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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5155
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
44TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION 
 
REF: STATE 39953 
 
This is CWC-26-06. 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (U) The 44th Executive Council session of March 14-17 
resulted in modest movement on some issues of importance to 
the U.S.  Most critical was what did not happen: there was no 
protracted discussion of the fact that the U.S. did not 
provide its extension request for the 100% destruction 
deadline.  This was due to the expectation that the U.S. will 
submit the request before April 29, 2006 as required by the 
Convention.  There was agreement on the Russian 45% 
destruction deadline and no language linking foreign 
assistance to Russian obligations.  Discussions with the 
Russian delegation provided useful insights into the Russian 
destruction program.  Text regarding biomedical sampling 
capability was noted.  The Iraqi Ambassador and members of 
his Embassy staff attended the EC as observers.  Finally, 
informal discussions generated substantial support for UK 
Ambassador Parker to be the head of the working group 
preparing for the Second RevCon, supported by 
vice-chairpersons from the other regional groups.  The March 
13 donors meeting, destruction informals and discussions with 
the Albanians are also reported below.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
ITEM 3 - STATEMENT BY THE DG 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The Director-General spoke on the usual themes: there 
are 12 CW destruction facilities in operation this 
intersessional period; the Technical Secretariat confirmed 
the soundness of the U.S. optimization approach; Russia will 
destroy 45% of its Category 1 CW stockpiles by December 31, 
2009 and it is requesting the EC decide to set this date as 
the phase 3 deadline.  He noted that Albania plans to start 
destruction operations at the Qaf-Molla CWDF in July.  The DG 
also noted the initial destruction deadline set out in the 
CWC is near and the international community will be expecting 
possessor states to increase their destruction efforts.  Any 
hesitation or uncertainties could damage the credibility and 
effectiveness of the CWC.  The DG commented that the present 
ratio of industry inspections is still too low and he hoped 
States Parties will support a quantitative increase in this 
type of inspection.  He further noted an uncertainty in an 
initial Schedule 2 inspection in the UK, and that they are 
working together to resolve the issue. 
 
¶3. (U) Under ICA, the DG noted TS efforts to assist national 
authorities, and to implement the CWC, and cited technical 
assistance visits.  He remarked on support of SPs for their 
Associate and Internship Support Programs, and improving 
national capacity building.  He particularly noted EU 
political support and voluntary contributions, and the 
continued offering of courses on analytical techniques.  The 
DG noted there are now 178 member states, however North Korea 
continues to remain unengaged on the CWC and there are still 
a number of Middle Eastern countries that are not yet 
signatories.  He mentioned that the TS will soon host the 
third workshop on universality in the Mediterranean Basin, 
with the date and venue announced in the near future. 
 
¶4. (U) The DG noted 96% of annual contributions were paid in 
2005, but were not made until the last quarter of the year, 
creating a problem for the TS in planning and delivering the 
approved program over the course of the year.  He said the TS 
is addressing procurement issues highlighted by SPs, the 
Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matter, the 
Office of Internal Oversight, and External Auditor.  He also 
noted the development of initiatives to improve TS management 
of positions in regards to tenure.  The DG expects Ralf 
Trapp's study on the policy to be ready before the summer 
holidays.  The DG said the TS will ask for additional funds 
for training and staff development in the 2007 draft budget, 
noting the OPCW currently spends 0.5% of its budget on this 
 
area, compared with the 2% the UN recommends.  The DG 
announced the Prime Minister of the Netherlands will attend 
the first observance of the Day of Remembrance for victims of 
chemical warfare on April 27, 2006.  He also announced the TS 
is working on plans to commemorate the 10th anniversary of 
the entry into force of the Convention in April 2007. 
Finally, the DG saluted Deputy DG Brian Hawtin who will be 
leaving the OPCW shortly and welcomed his successor, John 
Freeman. 
 
