This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

250303Z Apr 06

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002916 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO PTER XF JO
SUBJECT: Sandia Workshop Works to Lower Bioterrorism Risks, 
Raise Awareness 
 
 
¶1.  Summary: An April 11-13 workshop sponsored by Sandia 
National Lab gathered thirty Middle Eastern lab scientists 
in Amman to discuss biosafety and biosecurity risks and risk 
reduction strategies at health and agricultural biology 
labs.  Expert speakers outlined best practices for lowering 
risk of spreading toxins and pathogens by either deliberate 
theft for bioterrorism or by routine human error.  End 
summary. 
 
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Biological Dangers Still on Page One 
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¶2.  With avian flu in today's headlines, and SARS and 
anthrax still vivid memories, the timing for this workshop, 
and its target audience, could not have been better.  The 
workshop covered both biosecurity and biosafety, and the 
difference in the terms was one of the first topics of 
discussion. 
 
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Biosafety: Avoiding Spreading Disease by Mistake 
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¶3.  BACKGROUND: Biosafety is the use of appropriate 
equipment, protective gear, materials and techniques to 
prevent inadvertent spread of toxins and pathogens such as 
viruses and bacteria from the laboratory to the public. 
Several times during the SARS outbreak, lab researchers 
infected themselves, and in some cases their colleagues, 
health workers and family members, because of faulty lab 
procedures.  That occurred during a time of peak awareness 
and scrutiny; mistakes are more likely to occur when the 
pressure is off and people are paying less attention. 
 
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Biosecurity: Keeping Dangerous Items Out of the Wrong Hands 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶4.  Biosecurity is a newer term, coined to describe the safe 
management and physical protection of lab materials to 
prevent theft and other deliberately malicious acts.  This 
is not a theoretical threat; recent examples include the 
anthrax letters in the United States in 2001 and the use of 
sarin in the Tokyo subway system.  The origins of the 
anthrax used in the famous "white powder" letters to 
politicians and journalists are still not determined, but 
that incident and the lack of management tools for 
biohazardous materials was the impetus to create biosecurity 
in American labs. 
 
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Labs as a Source of Materials for Bioterrorists 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5.  Unsecured labs working with biological pathogens 
represent low-hanging fruit for bioterrorists.  Biohazardous 
materials in the lab are normally labeled and can be found 
in suitable form and quantity for use in a bioterrorist 
activity.  The lab is thus an inviting target for theft or 
other malicious acts.  With the biohazardous substance in 
hand, the would-be bioterrorist can inflict direct harm, 
disrupt an economy, deny use of facilities, raise public 
levels of anxiety, or threaten any of the above.  END 
BACKGROUND. 
 
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Workshop Reviewed, Discussed Current Practices 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6.  At the Amman workshop, biosecurity specialists from 
Sandia, State, the UK's Ministry of Defense and the private 
sector reviewed best practices for safe and secure 
laboratory operations.  Specialists also discussed laws and 
regulations on management and transportation of toxins and 
biohazardous substances.  Much time was spent discussing 
incident response: what to do if an accident, theft or 
release occurs.  Biohazardous substances include such 
organisms as plague, ebola, botulism, smallpox, and HIV. 
Not all substances in a lab are equally dangerous; part of a 
biosafety/biosecurity program is to assess the risk at 
individual sites and use the appropriate level of safety and 
security on them. 
 
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Opportunities, Desire for Further Activities 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶7.  In addition to classroom-style learning, the three-day 
workshop included many opportunities for discussion.  USG 
participants summarized the discussions at the workshop as 
being very candid.  The quality of laboratory practices 
varied widely.  Participants frequently expressed their 
appreciation for the discussions and their interest in 
further training, visits to their labs, and consulting. 
Some noted specific practices they learned during this 
workshop as "take-home" lessons to apply at their own labs. 
Others said they were "overwhelmed" with the amount of 
information presented, and would need time to assimilate it 
all. 
 
¶8.  Some participants noted the lack of policy-level 
engagement on these issues, and were skeptical about what 
could be changed in the absence of that engagement.  All of 
the participants, however, agreed that forming a regional 
biosafety/biosecurity society, as either a stand-alone 
organization or part of an already established one, was an 
important step. 
 
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Participants from 13 Countries 
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¶9.  Participants came from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, 
Morocco, Libya, Turkey, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and Lebanon.  Participants from the Palestinian 
Authority were un-invited by the hosting organization the 
Cooperative Monitoring Center - Amman at the request of 
Sandia in keeping with current USG policy on contact with 
the Palestinian Authority. 
 
¶10.  Comment: Given the relevance of the topic and the solid 
foundation laid by this workshop, follow-up activities would 
be productive.  Support from within the region for these 
activities is strong.  Supporting development of a regional 
biosafety association would be a good next step. 
 
¶11.  The U.S. delegation attending the workshop cleared this 
message in substance. 
 
HALE