VZCZCXRO1268
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1669/01 1021342
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZDK
P 121342Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9580
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2428
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2625
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5830
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1269

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD 
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL 
REL NATO/ISAF/AS/NZ 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SNAR ASEC PTER MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT - SECURITY PROGRAMS GETTING 
TRACTION IN URUZGAN PROVINCE 
 
REF: A) KABUL 1211 B) KABUL 1328 
 
KABUL 00001669  001.10 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Establishing GOA authority, 
particularly police authority, in Afghanistan's 
Uruzgan province is very much a work in progress. 
The province's two police forces are semi-reformed 
militias allied to rival warlords.  The PRT and 
coalition forces are making some progress in 
training and mentoring them, and it appears that the 
March 18 arrival of a new governor (reftels) will 
also contribute to their professionalization.  The 
police forces require significant reforms to 
regularize their status, combat corruption in the 
ranks, and develop effective policing tactics and 
coordinated strategies.  One of the greatest threats 
to Uruzgan's security is the poppy economy, which 
infects all aspects of public life.  As part of our 
effort to establish a secure environment, we must 
leverage available tools against poppy cultivation. 
We look forward to the PEP program's playing an 
important role in the GOA and coalition security 
strategy.  END SUMMARY. 
 
AHP - ALLIED WITH FORMER GOVERNOR JAN MOHAMMED 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The Afghan Highway Police (AHP) and Afghan 
National Police (ANP) constitute the civilian 
security forces in Uruzgan province (there are also 
two battalions of Afghan National Army forces here). 
The AHP are slated to have 201 personnel in Uruzgan 
and are charged with maintaining security along the 
province's major roads.  The AHP are commanded by 
Col. Matiollah, the hard-edged cousin of former 
Governor Jan Mohammed Khan.  Like Jan Mohammed, 
Matiollah is a semi-literate former militia 
commander and among the leaders of the Pashtun- 
Populzai tribe here (Uruzgan's strongest).  His 
impulse is to deploy his men to support his tribe's 
interests and/or kill Taliban rather than having any 
strategic approach to highway security.  The AHP's 
leadership is heavily Populzai (including about 
three dozen of Matiollah's kin) but lower ranks 
include members of several different tribes, 
excepting the Noorzai, who are fierce Populzai 
rivals here.  Credible accounts indicate that 
Matiollah operates protection rackets, skims from 
the AHP's payroll, and is involved in the illegal 
narcotics trade.  Matiollah is particularly adept as 
a Taliban fighter and has generally cooperated well 
with the PRT, regularly sending his men for Military 
Police Advisory Training (MPAT) and deploying them 
for missions in collaboration with coalition forces. 
For this reason we may need to support his retention 
as AHP Chief for the short term, in the interest of 
stability, but he will need to be replaced once the 
political situation in Uruzgan has become more 
stable. 
 
ANP - ROZI KHAN'S FORCE IS A COUNTERBALANCE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Uruzgan's ANP are also a semi-laundered 
former militia.  They are led by Rozi Khan, leader 
of the province's Barakzai tribe and rival to Jan 
 
KABUL 00001669  002.8 OF 004 
 
 
Mohammed, Matiollah and the Populzai.  Placing Rozi 
Khan at the head of the ANP created an effective 
counterweight to Jan Mohammed's autocratic 
tendencies, but it also ensured that the AHP and ANP 
could not cooperate at the senior level.  Like Jan 
Mohammed and Matiollah, Rozi Khan is a semi-literate 
former Mujahadeen fighter reported to be involved in 
illicit money-making activities.  The ANP are 
authorized to have 361 men in Uruzgan, but in the 
past Jan Mohammed maintained de facto control over 
nearly half of the force, at the expense of Rozi 
Khan's authority.  With the departure of Jan 
Mohammed, Rozi Khan has allied himself with Governor 
Monib and has even begun to outline plans to reform 
the ANP.  However, we understand that Rozi Khan will 
be replaced by the central government as part of 
upcoming police reforms - a move that we support. 
 
NECESSARY REFORMS AND THE PRT'S ROLE 
------------------------------------ 
¶4. (SBU) The problems of the AHP and ANP are 
systemic and severe:  the payroll and operational 
budgets are uncertain and skimmed by senior 
officers; most men are untrained and without 
uniforms or equipment, the rolls are inaccurate and 
clogged with non-existent men, while many men who 
are actually working are maintained off the books -- 
all of which creates real confusion on the street 
about who is and is not a police officer.  Meanwhile 
illiteracy, tribal loyalties, and lack of training 
and strategic vision at all levels prevent the 
forces from developing professional esprit and 
carrying out civilian policing activities. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The PRT has several activities aimed at 
strengthening the AHP and ANP: 
 
-- MPAT. 
Three US Military Police (MPs) attached to the PRT 
provide MPAT Training to the AHP and ANP.  The 
training is an 8-hour module for 20 students for one 
week covering ethics, first aid, search and arrest 
of suspects, and checkpoint and vehicle searches. 
While the training is basic, it is often the only 
formal training the participants have ever had.  It 
also presents us with an opportunity to record basic 
biodata and to photograph each participant.  To 
date, roughly half of the AHP and ANP police have 
taken the course.  This course could usefully be 
expanded to two weeks, though more fundamental 
training is constrained by participants' low 
literacy levels. 
 