----------------------- 
ITEM 4 - GENERAL DEBATE 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) There were nineteen speakers during the General 
Debate, most touched on the usual issues, including Article 
VII, universality, and African office.   The primary topic in 
most statements was destruction deadlines.  Nearly all 
countries and regional statements addressed the issue, many 
making the point that all destruction should be completed 
within the April 2012 timeframe laid out in the CWC.   New 
Zealand and Norway noted they have made or will make, 
additional contributions to Russia's destruction efforts. 
The topic of OPCW site selection was a hot button for New 
Zealand.  Their Ambassador also noted their displeasure with 
the facilitator's paper.  Malaysia on behalf of NAM, Iran and 
Cuba noted that political elements should not be used as an 
element in the methodology.  Norway, New Zealand and NAM also 
noted there needs to be a more equitable geographic 
distribution factor.  New Zealand used solid numbers to back 
up their statement, in particular noting that soon they will 
be undergoing a second round of inspections on their 
facilities. 
 
¶6. (U) The usual delegations, including NAM, Iran and Cuba, 
noted that Article XI needs to be fully implemented, in 
particular, unresolved issues in subparagraphs 2 (c) and 2(e) 
of the article.  Others mentioned it in relation to "peaceful 
uses of chemistry."  Some delegations mentioned the 2008 
Review Conference and the need for a good facilitator to run 
the working group, further stating it must be a consensus 
decision.  Sudan suggested it be presided by two Ambassadors, 
noting they could supply one of them.  Japan commented on the 
importance of timely submission of declarations.  There was 
reference to the subjects of assessed contributions and 
regularization of payments, the OPCW's role in fighting 
global terrorism, optimization of EC work, challenge 
inspections, forming a host country committee, and the OPCW 
MOU with the African Union.  China commented that Japan is 
lagging behind on abandoned CW in China and Japan replied in 
its statement on the work they have done, pointing out the 
difficulties involved.  Cuba again mentioned the U.S. 
blockade. 
 
¶7. (U) Delegations welcomed the Iraqi observers, noting it 
was a positive measure for their accession to the treaty. 
(EC Chairman Dastis had simply raised the Iraqi request 
before the EC began, and Iraqi attendance was adopted without 
any discussion.)  Iran first noted they were victims of 
chemical weapons by the former government of Iraq, then went 
on to say approval of Iraq's presence at observers at an EC 
should not be seen as a precedent for other non-State 
Parties, and stated any other requests to come to ECs or CSPs 
as observers should be decided by the EC on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
--------------------------------- 
ITEM 5 - STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Item 5.1: The EC agreed to defer until the next 
session the verification plan for the CWDF in India.  The 
U.S. stated that it was unable to join consensus until the 
draft associated facility agreement has been distributed and 
reviewed.  India informed the EC during the general debate 
that it requested to the OPCW on March 14, 2006 an extension 
to the 100 percent deadline.  The U.S. del learned later that 
India is requesting a date in 2009. 
 
¶9. (U) Item 5.2: The EC deferred until its next session the 
verification plan for the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal 
Facility.  The Russian delegation indicated that it was now 
satisfied with a resolution on Newport, but there was 
insufficient time to get approval from Moscow.  Such approval 
may be sufficient to ward off German objections on Newport. 
 
¶10. (U) Item 5.3: The EC approved the verification plan for 
the Pine Bluff Binary Destruction Facility. 
 
¶11. (U) Item 5.4: The EC approved the amendments to the 
verification plan for the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal 
Facility. 
 
¶12. (U) Item 5.5: The EC agreed to note the Note by the TS on 
corrections to the Russian Federation detailed plan for the 
conversion of the sarin CWPF at Volgograd and approved the 
corrections. 
 
¶13.  (U) Item 5.6: A State Party, the U.S. and Russia 
reported orally on the progress made in meeting the revised 
deadline.  The U.S. referred to the detailed presentation 
provided at the March 13 destruction informals and noted that 
copies of the presentation were available to delegations. 
 
¶14.  (U) Item 5.7: The EC noted the report by the DG on the 
progress that has been made in meeting the revised deadlines 
for the destruction of chemical weapons. 
 
