Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06TOKYO1692, DUSTR BHATIA IN TOKYO: SURVEYS THE RELATIONSHIP

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06TOKYO1692.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO1692 2006-03-30 07:53 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO6651
PP RUEHCN
DE RUEHKO #1692/01 0890753
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300753Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0350
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSS/OECD POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5415
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5422
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8048
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8572
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6599
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2804
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001692 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLEASE PASS AUSTR CUTLER 
PLEASE PASS USDA FOR U/S PENN 
PLEASE PASS FAS FOR TERPSTRA 
GENEVA FOR USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EAGR PREL ECON JA
SUBJECT: DUSTR BHATIA IN TOKYO: SURVEYS THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
TOKYO 00001692  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
SESITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
1.   (SBU) Japan is a key partner for the United States in 
its overall trade policy, and both countries need to do more 
to deepen the relationship in coming months.  That is how 
Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan Bhatia underscored the 
importance to the United States of Japan and the region 
during meetings in Tokyo March 20.  He described the priority 
the United States attaches to establishing deeper regional 
economic integration, pointing to the FTA negotiations 
Washington has launched with Korea and Malaysia.  He and his 
Japanese hosts at the Prime Minister's Office, and the 
Foreign, Trade, and Agriculture ministries, agreed to work 
hard to advance the bilateral partnership in coming months as 
Japan selects a new Prime Minister.  Bhatia reminded all 
parties, however, it will be hard to proceed as long as 
Japan,s market remains closed to U.S. beef.  Bhatia 
underscored the urgency of reaching a successful conclusion 
of the Doha trade round, and called on Japan to cooperate on 
WTO cases Washington is considering filing against China. 
End summary. 
 
Bilateral Partnership 
--------------------- 
 
2.   (SBU) Notwithstanding the irritant that beef represents 
on overall U.S.-Japan bilateral relations (septel), the 
partnership the two countries have forged over the past five 
years should be reinvigorated in coming months.  Assistant 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyasu Ando told Ambassador Bhatia 
that there were no "serious" economic issues between the two 
countries.  Bhatia agreed that the atmosphere had much 
improved and said that, other than beef, the challenges ahead 
lay more on capitalizing on opportunity rather than 
minimizing problems.  Bhatia said that Japan was our closest 
and largest partner in the region and we should seek to 
"deepen and broaden" the relationship.  The two countries 
should be thinking how to do this, he added, in the context 
of the Prime Minister's visit to the United States 
tentatively set for June. 
 
3.   (SBU) Deputy Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka and Vice 
Trade Minister Kazumasa Kusaka agreed that the relationship 
had progressed smoothly over the past five years and both 
their ministries were looking to identify the best way 
forward.  The departure from office of Prime Minister Koizumi 
by the end of the summer makes it difficult to launch any 
dramatic new initiatives at the moment.  Both governments, 
according to Kusaka, should take advantage of the intervening 
months before the summit in June to study the architecture of 
the relationship over the past five years to assess what 
worked and what did not work.  Although no public statement 
need be made, both sides should develop a common 
understanding on these points.  At the summit, the leaders 
could instruct their staffs to develop proposals for changes 
in the architecture to be presented to the President and new 
Prime Minister at their first meeting.  Yabunaka suggested 
that the two governments should hold talks in April or May to 
prepare for a Bush-Koizumi summit. 
 
4.   (SBU) A consistent theme conveyed to Ambassador Bhatia 
about reshaping the future dialogue was that the United 
States and Japan should work more closely together on IPR and 
energy issues.  This was Ando's view at the Prime Minister's 
office, and Yabunaka and Kusaka echoed it in their separate 
meetings.  On IPR, Ando and Kusaka said they hoped the United 
States would consider favorably Japan's idea of a 
non-proliferation agreement on counterfeit goods.  Ando said 
the Prime Minister was "personally interested" in such a 
multilateral agreement.  Ambassador Bhatia said there was no 
disagreement with the objective and we would continue to 
study the idea but we were concerned if the tactic could work 
with China. 
 
5.   (SBU) Bhatia also raised "secure trade," exploring how 
to use technology to protect transportation systems and 
reduce transaction costs, as another area for future 
 
TOKYO 00001692  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
cooperation.  On this issue, Kusaka complained that the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) focuses perhaps too 
much on security without taking into account adequately 
commercial concerns.  With better coordination, he said the 
United States could achieve the same security at less cost. 
Bhatia also raised with Assistant Cabinet Secretary Ando the 
hope that the two governments could make more progress in 
bilateral aviation talks.  The current bilateral agreement is 
quite restrictive, and Bhatia expressed his hope that Japan 
might consider modest liberalization that would give air 
carriers of both nations greater service opportunities.  Ando 
pledged to consider this but was otherwise noncommittal. 
 