-- POLICE MENTORS. 
Beginning in late 2005, INL contracted two (expanded 
to four in March 2006) Dyncorps police mentors to 
provide guidance to the forces' senior leadership. 
These mentors are police officers from the U.S. who 
undergo 10 days training in the U.S. and 10 days in 
Kabul before deploying to the field.  Hampered by 
logistical glitches (their radios and bodyguards 
only arrived in Uruzgan in March 2006, some five 
months late, their vehicles were redirected in order 
to meet security needs elsewhere and arrived only 
recently, and they are still without their own 
 
KABUL 00001669  003.8 OF 004 
 
 
housing, meals, computers and interpreters), the 
mentors have been slow off the mark and have yet to 
become fully effective.  However, the mentors have 
been able to provide informal support to the PRT's 
MPAT training program and, in the absence of their 
own vehicles, have taken advantage of PRT visits 
throughout the province to observe and engage with 
the AHP and ANP.  The PRT has also redirected some 
of its planned missions to support the mentors' 
activities in order to make them minimally 
effective.  As their administrative issues are 
resolved, the mentors will be able to provide 
critical high-level advice to the police and 
provincial leadership and -- with buy-in from a new 
governor and police chiefs -- guide them toward 
much-needed reforms. 
 
-- COORDINATION. 
Beyond the MPAT and mentoring programs, the PRT 
seeks to strengthen Uruzgan's security forces by 
developing a more strategic view of their 
operations.  We facilitate regular meetings to 
exchange information and develop operational plans 
among the AHP, ANP, ANA, NDS, the coalition forces, 
and the governor.  Governor Monib has used these 
efforts as a launching point to develop a 
coordination center that brings together the various 
forces and to set up checkpoints around Tarin Kowt, 
essentially the provincial capital's first effort at 
a sustained physical security presence.  In order to 
both strengthen Afghan forces and to ensure that 
they are the face of operations, the PRT and 
coalition forces include a contingent of local 
forces in every operation, whether it be MED/VETCAP 
(revolving medical and veterinary clinics), visits 
to USAID reconstruction projects, or kinetic 
operations against insurgents. 
 
POPPY EFFORTS KEY TO LONG-TERM SUCCESS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The poppy economy in Uruzgan is ubiquitous: 
it infects all aspects of public life here, 
corrupting public officials, distracting farmers 
from food crops, fueling violence, and drawing 
significant portions of the province out of the 
government's sphere of authority.  Thus a key 
element in strengthening the security sector here is 
to conduct effective campaigns against poppy 
cultivation.  With GOA eradication efforts this year 
focused on neighboring Kandahar and Helmand 
provinces, we need to work closely with the governor 
and local actors to leverage available means -- such 
as PEP -- to address the burgeoning poppy threat. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Until recently, the Poppy Elimination 
Program (PEP) here was plagued by the same 
logistical glitches as the police mentor program. 
Miscommunication and uneven coordination with the 
PRT regarding housing, equipment, and security 
delayed the program's rollout.  However, with the 
arrival of a new embassy PEP Advisor in March 2006, 
the program has gotten firmly back on track and 
should soon be showing results.  A constructive 
dialogue among the PRT, the PEP Advisor, and the 
 
KABUL 00001669  004.8 OF 004 
 
 
Governor has now been established, so that we can 
work through logistical challenges and get the PEP 
presence, both in downtown Tarin Kowt and their 
secure living quarters at the PRT, up and running. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Uruzgan is a challenging environment that 
teaches hard lessons.  As our MPAT, police mentor, 
and other security programs get traction, it is 
imperative that they be dovetailed to provide 
maximum results.  The timing could not be better, 
because a new governor and impending changes of 
other provincial leaders offer a clear opportunity 
to institute reforms and make progress across the 
board on issues such as registering the ANP and AHP, 
cleaning up their personnel and payrolls, and 
cultivating a closer relationship between all of 
Uruzgan's forces.  We also look forward to the 
resolution of administrative problems related to the 
mentoring program in order to take advantage of this 
window of opportunity.  Uruzgan needs a lot of work 
and a lot of help, but the alternative is a descent 
into greater instability that would threaten US and 
coalition interests here. 
Norland