¶15. (U) Item 5.8: The EC approved the Russian 45 percent 
deadline extension of its Category 1 CW.  The U.S., Germany, 
France, UK and Austria (representing the EU) raised with 
Russia the concern of the linkage in the draft decision 
document between Russia's ability to meet deadlines and the 
receipt of foreign assistance.  The U.S. suggested that 
Russia consider much simpler language concerning transparency 
as was contained in the October 2003 CSP decision 
(C-8/DEC.13, 24 October 2003) and to avoid any political 
links to international assistance.  Russia agreed to consider 
those concerns.  The matter was ultimately resolved with a 
revision on the decision language (EC-44/DEC/CRP.8, dated 16 
March 2006).  The deadline extension request suffered from 
some last minute intervention by Italy (legitimately during 
the discussion of this agenda item) and South Africa (not so 
legitimately, during the discussion of report language) 
pleading for additional time to consider the revision. 
 
¶16.  (U) Item 5.9: A State Party request on the extension of 
the 100 percent deadline for the destruction of Category 1 CW 
stockpile was adopted by the EC.  The State Party agreed to 
report every 90 days as is required under Part IV (A), 
paragraph 28 of the Verification Annex. 
 
¶17.  (U) Item 5.10:  The EC noted the report by the DG on 
progress in implementing the decision regarding the 
implementation of Article VII obligations.  The U.S. made an 
intervention on three points as per guidance regarding the 
document.  The new facilitator, Ambassador Maartin Lak (the 
Netherlands), introduced himself and called for SPs to work 
together to resolve outstanding issues like the establishment 
of national authorities and the enacting of penal 
legislation.  The Article VII working group met to consider 
report language for the EC, which led to an acceptable 
outcome, and, more importantly, provided indications that Lak 
will be an active, efficient facilitator ready to cooperate 
with the U.S. 
 
¶18. (U) Item 5.11: The EC deferred until the next session the 
facility agreement for the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal 
Facility. 
 
¶19. (U) Item 5.12: The EC adopted the Japanese facility 
agreement for its Schedule 1 facility for protective 
purposes. 
 
¶20. (U) Item 5.13: The EC adopted the Pine Bluff Binary 
Destruction facility agreement. 
 
¶21. (U) Item 5.14 and 5.15: The EC noted the TS note on 
 
amendments to the facility agreement regarding on-site 
inspections at the Anniston Chemical Destruction Facility and 
adopted the amendments to the verification plan at Anniston. 
 
¶22. (U) Item 5.16: At the request of Iran, the EC deferred 
until the next session the Note by the DG on the update on 
progress with schedule 2 facility agreements (EC-44/DG.1, 
dated 2 December 2005).  Iran's intervention resulted in 
report language calling for the TS to prepare further updated 
reports on progress with Schedule 2 facility agreements to 
consider at the next EC Session. 
¶23. (U) Item 5.17: On the issue of the status of annual 
declarations, the UK, Germany and Japan all made 
interventions from the floor on the importance of submitting 
declarations or "nil" declaration on past activities on a 
timely basis.  The EC report called for the need to continue 
consultation within the corresponding cluster during the 
intersessional period.  (Note: it appears likely that del rep 
Larry Denyer will be announced soon as the facilitator for 
this issue.) 
 
--------------------------- 
ITEM 6 - BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES 
--------------------------- 
 
¶24. (U) The EC noted the discussions on biomedical sampling 
of the report of the Eighth Session of the Scientific 
Advisory Board (section 5 of SAB-8/1, dated 10 February 2006) 
and the note by the DG on the report (para 5 of EC-44/DG.7, 
dated 8 March 2006).  See the discussion on Agenda Item 14 
below concerning the remainder of the SAB report, which was 
only received. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
ITEM 7 - OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶25.  (U) The EC was asked to consider and approve three notes 
on new validation data, EC-42/DG.6, dated 31 August 2005, 
which was deferred from the Forty Third Session, and 
EC-44/DG.3 and EC44/DG.4, both dated 13 February 2006.  India 
expressed concerns about potential confidential business 
information considerations, and the inadequate time available 
for review. At their request, and with support from a small 
number of other SPs, the EC decided that all three notes 
would be considered further at the next session. The EC also 
requested the TS submit a note assessing the implication of 
data contained in EC-42/DG.6 for the activities of the SPs. 
 