Regional Integration 
-------------------- 
 
6.   (SBU) Ambassador Bhatia underscored the high priority 
that the United States attaches to boosting its economic 
integration in Asia.  In describing the FTA negotiations 
Washington has launched with Korea and Malaysia, he said that 
the United States wants to "signal that we favor open markets 
in the region."  The Japanese officials wished the United 
States luck in what is a very ambitious FTA agenda.  Yabunaka 
noted that he was intimately involved in Japan's FTA talks 
with Malaysia.  The climate there, he said, was very 
political.  He predicted that autos would figure prominently. 
 Kusaka underscored that the talks Washington has launched 
with Korea were "strategically" the most important.  Bhatia 
noted that agreements varied from country to country, often 
with very different approaches -- from broad FTA to sector 
specific deals.  On the prospect that the United States and 
Japan could eventually work on their own FTA, Yabunaka 
demurred: "I'm not sure it would be a plus for us." 
 
Doha Round 
---------- 
 
7.   (SBU) Bhatia underscored in all his meetings -- 
including at the Agriculture Ministry -- that the United 
States attaches enormous priority to reaching a successful 
conclusion to the Doha Round and it was time for all 
participants to "put their cards on the table."  Hong Kong 
was not a failure, but the United States would like to see 
much more progress -- and is looking to Japan to show 
flexibility.  The Administration is not counting on an 
extension to Trade Promotion Authority, so the deadlines are 
very real.  Bhatia noted that there was no strong political 
consensus for trade agreements in the United States at the 
moment; trade negotiators must work hard to reach agreements 
that will enjoy broad bipartisan support.  He noted the close 
calls already, including the one vote margin of victory for 
the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) passed last 
summer. 
 
8.   (SBU) Kusaka and Yabunaka claimed Japan wants to have a 
successful trade round too.  Kusaka said that when Japan's 
flexibility was needed, Japan was ready -- particularly in 
the non-agricultural, or NAMA, talks.  Japan has the most 
WTO-friendly leadership ever, he argued, from the Prime 
Minister to the Agriculture and Trade ministers.  PM Koizumi 
has the "courage" to make decisions, Agriculture Minister 
Nakagawa "understands" the issues, and Trade Minister Nikai 
has the political clout to make things happen.  At the 
Agriculture Ministry, where the institution is not known to 
be as forward leaning on Doha as its minister, Vice Minister 
Hiroyuki Kinoshita conceded to Ambassador Bhatia that Doha 
was an important priority of the Prime Minister's.  He added 
that the ministry must work to advance the talks, but noted 
-- somewhat elliptically -- the need to protect vulnerable 
sectors. 
 
China WTO Cases 
--------------- 
 
9.   (SBU) In the context of the WTO discussion, Bhatia 
stressed Washington's hope that Japan would support the 
United States in two cases it plans to file against China in 
 
TOKYO 00001692  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
dispute settlement, on IPR and auto parts.  The Deputy Trade 
Representative said that filing a WTO case ought not to 
disrupt bilateral relations and is indeed the sign of a 
mature relationship.  Japan should not be uneasy about 
joining the United States in these cases.  In China, there 
are reform elements and there are mercantilist elements, and 
the best way to support the reform process is to hold 
authorities there to their WTO obligations.  Bhatia said the 
United States understands the importance of bringing strong 
cases for consideration in Geneva, and was preparing them. 
 
10.   (SBU) The GOJ is still studying the U.S. proposals and 
is far from a consensus on what role Japan should play.  Ando 
agreed largely with Bhatia's description of the issue.  We 
should no longer treat China as an apprentice in the WTO, he 
said, but as a full-fledged "responsible stakeholder." 
Kusaka, reflecting the ambivalence of Minister Nikai -- who 
is believed to be loath to confront Beijing -- was 
non-committal.  He told Bhatia that Japan wanted to help the 
reformers in China too, but suggested there were other ways 
to do this.  He described some programs that Japan has 
undertaken in China to educate mid-level bureaucrats in 
regional governments to understand their legal obligations 
better on IPR enforcement.  And U.S. and Japanese 
corporations should be cooperating more in areas of mutual 
concern and should not hide behind governments.  It was 
important that China hear a consistent message from its 
trading partners.  But arm-twisting China, he asserted, could 
be counter-productive, particularly if it looks like Japan 
and the United States are "ganging up" on the Chinese. 
 
Still Working on Consensus 
-------------------------- 
 
11.   (SBU) Yabunaka noted that Trade Minister Nikai was the 
biggest obstacle in the Japanese cabinet to taking a stand in 
the WTO against China on IPR and auto parts.  Nikai was 
widely regarded as "very pro-China," he said.  The Vice 
Foreign Minister reassured Bhatia that Japan was still 
examining the U.S. initiative "very carefully."  He noted 
ruefully that Japanese commercial interests had certainly 
been affected by China's non-compliance over the years. 
DONOVAN