VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1226/01 0951305
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051305Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4782
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0300
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2025
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS ALMATY 001226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE), ISN 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ENRG KSCA PARM KNNP ETTC IN KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S REACTION TO NSG DISCUSSION OF INDIA 
NUCLEAR INITIATIVE 
 
REF: A) VIENNA 248, B) STATE 42857 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Kazakhstan is open to further discussion 
of the India civil nuclear initiative, but is skeptical that 
the Nuclear Suppliers' Group will be able to reach consensus 
in the near future.  India needs to provide much more 
information about the nature of its obligations and what is 
being done to meet them.  The Kazakhstani delegation to the 
recent NSG meeting came away with the impression that any 
"exception" adopted by the NSG would apply only to the U.S. 
and possibly a few other major suppliers, preventing 
countries like Kazakhstan from cooperating with India.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In an April 4 meeting with POEC chief in Astana, 
MFA security affairs deputy director Sergey Savelyev shared 
Kazakhstan's impressions of the March 23 Consultative Group 
(CG) discussion of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
Initiative.  Savelyev, who attended the CG, said that he 
found A/S Rademaker's presentation very informative and 
thought-provoking.  Noting the number of detailed questions 
raised by Participating Governments (PGs), Savelyev said 
that his own discussions "in the corridors" revealed 
widespread concern about the possible impact of the 
initiative on the existing nonproliferation legal framework 
(including the 1995 RevCon conclusions), as well as the 
likely reaction of the DPRK and Iran. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Kazakhstan's approach was more "flexible" than that 
of some other PGs, Savelyev said.  It is open to further 
discussion of the initiative.  The Kazakhstani delegation 
had raised a few key questions (Ref A); the main concern was 
how the initiative would be perceived internationally.  Due 
to the number of questions raised at the CG, Savelyev 
predicted that the NSG would not be able to achieve 
consensus on the initiative in the near future (i.e. by the 
upcoming Plenary Session in Rio).  He thought the U.S. would 
have to engage quite intensively with the most skeptical 
delegations, such as China and the Nordics, before consensus 
would be possible.  Savelyev included Japan in the list of 
countries opposed to the initiative.   The challenge might 
not be insurmountable, Savelyev said, but "much more 
information is needed." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Savelyev complained that the Indian plan for 
separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs was 
circulated too late to allow careful review during the CG. 
Having now read the document carefully, he believes it lacks 
sufficient detail regarding India's obligations.  As an 
example, he referred to the statement that India had adopted 
export control rules/lists meeting NSG and MTCR 
requirements.  What information was available to 
substantiate the claim?  Had the rules/lists been shared 
with the international community?  Savelyev contrasted what 
he termed the lack of transparency vis--vis India with 
Kazakhstan's experience of developing its export controls in 
close coordination with Western partners and maintaining a 
continual dialogue. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Savelyev asked for clarification of a comment by 
A/S Rademaker during the CG which gave the impression that 
only the U.S., and possibly other "major suppliers," would 
be able to use the NSG exception to engage in civil nuclear 
cooperation with India.  Savelyev indicated that many 
delegations had come away with this impression.  Ireland had 
openly voiced the concern that the U.S., Russia, and France 
would dominate the market, he said. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Savelyev also asked whether there was any truth to 
reports that Pakistan had prepared documents regarding its 
own adherence to NSG and MTCR rules in hopes of being 
included in the initiative. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment:  When Kazakhstan talks about 
"international perceptions" of the initiative, it is 
undoubtedly referring to the positions of its powerful 
neighbors Russia and China.  The GOK is presumably under 
pressure from Russia to support the initiative and from 
China to oppose it.  It is also a member of the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), where it would face 
criticism if it supported an initiative seen as harmful to 
Pakistan's interests.  As a firm supporter of the 
international nonproliferation framework, which at the same 
 
time possesses vast uranium reserves that it could 
profitably export to India, Kazakhstan will likely remain on 
the fence until the situation develops further.  End 
comment. 
 
ORDWAY