---------------------- 
ITEM 8 - AFRICA OFFICE 
---------------------- 
 
¶26. (U) The facilitator of the consultations on the 
establishment of an OPCW Office in Africa, Malik Azhar Ellahi 
of Pakistan, reported on the results of the consultations. 
He also had submitted to the EC prior to March 1, 2006 a 
non-paper on the results of the consultations, which 
recommended a broader review of the situation before 
decision.  The South African delegation declared that a 
temporary office in Africa would not be a satisfactory 
solution, but this was not supported by other delegations. 
 
--------------------------------- 
ITEM 9 - WORKING GROUP TO PREPARE 
FOR SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE 
--------------------------------- 
 
27 (U) EC Chairman Dastis opened discussion on the 
establishment of an open-ended working group for preparations 
for the Second RevCon and announced that he has conducted 
consultations with regional groups.  However, he has not been 
able to reach a consensus on a nominee for the facilitator of 
the group, and plans to continue consultations.  Delegations 
were of the opinion that this is a very important issue, and 
thus the choice of a facilitator should not be rushed. 
 
¶28.  (U) This was a major topic of side-bar discussions.  The 
resulting straw polls show significant support for UK 
 
Ambassador Parker to chair the group, and complete acceptance 
that the Iranian Ambassador, who had announced last year that 
he wanted the post, could not get it.  However, the Iranian 
Ambassador is not yet ready to join consensus, and reaching 
an agreement was especially difficult as he was in Tehran for 
consultations the entire week of the EC.  There were a number 
of attempts to try to find a formulation that might address 
his concerns.  One bizarre suggestion that came from South 
Africa was a co-chairmanship (presumably a UK-Iranian 
pairing) that was put forth publicly by Sudan.  That has now 
died a well-deserved death.  There is now general consensus 
on an approach mirroring the EC with a chairman supported by 
vice-chairs from the other regional groups.  Dastis has 
indicated that he will meet with the Iranian Ambassador on 
his return to outline the sentiment of delegations. 
 
---------------------------- 
ITEM 10 - EC RATIONALIZATION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶29. (U) The Russian facilitator of discussions on the EC 
rationalization, Victor Smirnovskiy, reported on March 10 
consultations.  He noted the proposal to pass consideration 
of the matter to the working group for the Second RevCon. 
However, South Africa went directly to the TS to insert 
language (without the knowledge of the Russian Vice-Chair) 
asking that a TS paper on the status of outstanding items on 
the EC agenda be submitted to EC-46.  All delegations 
objected to that proposal.  After much debate, the EC 
requested that the TS paper, together with the original South 
African paper on the CW cluster, be submitted to the working 
group. 
 
---------------------------------- 
ITEM 11 - OIO AND EXTERNAL AUDITOR 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶30. (U) Item 11.1:  The EC noted the Report on the 
Implementation in 2005 of the recommendations contained in 
the 2004 annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight. 
The facilitator, Chiho Komuro (Japan), also provided a brief 
oral report on the consultation held on the report. 
 
¶31. (U) Item 11.2: The EC noted the Note by the TS on the 
status of implementation of the recommendations of the 
External Auditor.  Komuro announced that she would hold 
consultations on the note during the intersessional period. 
----------------------------------- 
ITEM 12 - PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶32. (U)  Privileges and immunities agreements with Colombia 
and Madagascar were concluded.  Del rep made the usual 
statement from the floor per reftel instructions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
ITEM 13 - ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶33. (U) Item 13.1: The EC deferred action on the 
consideration of a mechanism for SPs to regularize the 
payment of their dues to the OPCW.  Jae-woong Lee (ROK) and 
Florian Antohi (Romania) were announced as co-facilitators on 
the issue and will be convening consultations in the 
near-future. 
 
¶34. (U) Item 13.2: The EC approved the classification of two 
posts (EC-43/DG.7/Add.2, dated February 23, 2006) that had 
not been approved at EC-43, as the position descriptions had 
not yet been completed. 
 
¶35. (U) Item 13.3: The EC noted the report by the DG on OPCW 
income and expenditure for the financial year to December 31, 
¶2005. 
 
¶36. (U) Item 13.4: The EC deferred action on the Draft 
Financial Rules of the OPCW.  Facilitator Rick Snelsire 
(U.S.), noted that much progress had been made in recent 
 
consultations and that he hoped that the Financial Rules 
could be approved in the near future. 
 
