VZCZCXRO3717
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0943/01 1151119
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251119Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1611
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY PRIORITY 1022
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000943 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR VM
SUBJECT: Party Selects New (Old) Leadership; Senior 
Positions Remain Unclear 
 
Ref: Hanoi 895 and previous 
 
HANOI 00000943  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
This is a joint Embassy Hanoi-ConGen HCMC report. 
 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Communist Party closed its 10th National Party 
Congress (NPC) April 25 after re-electing Nong Duc Manh to 
the position of Party General Secretary.  The Party's new 
Central Committee, elected April 23, also selected the new 
Politburo and Party Secretariat.  Although many of those who 
had been rumored to be in line for top positions are in the 
new Politburo, the Party is keeping quiet about who will 
actually assume what job.  Based on Vietnamese practice, the 
positions of State President, Prime Minister and Chairman of 
the National Assembly will not be formally announced until 
they receive the blessing of the National Assembly, which 
could be as early as mid-May or as late as December.  The 
Congress' delegates also endorsed official Party documents 
such as the Political Report, which for the first time 
allows some Party members to engage in capitalist activities 
and updated the Party Statutes to reflect this change. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Our initial appraisal of the new Politburo and 
Central Committee membership is that, with increased 
representation by Ministry of Public Security officials and 
the reduction of the total number of Politburo and Party 
Secretariat members, as well as the elevation of the 
 
SIPDIS 
Directors of the Party Control Commission, the Internal 
Affairs Commission and the relatively hardline Minister of 
Culture and Information, the Party is sending a message 
about its intent to address corruption and strengthen 
central control.  Regional balance also appears not to have 
been a major consideration this time; southern and northern 
leaders prospered, at the expense of their central 
Vietnamese colleagues.  Moreover, the lack of clarity of 
when exactly Vietnam's new senior leaders will be formally 
selected may suggest continued internal disagreement over 
the composition of the top leadership as well as concerns 
that Government and Party functions not get sidetracked 
during the year Vietnam hosts APEC.  End Summary and 
Comment. 
 
The Party's New Leaders 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) closed its 
10th National Party Congress (NPC) April 25 with the 
announcement of its new Politburo lineup, including the re- 
election of General Secretary Nong Duc Manh.  In order of 
the number of votes the new Politburo members received from 
the new Central Committee, they and their current positions 
(which are likely to change in most cases) are: 
 
-- Nong Duc Manh - Party General Secretary 
-- Le Hong Anh - Minister of Public Security 
-- Nguyen Tan Dzung - Standing Deputy Prime Minister 
-- Nguyen Minh Triet - Secretary of HCMC Party Committee 
-- Truong Tan Sang - Chairman, Party Economic Commission 
-- Nguyen Phu Trong - Secretary, Hanoi Party Committee 
-- Pham Gia Khiem - Deputy Prime Minister 
-- Phung Quang Thanh - Vice Minister of Defense, General 
Chief of Staff 
-- Truong Vinh Trong - Chairman, Party Internal Affairs 
Commission 
-- Le Thanh Hai - Chairman of HCMC People's Committee 
-- Nguyen Sinh Hung - Minister of Finance 
-- Pham Quang Nghi - Minister of Culture and Information 
-- Ho Duc Viet - Chairman of the National Assembly's 
Committee for Science, Technology and Environment 
-- Nguyen Van Chi - Chairman, Party Control Commission 
 
¶4. (SBU) Regional balance was not a significant 
consideration for the Party Congress.  Southerners and 
northerners dominate the Politburo, with HCMC having three 
representatives -- Triet, Sang and Hai.  Our contacts told 
us that Ba Thanh, the brash and conservative Party Secretary 
of Danang, was lobbying hard for a slot on the Politburo. 
He was rebuffed.  In contrast to previous Party 
pronouncements that the new Politburo would have 15-17 
members, the new lineup only has 14 members.  Asked to 
comment on this during an April 25 press conference, Party 
General Secretary Manh said that "there were not enough 
individuals who met the criteria for Politburo membership. 
If some appear in the future, we can consider increasing the 
size of the Politburo." 
 
 
HANOI 00000943  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) There have been some foreign press reports 
indicating that, as numbers two, three and four on the list, 
Le Hong Anh will be President, Nguyen Tan Dzung will be 
Prime Minister and Nguyen Minh Triet will be Chairman of the 
National Assembly.  However, virtually all of our contacts 
have been unwilling to speculate on whether the number of 
votes received (and thus position on the list) will 
correspond with the eventual Politburo hierarchy, cautioning 
us "not to read too much into it."  Although rumors will 
continue to swirl about who will assume what position, 
nothing will be official until the National Assembly 
convenes and formally elects the new leadership.  During his 
press conference, General Secretary Manh refused to get 
drawn out on the subject of personnel decisions, noting that 
"the National Assembly has the final word on the subject." 
"Please wait and see," he said. 
 
¶6. (SBU) When exactly the National Assembly will meet to 
bless the leadership changes is the subject of some 
speculation.  The National Assembly will convene again on 
May 16, and National Assembly member and head of the Vietnam 
Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO) Vu Xuan Hong told 
the Ambassador April 14 that the legislature's first order 
of business will be to discuss and approve Vietnam's new 
leaders.  On April 23, however, senior Party official Dao 
Dzuy Quat (deputy director of the Party's Culture and 
Information Commission) floated a trial balloon in the 
Vietnamese press saying that the timing for the leadership 
handover has not been decided and suggesting that Vietnam 
needs "experienced leadership" in place for the November 
2006 APEC summit, and so the National Assembly would wait 
until December to approve the new leadership slate. 
 
