VZCZCXRO4867
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0618/01 0872052
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 282052Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8491
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0309
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0764
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0849
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0627
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1003
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0625
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0205
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0176
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0772
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0417
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0137
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0583
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0789
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 8768
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0875
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 000618 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: A STEP CLOSER TO TRANSITION: WITH UNSCR 1663 
PASSAGE, SYG CAN REACH OUT TO NATO 
 
REF: A. 03/21/2006 USUN E-MAIL 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 045066 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000618  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY. Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sudan Jan Pronk's March 21 
 
SIPDIS 
briefing to the Security Council revealed persistent 
divisions among Members on the prospect of African Union 
Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) transition and imposition of 
targeted sanctions.  Members spoke to the need to address 
problems created by the presence of the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) in southern Sudan.  The UK raised the possibility 
of a Council visit to Sudan, which was well-received.  After 
protracted debate between USUN and the French delegation over 
how to characterize AMIS transition in the draft text, the 
Council unanimously adopted resolution 1663 on March 27; text 
in Paragraph 13.  OP6 of the resolution provides for the SYG 
to reach out to 'international and regional organizations,' 
something which the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) has indicated Annan is 'bullish' to do.  However, the 
other P-5 delegations, in spite of their rhetoric that 
something must be done on Darfur, are still on the whole 
unwilling to act expeditiously, and the process of AMIS 
transition, at least in New York, is forced to follow suit. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
PRONK STRESSES DARFUR PEACE AND PROTECTION THROUGH ABUJA 
AGREEMENT, NEW CEASEFIRE AND ROBUST FORCE 
 
¶2. (SBU) SRSG Pronk's March 21 presentation to the UN 
Security Council (ref A) focused on Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) implementation and the Darfur situation. 
Pronk stressed the need for 'enlightened leadership,' as 
demonstrated by President El Bashir in his speech in Juba, to 
further CPA progress and to ensure that southern Sudan would 
get its share of the peace dividend.  Pronk lamented 
continued problems in Abyei, including violent clashes 
between rival factions and Government of National Unity's 
(GNU) obstruction of UNMIS' freedom of movement.  Pronk 
remained concerned about Eastern Sudan stability.  He 
acknowledged that the LRA posed a regional threat but that 
UNMIS, with its Chapter VI mandate, lacked the troops and 
weapons to appropriately address this threat.  Pronk cited 
lack of trust between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) and the GNU as the main obstacle to their cooperation 
with the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (MONUC) in tackling the LRA.  Pronk also made a 
bid for an augmented role for UNMIS in disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) to address insecurity 
in the South;  DPKO offered a paragraph (OP9), tweaked 
considerably by the Japanese Mission, for incorporation in 
UNSCR 1663 (2006). 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Pronk identified two goals with regard to Darfur: 
peace between factions and protection of unarmed civilians. 
Reaching these goals, according to Pronk, would require swift 
agreement in Abuja, followed by Darfur-Darfur dialogue; a 
comprehensive ceasefire agreement, buffeted by 'unequivocal' 
sanctions language; and a robust, large, strong, omnipresent 
peace force.  Pronk made note of the 'carefully orchestrated' 
public information campaign unleashed by the GNU against a UN 
Darfur presence, noting in particular the notion that Darfur 
would become another Iraq (NOTE. DPKO cites this rhetoric as 
the main obstacle to its planned assessment mission, which is 
envisaged for April but which is off to a slow start - the UN 
has not yet requested visas from the GNU.  END NOTE).  Pronk 
stressed the need for consultations as soon as possible with 
the GNU to correct these misperceptions, adding that the 
international community's delay in doing so had resulted in 
Khartoum's resentment.  Pronk declared that the 'UN was good 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000618  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
for Sudan,' given its status as the chief world organization 
to facilitate decolonization and to guarantee national 
sovereignty.  Pronk opposed the attaching of preconditions to 
AMIS transition, noting they could be used as stall tactics 
by those parties seeking to postpone the peace process. 
 
 
DIVISIONS REMAIN ON AMIS TRANSITION AND SANCTIONS 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ambassador Bolton raised concerns over the potential 
implications of decelerating the UN's contingency planning 
process for AMIS transition, citing the need for the Council 
to look beyond the qualifications contained in the AU PSC 
March 10 Communique and to focus on its decision instead.  He 
stressed the need for GNU to accept DPKO's assessment team. 
Ambassador Bolton urged Council Members to support a 
broadening of the AU's March 10 decision in order to enhance 
the re-hatting effort.  He addressed Pronk's concerns over 
possible UNMIS 'cannibalization' by explaining that incoming 
military elements should take advantage of logistic and 
administrative capabilities with a view to maximizing 
efficiency and expanding UNMIS' footprint in Sudan. 
 
