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Viewing cable 06ABUJA792, SUDAN: RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN AND CHAD DEMARCHES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ABUJA792 2006-04-17 10:35 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
VZCZCXRO4960
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHUJA #0792 1071035
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171035Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5186
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 3785
UNCLAS ABUJA 000792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI CD
SUBJECT: SUDAN: RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN AND CHAD DEMARCHES 
 
REF: A. STATE 59821 
 
     B. STATE 60228 
 
 1.  (SBU)   Summary:  Khartoum CDA Hume carried out ref A 
instructions on humanitarian administration concerns in Sudan 
with Vice President Ali Osman Taha at his Abuja hotel suite 
on April 15.  As Hume went through each of the five demarche 
points, Taha listened without comment except to interject 
that reaction to the NGO legislation seems a bit precipitous 
since the law is yet to be implemented.  CDA Hume also raised 
the issue of Chad with Taha.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Taha's initial overall comment was that if we 
succeed in getting things figured out here at the Darfur 
talks, all the concerns will be resolved.  He added that he 
hoped the enhanced cease-fire document (being worked in small 
committee with the parties, AU Mediation, and USDEL) could be 
resolved on April 15.  This would mean that the parties 
postpone major points which comprise the meat of the overall 
security arrangements text but permit putting the entire 
document on the table.  Taha said he was planning to return 
to Khartoum if the cease-fire document is not soon ready and 
would return when needed. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Regarding the five demarche points, Taha said he 
would have the Governor of South Darfur get in touch with us 
to explain the situation with the fuel deliveries and the 
Norwegian refugee organization.  Hume reminded Taha that 
Deputy Secretary Zoellick had taken up the issue with him 
last November and that correct management of Kalma camp was 
important to the USG. 
 
4.  (SBU)  On the NGO legislation, Taha complained mildly 
that the NGOs were conducting a psychological campaign 
against it even before it was promulgated.  He acknowledged 
that the GOS had to be sensitive to NGO needs but they in 
return should be sensitive to GOS realities and be patient. 
Some of the provisions of the law were to fulfill commitments 
to the international community such as prevention of money 
laundering.  Taha also wondered why the NGOs could not 
cooperate more directly with the GOS Humanitarian Relief 
Ministry, which in many areas had congruent responsibilities 
and interests.  In any case, he said, "let us agree to a 
liberal interpretation".  CDA Hume said Embassy Khartoum 
would pursue the issue with the Ministries in Khartoum. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Taha said he would look into the issues related to 
the Status of Forces Agreement when he returned to Khartoum. 
 
6.  (SBU)  He also committed to take up the visa issue with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to see what are the real 
problems. 
 
- - - 
CHAD 
- - - 
 
7.  (SBU)  CDA Hume raised the issue of Chad on April 10 and 
again on April 15.  On April 10, Taha said that a Darfur 
peace agreement in Abuja would resolve the Chadian issue.  On 
April 15, CDA Hume explained that he had no specific 
instructions to raise the issue, he would be remiss in not 
bringing it up.  Hume said that no matter what the realities 
of the situation are, or would be in coming days, they 
inevitably would include implications and criticism for 
Sudan.  Hume repeated and reinforced the point he had made in 
previous meetings with Taha about the need to absolutely 
assure the safety of the Darfur refugees in camps along the 
Chad border.  He said that it would be inconceivable that the 
USG would be silent about the matter.  The Vice President 
acknowledged that some of the rebels had moved to Chad from 
Sudan but that there had been no contact with them since. 
Even though "not involved", however, Taha did end by saying 
it was in the Government of Sudan's interest to have things 
under control. 
 
8.  (SBU)  The meeting ended with Taha expressing his hope 
that Hume would go to the Chida Hotel and successfully work 
the cease-fire document so he could have a reason to stay 
longer. 
CAMPBELL