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Viewing cable 06AITTAIPEI1303, MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06AITTAIPEI1303 2006-04-13 08:03 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1303/01 1030803
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130803Z APR 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9690
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5059
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6252
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001303 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC BARBORIAK 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
 
1. Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
coverage April 13 on the corruption scandals surrounding former 
Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General Chen Che-nan; the 
opposition parties' veto of President Chen Shui-bian's nomination of 
Hsieh Wen-ting as the state public prosecutor-general Tuesday; and 
the upcoming economic forum between the KMT and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).  The pro-unification "United Daily News" ran 
a banner headline on its front page that read: "Taiwan Does Not 
Exclude the Possibility of Unilaterally Opening [to Beijing] 
Taiwan's Tourism [Market] and Cross-Strait Charter Flight 
[Business]."  The sub-headline added: "On the Eve of KMT-CCP 
Economic Forum, the Mainland Affairs Council [Says It] Hopes to 
Complete Negotiations [with China] in Six Months.  Speaking of 
Cross-Strait Policies, Premier Su Says Whatever Needs to Be Done 
Should Be Done and [Taiwan] Needs Not Subject Itself to Others." 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, ran a 
news story on its front page with the headline: "China Uses 
Taiwan-made Numerical Control Machines to Produce [the Critical 
Spare Parts] for Weapons [Used Against the Island]."  The 
pro-independence "Taiwan Daily," on the other hand, ran a front-page 
headline news story that said "Three U.S. Aircraft Carriers to Hold 
Exercises off Guam in June." 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an article in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" and a commentary in the 
pro-unification "United Daily News" both discussed the notion of 
"one China with each side having its own interpretation."  The two 
articles agreed that since Beijing already said it is willing to 
return to the "1992 Consensus," it means that it is interested in 
resuming talks with Taiwan on the basis of "one China with different 
interpretations."  A commentary in the limited-circulation, 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times," however, 
criticized the KMT-CCP economic forum by calling it a "saboteur's 
dreamland" that intends to isolate the Chen Shui-bian 
administration.  End summary. 
 
A) "The KMT Does Not Know What It Is Fighting for" 
 
KMT Central Committee Member Chang Si-kang opined in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 500,000] (4/13): 
 
"... The [future] portrait of cross-Strait relations revealed in the 
meeting between [President] Chen Shui-bian and [KMT Chairman] Ma 
Ying-jeou [last week] will have a tugging influence on the United 
States and China.  As Taipei has started to 'define' cross-Strait 
relations, the roadmap of the triangular relationships between 
Washington, Beijing and Taipei will very likely develop in the way 
Taipei depicted.  President Chen said he hopes Beijing would 
recognize the notion of 'one China with each side having its own 
interpretation,' but did he not know that the essence of the '1992 
Consensus' is exactly 'one China with each side having its own 
interpretation'?  Since Beijing already said it is willing to return 
to the '1992 Consensus,' how can it be not aware of the contents of 
the consensus?  Chen's remarks only showed that in his heart, he 
simply resisted the cross-Strait talks 'out of spite.' ..." 
 
B) "'One China with Different Interpretations?'  A-bian Throws out a 
Ball; Is Hu Jintao Going to Catch It Or Not?" 
 
Lee Yun-chieh, a professor at National Open University, opined in 
the pro-unification: United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] 
(4/13): 
 
"... To ask the Beijing authorities to reply 'whether the 1992 
Consensus means one China with different interpretations' is 
actually asking Beijing 'how it views the Republic of China.' ... 
 
"PFP Chairman James Soong signed a six-point conference communiqu 
with Chinese President Hu Jintao May 12 2005.  The first of the 
six-point communiqu, which was tagged with the theme of 'urging 
[both sides of the Taiwan Strait] to resume talks on an equal 
footing based on the 1992 Consensus,' listed the original texts 
verbally used by Taiwan's  Straits Exchange Foundation and China's 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, respectively, in 
1992.  Judging against the backdrop that Soong started his 'bridging 
journey' to China carrying with him the ten-point consensus he 
reached with President Chen Shui-bian [in February 2005], [it seemed 
evident that] these texts showed  Beijing was willing to engage in 
cross-Strait talks with the Bian administration on the basis of the 
notion of 'one China with different interpretations.'  [We] can thus 
say that Beijing's attitude then had entered the stage of indirectly 
recognizing the Republic of China.  It is a pity that Chen regretted 
and denied afterwards [his consensus with Soong], and as a result, 
the cross-Strait impasse still continued until now. ... 
 
"... China suspected that the Green camp would interpret the one 
China as Taiwan independence.  In particular, in the wake of Chen's 
manipulation of issues such as the 'cessation of the National 
Unification Council' and 'Constitutionally one Taiwan', it will be 
even more difficult for Hu to give a positive response to Chen's 
call. ..." 
 
C) "KMT-CCP Forum Is a Saboteur's Dreamland" 
 
Liu Kuan-teh, a political commentator based in Taipei, commented in 
the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (4/12): 
 
"... The timing of this year's KMT-CCP forum is politically 
calculated and should be seen as part of Beijing's 'divide and 
conquer' strategy to isolate the administration of President Chen 
Shui-bian.  It provides Hu [Jintao] with a means of blaming the 
current cross-strait impasse on Chen when Hu meets Bush. ... 
Utilizing Taiwan's domestic politics is the core of Beijing's 
underhand strategy.  However, it is the KMT's willingness to dance 
to China's tune that reinforces Beijing's capacity to ignore the 
Chen administration.  It is also clear that Hu will use the example 
of the KMT-CCP talks to convince his US counterpart that Chen and 
the DPP are the major obstacles toward cross-strait dialogue. 
 
"Beijing's philosophy of 'uniting with the lesser enemy to oppose 
the main enemy' fits with the KMT's goal and Lien's personal desire 
to open the door to China.  Nevertheless, the KMT and Lien's scheme 
runs the risk of sabotaging the national interest, national 
security, sovereignty and dignity. ...  It is of utmost importance 
that members of the international community, especially our friends 
in the US, are able to decipher Beijing's strategy and demand an 
equal and peaceful negotiation between China and Taiwan." 
 
YOUNG