VZCZCXRO2017
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1821/01 1140916
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240916Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9770
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2459
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2648
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5873
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1298

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001821 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC MARR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT/KANDAHAR - DEALING WITH THE TALIBAN 
"SPRING OFFENSIVE" 
 
KABUL 00001821  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)   SUMMARY.  The "spring offensive" 
announced by Taliban leaders in southern Afghanistan 
a month ago appears to be picking up momentum. 
During the previous four months the Taliban engaged 
primarily in small hit and run attacks and 
improvised explosive bombings, and this remains 
their primary tactic.  The increased number of 
suicide attacks remains deeply disturbing.  However, 
in another move, they recently amassed a force of 50 
to 100 fighters in a cluster of villages along 
Highway One about 25 miles from Kandahar City, 
reportedly to prepare for attacks in Kandahar.   On 
the orders of Governor Asadullah Khalid, the Afghan 
National Police (ANP) launched a pre-emptive attack 
on April 14 which resulted in a report of up to 41 
Taliban and four ANP killed.  (Note: In a later 
meeting with Embassy officials, Asadullah revised 
the number down to about 25.  End note.)  Canadian 
forces were called in after the battle became 
protracted and the ANP began to take casualties. 
While the initiative of the Afghan authorities in 
tackling the Taliban is admirable, this battle 
showed that adjustments will have to be made to deal 
more effectively with the Taliban "spring 
offensive."  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Kandahar Provincial Governor Asadullah 
Khalid told Regional Command South on April 11 that 
he had received reports that a significant Taliban 
force had moved into the area around Sangisar in 
preparation for attacks on targets in Kandahar (he 
did not know which targets had been selected by the 
Taliban).  This area was once one of Mullah Mohammed 
Omar's headquarters and has long been suspected as 
being a center of remaining Taliban support.  Khalid 
mentioned that he planned to have the ANP search the 
villages in question and arrest any suspected 
Taliban later in the week.  He said that he would be 
in contact with Canada's Task Force Orion to request 
back-up support.  However, this was not done in 
advance; the Coalition forces were called in only 
after the operation was under way. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  On the morning of April 14, the ANP 
launched the mission and came under fire almost 
immediately.  According to the initial count by the 
ANP, the firefight, which lasted into the early 
evening, resulted in the deaths of 41 Taliban and 
four ANP deaths - although the number of Taliban 
killed was later revised downward to around 25. 
Further inquiry by CFC-A revealed the final number 
is likely much less than 25. Similarly, although the 
press reported that the Zherai district chief of 
police was killed and the district administrator was 
wounded, our information indicated that both were 
wounded.  Canadian forces, which were operating 
nearby, were called in by Afghan authorities and 
surrounded the villages.  The Canadians then fired 
on several compounds. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  On Saturday, April 15, the Taliban 
launched a series of hit and run attacks on several 
police posts along Highway One (part of the national 
"ring road").  This stretch of road has historically 
been a hotspot for Taliban activity, and Taliban 
 
KABUL 00001821  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
leadership have expressed an intent to increase 
activity further in this region in an attempt to 
isolate it from the surrounding areas.  No ANP were 
either killed or wounded in these quick hit and run 
attacks.  Afghan officials told us they believed the 
attacks were a face-saving effort by the Taliban, 
who had taken a humiliating defeat in one of their 
historic areas of support. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Subsequent to the April 14 battle, the 
Commander of Task Force Orion met with the Governor 
and top police officers to discuss the need for 
closer coordination in advance of such operations. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  There are some noteworthy good news items 
in these events.  First, people in Kandahar are 
increasingly willing to provide the provincial 
authorities with information on Taliban activities. 
Second, the Afghan authorities and ANP are willing 
to assume primary responsibility for providing 
security.  Third, the capabilities of the ANP are 
improving - they had pinned the Taliban down before 
calling in the Canadian forces.  Fourth, so far this 
year, the Taliban do not appear to have the 
capability to recruit or field as many fighters as 
they did last year. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Beyond the good news, however, the GOA 
will need to make significant adjustments to its 
tactics.  First, the ANP and ANA, which currently 
lack an effective Quick Reaction Force, will have to 
plan for larger pitched battles.  This winter the 
Taliban preferred to fire a few shots and flee 
rather than stand and fight when confronted with 
significant Afghan or coalition forces.  While this 
remains their primary tactic, they are now more 
frequently challenging the Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) as they present softer targets. 
Second, Governor Khalid and the Afghan authorities 
will have to coordinate more through the nascent 
Provincial Coordinating Center that has been set up 
to help coordinate intelligence and the activities 
of Afghan security forces and Coalition Forces in 
Kandahar Province.  Finally, inadequate supplies of 
ammunition and weapons at police outposts along the 
ring road may make them tempting targets to the 
Taliban who have no doubt heard of these shortages. 
Increased weapons and communications equipment for 
the police outposts are likely to be top priorities 
on the list of security improvements that Governor 
Khalid and the other governors are planning to put 
together at the April 25 Southern Governors' 
Conference in Kandahar (other priorities are, or 
should be, addressing corruption and irregular pay 
for the ANP).  The primary purpose of this 
conference is to develop a common set of security 
plans and requirements which the governors intend to 
present in Kabul at the ministerial level as soon as 
they can make appointments.   End Comment. 
 
NEUMANN