VZCZCXRO2752
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHUJA #0737/01 0951035
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051035Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5110
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 3733

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000737 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: CEASE-FIRE TEXT AS STEPPING 
STONE OR STUMBLING BLOCK? 
 
REF: ABUJA 792 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  The African Union Mediation presented 
the revised cease-fire document to international partners on 
April 4, hoping it will become a stepping stone to the final 
agreement.  AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok stated that the 
document could build momentum for the AU to table other 
elements of the comprehensive peace agreement by mid-month. 
He explained that the AU mediation was "deliberately not" 
tabling the power and wealth-sharing documents until it could 
assess how the parties consider the revised text.  In what 
could be a turning point in the talks, if agreed upon, the 
GOS could use the text to prevent a UN transition from 
occurring by arguing that the cease-fire and AMIS are 
sufficient.  If it is not agreed upon, the cease-fire 
document could lead to a blockage in the talks.  The AU wants 
to use the April 8 mini-summit of heads of state to press the 
parties to modify their positions on other issues.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The AU Mediation Team met with the international 
partners late evening April 4 to present the revised 
cease-fire document.  AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok explained 
that the AU hoped that the cease-fire document would build 
momentum for accomplishing the rest of the comprehensive 
agreement by the end of April.  According to Ibok, the AU 
deliberately decided not to table the power and 
wealth-sharing elements of the comprehensive agreement.  He 
explained that the AU security team resource persons felt the 
movements still do not understand key elements of the 
security arrangements, such as DDR and integration, and 
advised the AU to move incrementally.  As a result, he said 
that the AU mediation decided not to confuse the situation by 
having too many elements on the table at the same time. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The AU believes it can get agreement on the 
cease-fire and then, Ibok promised, however, that the 
mediation is "increasingly coming to a position to table all 
proposals soon".  He said that the mediation will work with 
the parties on the cease-fire for a week and that the AU 
already has worked on text for the final security 
arrangements, which include DDR and integration.  Ibok said 
that the mediation hoped to have the comprehensive package 
(power, wealth, and security) on the table by mid-April. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Alex de Waal, an AU resource person on the 
security arrangements team, reviewed the document.  Based on 
meetings with the parties, he said that the GOS can accept 
the document and it is "a good deal" for the movements. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of issues over which there is 
significant disagreement: the timing of verification of 
positions, GOS insistence on reciprocal withdrawal of 
movements to redeployment zones before it neutralizes the 
janjaweed, the GOS insertion of provision which allows it to 
suspend parts of the agreement to defend its borders, 
policing of the IDP camps, a GOS-inserted provision for 
recognition of historic nomadic routes, and increased 
responsibilities for AMIS.  The GOS also will likely object 
to a provision giving the cease-fire agreement primacy over 
the N'Djamena Accord. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  USDEL emphasized the importance of the cease-fire 
document drawing the process forward.  The parties must see a 
common future and if the AU sees that the cease-fire document 
as widening the gap between the parties, it needs to get the 
other elements of the comprehensive deal on the table 
immediately.  The movements, for example, will be hesitant to 
accept the document without knowing their future status, 
particularly conditions for disarmament and integration.  The 
partners are fully supportive of the AU efforts, but cannot 
place the maximum amount of pressure on the parties without 
all the elements of the comprehensive deal in play. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
COMINGS AND GOINGS 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  AU Special Envoy Salim will brief members of the 
AU Peace and Security Council this week and then return to 
Abuja for the heads of state meeting.  He will then proceed 
to New York to brief members of the United Nations Security 
Council.  We are being told that Sudanese Vice President Ali 
Osman Taha will be arriving in Abuja on/about April 6 for six 
days.  Ibok hoped the heads of state would give momentum to 
the process by pressing the parties to modify some of their 
positions. 
 
 
ABUJA 00000737  002 OF 002 
 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The mediation views the cease-fire document, which 
it expects to put it to the parties on April 6, as a stepping 
stone to tabling the other elements of the peace deal.  The 
risk of this approach, however, is significant, particularly 
if the cease-fire is used by the Government of Sudan to keep 
the UN out of Darfur and prevents agreement on a 
comprehensive peace deal.  Wrangling over the cease-fire text 
without the full package in play could bog down the talks 
altogether.  The AU said it will see how the parties react to 
the revised cease-fire over the next few days and then decide 
whether to put the rest of the comprehensive deal on the 
table.  During today's session for international partners to 
provide their comments, USDEL will fully support the AU's 
efforts.  We will press the mediation to move forward quickly 
if the parties get bogged down or refuse to accept the 
cease-fire without knowing the details of the final security, 
power, and wealth-sharing arrangements. 
CAMPBELL