¶5. (SBU) China, Qatar and Russia continued to insist on 
preconditions for AMIS transition to a UN operation, with 
China going so far as to disregard the AU PSC March 10 
decision and to requst that the AU make a formal decision on 
transition for eventual presentation to the Council.  In 
addition to a formal AU decision, China considers GNU consent 
an equally 'irreplaceable precondition' for AMIS transition. 
Russian DPR Dolgov added that the SC must ensure the AU's 
April 30 deadline for a peace agreement in Abuja, noting that 
parties there had responded favorably to the idea of an 
enhanced ceasefire.  Dolgov, like the Chinese delegate, noted 
the need for contingency planning but stressed the key 
importance of a peace agreement and of GNU voluntary consent 
and cooperation for any activities of UN peacekeepers. 
Qatari PR Al-Nasser was quick to jump on this bandwagon, 
saying a transition would be effective only with GNU 'consent 
and blessing.'  He urged the international community to 
cooperate with the GNU toward a comprehensive peace in Sudan 
and to provide financial support to AMIS until any transition 
is completed. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Other Members were more forward-leaning in their 
thinking on the transition.  UK PR Jones Parry insisted on a 
concept of operations from DPKO by the end of March. 
Peruvian PR de Rivero noted that achieving peace in Abuja 
could take a prohibitively long time and added that 
protection of civilians could not be accordingly deferred, 
citing the possibility that the Council would encounter a 
'pre-Dayton, ex-Yugoslavia syndrome.'  De Rivero declared 
that regardless of the outcome in Abuja, 'nothing could 
replace the need to plan and deploy a UN force with a robust 
mandate.'  He further stressed that the GNU, which could not 
protect its own population, should be convinced to desist in 
its resistance to a UN force in Darfur. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Greek PR Vassilakis and Slovakian PR Burian urged 
expeditious AMIS transition planning, and Tanzanian PR Mahiga 
suggested formation of a subcommittee to enhance AMIS during 
the transition (NOTE. Mahiga also supported the idea of 
formation of a 'Group of Friends of Abuja,' with the UK at 
the helm.  END NOTE).  Danish PR Loj urged an assessment 
mission be dispatched as soon as possible and urged GNU 
cooperation to this end.  The Congolese delegate observed 
that the slow pace of Abuja negotiations was prolonging 
Darfur suffering.  While Congo acknowledged that GNU 
agreement was 'vital' to the success of an eventual UN Darfur 
mission, it pointed out that without active GNU participation 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000618  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
in the transition, the international community would become 
increasingly 'mobilized' to act in the interest of protection 
of civilians.  Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng reiterated his 
delegation's support for transition and hope for AU-UN 
cooperation, particularly in the form of an assessment 
mission. He recommended an aggressive public relations 
campaign against GNU propaganda. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Responding to vocal calls from several Members (UK, 
Greece, Denmark, Ghana, Japan) on the need to follow up on 
UNSCR 1591 (2005) with limited targeted sanctions to maintain 
Council credibility and to induce Abuja parties to reach a 
settlement, Qatari PR inquired as to the relative use such 
measures could be in effecting Darfur peace.  China 
reiterated its 'cautious' position on sanctions.  SRSG Pronk 
spoke in favor of sanctions pursuant to 1591 but recommended 
that the Council designate individuals from the middle of the 
list of names, rather than those at either extreme, in order 
to demonstrate greater flexibility and realism. 
 
 
MEMBERS ON CPA IMPLEMENTATION, LRA AND SC VISIT 
 
¶9. (SBU) Chinese, Russian and Qatari delegates jumped on the 
positive steps SRSG Pronk highlighted on progress in CPA 
implementation, and the Tanzanian PR seconded Pronk's 
characterization of President El Bashir's trip to Juba and 
Rumbek as an example of 'enlightened leadership.'  The 
Japanese and Slovakian representatives stressed the need to 
establish remaining CPA institutions as stipulated, 
especially security mechanisms, and the Ghanaian PR remarked 
that delay on creation of security institutions was producing 
an attitude of mistrust between the National Congree Party 
and SPLM.  UK PR Jones Parry wanted to see more movement on 
implementing boundary decisions.  The Chinese rep said it was 
a 'crucial moment' for the implementation of DDR and refugee 
return.  Both the Chinese and the Danish delegates urged 
donors to live up to their Oslo pledges to create a peace 
dividend in south, as the Government of Japan had done, 
dispersing $80 million (80 percent of its Oslo pledge). 
 
¶10. (SBU) The UK and Tanzanian PRs led the charge for the UN 
to follow up on UNSCR 1653 (2006) and present the Council 
with a briefing on how MONUC and UNMIS could cooperate to 
combat the LRA problem in southern Sudan; a briefing was 
subsequently scheduled for March 29.  Danish PR Loj asked 
about GNU willingness to address long-run possibilities on 
the LRA issue, including cooperating with the ICC; Pronk 
confirmed GNU willingness in this regard. 
 