¶7. (SBU) At any rate, once the National Assembly elects a 
new Prime Minister, the PM will nominate Cabinet ministers 
for National Assembly endorsement.  Current (but retiring) 
Deputy Prime Minister and member of the Secretariat Vu Khoan 
said in an interview on April 24 that cabinet ministers "do 
not have to be Central Committee members, or even Party 
members."  He acknowledged, however, that their work would 
be "very difficult" if they are not. 
 
New Party Secretariat 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Party Secretariat, which handles the day-to-day 
management of Party affairs, was also announced.  Its 
members (and their current positions) are: 
 
-- Nong Duc Manh - Party General Secretary 
-- Truong Tan Sang - Chairman, Party Economic Commission 
-- Truong Vinh Trong - Chairman, Party Internal Affairs 
Commission 
-- Nguyen Van Chi - Chairman, Party Control Commission 
-- Pham Quang Nghi - Minister of Culture and Information 
-- Le Van Dzung, Chief of People's Army of Vietnam's General 
Political Department 
-- Tong Thi Phong, Chairman, Party Mass Mobilization 
Commission 
-- To Huy Rua, Director, Ho Chi Minh Political Institute 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Secretariat's Standing Member, an influential 
position that regulates the paper flow to the Politburo and 
administers many key personnel decisions, previously held by 
Phan Dzien, has not yet been announced.  The first five of 
the eight members of the Secretariat listed above are 
concurrent members of the Politburo, which is an increase 
from the previous Secretariat, which had four Politburo 
members out of nine total Secretariat members. 
 
New Central Committee 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) On April 23, the delegates to the NPC elected the 
Party's new Central Committee, which has increased in size 
from 150 to 160 regular members, with 21 non-voting 
alternates.  Our early assessment is that the new CC's 
membership does not reflect a major new direction for 
Vietnam, but there have been some changes from the previous 
committee's lineup. 
 
¶11. (SBU) No Foreign Ministry officials were elected as 
regular CC members (unless one counts Deputy Prime Minister 
Pham Gia Khiem, who is also a new Politburo member and is 
rumored to be in line to replace Foreign Minister Nguyen Dzy 
Nien, who was not a Politburo member).  Interestingly, there 
is one MFA official among the CC alternates:  Department of 
International Organizations Director General Pham Binh Minh, 
 
HANOI 00000943  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
who is well-known as our and others' interlocutor for our 
respective human rights dialogues.  His inclusion as a CC 
alternate may auger a promotion in the near future.  Other 
prominent rumored losers for membership in the CC include: 
Nong Duc Manh's son, Nong Quoc Tuan, who is head of the 
National Youth Federation; General Nguyen Chi Vinh, an MOD 
General in charge of intelligence and closely associated 
with former conservative President Le Duc Anh; and, and 
Madame Pham Phuong Thao, Chairwoman of the HCMC People's 
Council.  (The slate of 207 candidates for the CC was Qt 
made public.) 
 
¶12. (SBU) At 16 out of 160 CC members, the percentage of 
military members of the new CC remains unchanged from the 
previous committee, although the ratio of "political 
commissars" to those in command positions has increased over 
the previous Central Committee.  This is likely a reflection 
of either the increased importance of these commissars with 
the Vietnamese military or the decreased importance of Party 
credentials in the selection of military region commanders. 
The alternates appear to be a who's who of younger leaders 
that the Party is cultivating -- many from the district 
level -- including the former Youth Union Chairman of HCMC. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) also 
substantially increased its presence on the Central 
Committee, with six of the current eight MPS Vice Ministers 
plus the current Minister represented.  This adds weight to 
the speculation that the Ministry of Public Security 
will divide into two ministries, a Ministry of State 
Security and a Ministry of Police, because even if the vice 
ministers not selected for the Central Committee retire, six 
vice ministers is too many for one Ministry.  It is worth 
noting that the current Minister of Public Security, Le Hong 
Anh, was the highest vote-getter in the Politburo election 
after the unopposed General Secretary Manh. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Finally, in spite of the Party's trumpeting of its 
new and more "democratic" style of allowing NPC delegates to 
nominate CC candidates, or for individuals to nominate 
themselves, it does not appear that any of these new-style 
candidates made the final cut. 
 
Party Documents 
--------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The NPC's delegates also voted on and approved the 
Political Report, which is little changed from the previous 
versions that had been circulated for comment -- and 
criticized in reformist press (reftels).  Significantly, the 
report contains language allowing Party members to engage in 
capitalist activities, although the language was not nearly 
as open as reformists had wished.  Questioned at the press 
conference on whether capitalists would be able to become 
Party members, General Secretary Manh responded that "the 
issue requires further study and specific regulations."  In 
a further change meant to broaden its national appeal, the 
Party transformed itself from the "vanguard of the working 
class" to the "vanguard of the working class and the 
representative of the nation's interest." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Our initial appraisal of the new Politburo and 
Central Committee membership is that, with increased 
representation by Ministry of Public Security officials and 
tightening of the number of officials represented in the 
Politburo and Secretariat, the Party is sending a message 
about its intent to address corruption and strengthen 
central control.  Moreover, the lack of clarity as to when 
exactly Vietnam's new senior leaders will be formally 
elected may suggest continued internal disagreement over the 
composition of the top leadership, as well as an 
opportunistic move by the existing leadership (who are not 
happy about retiring) to extend their terms.  Once the 
senior-most slots are allocated, there likely will be 
additional personnel maneuvers to fill other key slots, 
including the Party Secretaries of Hanoi and HCMC and the 
leadership of the Vietnam Fatherland Front. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Embassy and ConGen HCMC will follow up with closer 
examinations of the new Politburo and Central Committee. 
 
MARINE