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Viewing cable 06JAKARTA4365, CENTRAL SULAWESI: "POSO 3" CLEMENCY APPEAL REJECTED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06JAKARTA4365 2006-04-04 09:50 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Jakarta
VZCZCXRO1414
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #4365/01 0940950
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040950Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2261
INFO RUEHJA/AMCONSUL SURABAYA 1321
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 9284
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004365 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 993 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/IET, DRL 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: NA 
TAGS: PHUM PINS PGOV KJUS ID
SUBJECT: CENTRAL SULAWESI: "POSO 3" CLEMENCY APPEAL REJECTED 
- EXECUTION SENTENCE FOR MASS MURDER ON TRACK 
 
REF: A) 01 Jakarta 244 
 
     B) 01 Jakarta 1288 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The executions of the so-called "Poso 3"-- 
Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Martinus Riwu--in 
Central Sulawesi following their 2001 convictions for mass 
murder, torture and arson, could take place next week. 
"Procedural" reasons delayed the executions from their 
planned April 1 date.  Two court appeals, including one to 
the Supreme Court, upheld the convictions; clemency requests 
have not prospered.  While some local Christians protest the 
executions, few have claimed innocence for the three; 
supporters oppose the death penalty and argue that the three 
should remain alive to testify against 19 other alleged 
masterminds of the Central Sulawesi conflict, all 
Protestant. The executions do not appear likely to touch off 
violence, in part because most appear to agree on the men's 
guilt, but local leaders nonetheless have tried to develop 
strategies to reduce the chances of violence.  End Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
2. (SBU) The Palu District Court in 2001 found guilty 
Fabianus Tibo (60 years old from Flores), Dominggus da Silva 
(42 years old from Flores) and Martinus Riwu (48 years old 
from Kupang, West Timor) for a series of brutal murders 
between May 23 and June 30, 2000 in Poso, Central Sulawesi 
(Ref b).  Tibo led the "Red Bats", a Christian militia group 
instrumental in the mass violence during the worst days of 
the Poso conflict (Da Silva and Riwa belonged to the "Red 
Bats".)  While media reports also pointed a finger at a 
former civil servant, Advent Lindo Lateka, as the original 
financial backer and "brains" of the militia group (Lateka 
died during a clash in June 2000), Tibo reportedly got 
recruited to lead the group based on his reputation as 
"tough" due to a 1990 conviction for murder.  Tibo does not 
deny involvement with the group or the conflict, but claims 
that 16 other "intellectual actors" (masterminds) encouraged 
him to get involved and should therefore also face trial. 
 
3. (SBU) Following the 1999-2000 violence sparked by Muslim 
gangs, who burned hundred of homes, killing several 
Christians, police arrested several perpetrators.  When a 
mob stormed the local jail, the detainees escaped.  This 
sparked a new and vicious round of violence.  Reftel B 
reported that a number of provocateurs, including Tibo, Da 
Silva and Riwu, led some 700 Red Bat recruits in several 
mass attacks on Muslim villages in and near Poso.  As 
reported at the time, a mob led by Tibo, da Silva and Riwu, 
surrounded a group of about 200 Muslim men who had taken 
shelter in a mosque at the Walisongo pesantren.  According 
to an eyewitness who escaped, Tibo and his gang tied the 
victims' hands behind their backs and proceeded to hack them 
to death with machetes (ref B).  While police initially 
reacted slowly, with the help of the military they managed 
to put together sufficient evidence to jail the three 
leaders -- Tibo, Da Silva, and Riwu.  (Note: Many see Muslim 
outrage over the Walisongo massacre as prompting the arrival 
in Central Sulawesi of Muslim jihadist groups, including 
Laskar Jundullah, veterans of the conflict in the nearby 
Maluku Islands.  End Note.) 
 
Verdicts Upheld Up to the Top 
----------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) During the course of the 2001 trial, 28 witnesses 
and other evidence linked Tibo, da Silva, and Riwu the 
deaths of some 300 people in a two-month period.  Per Ref B, 
none of the men showed remorse during the trial; the 
defendants had grinned and clapped their hands on hearing 
the charges read before the court.  The court convicted all 
three of mass murder, torture, and arson; the mass murder 
charge alone carries the death penalty in Indonesia.  The 
three subsequently appealed to the Central Sulawesi High 
Court, which upheld the guilty verdicts later that year. 
Tibo, da Silva and Riwu subsequently appealed to the 
Indonesian Supreme Court, which in November 2002 upheld the 
lower courts' decisions. 
 
5. (SBU) In November 2005, the three filed their first 
request for clemency, based partially on the claim, first 
broached during their 2002 appeal to the Central Sulawesi 
High Court, that at least 16 other men acted as the "real" 
masterminds of the Poso unrest.  (Note: Tibo had named the 
 
JAKARTA 00004365  002 OF 003 
 
 
16 during his trial and reports indicate they included local 
officials and former military officers.  Da Silva later 
added 3 names to that list, including 2 priests, all of them 
Protestant.  End Note.)  The clemency request failed. 
Central Sulawesi Police Chief Oegroseno has reopened an 
investigation into the alleged 19 perpetrators--some of whom 
no longer live--but has stated that this will not delay the 
execution of Tibo, da Silva and Riwu.  The three then 
submitted a second clemency plea; however, the Central 
Sulawesi Prosecutor's Office did not retreat from its 
position that the sentence of death would go forth, and 
noted that Indonesian law allows only one request for 
clemency. 
 