----------------------------------- 
ITEM 14 - SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶37. (U) The SAB chair and the head of the SAB working group 
on biomedical sampling made themselves available to address 
questions from the EC on their respective reports.  In the 
end, the EC received the report of the Eighth Session of the 
SAB, while noting the relevant discussions on biomedical 
sampling within these documents (section 5 and para 5, 
respectively).  The reason for this awkward decision was 
because some delegations felt they needed more time for their 
capitals to review the remaining details of the report and 
DG's note. 
 
------------------------ 
ITEM 15 - ANTI-TERRORISM 
------------------------ 
 
¶38. (U) The EC was asked to note the DG's note on the OPCW's 
contribution to global anti-terrorist efforts. Facilitator 
Sophie Moal-Makame (France) briefed the EC, with emphasis on 
the recent useful interaction with the African Centre for 
Study and Research on Terrorism. Several SPs spoke in support 
of the report and the ongoing effort by the open-ended 
working group, with "WMD" mitigation concepts mentioned by 
several SPs. Comment was also made that anti-terrorism should 
be included within the scope of RevCon preparation. South 
Africa, supported by India, noted the need for more time to 
review the note in context of the working group's mandate. 
Thus, the note was acknowledged as having been received and 
will be considered further at the next EC. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
ITEM 16 - ELECTION OF EC CHAIR AND VICE-CHAIRS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶39. (U) The EC elected Ambassador Hlengiwe Buhle Mkihze of 
South Africa as the new Chairperson, and the permanent 
representatives of Colombia, Germany, Iran, and Russian 
Federation as its new Vice-Chairpersons.  (Note: There are 
repeated references in the preceding paragraphs to 
difficulties raised by the South African delegate. 
Unfortunately, his behavior at this EC was the rule, not the 
exception, and it has generated concern among delegations 
about whether the South African chairperson will have the 
kind of support needed to be effective.  Amb. Javits has 
emphasized to his South African counterpart that he wants her 
to have a successful tenure in the chair, and that it is 
important that she have a skillful and respected officer to 
help her achieve that goal.) 
 
---------------------------- 
ITEM 17 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶40. (U) A number of delegations raised concerns about the 
OPCW Memorandum of Understanding with the African Union and 
other similar agreements.  The DG expressed his intent to 
report to EC-45 on the issue generally, the MOU with the 
African Union and other regional organizations specifically, 
as well as similar documents. 
 
---------------- 
RUSSIA BILATERAL 
---------------- 
 
¶41. (U) U.S. delegation met with the Russian delegation on 
the margins of EC-44.  Russian participants included Elena 
Rodyushkina, Anna Lukashina, Leonid Liangasov, Viktor 
Smirnovsky, and Petr Svirin.  U.S. provided the Russians with 
a non-paper drawn from EC-44 guidance prior to consultations. 
 The primary purpose of the meeting was to request detailed 
information on the status of documentation at Russia's two 
newest destruction facilities, specific technologies employed 
at these sites, and future plans for destruction.  U.S. also 
 
provided a draft revision of language for the Newport 
Facility Agreement and Verification Plan for Moscow's review. 
 The Russian delegation was significantly more responsive 
than in previous sessions, and provided a surprising amount 
of detail that in all cases closely matched what TS staff had 
explained. 
 
¶42. (U) The U.S. inquired as to possible reasons for the 
delay in distribution of documents for the Kambarka facility, 
and stressed its belief that timely provision of 
documentation is essential in ensuring transparency.  The 
Russians assured the U.S. of its intention to provide 
documents in time for EC-45 consideration.  Rodyushkina then 
explained that four major issues remain.  First, Russia has 
some concerns about TS insistence that all equipment items 
from the approved list be brought on site, primarily for 
reasons having to do with transportation costs.  Russia also 
has concerns with the use of NDE equipment on agent storage 
tanks.  Russia has requested that a full equipment list be 
included in the FA, with corresponding restrictions on its 
use. 
 