¶11. (SBU) UK PR Jones Parry raised the possibility of a 
Council visit to Sudan, a proposal subsequently endorsed by 
the majority of Members.  Pronk said any Council trip to 
Darfur would have to be done soon in order to be effective. 
Such a visit, according to Pronk, could be used to allay GNU 
fears that transition would result in infringement on 
Sudanese sovereignty and to correct misperceptions, including 
the idea that a UN deployment would be a repeat of the 
invasion of Iraq and that the UN was 'paving the way' for a 
NATO deployment.  To this end Pronk also urged increased 
bilateral consultations with the GNU. 
 
 
UNSCR 1663 (2006) 
 
¶12. (SBU) After much negotiation on the draft text (ref B), 
the Council adopted a resolution to renew UNMIS' mandate and 
to provide for the SYG to reach out to 'international and 
regional organizations' for assistance to AMIS during 
transition to a UN operation.  The French remain indignant 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000618  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
that the transition not be portrayed as a done deal in any 
Council text, largely to protect their own interests in Cote 
D'Ivoire and the DRC and to avoid a financial burden in 
Sudan.  The Russians and Chinese continue to insist that a 
final signal from the AU is necessary before transition can 
be formally mandated and maintain their stance the GNU must 
offer its consent and approval in this regard.  The other P-5 
delegations, in spite of their rhetoric that something must 
be done in Darfur, are still on the whole unwilling to act 
expeditiously, and the process of AMIS transition, at least 
in New York, is forced to follow suit. 
 
¶13. (U) Begin 1663 text: 
The Security Council, 
 
Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolution 
1627 (2005) and 1653 (2006), and statements of its President, 
in particular that of 3 February 2006 (S/PRST/2006/5), 
concerning the situation in the Sudan, 
 
Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, 
independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan, 
 
Welcoming implementation by the parties of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, and urging them to meet 
their commitments, 
 
Acknowledging the commitments by troop-contributing countries 
in support of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan 
(UNMIS), and encouraging deployment in order for UNMIS to 
support timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, 
 
Reiterating in the strongest terms the need for all parties 
to the conflict in Darfur to put an end to the violence and 
atrocities, 
 
Stressing the importance of urgently reaching a successful 
conclusion of the Abuja Talks and calling on the parties to 
conclude a peace agreement as soon as possible, 
 
Welcoming the Communique of the 46th meeting of the African 
Union Peace and Security Council of 10 March 2006, and its 
decision to support in principle the transition of the 
African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to a United Nations 
operation within the framework of partnership between the 
African Union and the United Nations in the promotion of 
peace, security and stability in Africa, to pursue the 
conclusion of a peace agreement on Darfur by the end of April 
2006, and to extend the mandate of AMIS until 30 September 
2006, 
 
Expressing its deep concern at the movement of arms and armed 
groups across borders such as the long running and brutal 
insurgency by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which has 
caused the death, abduction and displacement of many innocent 
civilians in the Sudan, 
 
Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security, 
 
Decides to extend the mandate of UNMIS until 24 September 
2006, with the intention to renew it for further periods; 
 
Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every 
three months on the implementation of the mandate of UNMIS; 
 
Reiterates its request in paragraph 2 of resolution 1590 
(2005) that UNMIS closely and continuously liaise and 
coordinate at all levels with AMIS, and urges it to intensify 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000618  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
its efforts in this regard; 
 
Requests that the Secretary-General, jointly with the African 
Union, in close and continuing consultations with the 
Security Council, and in cooperation and close consultation 
with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, including the 
Government of National Unity, expedite the necessary 
preparatory planning for transition of AMIS to a United 
Nations operation, including options for how UNMIS can 
reinforce the effort for peace in Darfur through additional 
appropriate transitional assistance to AMIS, including 
assistance in logistics, mobility and communications, and 
that the Secretary-General present to the Council by 24 April 
2006 for its consideration a range of options for a United 
Nations operation in Darfur; 
 
Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to provide 
maximum possible assistance to AMIS; 
 
Requests the Secretary-General and the African Union to 
consult with international and regional organizations and 
member states to identify resources to support AMIS during 
transition to a United Nations operation; 
 
Strongly condemns the activities of militias and armed groups 
such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which continue to 
attach civilians and commit human rights abuses in the Sudan; 
and urges in this regard UNMIS to make full use of its 
current mandate and capabilities; 
 
Recalls resolution 1653 (2006) and its request that the 
Secretary-General make recommendations to the Council; and 
 
SIPDIS 
looks forward to receiving by 24 April 2006 these 
recommendations which would include proposals on how United 
Nations agencies and missions, in particular UNMIS, could 
more effectively address the problem of the LRA; 
 
Encourages the Sudanese parties to finalize the establishment 
of national institutions for disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), as stipulated in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and to expedite the 
development of a comprehensive DDR programme, with the 
assistance of UNMIS as provided in resolution 1590 (2005); 
 
Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
 
¶14. (U) End 1663 text. 
BOLTON