Death Penalty Becomes the Issue 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Our contacts say that until about six months ago 
when the planned date of the executions neared, the case 
drew little local attention.  In part, this may reflect 
local commitment--both Christian and Muslim--to having 
perpetrators of violence during the conflict tried for their 
crimes and possibly part of a growing local reluctance to 
reopen the wounds of the conflict years.  Our recent 
discussions with contacts in Central Sulawesi that few if 
any, be they Muslim, Catholic or Protestant, believe these 
men innocent.  Even local Catholic leaders who have lead 
public efforts against the executions do not deny that the 
men's guilt; as the secretary to the Sulawesi Bishop told 
reporters several months ago, "[our resistance to their 
execution] does not mean that the Church defends and 
condones their actions." 
 
7. (SBU) Local or national resistance to the executions 
appears based on anti-death penalty sentiment, and on a 
desire to preserve the men's testimony to develop possible 
cases against other perpetrators.  From discussions with 
local contacts and review of the issue, we do not know of 
any evidence offered over the past four years to suggest 
innocence for the three.  Their request for clemency claims 
that other guilty parties exist who should face trial, and 
asked for delay in the execution so they can give evidence 
against 19 other individuals allegedly involved.  On Sunday 
April 2, thousands of Christians in the city of Tentena held 
a mass prayer for Tibo, da Silva and Riwu and demanded 
abolishment of the death penalty.  (Embassy note: On the 
same day some 200 hundred noisy protestors stood in 
Jakarta's Plaza Indonesia demanding the men's release.) 
 
Slight Delay, But Government Prepared 
------------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) "Technical difficulties" delayed the execution 
scheduled for April 1; however, the difficulties appear 
procedural, not waffling by the government.  Our contacts in 
Central Sulawesi say the "technical" reasons refer to a 
requirement that a notification letter from the Attorney 
General go to the families no later than 72 hours prior to 
the execution.  While officials have not publicly set a new 
date for the executions, they suggest it could take place 
within the next week. 
 
9. (SBU) While a few local leaders have voiced concern that 
the executions could incite unrest, the recent public 
discussion of the executions in Central Sulawesi has not 
sparked violence; some local groups have held vigils or 
gatherings, but Poso city has remained calm.  Local 
government figures appear committed to keep it that way. 
Central Sulawesi governor Paliudju met provincial leaders 
including Police Chief Oegroseno, Army and Naval commanders, 
and the head of the provincial legislature (DPRD) on Monday, 
April 3, to discuss the executions and develop strategies to 
contain any trouble afterwards. 
 
Other Cases 
----------- 
 
10. (SBU) Our contacts in Central Sulawesi and other 
observers tell us of their frustration at the slow pace of 
trials and convictions for those involved with sectarian and 
other violence in the province, and point to the lack of 
charges against Muslims responsible for the initial May - 
June 2000 violence or against members of the Laskar Jihad 
Islamic paramilitary groups which instigated violent 
incidents in 2001.  They add, however, that the courts have 
 
JAKARTA 00004365  003 OF 003 
 
 
handed down other convictions related to earlier Poso 
violence in addition to that of the Poso 3.  In 1999, the 
court convicted Herman Parimo, a Protestant local 
legislator, for inciting the first wave riots and violence 
and sentenced him to 14 years in prison; Parimo died in 
April 2000 while appealing the verdict.  District Chief 
Agfar Patanga, a Muslim, convicted in 2000 for inciting 
violence and received a sentence of 24 months. Protestant 
preacher Renaldy Damanik, known for his extremist and 
polarizing rhetoric and convicted in 2002 for weapons 
possession after police discovered weapons in his home, had 
portrayed himself as the leader of Poso's Protestant 
community.  He left jail in late 2004, and has lobbied 
against the executions and "warned" of possible violence. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (SBU) Nothing we have seen suggests that court falsely 
convicted these three individuals.  Shortly after the May 
2000 killings in Poso, Embassy Jakarta (and later, a senior 
U.S. official in the UN) issued a press statement condemning 
the perpetrators of the massacre (Ref B).  The USG has 
consistently urged the Government of Indonesia to bring 
perpetrators of mass violence to justice through Indonesian 
courts and legal processes in accordance with Indonesian 
law, including holding perpetrators of both the Central 
Sulawesi and Maluku conflicts legally responsible for their 
crimes.  While we could criticize the lack of additional 
convictions for both the May-June 2000 violence and the 
August 2001 violence, the bottom line remains that we see no 
indication that the "Poso 3" did not commit the crimes. 
 
PASCOE