¶43.  (U) Second, the TS has requested Russia change some of 
the camera positions from their current configuration in the 
storage buildings.  Russia is reluctant to reposition cameras 
in the first storage building, as agent is already being 
destroyed from this building, which presents safety concerns 
in modifying equipment.  Del rep inquired as to whether 
Russia would then at least consider changes to the four 
remaining buildings; Rodyushkina replied that cost will also 
be a factor.  Third, the TS and Russia seem to disagree on 
whether agent volume or mass should be recorded in tracking 
quantity destroyed.  One possible solution would be the 
introduction of further calculations using density as flow 
meter readings are obtained.  Finally, the TS had requested 
that Russia declare the storage buildings as temporary 
storage areas, while Russia would prefer to declare the tanks 
as an integral part of the destruction process.  It seems, 
however, that in this case Russia is willing to accept the TS 
proposal. 
 
¶44.  (U) The U.S. also requested information on the status of 
the FA and VP for Maradykovsky.  Russia stated that the TS 
has scheduled its Final Engineering Review in May, at which 
point additional changes to monitoring equipment may be made 
before documents are finalized.  The U.S. then asked how 
Russia intended to conduct destruction operations for its 
second train (smaller munitions).  Rodyushkina replied that a 
more traditional approach will be applied, in which agent is 
drained from munitions into a neutralization reactor.  There 
are a limited number of munitions with a mustard/lewisite 
mixture, for which Russia plans to construct a separate 
destruction unit for neutralization with monoethanol.  The 
reaction mass will be disposed of in a thermal treatment unit 
(Del comment:  this term seems to be used interchangeably 
with incinerator) in Building 101, adjacent to the main 
technical building, Building 1047.  Construction has 
evidently begun on the incinerator foundation.  Reaction mass 
from both trains will be fed to accumulation vessels, and 
then into the incinerator.  A metal parts furnace with an 
afterburner is also being constructed. 
 
¶45.  (U) The U.S. inquired as to whether similar processes 
would be used at Leonidovka and Pochep, given the 
similarities between stockpiles.  Russia stated that a 
similar neutralization technology will be used at Leonidovka, 
but that a more traditional approach will probably be used at 
Pochep, given the distance between the storage and 
destruction facilities at this site.  The U.S. also asked 
whether Russia intended to dispose of all reaction masses 
through on-site incineration.  Russia replied that 
hydrolysate disposal was dependent on several factors, to 
include new environmental regulations, cost, and 
practicability.  Rodyushkina confirmed that Russia does 
intend to construct an on-site incinerator at Leonidovka, but 
that reaction mass from Pochep may need to be transported 
elsewhere. 
 
¶46.  (U) The U.S. distributed proposed changes to the Newport 
 
documents (based on consultations with Germany), and asked 
whether Russia was prepared to approve the documents even 
without these changes.  The Russians requested more time to 
consider the changes in the context of the full document, but 
asked whether the hydrolysate was being stored at the 
facility, and how agent quantity destroyed was being tracked. 
 The U.S. explained the current on-site storage arrangement, 
and the fact that no destruction credit will be taken until 
the hydrolysate undergoes secondary treatment.  The U.S. 
highlighted the fact that the new language proposed now 
explicitly states the requirement for EC approval of changes 
involving the TSDF. 
 
¶47.  (U) Finally, the U.S. asked whether Russia intended to 
circulate a new draft of its 45% extension request, based on 
concerns numerous delegations had expressed about language 
clearly linking Russia's ability to meet CW destruction 
deadlines with provision of international assistance.  The 
U.S. again expressed its concern over this language, and 
offered several possible alternatives.  Lukashina explained 
that, realistically, Russia did require international 
assistance for progress with CW destruction, and was merely 
attempting to highlight this fact.  Lukashina also noted that 
the language was preambular, not operative, and did not 
therefore imply an obligation for donor states.  The U.S. 
pointed out that the language, simply by virtue of its 
presence in a decision document, implied a political linkage. 
 
