VZCZCXRO2548
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #0782/01 0950636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050636Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1379
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0875
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000782 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KNNP MNUC PARM PHSA PREL VM
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM: PSI ENDORSEMENT UNLIKELY SOON 
 
REF: A. 05 Hanoi 2478; B. State 50811 
 
HANOI 00000782  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Heavy Embassy pressure on the GVN has 
forced the issue of the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) all the way to the Prime Minister's office, where we 
are told the decision has been made to authorize Vietnam's 
participation in PSI-related activities on a case-by-case 
basis, but not to endorse the Statement of Interdiction 
Principles (SOP) at this time.  Most of the GVN's technical 
concerns about PSI have been resolved.  The remaining hurdle 
to endorsement of the SOP is political, and it is too high 
to surmount at this time.  We may, however, be able to 
convince the GVN to send a relatively low-level participant 
to the May 31 meeting in Poland.  End Summary. 
 
Embassy Actions in Support of PSI 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In September 2005, the Ambassador delivered a joint 
demarche on PSI with the Ambassadors and Charges from New 
Zealand, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada 
(Ref. A) to Vice Foreign Minister Le Van Bang.  In January 
2006, he and Australian Ambassador Bill Tweddell again 
demarched the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in March 2006 
the Ambassador delivered a letter to the MFA along with a 
Vietnamese translation of a paper on PSI and the 
International Law of the Sea (given by Ashley Roach from the 
Office of the Legal Advisor at the March 9-12 2005 
conference on the Law of the Sea in Xiamen, China) to 
respond to some of the MFA's earlier objections. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In December 2005, the MFA informed the Embassy that 
the issue of signing on to the SOP had been tasked out by 
the Prime Minister to "relevant agencies" for comment. 
Armed with that information, Embassy officers provided 
separate detailed PSI briefings to deputy director-level GVN 
officials from the Ministries of Trade, Foreign Affairs, 
Defense and Public Security, as well as the General 
Department of Customs, the Communist Party's External 
Relations Commission and the Office of the Government. 
Consideration of PSI in the GVN was suspended, along with 
all other work in Vietnam, for much of the end of January 
and most of February for Lunar New Year celebrations and 
activities.  In March, working-level MFA officials told 
Poloff that the Prime Minister would authorize participation 
in PSI-related activities on a "case by case basis," but 
that endorsement of the SOP is still under review. 
 
MFA Official Delivers Bad News 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On March 31, Poloff delivered Ref B demarche to 
the MFA's Deputy Director General for International 
Organizations Le Hoai Trung.  Trung said that in addition to 
the information in the demarche, he had also received the 
legal paper the Ambassador sent to the MFA regarding PSI and 
the Law of the Sea.  The information, Trung said, will be 
"useful" in the MFA's discussions with other agencies. 
 
¶5. (SBU) "On a purely legal basis," Trung said, "Vietnam is 
beginning to accept that PSI is reasonable."  The MFA has 
advocated endorsing the SOP because the non-binding nature 
of the endorsement and the caveat that endorsement is bound 
by national and international law provide the necessary 
safety valves Vietnam needs.  However, other agencies (he 
did not specify, but we believe the problem is with the 
Ministry of Defense and possibly the Ministry of Public 
Security) are concerned about specific issues of 
implementation, such as the difficulty of stopping a plane 
nonviolently and the technicalities of using force without 
UN sanction or a clear self-defense justification.  Vietnam 
is aware that the PSI is "consistent" with UNSC Resolution 
1540, Trung said, but 1540 does not authorize it.  UN 
Secretary General Annan's statements in favor are positive, 
 
SIPDIS 
but not binding.  "Annan says lots of things the United 
States disagrees with, or ignores.  What makes this one 
different?" he asked. 
 
¶6. (SBU) When Poloff started to answer that Annan's 
endorsement should ease Vietnam's concerns about PSI's 
consistency with UN resolutions, Trung cut him off.  "The 
real problem here is political," he admitted.  Vietnam's 
laws criminalize proliferation and its foreign policy is 
explicitly against it, he noted.  Legal issues can be 
addressed, but the determination of the Prime Minister is 
that endorsing PSI will make Vietnam a part of a group of 
nations that seems to be working outside of existing 
multilateral channels and institutions to characterize 
"other nations" as proliferators.  That said, Vietnam wants 
 
HANOI 00000782  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
to signal its strong support for nonproliferation by 
strengthening its compliance with international 
nonproliferation norms and participating in "appropriate" 
PSI activities "on a case-by-case basis."  However, "PSI is 
a group we are not ready to be a part of right now." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Trung warned that it will not be useful to approach 
the leadership on the issue of the Statement of Interdiction 
Principles again any time soon, and definitely not before 
the 10th National Communist Party Congress scheduled for 
April 18-25.  The MFA attempted to submit a paper on 
Vietnam's opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction to the Party leadership for inclusion in the 
Party Congress' foreign policy document (a guidance paper 
that gives overall direction to Vietnam's foreign policy for 
the next five years), but it was returned with curt 
instructions to "pursue further research with all relevant 
agencies," Trung said.  "That was the Party's way of saying 
`not this, not now,'" he explained. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Vietnam, especially the MFA, is very open-minded 
about PSI and "is not ruling it out forever."  In fact, 
Vietnam has been one of the countries in the region that has 
actively supported PSI's consideration, and has found itself 
"far out in front" of other ASEANs on the subject. 
 
¶9. (SBU) When pressed on the subject of Vietnam's 
participation in the May 31 conference in Poland, Trung said 
that it is possible that Vietnam might be able to consider 
using the "case by case basis" authorization of the Prime 
Minister, but participation would be at "a relatively low 
level" and cannot be considered before the end of the Party 
Congress.  Trung promised to review the issue with us again 
at the end of April, after the Congress finishes. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Vietnam does not now have the consensus among its 
agencies and leaders that it needs to endorse the SOP.  In 
advance of the Party Congress, no one is going to take 
risks, and advocating PSI is a risk at this point.  We 
expect the Party Congress to provide a mostly new leadership 
slate, including a new PM and new Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and possibly Defense, and we will raise PSI with 
them as soon as we can.  Attendance in Poland, though, 
remains a very long shot. 
 
MARINE