajik Complaints Fuel for Political In- 
Fighting 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
--- 
 
2.  (SBU) Tajik grumblings about their treatment at 
the hands of the Hazara are being heard all the way to 
Kabul.  Aide-de-camp to Governor Habiba Sarabi Mr. 
Amir Fooladi explained to PRToff on April 18 that such 
complaints are seasonal, peaking in the spring when 
unresolved disputes over scarce arable land come to 
the fore.  This year, however, rather than simply 
expressing such views privately, a number of Bamyan 
Tajiks have traveled to Kabul to air their grievances. 
es. 
Fooladi noted that the Bamyan Tajiks had even met with 
Speaker of Parliament Qanooni to complain about Tajik 
treatment at the hands of local officials (almost 
exclusively Hazara).  Fooladi surmised that these 
complaints are centered on Governor Sarabi. 
 
Khalili Behind Effort to Undermine Governor? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Surprisingly, Second Vice President Abdul 
Karim Khalili (ethnic Hazara) appears to be the source 
of support for these complaints.  Fooladi confided 
that Khalili had met with the Tajik agitators 
earlier in the month to hear their complaints. 
Fooladi went further, claiming that Khalili had 
promised the Tajiks that he would support a Tajik as 
Governor of Bamyan, should the current rumor campaign 
succeed in removing Sarabi.  Fooladi would not comment 
whether the current rumor campaign prompted President 
Karzais last minute request for a meeting with Gov. 
Sarabi on April 16, but did admit that it likely 
would be discussed. 
 
. 
 
Governor Sarabis Back Against the Wall 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Even before her first day on the job in 
March 2005, Governor Sarabi had three strikes against 
her, as a well-placed international source explained. 
One, she is a woman, the only woman governor in the 
country.  Two, she is originally from Ghazni, and thus 
not a true Hazara in some circles.  Three, her 
appointment took down someone well-connected to local 
political machinery.  (Note:  Khalili reportedly is a 
strong supporter of Aliyar -- both are from Yakawlang 
district -- and opposed Sarabis appointment.) 
 
KABUL 00001887  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
Fooladi said that President Karzai has offered Sarabi 
an Ambassadorship as a graceful exit if and when she 
chooses to exercise it, but that she had turned it 
down.  She wants to show her doubters that a woman 
can succeed as governor in Afghanistan, he explained. 
 
Re-Appointment of Dep. Chief of Police Boosts Khalili 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
---- 
 
5.  (SBU) The return of Abdul Rahman to his previous 
position as Deputy Chief of Police does not appear to 
help Sarabi shore up her position.  Rahman, a close 
friend of Aliyar and VP Khalili, reclaimed his 
position from former Dep. Chief of Police Abdul Malik 
on April 18.  Maliks removal had been long forecast, 
as MOI Embedded PRT Representative General Ali told 
PRToff in December that Maliks role in corruption, as 
well as his abuse of alcohol and minors, made him 
unfit for his position. 
 
6.  (SBU) Rahmans return, however, was not expected. 
We thought he and his corrupt friends were gone for 
good, the head of the regional Afghan Independent 
Human Rights Commission complained.  Malik was bad, 
but Rahman is not much better.  (FYI: Rahman told us 
he stepped down voluntarily to run for the Wolesi 
Jirga.  Rahman received a relatively large number of 
votes, 5410, although not sufficient to claim one of 
Bamyans four WJ seats.  End FYI.)  General Ali 
ral Ali 
expressed his disappointment that someone so corrupt 
could get a second chance.  (Note:  Rahman was 
implicated in a string of burglaries in the Bamyan 
bazaar. His involvement in a diesel/petrol siphoning 
ring that stole so much fuel that Rahman opened his 
own  service station in Kabul reportedly is what led 
to his initial dismissal. End Note.) 
 
7.  (SBU) Many contacts interpreted Rahmans re- 
appointment as a boost to Khalili, and a knock on 
Sarabis efforts as governor.  He (Rahman) will not 
make it any easier for her (Sarabi), said a local 
contractor.  Perhaps Karzai is losing faith in her, 
the head of the Shaidan District shura wondered.  ANP 
Colonel Timor Shah predicted that Sarabi would soon 
move on:  she has no friends left in Bamyan 
(government); why would she stay? 
 
Comment:  Looking to Donors for a Boost 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Governor Sarabi has put herself in harms 
way for her beliefs and ideas in the past, especially 
pecially 
during the Taliban era when she crossed the Afghan- 
Pakistan border regularly at night to teach in 
clandestine womens schools against Taliban edicts. 
Her concern for Bamyans people (at least its Hazara 
majority) appears genuine.  It thus seems unlikely 
that she would give up her position as governor 
without a struggle, or at least an explicit request 
from Karzai. 
 
9.  (SBU) Sarabis grace period as Bamyan Governor 
appears to be over, however, especially now that VP 
Khalili appears to be consolidating his ethnic power 
base in the Hazarajat.  Her isolation within the local 
political scene may explain her full court press with 
donors to commit to the ambitious but vague future 
 
KABUL 00001887  003.4 OF 003 
 
 
development plan for Bamyan City.  The US, which had 
at various times committed to three large-scale 
infrastructure projects for Bamyan (a police training 
center, a courthouse, and a provincial administrative 
building) remains a favorite target for her 
infrastructure requests.  Until these projects and 
nd 
others are built, Sarabi will have few examples to 
which she can point as proof of her success in 
garnering resources for Bamyans people.  Sarabis 
position thus may continue to weaken, an unfortunate 
development for Afghanistans only woman governor. 
 
NEUMANN 
NN