--------------- 
DONORS MEETING 
--------------- 
 
¶48. (U) U.S. del reps attended the March 13 informal 
consultations on international assistance for Russia's CW 
destruction program.  The meeting was chaired by Frank van 
Beuningen of the Dutch MFA, who facilitated a tour-de-table 
during which donor states gave an update on their financial 
commitments, and progress on construction at the various 
sites.  Russia also made a statement, thanking all donor 
states at the beginning, but following with a status update 
from which U.S. efforts at Schuch'ye were notably absent. 
U.S. del highlighted its overall monetary contributions so 
far, and current problems settling on a suitable contractor 
for Building 101.  Overall, recent developments included 
conclusion of a bilateral agreement between France and 
Russia, beginning of destruction operations at Kambarka, and 
plans for a joint UK/Canada visit to Khizner in the near 
future. 
 
¶49.  (U) Germany made a more detailed statement explaining 
the background, as well as the current status, of its 
assistance efforts.  Del later learned that this was at the 
request of van Beuningen, who is searching for ways to 
re-energize the donors meeting.  He asked whether the U.S. 
would be willing to consider giving a similar presentation 
during the next meeting July 4, 2006.  Finally, the Russian 
delegation called upon donor states to respond to Russia's 
EC-42 proposal for additional projects that could benefit 
from international assistance. 
 
------------------------ 
DISCUSSIONS WITH ALBANIA 
------------------------ 
 
¶50. (U) Members of the U.S. delegation and the program 
manager and deputy for the CTR/DTRA Albania CW-stockpile 
destruction project met with the Albanian delegation and TS 
representatives on the margins of the EC to review the draft 
facility agreement and draft verification plan for the 
Qaf-Molla CWDF.  Final agreement was reached on the Facility 
Agreement and Verification Plan, as well as on the draft 
decision.  Final concurrence with the agreed Facility 
Agreement is required from Tirana, with official submission 
to the TS expected by April 3, 2006, in time for distribution 
and consideration for approval during EC-45. 
 
--------------------- 
DESTRUCTION INFORMALS 
--------------------- 
 
 
¶51. (U) The TS as usual provided updates on the status of 
verification activities, chemical demilitarization and a 
review of progress on the destruction of CW and on the 
destruction or conversion of CWPFs for the period 02 December 
2005 to 10 March 2006.  Handouts were provided addressing the 
above. 
 
¶52. (U) The U.S. made its presentation on the status of its 
destruction program, and received no questions from 
attendees.  Russia gave a PowerPoint presentation on its CW 
destruction program with lots of pictures and colored charts, 
but provided nothing new.  Shchuch'ye is still listed as 
beginning operations in 2008.  The CWDF at Kambarka began 
operations on December 20 that were referred to as trial 
tests, and reported its draft verification plan and facility 
agreement (FA) as still with the TS.  The U.S. learned that 
there are several outstanding issues relating to the FA.  The 
TS conducted its initial visit in September 2005 to the 
 
SIPDIS 
Maradykovsky CWDF and Russia reported its plans to begin 
operations by second half of 2006.  The verification plan for 
destruction and FA are also in the works.  The CWDFs at 
Leonidovka and Pochep are supposed to become operational in 
2008 with Kizner starting in 2009.  The Gorny CWDF completed 
destruction operations. So far, Russia has been credited with 
destroying approximately 3% of its Category 1 CW.  Germany 
provided an electronic presentation with lots of pictures and 
self-proclamation for German equipment and expertise in 
assisting Russia with the destruction of its CW stockpile. 
 
¶53. (U) The Indian delegation provided an oral presentation 
on its CW destruction operations.  The CWPF at Borkhedi began 
operating in mid January and is expected to end its campaign 
in mid March.  Its FA is still being worked with the TS.  The 
next campaign is expected to start in July 2006.  India has 
destroyed 53% of its Category 1 CW.  India made no reference 
during the informals that it will be seeking an extension to 
the 100 percent deadline. 
 
¶54. (U) A State Party gave an electronic presentation with no 
handouts.  It explained its rationale behind its decision to 
seek an extension to the 100% deadline.  The State Party 
began a new campaign on March 13; so far it has destroyed 67% 
of its Category 1 CW. 
 
¶55. (U) Libya and Albania provided their pre-arranged 
briefing as coordinated by the U.S.  There were no questions 
from SPs.  China and Japan as usual gave the latest ACW 
updates.  Both China and Japan stated that Japan would be 
seeking a deadline extension from the OPCW. 
 
¶56. (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL